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AN ABSTRACT 
I . The purpose of thxs study has been to investxgate 
as f u l l y as possible the background and the developments of 
the hormic theory and xts e f f e c t i v e influence upon present-
day psychology. 
I I . H i s t o r i c a l l y , the hormic p r i n c i p l e i s traceable 
back to Plato and mainly to A r i s t o t l e . Philosophically, i t s 
roots cannot be isolated from Hobbes's and Locke's p r i n c i p l e 
of Empirical Associationism, a p r i n c i p l e based largely upon 
the premise that there are psychological laws which describe 
what man would think, what he could know, and what he might 
do. Such a trend of thinking was to some extent confounded 
with Descartes* mechanism which l a t e r McDougall decried on 
the ground that i t does not account fo r the individual's free 
w i l l . 
I I I . With the advent of Darwin's theory of evolution 
(1859) the climate of thought i n B r i t a i n was propitious f o r 
the new outlook and Psychology m par t i c u l a r p r o f i t e d 
tremendously from i t s novel interpretations. Seizing upon new 
concepts implied i n the evolutionary creed, McDougall 
~2~ 
e f f i c i e n t l y introduced the hormically, motivational 
Psychology. 
IV. Unlike the mechanistic contentions, the dynamic 
hormic theory emphasises the nature of the organism's 
behaviour; i . e . nature endows the individual with a 
remarkable co n s t i t u t i o n which purposively produces or 
attempts to produce the r i g h t kind of behaviour and the 
appropriate type of mental a t t i t u d e . Motivation therefore 
emerges from w i t h i n and brain i s the source of the i n t e l l e c t , 
of thinking, of ideas as well as i t i s the organ of 
motivation, Ethological and b i o l o g i c a l observations as well 
as modern Psychological techniques have favourably endorsed 
McDougall's hormic position. 
V. What gives the hormic theory supremacy over the 
r i v a l ones i s that i t maintains a kaleidoscopic, voluntary 
explanation of behaviour and retains i n i t s philosophy 
s p i r i t u a l i t y , r a t i o n a l i t y and the purposefulness of l i f e . I t 
has been found, besides other major characteristics, that i n 
i t s present implications and psychological applications,the 
hormic theory has now experimental support, i s viable and 
highly i n f l u e n t i a l . 
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PART I . 
THE CLIMATE OF 
THOUGHT IN 
BRITAIN'S XVIITH. CENTURY AND AFTER 
CHAPTER I 
BEGINNINGS OF EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY 
1. The Classical Empiricism (Associatxonism). 
"The hormic theory of action," says McDougall, " i s 
(1) 
not a new theory, but a very old one". With that 
statement as a s t a r t i n g point, certain questions may now be 
raised: how to proceed on some d i s t i n c t i v e l i n e of 
investigation, what new ground of knowledge has thus far been 
organised in t o an exclusive system, what is the nature of the 
background from which hormic psychology arose, the impact of 
hormic psychology upon recent psychological studies, and so 
f o r t h . The answers to such questions might be divergent, but 
they might equally be interesting and valuable. I t i s , 
therefore, with these and some other questions that the 
following chapters of the present investigation must be 
occupied. 
I t was by no sheer accident that B r i t a i n has become 
gradually the home of orthodox psychological thought. "The 
(1) An outline of Psychology, London, Methuen, (1923), 
p. 218; see also : 
An Introduction to Social Psychology, London, Methuen, 
25th ed., (1943), 1st published (1908); pp. 458 f f . 
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Sceptre of psychology," to use J.S. Mxll's own observation, 
(2) 
"has decidedly returned to England". In point of f a c t , t h i s 
has been so ever since the time of Hobbes and Locke when 
England became "the country which has done the most for 
(3) 
psychology". At the time two currents of psychological 
(4) 
doctrines were produced i n B r i t a i n : The "A p r i o r i " school, 
which may also be termed the deductive; t h i s school took 
abstract notions as clues to the consequences. I t reasoned 
from causes to effects. Prominent among i t s members were 
Sir William Hamilton (1788-1856), William Whewell (1794-1866), 
James F. F e m e r (1808-1864) and Henry L. Mansel (1820-1871). 
(2) Quoted by Th.Ribot: English Psychology, (1889), p.44. 
(3) i b i d , English tra n s l a t i o n , London, Kegan Paul, (1889), 
p.33. see also : 
Hearnshaw, L.S., A Short History of B r i t i s h Psychology, 
London, Methuen (1964), preface, p.VI. 
(4) Ribot, Th., op.cit., pp.33-34 ; see also : 
( l ) Metz, Rudolph, A Hundred Years of B r i t i s h Philosophy, 
English t r a n s l a t i o n , London, George Allen, (1938), 
pp.34 f f , 246-7 ; 
( n ) Warren, Howard C., A History of the Association 
Psychology, New York, Charles Scnbner's 
sons, (1921), pp.33 f f . 
( m ) Brett's History of Psychology, 3 vols., abridged 
and ed. by R.S. Peters, London, George Allen, (1953), 
pp. 36 f f . 
( I V ) Lewes, George Henry, The Biographical History of 
Philosophy, London, John W. Parker, (1857), pp.419-20; 
(v) The History of Philosophy, 2 vols. 
London, Longman's (1880), vol I I , pp.417 f f . 
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(5 ) The other one xs the "A p o s t e r i o r i " school, which may be 
called the inductive; contrary to the former one, t h i s school 
was characterized by reasoning from effects to causes. I t 
began with Hobbes, i f not e a r l i e r , and numbers among i t s 
distinguished adherents, James M i l l (1773-1836), John Stuart 
M i l l (1806-1873), Samuel Bailey (1791-1863), Herbert Spencer 
(1820-1903), Alexander Bain (1818-1903), George Henry Lewes 
(1817-1878) and others.* 
Before any conclusions could be drawn i n r e l a t i o n to 
the divergent or convergent ideas maintained by the two 
schools, i t may be convenient to survey b r i e f l y some of t h e i r 
exponents' views. A thorough study of English contemporary 
psychology would necessarily include both these schools. 
Psychology i s no exception to F.V. Smxth's observation 
that, "In the various sciences there have from time to time 
( i 
been changes m the types of explanation which are acceptable". 
(5) Ribot, Th. op.cit., pp. 33-34. 
* See, for example, Sir. H. Holland, Dr. Noble, Dunn, 
Morell, Maudsley, Murphy, etc. 
(6) F.V. Smxth, Explanatxon of Human Behaviour, London 
Constable and Co., 2nd ed. (1960), 1st publ. 1951, 
p.3. 
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This i s so owing to the endless corrections and modifications 
to which psychology has been subjected during and since i t s 
emancipation from philosophy. Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), for 
instance, began a new epoch i n the development of the doctrine. 
(7) 
He has been proclaimed "the father of empirical psychology". 
The facts which seemed to j u s t i f y the claim were the treatment 
of the association of ideas. I t i s true that the roots of 
(8) 
association psychology can be taken back to A r i s t o t l e . Yet, 
i t i s Hobbes's psychology which i s noteworthy as an i n i t i a l 
(7) ( I ) Brett's History of Psychology, op.cit., p.368, 
see also : 
( n ) Harold Hoffding, A History of Modern Philosophy, 
English trans., 2 vols, London, Macmillan and 
Co. (1900), reprinted (1908) Ch.IV, Vol 1, pp 259-291. 
( m ) W.R. Sorley, A History of English Philosophy, 
Cambridge University Press, (1920), Chapter IV. 
(8) See: 
( l ) H.C. Warren, op.cit. pp. 33-34. 
( n ) Frank T h i l l y , A History of Philosophy, N.Y., 
Henry Holt and Co., (1914), l a s t p u b l i . 1931, 
pp. 263-272. 
( i n ) Mandler, J.M. and Mandler, G., Thinking : From 
Association to Gestalt., New York, 
John Wiley, (1B64), pp. 9-15, 15-25. 
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attempt, (1) to establish the r e l a t i o n between d i f f e r e n t sorts 
of mental states on what i s today called a psycho-physical 
basis; and (2) to trace a l l mental content ultimately to sense 
experience, eliminating the old notion of innate ideas. 
A r i s t o t l e ' s work was mainly by way of enumeration and 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . He applies the laws of associative connection, 
which he discovered, to but one class of experiences - memory. 
"And neither the l a t e r Greeks nor the Schoolmen, neither 
Augustine nor Descartes, despite t h e i r independent analyses", 
(9) 
writes Warren, "advanced perceptibly beyond his position". 
Only by implication, according to A r i s t o t l e , are the laws of 
associative connection extended to the relations between memory, 
sensation, and the other mental processes. Hence Hobbes broke 
wi t h the Greek philosophy which he designated as "phantasm", 
and saw that "a man can have no thought respecting anything not 
(11) 
subject to sense". Like Bacon, he accentuated the pr a c t i c a l 
(9) op.cit., p.33 ; see also : pp. 23-32. 
(10) T h i l l y , op.cit., p.263. 
(11) G.H. Lewes, The Biographical History of Philosophy op.cit, 
p. 424. 
See also : his : The History of Philosophy, op.cit. p.417. 
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(12) u t i l i t y of s c i e n c e or philosophy. As G.H. Lewes has judged, 
i t was Hobbes and Locke, who were the p r e c u r s o r s of t h a t school 
of psychology which f l o u r i s h e d i n the eigh t e e n t h century, and 
which made every o p e r a t i o n of the mind proceed out of 
"transformed s e n s a t i o n s " , which ended i n s a y i n g to " t h i n k " i s 
(13) 
to " f e e l " . The B r i t i s h t h i n k e r s who followed Hobbes 
developed t h e i r systems of psychology along the l i n e s t h a t he 
marked out; h i s h i s t o r i c a l v a l u e to a s s o c i a t i o n i s m , t h e r e f o r e , 
l i e s not so much i n h i s own c o n t r i b u t i o n s to the d o c t r i n e , as i n 
the f a c t t h a t he e s t a b l i s h e d the type of psychology out of 
(14) 
which a s s o c i a t i o n i s m n a t u r a l l y and l o g i c a l l y developed. 
(12) T h i l l y , o p . c i t . p.264, see a l s o : F.A. Lange, 
The H i s t o r y of M a t e r i a l i s m , E n g l i s h t r a n s , 
London, Kegan P a u l , (1925), pp. 269-290. 
(13) G.H. Lewes, B i o g r a p h i c a l H i s t o r y of Philosophy, o p . c i t . , 
pp. 419-20. 
See a l s o : The H i s t o r y of philosophy, o p . c i t . p.229. 
(14) See ( i ) Warren, o p . c i t . pp.33-34. 
( l i ) John Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, 
London, Ge r a l d Duckworth, (1957), p.124. 
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Hobbes's psychology i s found i n h i s two p r i n c i p a l works, 
"Human Nature" (1650), and " L e v i a t h a n " ( 1 6 5 1 ) . He was c h i e f l y 
(15 ) 
concerned i n showing t h a t the " c o g n i t i v e powers" of the mind 
d e a l only w i t h m a t e r i a l provided by the s e n s e s . Imagination i s any 
conception remaining and g r a d u a l l y decaying from the a c t of 
s e n s e s . The s t r o n g e s t and c l e a r e s t of these images a r e found i n 
(16) 
dreams and i n v i s u a l a f t e r - i m a g e s . Hobbes pointed out, among 
other p s y c h o l o g i c a l t o p i c s , two t r a i n s of thought: the 
in c o n s t a n t or, as he c a l l s i t "unguided, without design", wherein 
t h e r e i s no p a s s i o n a t e thought. The second c l a s s he c a l l s 
" r e g u l a t e d " by some d e s i r e and d e s i g n . "imagination", "imagery", 
"memory", "rememberance", " p e r c e p t i o n " , " f o r e s i g h t " , " d e s i r e " and 
other terms a r e present i n Hobbes's two the s e s throughout. 
(15) Hobbes, Thomas, L e v i a t h a n , e d i t e d w i t h an i n t r o d u c t i o n by 
Michael Oakeshott, Oxford, B a s i l B l a c k w e l l , ( 1 9 4 6 ) , 
c h a p t e r s 2 and 3, pp. 8-17. 
(16) i b i d , see a l s o : 
( l ) Hobbes's Human Nature, m B r i t i s h M o r a l i s t s , 
ed. by L.A. Selby-Bigge, v o l . 2, Oxford, 
(1897); 
( n ) H e i d b r e d e r , Edna, Seven P s y c h o l o g i e s , New York, 
Appleton - Century, (1935), 1 s t p u b l i s h e d 
(1931), pp. 38-39. 
- 8 -
Such terms, as i s w e l l known, loom l a r g e i n today's p s y c h o l o g i c a l 
(17) 
d i s c u s s i o n s . Hobbes, being a c r i t i c of D e s c a r t e s ' views and 
(18) 
impressed by G a l i l e o , has a t l e a s t made two c o n t r i b u t i o n s t h a t 
might be of s i g n i f i c a n t i n t e r e s t to psychology; ( 1 ) The notion 
of "the r a t i o n a l man" : the noti o n t h a t human conduct i s 
dominated by reason; and (2) That h i s psychology i s i n d i c a t i v e of 
new paths : one of these i s the ge n e r a l treatment of 
p s y c h o l o g i c a l p r o c e s s e s which lands them c l e a r l y i n the stream of 
n a t u r a l events. Y e t , h i s psychology, however, i s d e s c r i b e d as 
(19) 
" m a t e r i a l i s t i c " , " m e c h a n i s t i c " and " d e t e r m i n i s t i c " , throughout. 
C r e d i t must go to John Locke (1632-1704) f o r 
(17) Heidbreder, Seven P s y c h o l o g i e s , o p . c i t . , p.38 
(18) ( I ) i b i d , p.40. 
( n ) Mandler, J.M. and Mandler, G. Th i n k i n g , o p . c i t . , 
pp. 15-25. 
(19) i b i d , pp. 39, 40, see a l s o : 
Lange, The H i s t o r y of M a t e r i a l i s m , o p . c i t . , 
pp. 297, 300, 354. 
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i n t r o d u c i n g the phrase " a s s o c i a t i o n of i d e a s " . By "ldea"^" 1"^ 
(22) 
he meant "the o b j e c t of the mind when i t t h i n k s " . The 
(23) 
q u e s t i o n i s what was "the founder of Modern Psychology" 
endeavouring to do ? What i s the o r i g i n of our i d e a s : are they 
p a r t l y i n n a t e and p a r t l y a c q u i r e d , or a r e they wholly a c q u i r e d , 
and i f so, i s Sense the s o l e i n l e t ? To these q u e s t i o n s some 
(24) 
r e p l i e d q u i t e p l a i n l y , "Sense i s the o r i g i n of a l l our i d e a s " . 
Locke's answer was, "Sense and r e f l e c t i o n a r e the sources of a l l 
(25) 
our i d e a s " . L e i b n i t z maintained t h a t , "there i s nothing i n the 
i n t e l l e c t which was not p r e v i o u s l y i n the sense, except the 
i n t e l l e c t i t s e l f " / 2 6 ^ 
(20) ( l ) T h i l l y , H i s t o r y of Philosophy, o p . c i t . , pp. 310-311; 
( n ) Murphy, Gardner, H i s t o r i c a l I n t r o d u c t i o n to Modern 
Psychology, London, Routledge and Kegan P a u l , 5th ed., 
(1949), 1 s t p u b l i s h e d (1928), pp.27-29. 
(21) ( I ) Lewes, G.H., The B i o g r a p h i c a l H i s t o r y of Philosophy, 
o p . c i t . , p.436; 
( n ) , The H i s t o r y of P h i l o s o p h y t o p . c i t , 
v o l . 2, pp. 239 f f . 
( m ) B r e t t ' s H i s t o r y of Psychology., o p . c i t . , p.404. 
(22) i b i d p.404 
(23) John Locke being d e s c r i b e d by G.H. Lewes i n : The B i o l o g i c a l 
H i s t o r y of Philosophy, o p . c i t . p.434; see a l s o : 
W.R. S o r l e y : A H i s t o r y of E n g l i s h Philosophy, o p . c i t . Ch.VI 
(24) Hobbes's L e v i a t h a n o p . c i t . p.7 
(25) See John Locke's P h i l o s o p h i c a l Works, ed. by 
J.A. St.John. London, George V i r t u e , (1843) Book I I , 
Gh. I . p. 122 
(26) T h i l l y , o p . c i t . pp. 307 f f . 
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Compared w i t h Hobbesrs, Locke's r o l e seems to be more 
i n f l u e n t i a l i n B r i t i s h e m p i r i c i s m . U n l i k e Hobbes, he appears to 
have assumed a more f u n c t i o n a l a t t i t u d e . A g a i n , u n l i k e Hobbes,who 
regarded s e n s a t i o n s asthemain source of a l l e x p e r i e n c e , Locke 
considered "the i d e a s of s e n s a t i o n " , transformed by r e f l e c t i o n , as 
the v i t a l means of e x p e r i e n c e . He u n e q u i v o c a l l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d 
(27) 
between "i d e a s of s e n s a t i o n " and " i d e a s of r e f l e c t i o n " . 
According to Locke the mind t h i n k s i n t h r e e d i f f e r e n t ways : 
( 1 ) by "combining s e v e r a l simple i d e a s i n t o a compound one", which 
g i v e s our "complex i d e a s " J ( 2 ) by b r i n g i n g "two i d e a s , whether 
simple or complex, toget h e r , and s e t t i n g them by one another, so as 
to take a view of them a t once, without u n i t i n g them i n t o one -
which g i v e s us " i d e a s of r e l a t i o n s ' ' ^ ( 3 ) by " s e p a r a t i n g them from 
a l l other i d e a s t h a t accompany them i n t h e i r r e a l e x i s t a n c e ; t h i s 
(28) 
i s c a l l e d a b s t r a c t i o n " , and i s the means by which a l l our 
"general i d e a s " a r e formed. These p r o c e s s e s correspond c l o s e l y to 
our modern conceptions of f u s i o n , c o m p l i c a t i o n , and a n a l y s i s . 
(27) See : ( I ) T h i l l y , H i s t o r y of Philosophy o p . c i t , pp.364 f f . 
( n ) G.H. Lewes, The B i o g r a p h i c a l H i s t o r y of 
Philosophy, o p . c i t , p.441. 
( m ) J.H. Warren, o p . c i t . , pp. 38-39. 
(28) See : ( l ) John Locke's P h i l o s o p h i c a l Works, o p . c i t . , 
Book I I , C h . l , pp. 122-123. 
( n ) John Locke : E s s a y Concerning Human Understanding 
(1690) i n B r i t i s h M o r a l i s t s , Ed. by L.A.Selby-Bigge. 
pp. 326-356. 
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(29) 
Locke seconds Hobbes's attempt to derxve a l l complex experience 
from simple e x p e r i e n c e , but d i f f e r s w i t h him i n d e r i v i n g simple 
experience from r e f l e c t i o n as w e l l as from s e n s a t i o n . He 
thereby abandons the f i e l d of pure s e n s a t i o n i s m j and m t h i s 
r e s p e c t he i s followed by l a t e r E n g l i s h w r i t e r s , H i s c h i e f 
h i s t o r i c m erit i n psychology,however, i s h i s c o n t r i b u t i o n of the 
term " a s s o c i a t i o n of i d e a s " , which focused the a t t e n t i o n of 
f u t u r e t h i n k e r s on t h i s f a c t o r as a means f o r the e m p i r i c a l 
d e r i v a t i o n of knowledge. 
The r e s u l t of s p e c u l a t i o n s begun by Hobbes and f u r t h e r 
developed by Locke was to s e t t l e the d i s p u t e r e s p e c t i n g "Experience", 
and to g i v e , t h e r e f o r e , a new d i r e c t i o n to i n q u i r y . I t was 
(31) 
considered as e s t a b l i s h e d : ( 1 ) That we could have no knowledge 
which i s not d e r i v e d from e x p e r i e n c e , ( 2 ) That experience was of 
(29) ( i ) John Locke : E s s a y Concerning Human Understanding, 
o p . c i t . Book I I , , Ch.12 
( n ) H.C, Warren, o p , c i t . , p.38 
(30) See ( I ) Locke's P h i l o s o p h i c a l Works, o p . c i t . Book I I , 
Chapters 2 and 12. 
( n ) Heidbreder, Seven P s y c h o l o g i e s , o p , c i t e pp,40-41, 
(31) See ( i ) G.H, Lewes, The B i o g r a p h i c a l H i s t o r y of 
Philosophy, o p , c i t , , p,460 
( n ) H.C, Warren, o p , c i t , p.40 
( i n ) John Passmore, o p . c i t , pp.71, 180, 205, 428, 
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two kinds : v i z . o f e x t e r n a l o b j e c t s and of i n t e r n a l o p e r a t i o n s ; 
t h a t meant th e r e were two d i s t i n c t s o u r c e s : s e n s a t i o n s and 
r e f l e c t i o n s . ( 3 ) That a l l knowledge could only c o n s i s t i n the 
agreement or disagreement of our i d e a s . ( 4 ) We could never know 
th i n g s i n themselves, but only t h i n g s as they a f f e c t us, i . e . 
only our i d e a s . Such i n a n u t s h e l l were Hobbes's and Locke's 
p o s i t i o n s r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
Three d i s t i n c t systems may be a s s o c i a t e d w i t h Locke's 
own system, these are : B e r k e l e y ' s I d e a l i s m , Hume's S c e p t i c i s m , 
and i n France, C o n d i l l a c ' s S e n s a t i o n a l i s m . I t i s w i t h the f i r s t 
of these t h a t the f o l l o w i n g paragraphs w i l l now be concerned. 
George Be r k e l e y (1685-1753), i n e n t i r e agreement w i t h 
Locke, pointed out t h a t our knowledge of the e x t e r n a l world comes 
(32) 
through the s e n s e s . He c o n s i d e r a b l y s t r e s s e d the a s s o c i a t i o n 
p r o c e s s , which he termed "suggestion". He enumerated s e v e r a l of i t s 
modes;e.g. "Distance", which i s "suggested to the mind by the 
* Perhaps i t was the B r i t i s h A s s o c i a t i o n i s m which took the 
stimulus-response form i n America i n 1898 t h a t gave 
Behaviourism i t s impetus i n 1912. 
(32) ( l ) Heidbreder : Seven P s y c h o l o g i e s , o p . c i t . p.43. 
( n ) George Henry Lewes : The B i o g r a p h i c a l H i s t o r y of 
Philosophy, o p . c i t , p.465. 
( i n ) : The H i s t o r y of Philosophy, Vol, 
o p . c i t . , pp. 295ff. 
( I V ) W.R. S o r l e y , A H i s t o r y of E n g l i s h Philosophy, 
o p . c i t , Ch. V I I . 
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mediation of some other i d e a , which i s i t s e l f p e r c e i v e d i n the 
,. (33) (34) . a c t of s e e i n g . G.H.Lewes c i t e d B e r k e l e y as s a y i n g : 
"... That the t h i n g s I see w i t h my eyes and touch w i t h my hands 
do e x i s t , r e a l l y e x i s t , I make not the l e a s t q u e s t i o n . The only 
t h i n g whose e x i s t e n c e I deny i s t h a t which ph i l o s o p h e r s c a l l 
matter, or c o r p o r e a l substance ". T h i s , i n a sense, r e f l e c t s h i s 
i d e a l i s m . The p r i o r s u b j e c t i v e nature of knowledge, then 
p r e v a i l i n g a t B e r k e l e y s e r a l e d e v e n t u a l l y to i d e a l i s m . One 
(35) 
great r e s u l t of B e r k e l e y ' s e f f o r t was t h a t he taught about 
the v a n i t y of o n t o l o g i c a l s p e c u l a t i o n s . Berkeley maintained, 
"That one i d e a may suggest another to the mind, i t w i l l s u f f i c e 
t h a t they have been observed to go together, without any 
(33) ( I ) B e r k e l e y , New Theory of V i s i o n , (1709) Sec: 16. 
c f . T r e a t i s e Concerning The P r i n c i p l e s of Human Knowledge. 
(171 0 ) , Sec; 43. 
H.C. Warren, o p . c i t . p.40 
(34) The B i o g r a p h i c a l H i s t o r y of Philosophy, o p . c i t . , p.465 
* There came afterwards what was c a l l e d the N e o - I d e a l i s t movement. 
U n l i k e the Hegelian i d e a l i s m , i n England t h i s movement had 
maintained i t s reasonable as w e l l as i t s s p i r i t u a l a s p e c t . I t 
found i t s way r i g h t through to l i t e r a t u r e , e s p e c i a l l y p o e t r y j 
i t s c h i e f r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s were the romantic poets, namely, 
S h e l l e y , K e a t s , Wordsworth,and C o l e r i d g e , whose a l l important 
r o l e , not only as a poet but a l s o as a phi l o s o p h e r , w i l l be 
considered i n a f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n of the pr e s e n t chapter. 
(35) ( l ) G.H. Lewes : The B i o g r a p h i c a l H i s t o r y of Philosophy, o p . c i t . 
p. 478. 
( n ) See a l s o : Murphy: o p . c i t . pp.30-32. 
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.. (36) 
demonstration of the n e c e s s i t y of t h e i r co e x i s t e n c e . 
Berk e l e y d i v i d e s our mental content i n t o i d e a s of 
sense and ide a s of imagination. "The ide a s of sense are more s t r o n g , 
l i v e l y , and d i s t i n c t than those of the imagination; they have 
l i k e w i s e a s t e a d i n e s s , order and coherence and are not e x c i t e d a t 
(37) 
random ... but i n a r e g u l a r t r a m s e r i e s " . The ideas of 
imagination " are more p r o p e r l y termed i d e a s or images of things 
(38) 
which they copy and r e p r e s e n t " - t h i s i s a h i n t towards the 
modern use of the term " i d e a " . He added f u r t h e r " I f i n d I can 
(39) 
e x c i t e i d e a s i n my mind a t p l e a s u r e " . He can "by an a c t of my 
w i l l ... form a great v a r i e t y of them and r a i s e them up i n my 
imagi n a t i o n , " though "these c r e a t u r e s of my fancy a r e not a l t o g e t h e r 
so ... permanent as those p e r c e i v e d by my s e n s e s " . ^ 4 0 ^ According to 
Berk e l e y "we p e r c e i v e a c o n t i n u a l s u c c e s s i o n of i d e a s (both of 
(36) New Theory: o p . c i t . , s e c . 25. 
(37) P r i n c i p l e s of Human knowledge, o p . c i t . s e c t . 30. 
(38) New Theory; s e c . 33 
(39) P r i n c i p l e s of Human Knowledge, o p . c i t . s e c t . 28. 
(40) Dialogues between Hylas and P h i l o u s , 
(1713) I I . 
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sense and of i m a g i n a t i o n ) ; some a r e anew e x c i t e d , others a r e 
(41) 
changed or t o t a l l y d i s a p p e a r " . The ideas themselves a r e 
i n a c t i v e , so t h a t one i d e a cannot produce or make any 
(42) 
a l t e r a t i o n i n another, but the changes a r e caused by an 
(43) 
" i n c o r p o r a l a c t i v e substance or s p i r i t " . 
B e r k e l e y ' s work transformed the problem of knowledge 
i n t o a d i s t i n c t i v e l y p s y c h o l o g i c a l one. Although h i s 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l standpoint was i d e a l i s t i c , i t r e s t s , n e v e r t h e l e s s , 
on experience. His a n a l y s i s was more thoroughly e m p i r i c a l than 
t h a t of Hobbes and Locke. His theory of v i s u a l space 
p e r c e p t i o n e s p e c i a l l y c a l l e d a t t e n t i o n to the f a c t t h a t our 
knowledge of d i s t a n c e i s a n a l y s a b l e i n t o s i m p l e r e x p e r i e n c e s . 
T h i s i d e a i n i t s e l f seems to have encouraged h i s s u c c e s s o r s to 
go deeper i n t o the a n a l y s i s and s y n t h e s i s of a l l c l a s s e s of 
e x p e rience. His p s y c h o l o g i c a l e mpiricism, however, exerted 
(44) 
great e f f e c t . To s u b s t i t u t e " n o t i o n " f o r " i d e a " was a 
s i g n i f i c a n t change i n h i s outlook p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y . I t so o f t e n 
happens t h a t a reader of B e r k e l e y ' s w r i t i n g s would encounter 
h i s constant appeal to regard experience as e x p erience. His 
(41) P r i n c i p l e s of Human Knowledge, o p . c i t . , Sect.26. 
(42) i b i d , S e c t . 25. 
(43) i b i d , S e c t . 26. See a l s o : New Theory S e c t . 26. 
(44) See : ( l ) Hoffding, H., o p . c i t . , V o l . I , pp. 414 f f ; 
( n ) Warren, H.C., o p . c i t . , p. 42; 
( i n ) B r e t t ' s H i s t o r y of Psychology, o p . c i t , p.412 
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continuous demand was f o r a r e v i s i o n of the meaning of words 
(45) i n order to preclude the meaningless c o n t e n t s . I n h i s works, 
time and time again the reader i s asked to hold h i m s e l f to 
what he e x p e r i e n c e s . T h i s may stand s i m i l a r to what i n modern 
per c e p t i o n psychology i s c a l l e d the d e s c r i p t i o n of what i s 
experienced. A p e r c e i v e d o b j e c t , f o r example, i s nothing e l s e 
but the sum of a number of p e r c e i v e d sensory elements. Perhaps 
h i s aim was to prove a p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o s t u l a t e , but t h i s does 
not d e t r a c t from h i s v a l u a b l e , b a s i c a t t i t u d e as "a pioneer of 
modern psychology". 
Locke, B e r k e l e y , and Hume form a c h r o n o l o g i c a l 
(47) 
sequence c o n v e n i e n t l y named,"The E n g l i s h E m p i r i c a l Philosophy". 
The p h i l o s o p h i c l i n e which s t r e t c h e s from Bacon and Hobbes to 
(45) A New Theory of V i s i o n , o p . c i t . 
(46) Rasmussen, E.T., "Berkeley and Modern Psychology", 
The B r i t i s h J o u r n a l f o r the Philosophy of S c i e n c e , V o l . I V , 
1953-54, p.3 
See a l s o : T h i s v o l , " P h y s i o l o g i c a l Mechanisms i n the 
P e r c e p t i o n of D i s t a n c e by S i g h t and B e r k e l e y ' s Theory of 
V i s i o n " by M.H. Pirenne, pp. 13-21. 
(47) See: ( l ) B r e t t ' s H i s t o r y of Psychology, o p . c i t . p.400 
( n ) Passmore, John, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, 
o p . c i t . , pp.179-80, 190-1. 
( m ) S o r l e y , W.R. o p . c i t . , Ch. V I I I . 
* I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note t h a t i n h i s : B i o g r a p h i c a l H i s t o r y 
of Philosophy, (1857), G.H. Lewes took F r a n c i s Bacon as a 
s t a r t i n g - p o i n t . 
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Locke, B e r k e l e y , and Hume, and thence tP Bentham, the: M i l l s , 
and Spencer, i m p l i e s a complex of coherent and harmonious 
p r i n c i p l e s which take on a d i f f e r e n t appearance a c c o r d i n g to 
the standpoint from which they are viewed, but always stand 
i n r e l a t i o n to the same t o t a l i t y . I f i t i s d e s i r e d to f i n d 
s u i t a b l e terms f o r t h i s t o t a l i t y i n i t s main a s p e c t s , " e m p i r i c i s m " 
or " p o s i t i v i s m " must be chosen to show i t s g e n e r a l p h i l o s o p h i c 
p o s i t i o n , " s e n s a t i o n a l i s m " or "phenomenalism" i n r e l a t i o n t o 
i t s theory of knowledge, " a s s o c i a t i o n i s m " i n r e l a t i o n to i t s 
psychology, "hedonism", "eudemonism" or " u t i l i t a r i a n i s m " i n 
r e l a t i o n to i t s e t h i c s , " s c e p t i s c i s m " or " a g n o s t i c i s m " i n 
r e l a t i o n to i t s metaphysics, "deism" or " i n d i f f e r e n t i s m " i n 
r e l a t i o n to r e l i g i o n , " l i b e r a l i s m " i n r e l a t i o n to p o l i t i c s . The 
c l a s s i c a l e m piricism of the X V I I t h and X V I I I t h C e n t u r i e s , which 
i s d i s t i n g u i s h e d from i t s n a t u r a l s u c c e s s o r , the modern 
empi r i c i s m of the X l X t h Century, culminated i n the philosophy of 
David Hume and f i n d s a temporary ending t h e r e . The terminus was 
temporary because Hume d i d not l e a v e behind him a neat and t i d y 
s t o c k of d o c t r i n e s . Herein l i e s the r e a l meaning of what i s 
(4 
u s u a l l y i n a condescending s p i r i t c a l l e d "the Human S c e p t i c i s m " . 
* According to Oxford D i c t i o n a r y eudemonism or "Edaemonism" i s 
t h a t system of e t h i c s which f i n d s the moral standard i n the 
tendency of notions to produce happiness. 
(48) R. Metz, A Hundred Y e a r s of B r i t i s h Philosophy, o p . c i t . 
pspr. 47-48. 
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The l i n e of B r i t i s h e mpiricism, upon the whole, runs s t r a i g h t 
forward and co n t i n u o u s l y t i l l i t reaches i t s h i g h e s t point m 
Hume whose p s y c h o l o g i c a l s p e c u l a t i o n s w i l l be d i s c u s s e d below. 
David Hume (1711-1776) saw the world as a d r i f t of 
i d e a s , "without connection, without permanence, without u n i t y , 
(49) 
without meaning, simply present and p a s s i n g " . Although 
" S c e p t i c i s m " dominated Humess e a r l i e r w r i t i n g s , he l a t e r on 
assumed " p o s i t i v i s m " as a s u b s t i t u t e f o r i t . ^ 5 0 ^ He was the 
f i r s t a f t e r A r i s t o t l e t o attempt a thorough c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of 
the modes of a s s o c i a t i o n . He r i g h t l y c l a i m s f o r h i m s e l f e n t i r e 
o r i g i n a l i t y m t h i s f i e l d . "Though i t be too obvious to 
escape o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t d i f f e r e n t i d e a s a r e connected together", 
he w r i t e s , " I do not f i n d t h a t any phil o s o p h e r has attempted to 
enumerate or c l a s s a l l the p r i n c i p l e s of a s s o c i a t i o n - a 
(51) 
s u b j e c t , however, t h a t seems worthy of c u r i o s i t y " . To him 
t h e r e appeared to be only t h r e e p r i n c i p l e s of connection among 
i d e a s , namely, "resemblance", " c o n t i g u i t y m time or p l a c e " and 
"cause or e f f e c t " . 
(49) Heidbreder, Seven P s y c h o l o g i e s , o p . c i t . p 49. 
(50) B r e t t ' s H i s t o r y of Psychology, o p . c i t , pp 414-415. 
(51) Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, (1784), 
S e c t . 3 ; c f . T r e a t i s e on Human Nature (1 7 3 9 ) , 
Book I , P a r t I , S e c t . 4. 
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A s i g n i f i c a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n made by Hume i s h i s 
..(52) 
a l t e r a t i o n of the meaning of the term idea i n the 
d i r e c t i o n a l r e a d y suggested by Be r k e l e y . Hume d i v i d e s 
(53) 
experience i n t o " i m p r e s s i o n s " and " i d e a s " . Impressions 
c o n s i s t of s e n s a t i o n s , p a s s i o n s , and emotions "which enter 
w i t h most f o r c e " i n t o c o n s c i o u s n e s s / ^ ^ Ideas a r e " f a i n t 
..(56) „ „ (55) 
images of these ; they a r e copies of our impressions . 
(52) ( l ) Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, o p . c i t . Sect.3 
( n ) See a l s o : Hoffding : H i s t o r y of Modern Philosophy, 
o p . c i t , p.435. Vol I . 
(53) ( l ) Hoffding, Vol.1, o p . c i t . p.435. 
( n ) B r e t t ' s H i s t o r y o p . c i t , pp. 419-420. 
(54) ( l ) Hume's T r e a t i s e , o p . c i t , Book I , p a r t I , S e c t . 1. 
( n ) G.H. Lewes : The H i s t o r y of Philosophy, V o l . 2, 
o p . c i t . pp. 325 f f . 
One has to bear i n mind t h a t s c e p t i c i s m which Hume 
brought about - afterwards he abandoned to p o s i t i v i s m -
has nothing very alarming i n i t to the human being, except 
to philosophy. I n Hume's view t h e r e i s no co n v i n c i n g 
argument from experience to prove t h a t the p e r c e p t i o n s a r e 
connected w i t h e x t e r n a l o b j e c t s T h i s , d o u b t l e s s , i s sheer 
s c e p t i c i s m . Whereas i d e a l i s m would argue t h a t the very 
p e r c e p t i o n or s e n s i b l e image ISI the e x t e r n a l o b j e c t . 
See : G.H. Lewes : The B i o g r a p h i c a l H i s t o r y of Philosophy, 
o p . c i t , pp.484-485. 
(55) T r e a t i s e , o p . c i t , Book I , p a r t I , s e c t . I . 
(56) Enquiry, o p . c i t . S e c t . 2. 
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Ideas a r e of two s o r t s : memories and imaginations; the former 
a r e more l i v e l y , w h i l e the l a t t e r a r e not r e s t r i c t e d to the 
(57) 
order or form of our o r i g i n a l i m p r e s s i o n s . Impressions as 
used by Hume i n c l u d e what a r e today known as s e n s a t i o n s and 
per c e p t i o n s ; h i s term " i d e a " i n c l u d e s both images and thoughts i n 
modempsychological terminology. 
Having s e t t l e d h i s terminology, Hume proceeds to c o n s i d e r 
the nature of the connection between s u c c e s s i v e i d e a s . " i t i s 
e v i d e n t " , he observed, " t h a t t h e r e i s a p r i n c i p l e of connection 
between the d i f f e r e n t thoughts or i d e a s of the mind, and t h a t m 
t h e i r appearance to the memory or imagination,they i n t r o d u c e each 
.. (58) 
other w i t h a c e r t a i n degree of method and r e g u l a r i t y . Ideas 
a r e a p r i o r i connected, not by mere chance, but by a preconceived 
d e l i b e r a t e determination; "Were id e a s e n t i r e l y l o o s e and 
„ (59) 
unconnected, chance alone would j o i n them 0 But s i n c e , the 
same simple i d e a s ... f a l l r e g u l a r l y i n t o complex ones," i t must 
be supposed t h a t t h e r e i s "some bond of union among them, some 
a s s o c i a t i n g q u a l i t y by which one i d e a n a t u r a l l y i n t r o d u c e s 
another". T h i s u n i t i n g p r i n c i p l e " i s not to be considered as 
an i n s e p a r a b l e connection ... Nor y e t a r e we to conclude t h a t 
without i t the mind cannot j o i n two i d e a s ... But we a r e only to 
( f i i ^ 
regard i t as a g e n t l e f o r c e , which commonly p r e v a i l s " . I t i s (57) T r e a t i s e , o p . c i t . S e ct 3. 
(58) Enquiry, o p . c i t . S e ct 3. 
(60) i b i d . 
(59) T r e a t i s e , o p . c i t . S e ct 4. 
(61) i b i d . 
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at t h i s s tage i n the d i s c u s s i o n t h a t he enumerates h i s t h r e e 
modes of a s s o c i a t i o n a l l u d e d to above - resemblance, c o n t i g u i t y , 
and c a u s a l i t y . 
Throughout h i s two works,Hume concerned h i m s e l f 
c h i e f l y w i t h the a s s o c i a t i o n of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e e x p e r i e n c e s . But 
he notes t h a t "there i s an a t t r a c t i o n or a s s o c i a t i o n among 
impressions as w e l l as among i d e a s ; though w i t h t h i s remarkable 
d i f f e r e n c e , t h a t i d e a s are a s s o c i a t e d by resemblance, 
c o n t i g u i t y , and c a u s a t i o n , and impressions only by 
(62) 
resemblance". T h i s , however, does not belong to h i s 
general a n a l y s i s , i t i s a mere c a s u a l statement. Hume's 
( I 
analysis,however, l a g s behind Hobbes and Locke i n t h i s r e s p e c t . 
The psychology of Hume, one would say, i s a rounding out of 
Be r k e l e y ' s and Locke's. L i k e Hobbes, Locke and Ber k e l e y , Hume, 
c a r r y i n g h i s a n a l y s i s through s u c c e s s i v e s t a g e s , a r r i v e d a t a 
point where no ab s o l u t e j u s t i f i c a t i o n could be given f o r the 
a u t h o r i t y of the i n t e l l e c t . S t a r t i n g , l i k e them, from the 
e m p i r i c a l standpoint, he employs a more r i g i d method, e s p e c i a l l y 
i n a n a l y s i n g the notions of c a u s a l i t y and ne c e s s a r y connection, 
and advances to the e p i s t i m o l o g i c a l c o n c l u s i o n t h a t a l l 
(62) i b i d . S e c t . 5 
(63) ( I ) B r e t t ' s H i s t o r y of psychology, o p . c i t . , p.420. 
( n ) Heidbreder, Seven P s y c h o l o g i e s , o p . c i t . , p.51. 
(64) i b i d . See a l s o : H.C. Warren, o p . c i t . , pp.45-46. 
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knowledge i s knowledge of experience. H i s t o r i c a l l y , h i s work 
forms the s t a r t i n g - p o i n t of two wid e l y d i s t i n c t movements i n 
philosophy and psychology. The B r i t i s h School, which had 
al r e a d y abandoned the notion of i n n a t e i d e a s , sought by 
f u r t h e r a n a l y s i s of consciousness i n terms of a s s o c i a t i o n to 
ob t a i n the utmost out of exp e r i e n c e . I n England, philosophy 
a f t e r Hume became both a s s o c i a t i o n i s t i c as w e l l as 
p s y c h o l o g i c a l , w h i l e the S c o t t i s h s c h o o l , inaugurated by Thomas 
Reid i n 1764, followed Hume i n the e m p i r i c a l a n a l y s i s of 
con s c i o u s n e s s , but he l d t h a t experience g i v e s a d i r e c t , 
i n t u i t i v e knowledge of t h i n g s ; hence i t found l e s s need f o r 
the p r i n c i p l e of a s s o c i a t i o n . I n the l i n e of d i r e c t 
development, H a r t l e y ' s a n a l y s i s i s a n a t u r a l extension of 
, (65) Hume s. 
The most eminent members of the S c o t t i s h school were : 
Thomas Reid (1710-1796), Dugald Stewart (1753-1828), 
Thomas Brown (1778-1820), S i r James Mackintosh (1765-1832), 
S i r W i l l i a m Hamilton (1788-1856), Henry L. Mansel (1820-1871), 
John D. Morell (1816-1891), James M'Cosh (1811-1894), 
Henry Calderwood (1830-1897) and o t h e r s . 
(65) ( I ) Mandler, J.M. & Mandler, G. Thinking, o p . c i t . pp.51-68. 
( n ) T h i l l y , o p . c i t . pp. 345-361. 
( m ) Lange, o p . c i t . , pp. 204-211. 
( i v ) H.C. Warren, o p . c i t . pp. 43-47. 
( v ) G.H. Lewes, The B i o g r a p h i c a l H i s t o r y of Philosophy, 
o p . c i t , p.479-485. 
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According to Hume, then, o b j e c t s are not 
n e c e s s a r i l y connected; i t i s the ide a s which a r e connected 
i n our mind by a s s o c i a t i o n . The a s s o c i a t i o n i s the r e s u l t 
of r e p e t i t i o n , of h a b i t . The ideas have gone together so 
of t e n t h a t when one appears i t suggests the other. What i s 
happening here i s not l o g i c a l but p s y c h o l o g i c a l n e c e s s i t y , 
which depends on experience, the process i s the same among 
men and animals a l i k e . 
I t i s d i f f i c u l t to name the founder of a s s o c i a t i o n i s m 
i n B r i t a i n - i t may have been Hobbes or Locke, Be r k e l e y or 
Hume - but ther e can be no doubt t h a t i n the work of David 
H a r t l e y (1705-1757) the b a s i c d o c t r i n e was formulated w i t h 
a l l the d e f i n i t e n e s s and e x p l i c i t n e s s t h a t any school could 
r e q u i r e . H a r t l e y taught t h a t t h e r e are two orders of events 
A comparative study of the term " h a b i t " as then was used 
by Hume and as now used i n modern p s y c h o l o g i c a l t h e o r i e s 
of l e a r n i n g could be an i n t e r e s t i n g t o p i c of r e s e a r c h . 
(66) See : ( l ) G.H. Lewes, The B i o g r a p h i c a l H i s t o r y of 
Philosophy, o p . c i t . pp 509-511. 
( n ) B r e t t ' s H i s t o r y of Psychology, o p . c i t . 
pp. 421-428. 
( i n ) Heidbreder, Seven P s y c h o l o g i e s , o p . c i t . pp.53-54. 
A s m a l l c o r r e c t i o n here must be made on Heidbreder's 
s i d e : on p.54 i n s t e a d of David H a r t l e y , "Daniel H a r t l e y " 
was mentioned ; t h i s should be observed. 
- 24 -
to be taken i n t o account, the mental and the p h y s i c a l . 
They are not i d e n t i c a l but run p a r a l l e l to each other, so 
t h a t a change i n one i s accompanied by a change i n the 
other. On the mental s i d e , t h e r e a r e s e n s a t i o n s and i d e a s ; 
on the p h y s i c a l s i d e , t h e r e a r e v i b r a t i o n s . To him,there 
was a d i r e c t connection between s e n s a t i o n and i d e a . However, 
the s t r e n g t h of h i s system probably l i e s m : 
( 1 ) applying the a s s o c i a t i o n d o c t r i n e to the e x p l a n a t i o n of 
mental phenomena ; 
( n ) u s i n g the whole system to e x p l a i n c e r t a i n p h y s i o l o g i c a l 
f u n c t i o n s which may be c a l l e d v o l u n t a r y and i n v o l u n t a r y 
a c t i o n s , to employ modern p s y c h o l o g i c a l terms. 
The two fundamental p o i n t s of H a r t l e y ' s theory of 
mind, then, are ( 1 ) h i s attempt to t r a c e a c l o s e correspondence 
between mental and n e u r a l a c t i v i t y i n terms of v i b r a t i o n , and 
( 2 ) h i s e l a b o r a t i o n of a l l experience a c c o r d i n g to the 
p r i n c i p l e s of a s s o c i a t i o n . H a r t l e y ' s d o c t r i n e of v i b r a t i o n s , 
though i t suggests c e r t a i n modern t h e o r i e s of p s y c h o l o g i c a l 
p a r a l l e l i s m , was not t h e i r d i r e c t p r e c u r s o r . His work : 
* ( l ) Cf. R. D e s c a r t e s ' s dualism; mind and matter, the t h i n k i n g 
substance and the extended substance. 
( n ) F.H. Br a d l e y : Appearance and R e a l i t y (1893), Ch. X X I I I , 
Body and Soul, 
( i n ) and i n r e c e n t time W. McDougall : Body and Mind. 
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Observations on Man, h i s Frame, h i s Duty, and h i s 
* (67) 
Expe c t a t i o n s , (1749) , i s d i v i d e d i n t o two p a r t s , the 
f i r s t comprising H a r t l e y ' s psychology ("observations on the 
frame of the human body and mind"), the second h i s e t h i c s 
and theology ("observations on the duty and e x p e c t a t i o n s of 
mankind"). Only the former concerns us here. Man, 
according to H a r t l e y , c o n s i s t s of body and mind. Body i s 
s u b j e c t to i n v e s t i g a t i o n s of the same s o r t "as the other p a r t s 
of the e x t e r n a l m a t e r i a l world". Mind i s " t h a t substance, 
agent, p r i n c i p l e , e t c , to which we r e f e r the s e n s a t i o n s , i d e a s , 
p l e a s u r e s , p a i n s , and vo l u n t a r y motions". He d i v i d e s 
experience, or " i n t e r n a l f e e l i n g s " i n t o s e n s a t i o n s and i d e a s . 
" S e n s a t i o n s " , he wrote, "are those i n t e r n a l f e e l i n g s of the 
mind which a r i s e from the impressions made by e x t e r n a l o b j e c t s 
upon the s e v e r a l p a r t s of our bodies. A l l our other i n t e r n a l 
f e e l i n g s may be c a l l e d i d e a s " . T h e i d e a s which 
resemble " s e n s a t i o n s a r e c a l l e d ideas of s e n s a t i o n ; a l l the 
r e s t may t h e r e f o r e be c a l l e d i n t e l l e c t u a l i d e a s " ; and he 
H a r t l e y ' s work was r e p r i n t e d w i t h an i n t r o d u c t i o n by P a r r i n 
1801. 
(67) H. Hoffdmg, o p . c i t . , V o l . I , pp. 4 4 6 f f . 
(68) O bservations, P a r t I , I n t r o d u c t i o n . 
(69) Observations, o p . c i t . I n t r o d u c t i o n . 
** Here we can note the advance over Hume i n t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n 
between the p h y s i c a l impressions or s t i m u l i and the 
r e s u l t i n g s e n s a t i o n s . 
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proposes to show t h a t "the ideas of s e n s a t i o n are the elements 
of which a l l the r e s t a re compounded". P l e a s u r e s and pains 
are e i t h e r s e n s a t i o n s or i d e a s , a l l experiences being 
"attended w i t h some degree e i t h e r of p l e a s u r e or pain".^°^ 
H a r t l e y e x p r e s s l y excludes " r e f l e c t i o n s " as a s e p a r a t e source 
of i d e a s , and i n t h i s way seeks to make h i s a n a l y s i s s i m p l e r 
than Locke's. 
H a r t l e y assumed t h a t the human mind was endowed 
w i t h c e r t a i n f a c u l t i e s , namely, "memory, imagination or fancy, 
(71) 
understanding, a f f e c t i o n , and w i l l " , by means of which the 
elements are transformed. The motions of the body, he 
maintained, a r e of two k i n d s , automatic and v o l u n t a r y ; The 
former "are those which a r i s e from the mechanism of the body i n 
an evident manner", w h i l e the l a t t e r a r e "those which a r i s e 
from i d e a s and a f f e c t i o n s , and which t h e r e f o r e a r e r e f e r r e d to 
(72) 
the mind". He proposed, then, ( 1 ) to l a y down the g e n e r a l 
laws "according to which the s e n s a t i o n s and motions are 
performed" and "ideas generated" ; (2) to apply these laws i n 
t u r n to each s o r t of s e n s a t i o n and motion ; and ( 3 ) to apply 
them f u r t h e r to the genesis of each p a r t i c u l a r s o r t of i d e a s , 
such as memory, imagination, e t c . (70) i b i d . 
(71) i b i d . 
(72) i b i d . 
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(73) The s o l e basxs of assocxatxon, as H a r t l e y 
conceived i t , i s c o n t i g u i t y ; and he l i m i t s i t to c o n t i g u i t y 
i n time. Sensa t i o n s must be simultaneous or i n immediate 
s u c c e s s i o n i n order t h a t one may b r i n g up the i d e a of the 
other. His view seems to be t h a t c o n t i g u i t y i n space i s no 
p a r t of the mental law ; i f s p a t i a l l y contiguous o b j e c t s a r e 
more l i k e l y to be sensed a t the same time or s u c c e s s i v e l y 
than o b j e c t s which l i e f a r a p a r t , t h i s i s a p h y s i c a l 
phenomenon. Whether the o b j e c t s be d i s t a n t or a d j a c e n t , i t 
i s the s i m u l t a n e i t y or s u c c e s s i o n of t h e i r impressions t h a t 
l e a d s to the a s s o c i a t i o n , not t h e i r space r e l a t i o n . H a r t l e y 
ignores the law of resemblance a l t o g e t h e r . The only 
resemblance which he r e c o g n i s e s i s t h a t between the 
s e n s a t i o n and i t s corresponding i d e a . An idea does not 
r e c a l l s i m i l a r i d e a s , but the same idea i s repeated, and w i t h 
(74) 
i t a r e a s s o c i a t e d others formerly experienced c o n t i g u o u s l y . 
H a r t l e y broadens the conception of a s s o c i a t i o n by 
i n c l u d i n g the motor s i d e i n h i s d i s c u s s i o n . The f u n c t i o n of 
h a b i t p l a y s an important p a r t i n h i s a n a l y s i s of the 
a s s o c i a t i v e p r o c e s s . He holds t h a t muscular movements form 
a s s o c i a t i o n s of the same s o r t as the a s s o c i a t i o n s between i d e a s , 
(73) H.C. Warren, o p . c i t . , p.55 
(74) i b i d pp.55-56. 
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so t h a t the r e c u r r e n c e of one tends to r e i n s t a t e others which 
formerly succeeded i t . The r e c u r r e n c e of a movement may 
r e c a l l an i d e a formerly a s s o c i a t e d w i t h i t , or the r e c u r r e n c e 
of a s e n s a t i o n or i d e a may b r i n g about the r e c e p t i o n of a 
movement. Thus i n H a r t l e y , f o r the f i r s t time, we f i n d the 
p r i n c i p l e of a s s o c i a t i o n s t a t e d broadly enough to cover the 
(75) 
e n t i r e f i e l d of human experience and a c t i v i t y . 
H a r t l e y ' s d i s c u s s i o n of v o l i t i o n , though more 
adequate than t h a t of h i s p r e d e c e s s o r s , i s s c a t t e r e d about 
i n v a r i o u s p l a c e s and i s no where brought together i n a 
summary. The " w i l l " i s brought i n t o v i t a l r e l a t i o n w i t h 
muscular a c t i v i t y i n g e n e r a l . The motor theory i s worked out 
along a s s o c i a t i o n a l l i n e s f o r the f i r s t time. His treatment 
of sensory p l e a s u r e s and pains i s too b r i e f to be s a t i s f a c t o r y . 
There i s a l s o some a r t i f i c i a l i t y m h i s a n a l y s i s of memory. 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , H a r t l e y ' s attempt was the f i r s t of i t s k i n d to 
apply f u l l y the a s s o c i a t i v e p r i n c i p l e f o r the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
of any experimental a c t i v i t y . His p r i n c i p a l aim appears to be 
to e x p l a i n the e n t i r e mental l i f e i n terms of t h e - s u c c e s s i o n 
(75) ( 1 ) Observations o p . c i t . Book I , P a r t I , S e c t : 4. 
( n ) For f u r t h e r reading, s e e ; J . Edward Erdmann, 
A H i s t o r y of Philosophy, E n g l i s h T r a n s . , 3 V o l s , 
London, Swan and Co., (1890), e s p e c i a l l y V o l . 3^ 
Modern Philosophy. 
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of elementary experience. His s o l e data were s e n s a t i o n s , which 
may be transformed i n t o higher complexes; the complexes, i n 
t u r n , may t r a n s i t from "one conscious s t a t e to the n e x t " . ^ ^ 
2. Other X V I I I t h Century A s s o c i a t i o n i s t s . 
For a f u l l a p p r e c i a t i o n of the scope of 
a s s o c i a t i o n i s t thought m the X V I I I t h Century, i t i s i m p e r a t i v e 
to have a b r i e f look a t other a s s o c i a t i o n i s t s , before c o n s i d e r i n g 
the M i l l s ( f a t h e r and son) and Bain, One of these was Abraham 
Tucker (1705-1774). He reviewed the a s s o c i a t i o n i s t a n a l y s i s of 
mind e x h a u s t i v e l y . Next to him comes Joseph P r i e s t l e y (1733-1804), 
who was a t t r a c t e d by H a r t l e y ' s theory; he adopted and p o p u l a r i s e d 
i t . Both he and Tucker r e i t e r a t e d the view t h a t mental 
phenomena a r e a l t e r e d by f u s i o n . These were followed by 
A r c h i b a l d A l i s o n (1757-1839), who a f f i r m e d t h a t matter arouses 
s e n s a t i o n s , not emotions; the l a t t e r a r i s e only through the 
e x e r c i s e of the imagination. H a r t l e y ' s theory was a l s o taken up 
by Erasmus Darwin (1731-1802), the grandfather of C h a r l e s Darwin. 
Erasmus Darwin was a n a t u r a l philosopher, a doctor, and a poet. 
I n h i s c h i e f work, Zoonomia, or The Laws of Organic L i f e (London, 
1794), he e x p l a i n s the o r i g i n of i n s t i n c t s through experience 
(76) H.C. Warren, A H i s t o r y of A s s o c i a t i o n Psychology, o p . c i t . 
* W i l l be thoroughly considered w i t h others i n the next chapter. 
** T h i s w i l l be the main Theme of P a r t I I of t h i s study. 
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and a s s o c i a t i o n , under the i n f l u e n c e of the impulse to s e l f -
p r e s e r v a t i o n and accommodation to ci r c u m s t a n c e s . He goes 
f a r t h e r than H a r t l e y , s i n c e he l a y s s p e c i a l weight on the f a c t 
t h a t a c q u i r e d q u a l i t i e s may be t r a n s m i t t e d ; the psychology of 
a s s o c i a t i o n i s thus extended to a b i o l o g i c a l d o c t r i n e of 
e v o l u t i o n , which has not a l i t t l e i n common w i t h the hypothesis 
of the development of s p e c i e s brought forward some ye a r s l a t e r 
by Lamarck; and, together w i t h t h i s , i t prepared the way f o r the 
great hypothesis w i t h which the name of Darwin must be ever 
connected. Next comes Thomas Brown (1778-1820), a p u p i l of 
Dugald Stewart (1753-1828), through whose te a c h i n g s he was 
grounded i n the t r a d i t i o n of Thomas Reid (1710-1796) and the 
S c o t t i s h s c h o o l . But u n l i k e the S c o t t i s h p s y c h o l o g i s t s , Brown 
does not c o n s i d e r the mental p r o c e s s e s s p e c i a l f a c u l t i e s or powers 
of mind. He makes them,like H a r t l e y , m a n i f e s t a t i o n s of the 
workings of a s s o c i a t i o n . I n h i s " L e c t u r e s on the Philosophy of 
the Human Mind" ( 1 8 2 0 ) , he adopted a standpoint a l i e n to the 
As i t w i l l be seen l a t e r i n p a r t I I of t h i s study, 
t h i s was the b a s i s of McDougall's experiments 
conducted between 1926-1938. 
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(77) * E n g l i s h movement. 
Brown f i l l e d the gaps l e f t unexplained by 
a s s o c i a t i o n i s m i n i t s cruder forms. He enunciated two main 
p r i n c i p l e s of mental l i f e , which he c a l l e d r e s p e c t i v e l y , "simple 
s u g g e s t i o n " and " r e l a t i v e s u g g e s t i o n " . I t i s r e l a t i v e suggestion 
t h a t accounts f o r the c r e a t i v e a s p e c t s of the mind. Brown 
s u b s t i t u t e d the term "suggestion" f o r " a s s o c i a t i o n " , which he 
considered i m p l i e d some process of u n i f i c a t i o n between the i d e a s 
a s s o c i a t e d . Another important point which Brown put forward and 
met w i t h q u i c k e r r e c o g n i t i o n was h i s emphasis of the importance 
of the muscle sense; a point which he c a r r i e d over from 
(78) 
physiology i n t o psychology. 
(77) ( l ) Hoffdmg, V o l . I , o p . c i t . pp.448-449. 
( n ) H.C. Warren, o p . c i t . pp.64-80. 
( m ) F. T h i l l y , o p . c i t . p.364. 
( i v ) J.C. F l i i g e l , A Hundred Ye a r s of Psychology, London, 
Duckworth, (1933), pp. 23-24. 
( v ) Heidbreder, E. Seven P s y c h o l o g i e s , o p . c i t . p.55 
* I t was i n these l e c t u r e s t h a t Thomas Brown suggested h i s nine 
laws of suggestion, they are : ( 1 ) the law of r e l a t i v e d u r a t i o n , 
( 2 ) the law of r e l a t i v e l i v e l i n e s s , ( 3 ) r e l a t i v e frequency, 
( 4 ) r e l a t i v e recency, ( 5 ) law of fewer a l t e r n a t i v e a s s o c i a t i o n s , 
( 6 ) law of c o n s t i t u t i o n of d i f f e r e n c e s , ( 7 ) the law of 
v a r i a t i o n s i n the same i n d i v i d u a l , ( 8 ) d i v e r s i t i e s of s t a t e , 
( 9 ) law of h a b i t of l i f e . 
(78) ( l ) J.C. F l i i g e l , o p . c i t . p.27. 
( n ) H.C. Warren, o p . c i t . pp.77-79. 
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To sum up : The w r i t e r s d e a l t w i t h above employed 
the e m p i r i c a l method m philosophy. They were concerned, 
g e n e r a l l y , i n demonstrating t h a t a l l knowledge i s d e r i v e d from 
experience. I n t h e i r p s y c h o l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s they a p p l i e d the 
term " a s o c i a t i o n " to the p r o c e s s . T h e i r c h i e f problem was to 
a n a l y s e the complex data of consciousness i n t o elementary 
e x p e r i e n c e s , and to show how these elements a r e combined together 
by means of the a s s o c i a t i v e f a c t o r . A c h r o n o l o g i c a l study of 
the movement i n d i c a t e s how the a n a l y s i s grew c l e a r e r w i t h each 
w r i t e r . 
3. The X l X t h Century E m p i r i c i s m . 
H i s t o r i c a l l y speaking, t h e r e was a break between 
the c l a s s i c a l or t r a d i t i o n a l a s s o c i a t i o n l s m and t h a t of the X l X t h 
Century, which i s i n v a r i a b l y named "modern". However, the 
d i v i s i o n of the a s s o c i a t i o n movement i n t o p e r i o d s should not be 
' * (79) 
regarded as sharp and a b s o l u t e . The years (1764) and (1865) , 
f o r example, r e p r e s e n t dramatic climaxes m the c o n t r o v e r s i a l 
arguments between the two s c h o o l s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e r e appear to 
* The former marks Thomas Reid's c r i t i c i s m of David Hume's views, 
the l a t t e r r e p r e s e n t s J . S . M i l l ' s r e j e c t i o n of W. Hamilton's 
i d e a s . 
(79) ( l ) G. Murphy, H i s t o r i c a l I n t r o d u c t i o n to Modern Psychology, 
o p . c i t . pp.162-4. 
( n ) R. Metz : A Hundred Ye a r s of B r i t i s h Philosophy, pp.47-93. 
( m ) B r e t t ' s H i s t o r y of Psychology, o p . c i t , pp. 6 3 3 f f . 
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be s u f f i c i e n t grounds f o r grouping the pure a s s o c i a t i o n i s t s 
i n t o two c h r o n o l o g i c a l p e r i o d s . The p e r i o d examined i n the 
preceding s e c t i o n s i s marked by a groping a f t e r fundamental 
terms, and by a somewhat d e s u l t o r y or a t l e a s t unsystematic 
a n a l y s i s . The w r i t e r s of the l a t e r p e r i o d assumed the 
fundamental notions of a s s o c i a t i o n , and t h e i r t a s k was to make 
the a n a l y s i s more o r d e r l y and f a r - r e a c h i n g . 
I n accordance w i t h i t s h i s t o r i c a l importance, 
modern emp i r i c i s m , as e x e m p l i f i e d i n i t s c h i e f works from 
Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) to the younger M i l l and B a i n , shows 
i t s e l f to be an i n t e l l e c t u a l movement of high rank and very 
powerful i n f l u e n c e . I t not only formed the back-bone and d r i v i n g 
f o r c e of the s p e c i f i c advance i n philosophy and psychology, but 
l i k e no other movement of the day, i t d i f f u s e d i t s i n f l u e n c e 
i n t o the spheres of l i t e r a t u r e , c u l t u r e , education, and a l l 
a s p e c t s of s o c i a l l i f e . The X l X t h Century e m p i r i c i s m marks a 
well-worked-out-system of e m p i r i c a l psychology. Apart from the 
e v o l u t i o n i s t s c h o o l which w i l l be d e a l t w i t h i n the next chapter, 
the notable f i g u r e s of modern emp i r i c i s m are James M i l l , John 
S t u a r t M i l l and Alexander B a i n . 
* Although Bentham goes back a long way i n t o the X V I I I t h 
Century both i n r egard to h i s i n t e l l e c t u a l education and 
to h i s l i t e r a r y a c t i v i t y , he belongs m regard t o h i s 
p h i l o s o p h i c i n f l u e n c e to the X l X t h Century. He i s more 
accounted f o r as a philosopher than as a p s y c h o l o g i s t . 
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A f t e r Bentham, the mam stream of e m p i r i c a l thought 
continued d i r e c t l y i n James M i l l (1773-1836), a d i s c i p l e of 
(80) 
Bentham, He forms a bridge from Bentham to h i s own son, 
John S t u a r t M i l l . His : A n a l y s i s of the Phenomena of the Human 
* 
Mind (1829) i s the c l a s s i c of n i n e t e e n t h century a s s o c i a t i o n i s m , 
as H a r t l e y ' s " O bservations" i s the c l a s s i c of the eigh t e e n t h 
century. I n i t , he l a i d the p s y c h o l o g i c a l foundation of the 
u t i l i t a r i a n d o c t r i n e . "This gaunt and b l o o d l e s s work propounds 
an extreme form of a s s o c i a t i o n i s m " , w r i t e s Hearnshaw, "m which 
a l l man's complex i n t e l l e c t u a l and moral s t a t e s a r e ana l y s e d i n t o 
** 
combinations of s e n s a t i o n s , i d e a s , and t r a i n s of i d e a s , and 
human a c t i o n i s shown to be wholly dominated by what M i l l ' s 
t e a c h e r , Bentham, c a l l e d 'two so v e r e i g n masters, p a i n and 
(81) 
p l e a s u r e ' ". Apart from i t s f u n c t i o n as a foundation, M i l l ' s 
(80) ( I ) L.S. Hearnshaw, A Short H i s t o r y of B r i t i s h Psychology, 
London, Methuen, (1964) o p . c i t , p.2 
( n ) R. Metz, o p . c i t . p. 57 
* New e d i t i o n by J.S. M i l l , 1869. 
** The f i r s t i n n e r c i t a t i o n seems to be taken from James M i l l ' s 
a n a l y s i s ; no page of r e f e r e n c e has been g i v e n . 
(81) L.S. Hearnshaw, o p . c i t , p. 2 
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psychology has a s p e c x a l h i s t o r i c a l importance; i n i t M i l l 
picked up a j u n c t i o n w i t h the a s s o c i a t i o n psychology of the 
o l d e r c l a s s i c a l school where i t had been broken by the 
S c o t t i s h T h i n k e r s . He gave currency again to the mechanism 
of the mind, introduced once more the anatomizing method and 
w i t h i t " p s y c h i c chemistry", h e l d f i r m l y to the a n a l y s i s of 
mental phenomena i n t o t h e i r s i m p l e s t p a r t s ( p s y c h i c atoms), 
r e v i v e d the law of a s s o c i a t i o n as the b a s i c law of p s y c h i c 
l i f e and the phenomenalist view i n the theory of knowledge, and 
thus c a l l e d a f r e s h i n t o e x i s t e n c e the whole s t o c k of i d e a s 
(82) 
belonging to the c l a s s i c a l p h i l o s o p h i c theory. 
John M i l l drew n e a r e r to H a r t l e y than to Locke 
and Hume, but r e f r a i n e d from a l l p h y s i o l o g i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n s 
and confined h i m s e l f to the simple e x p l o r a t i o n of consciousness. 
(82) ( l ) J.T. Merz, H i s t o r y of European Thought m the 
X l X t h Century, V o l . 3 p. 202 
( n ) R. Metz, o p . c i t . p. 59 
( l i i ) L.S. Hearnshaw, o p . c i t . pp 2-4. 
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He a l s o accepted H a r t l e y ' s conception of mental phenomena 
r a t h e r than Thomas Brown's. M i l l adopted two " c l a s s e s of 
(83) 
f e e l i n g s " , " s e n s a t i o n s " and " i d e a s " . Besides the 
t r a d i t i o n a l f i v e s e n s e s , he n o t i c e s t h r e e other s o r t s of 
s e n s a t i o n s - p h y s i c a l p a i n , muscular s e n s a t i o n s and o r g a n i c 
s e n s a t i o n s . The experiences d e r i v e d from these senses a r e by 
no means sim p l e . "We can not t h i n k of the s e n s a t i o n of c o l o u r , 
without a t the same time t h i n k i n g of something coloured - of 
There seems to be d i s c r e p a n c y as to James M i l l ' s avoidance 
of appealing to p h y s i o l o g i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n s . R. Metz, f o r 
example,emphasises t h i s , whereas H.C. Warren i s of the 
opinion t h a t M i l l gave due emphasis to the p h y s i o l o g i c a l 
e x p l a n a t i o n s , to the a c t i v i t y of the b r a i n and nervous 
system, and t h a t he made use of the p h y s i o l o g i c a l 
concomitants to i l l u s t r a t e the p r i n c i p l e s of mental a c t i v i t y . 
Checking t h i s a g a i n s t other r e f e r e n c e s , i t turned up t h a t 
Metz was more a c c u r a t e . G.H. Lewes, f o r example, i n h i s : 
B i o g r a p h i c a l H i s t o r y of Philosophy, p. 528, w r i t e s "The 
A n a l y s i s of the Mind, by the l a t e James M i l l , which may be 
regarded as the development of H a r t l e y ' s d o c t r i n e , 
s t r i p p e d of i t s p h y s i c a l h y p o t h e s i s i s l e s s known; but i t 
i s a work of g r e a t v a l u e , and would long ago have been 
as popular had i t been w r i t t e n i n a more engaging 
manner ..." 
(83) The A n a l y s i s of the Mind, Ch.2, p.52 
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s u r f a c e or e x t e n s i o n , a notion d e r i v e d from another sense ... 
Some of the t h i n g s suggested by the s e n s a t i o n s of s i g h t , as 
exte n s i o n and f i g u r e , are suggested so i n s t a n t a n e o u s l y that 
they appear to be o b j e c t s of s i g h t , t h i n g s a c t u a l l y s e e n " , ^ ^ 
The notion of any sense i s a complex i d e a , i n c l u d i n g as 
i n g r e d i e n t s ( 1 ) the id e a of the organ, (2) the idea of the 
s e n s a t i o n , ( 3 ) the id e a of the o b j e c t of s e n s a t i o n , (4) the 
ide a of synchronous order of the f i r s t two, and (5 ) the i d e a 
(85) 
of a s u c c e s s i v e order of the t h i r d . M i l l was not of the 
opinion h e l d by h i s p redecessors t h a t i d e a s are always 
f a i n t e r than s e n s a t i o n s , though he b e l i e v e d t h i s to be 
u s u a l l y the c a s e . Some ideas a r e f a i n t e r than ot h e r s - a 
c o n d i t i o n which i s due to the r e l a t i v e remoteness of the 
o r i g i n a l s e n s a t i o n as to the r e l a t i v e v i v i d n e s s of t h a t 
s e n s a t i o n i t s e l f ; but i t i s d i f f i c u l t , he thought, to compare 
the r e l a t i v e v i v i d n e s s of s e n s a t i o n s , except when they a r e 
p l e a s u r a b l e or p a i n f u l . ^ 8 * ^ T h i s c o n c l u s i o n i s probably due 
to h i s confounding of d i s t i n c t n e s s w i t h i n t e n s i t y . 
M i l l ' s conception of a s s o c i a t i o n may be explained 
by h i s dictum t h a t "our ide a s s p r i n g up, or e x i s t , m the 
order i n which the s e n s a t i o n s e x i s t e d of which they a r e the 
(84) i b i d , C h . I , Sect 3, pp 21-22. 
(85) i b i d , p 19. 
(86) o p . c i t , Ch.3, pp. 84, 85. 
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c o p i e s " . For him " t h i s i s the g e n e r a l law of the a s s o c i a t i o n 
of i d e a s , by which term ... nothing i s here meant to be 
(87 ) 
expressed but the order of occurrence". M i l l thought t h a t 
t h e r e a r e degrees i n a s s o c i a t i o n as t h e r e are degrees i n 
s e n s a t i o n s and degrees i n i d e a s . M i l l f i n d s t h r e e c o n d i t i o n s 
which modify the degree : an a s s o c i a t i o n i s s a i d to be s t r o n g e r 
than another when i t i s ( 1 ) "more permanent", ( 2 ) "performed 
w i t h more c e r t a i n t y " , and (3) "performed w i t h more 
( 88 } 
f a c i l i t y " . M i l l concludes by c a l l i n g a t t e n t i o n to the 
a s s o c i a t i o n of complex id e a s together i n t o a "doubly 
(89) 
compounded", or "duplex" i d e a . These duplex i d e a s -
decomplex i d e a s i n H a r t l e y ' s terminology - may be of a l l 
degrees of complexity. The a s s o c i a t i o n theory, however, 
conceives of mind, or experience, as a s e r i e s of mental s t a t e s 
u n i t e d i n t o v a r i o u s complexes and s u c c e s s i o n s , very much as the 
atoms of the p h y s i c a l u n i v e r s e are u n i t e d i n t o m a t e r i a l t h i n g s 
and produce m a t e r i a l events. A s s o c i a t i o n i s m w i t h M i l l , then, 
may p r o p e r l y be termed m e c h a n i s t i c . 
M i l l c o n sidered "conceptions" and " i m a g i n a t i o n s " as 
s i m p l e r types of experience than memory, which i s "an i d e a 
and something m o r e " . ^ ^ I n t h i s he i s i n agreement w i t h Brown, 
(87) i b i d , p. 78 
(88) i b i d , p. 82 
(89) i b i d , p. 115 
(90) Chap. 10, p 321. 
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though the g e n e r a l trend of h i s a n a l y s i s f o l l o w s H a r t l e y ' s 
more c l o s e l y . I n remembering, he w r i t e s , "the mind runs 
back from the present moment to the moment of p e r c e p t i o n , 
t h a t i s to say, i t runs over the i n t e r v e n i n g s t a t e s of 
consciousness c a l l e d up by A s s o c i a t i o n ; ... and i n t h i s case 
we a s s o c i a t e them so r a p i d l y and c l o s e l y t h a t they run, as 
i t were, i n t o a s i n g l e point of co n s c i o u s n e s s , to which the 
(91) 
name memory i s a s s i g n e d " . T h i s e x p l a n a t i o n of memory 
i l l u s t r a t e s M i l l ' s mechanical view of a s s o c i a t i o n . He 
a t t r i b u t e d the d i s t i n c t i o n between i n t e l l e c t u a l and a c t i v e 
powers of the mind to the f a c t t h a t w h i l e some " s e n s a t i o n s 
and i d e a s a r e considered merely as e x i s t i n g " , o t h e r s a r e 
"considered as not merely e x i s t i n g , but a l s o as e x c i t i n g to 
,. (92) (93) a c t i o n . His treatment of p l e a s u r a b l e and p a i n f u l 
s e n s a t i o n s may c l e a r l y show Bentham's i n f l u e n c e . His a n a l y s i s , 
u n s a t i s f a c t o r y i n many p o i n t s , i t i s none the l e s s the most 
thorough of any up to h i s time, and the most s y s t e m a t i c i n i t s 
p a s s i n g from one point to another. I t i s a l s o the most 
r i g i d l y a s s o c i a t i o n a l . 
(91) i b i d , p 331 
(92) Vol I I , Ch.15, p 178. 
(93) i b i d , Chap 19, p 190. 
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We come now to John S t u a r t Mxll (1806-1873), i n 
whom modern empiricism reaches i t s h i g h e s t p o i n t , as the 
c l a s s i c a l e m p i r i c i s m reached i t s h i g h e s t peak i n Hume a 
century e a r l i e r . I n the development of B r i t i s h p s y c h o l o g i c a l 
thought, M i l l ' s work stands f o r the l a s t g r eat s y n t h e s i s of 
empiricism. I n i t , a l l the l e a d i n g themes of empiricism u n i t e 
(94) 
once more i n t o a great harmony. M i l l ' s p s y c h o l o g i c a l 
** 
views a r e found i n h i s : System of L o g i c ( 1 8 4 3 ) , and i n h i s : 
* Many persons t h i n k M i l l to be the g r e a t e s t B r i t i s h Thinker of 
the X l X t h Century. However t h i s may be, i t i s c e r t a i n t h a t he 
was the g r e a t e s t p h i l o s o p h i c w r i t e r of h i s age. L i k e Bacon, 
Hobbes, Locke, Shaftesbury, B e r k e l e y , Hume, Bentham, James M i l l , 
and l a t e r Spencer, he never h e l d an academic post, and 
p r a c t i s e d philosophy, not as a merely s c i e n t i f i c or l e a r n e d 
p u r s u i t , but as a s p i r i t u a l m i s s i o n to be f u l f i l l e d i n 
obedience to an inward c a l l . 
(94) ( l ) R. Metz, o p . c i t . pp 6 2 f f . 
( n ) G. Murphy, H i s t o r i c a l I n t r o d u c t i o n to Psychology, 
o p . c i t , p 104. 
( m ) B r e t t ' s H i s t o r y of Psychology, o p . c i t , pp 633-641. 
** I t might be h e l p f u l to know t h a t most of John S t u a r t M i l l ' s 
views came to him by h i s a b s o r p t i o n i n the poetry of 
Wordsworth and from h i s acquaintance w i t h the gr e a t romantic 
poet and t h i n k e r C o l e r i d g e and by f r i e n d l y i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h 
e n t h u s i a s t i c young f r i e n d s of C o l e r i d g e such as F r e d e r i c k 
D. Maurice and John S t e r l i n g , the f r i e n d of C a r l y l e . 
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Examination of S i r W i l l i a m Hamilton's Philosophy (1865). I n 
h i s widely read L o g i c M i l l not only argues t h a t " t h e r e i s a 
d i s t i n c t and s e p a r a t e S c i e n c e of Mind", but names t h i s 
/ 95 } # 
s c i e n c e "Psychology", M i l l made a d i s t i n c t i o n between 
(96) 
psychology and ethology, or the s c i e n c e of c h a r a c t e r , which 
has not g e n e r a l l y been adopted, but which n e v e r t h e l e s s 
overshadows the much l a t e r development of a psychology of 
p e r s o n a l i t y . 
I n chapter I V , Book V I , "On the Laws of Mind", of h i s 
L o g i c , M i l l p r e s e n t s h i s conception of a s s o c i a t i o n very c l e a r l y . 
The s u b j e c t - m a t t e r of psychology, he d e c l a r e s , i s "the 
u n i f o r m i t i e s of s u c c e s s i o n " , t h i s i s determined by the laws of 
(97) 
mind according to which one mental s t a t e succeeds another. 
Two of the most general laws a r e as f o l l o w s : ( 1 ) "Whenever any 
s t a t e of consciousness has once been e x c i t e d i n u s , no matter 
by what cause, an i n f e r i o r degree of the same s t a t e of 
(95) ( l ) John S t u a r t M i l l , System of L o g i c , London, Longman's 
(1884), (People's e d i t i o n ) 1 s t publ. (1843), 
Book V I , Ch.4. 
( n ) See a l s o : L.S. Hearnshaw, o p . c i t . p.3 
* Ethology as i t has been mentioned above, was o r i g i n a l l y employed 
by J . S . M i l l to designate the "Science of C h a r a c t e r " ; 
N.Tinbergen has r e c e n t l y used the term to mean always "the 
s c i e n t i f i c study of Animal Behaviour". Tinbergen's use, however, 
i s c r i t i c i s e d . 
(96) System of L o g i c , B»ok V I , Ch.V 
(97) o p . c i t . S e c t . 3 . 
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co n s c i o u s n e s s , a s t a t e of consciousness resembling the former 
but i n f e r i o r i n i n t e n s i t y , i s capable of being reproduced i n 
us without the presence of any such cause as e x c i t e d i t a t 
f i r s t " . T h i s d e f i n e s the nature of ideas i n r e l a t i o n to 
s e n s a t i o n s . ( 2 ) "These i d e a s or secondary mental s t a t e s , a r e 
e x c i t e d by our impressions or by other i d e a s according to 
(98),, 
c e r t a i n laws which a r e c a l l e d Laws of A s s o c i a t i o n . I n h i s 
L o g i c , M i l l formulated t h r e e such laws of mind : " s i m i l a r i t y " , 
" c o n t i g u i t y " , which he combined w i t h frequency or habit, and 
" i n t e n s i t y " . ( 9 9 ) 
M i l l d i f f e r e d w i t h h i s f a t h e r on the q u e s t i o n of 
s i m i l a r i t y , making i t the f i r s t p r i n c i p l e of a s s o c i a t i o n . 
Moreover, he h e l d ^ ^ ^ t h a t the laws of a s s o c i a t i o n a r e 
supplemented by c e r t a i n laws of " o b l i v i s c e n c e " , the p r i n c i p a l 
one of which he s t a t e d as f o l l o w s : "When a number of id e a s 
suggest one another by a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h such c e r t a i n t y and 
r a p i d i t y as to c o a l e s c e together i n a group, a l l those members 
of the group which remain long without being e s p e c i a l l y 
(98) i b i d , 
(99) i b i d . Here i t must be n o t i c e d t h a t i n a note to the 
" A n a l y s i s ' ^ J . S . M i l l r e j e c t s the law of c o n t r a s t a b s o l u t e l y , 
See Vol I , p. 126 
(100) Examination of S i r W i l l i a m Hamilton Philosophy, (1865) 
V o l . I , Ch I I , p 235. 
(101) i b i d . 
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attended t o , have a tendency to drop out of c o n s c i o u s n e s s " / ^ ^ 
M i l l ' s views of the compounding of exper i e n c e s i s 
most c l e a r l y s t a t e d i n h i s System of L o g i c . C e r t a i n of our 
complex i d e a s , as he t h i n k s , a r e generated from simple ones; 
they do not c o n s i s t of them. For, "the e f f e c t of co n c u r r i n g 
causes i s not always p r e c i s e l y the sum of the e f f e c t s of those 
causes when s e p a r a t e , nor even always an e f f e c t of the same 
k i n d " . ^ 1 ^ ^ I n psychology, as i n the p h y s i c a l s c i e n c e s , t h e r e 
are two d i s t i n c t types : "The laws of the phenomena of mind 
are sometimes analogous to mechanical, but sometimes a l s o t o 
chemical laws. When many impressions or i d e a s a r e operating i n 
the mind together, t h e r e sometimes takes p l a c e a process of 
s i m i l a r kind to chemical combination. When impressions have 
been so oft e n experienced i n c o n j u n c t i o n t h a t each of them c a l l s 
up r e a d i l y and i n s t a n t a n e o u s l y the ide a s of the whole group, 
those ideas sometimes melt and c o a l e s c e i n t o one another, and 
appear not s e v e r a l i d e a s but one. ^"^^ ** With the a p p l i c a t i o n of 
mental chemistry, M i l l f i l e s two c a v e a t s . ( 1 ) When we see t h a t 
some complex idea may have been generated i n t h i s w i s e from 
(102) i b i d , Vol I , p. 317 
(103) System of L o g i c , o p . c i t . S e c t 3. 
(104) i b i d . 
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s i m p l e r elements, we should not assume a t once t h a t i t 
a c t u a l l y has been t h e r e ; ( 2 ) even i f the a s s o c i a t i o n theory 
be proved, "we should not be the more enabled to r e s o l v e the 
laws of the more complex f e e l i n g s i n t o those of the s i m p l e r 
„ (105) ones . 
Although J.S . M i l l ' s p s y c h o l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s might be 
thought of as detached and incomplete, t h i s disadvantage i s 
s c a r c e l y f e l t i f h i s system i s taken as a whole. According 
to him a s s o c i a t i o n produces experiences which a r e r e a l l y 
u n i t a r y . A s s o c i a t i o n does more than u n i t e - i t t r a n s f o r m s . 
Furthermore, h i s thorough a n a l y s i s of consciousness has been 
an avenue taken up by h i s contemporary B a i n , whose views w i l l 
be the concern of the f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n s . 
Alexander Bam (1818-1903) " c a n ^ 1 0 6 * r i g h t l y be 
regarded as opening a new chapter i n the h i s t o r y of B r i t i s h 
psychology" - w r i t e s Hearnshaw, "a new chapter, not a new book; 
i * 
f o r i n r e c o g n i s i n g Bain s advances on h i s p r e d e c e s s o r s , we must 
(105) i b i d . 
(106) L.S. Hearnshaw, A Short H i s t o r y of B r i t i s h Psychology, 
o p . c i t . pp 5-6. 
(*) I t was i n B a i n , S i r J . G . F r a z e r , and J . C a i r d t h a t the 
three c h i e f s c h o o l s of B r i t i s h Philosophy i n the X l X t h 
Century were f o r many years r e p r e s e n t e d Contemoraneusly 
a t the S c o t t i s h u n i v e r s i t i e s ; The S c o t t i s h school was i n 
d e c l i n e , the e m p i r i c a l a t i t s h i g h e s t p o i n t , and the 
i d e a l i s t on the upward path. 
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not underestimate h i s debts to them. Behind him l a y the 
whole h i s t o r y of B r i t i s h a s s o c i a t i o n i s t psychology, adumbrated 
by Hobbes and Locke, and worked out more e l a b o r a t e l y by 
the admirable H a r t l e y (1705-1757), whose Observations on 
Man (1749) a r e s y s t e m a t i c , thorough, and as f a r as the 
knowledge of h i s day permitted, f a c t u a l " . T h i s passage has 
been c i t e d a t l e n g t h to show the advantages t h a t formed the 
background to Bam. As a p s y c h o l o g i s t he stands halfway 
between the mental philosophy of the eighteenth and e a r l y 
n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r i e s and the s c i e n t i f i c psychology of t h i s 
century. He was "a t r a n s i t i o n a l f i g u r e " , ? h e "moved 
at l e a s t p a r t of the way from the o l d e r i n t e l l e c t u a l i s m and 
a s s o c i a t i o n i s m to the a c t i v i s t and hormic p s y c h o l o g i e s which 
, . . .„ (108) supplanted i t . 
Alexander Bam was one of the most g i f t e d p u p i l s of 
M i l l . He owed h i s advancement to him. But he was no l e s s 
i n f l u e n c e d by "the two great seminal minds of England i n t h e i r 
( 1 0 9 ) * 
age". Hearnshaw quoted J.S. M i l l as s a y i n g , 'Every 
(107) L.S. Hearnshaw, o p . c i t . p. 9 
(108) i b i d . 
(109) i b i d p. 6 
* The a l l u s i o n i s to Bentham and C o l e r i d g e , i t i s made by 
M i l l and quoted by L.S. Hearnshaw as above. 
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Englishman of the present day i s by i m p l i c a t i o n e i t h e r a 
Benthamite or a C o l e r i d g i a n " . ^ 1 1 0 ^ S.T.Coleridge (1772-1834) 
indeed, i s a f i g u r e of fundamental i n t e r e s t to B r i t i s h 
p s y c h o l o g i s t s . He r e j e c t e d the atomism and the p a s s i v i t y of 
the o l d e r a s s o c i a t i o n i s t s . He turned from the a s s o c i a t i o n i s m 
of H a r t l e y . He s t r e s s e d the u n d e r l y i n g u n i t y and a c t i v i t y of 
the mind and the r o l e of the f e e l i n g ; and he was i n t e r e s t e d 
i n the a c t i v e powers of imagination, which he d i s t i n g u i s h e d 
from the p a s s i v e a s s o c i a t i v e p r i n c i p l e he termed "fancy". He 
b e l i e v e d t h a t the s e p a r a t i o n of psychology from physiology was 
f a t a l , d e p r i v i n g the former of a l l root and o b j e c t i v e t r u t h , 
and reducing the l a t t e r to a more enumeration of f a c t s and 
phenomena. T h i s b r i e f divergence has been as n e c e s s a r y to 
(110) ( i ) i b i d p. 6 
( n ) See a l s o : R. Metz, o p . c i t , pp 74-76. 
( m ) S.T.Coleridge, The P h i l o s o p h i c a l L e c t u r e s , a s e r i e s 
of l e c t u r e s beginning December 14, 1818 to 
March 29, 1819, ed. by Kathleen Coburn (19 4 9 ) , 
London, The P i l o t P r e s s L i m i t e d , see e s p e c i a l l y 
L e c t u r e s X I , X I I , and X I I I . 
( I V ) S.T.Coleridge, B i o g r a p h i a L i t e r a r i a (1817), a r e p r i n t 
(1905), London, George B e l l & Sons, p a r t i c u l a r l y , 
Chapters 5,6,7 and 8. 
( v ) , Confessions of An I n q u i r i n g S p i r i t , a r e p r i n t 
(1849) London, W i l l i a m P i c k e r i n g . 
( v i ) For f u r t h e r reading see a l s o : J.B.Beer, C o l e r i d g e ; 
The V i s i o n a r y , (1959), London, Chatto & Wmdus. 
(111) L.S. Hearnshaw, o p . c i t . pp 7-8. 
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show t h a t "There was indeed more i n Bain's background than 
J t l (112) B a i n ever r e a l i s e d . 
I n h i s two great and i n f l u e n t i a l works: The Senses 
and the I n t e l l e c t (1855) and The Emotions and The W i l l (1859) , 
i n which he t r e a t e d the whole f i e l d of mental l i f e more 
thoroughly and comprehensively than had ever before been done, 
he c a r r i e d forward the d i r e c t l i n e of B r i t i s h psychology. 
Bain's conception of mind i s contained i n h i s two volumes 
above. F o l l o w i n g an a s s o c i a t i v e p r i n c i p l e i n h i s a n a l y s i s j 
he d i s c u s s e d mental content m a f u l l and thorough manner. 
He d i s t i n g u i s h e d a t the o u t s e t between th r e e s o r t s of mental 
phenomena: (1 ) f e e l i n g , i n c l u d i n g " p l e a s u r e and p a i n s , 
emotion, p a s s i o n , a f f e c t i o n , sentiment"; (2) " v o l i t i o n , or 
the w i l l , embracing the whole of our a c t i v i t y as d i r e c t e d by 
our f e e l i n g s " , and ( 3 ) "thought, i n t e l l e c t , o r c o g n i t i o n " . 
" i n t e l l e c t " i n c l u d e s such f u n c t i o n s as memory, reason, judgement, 
and imagination". i t i m p l i e s t h r e e f a c t s : ( 1 ) " D i s -
(112) i b i d p.8 
* I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note t h a t these two y e a r s c o i n c i d e w i t h 
the p u b l i c a t i o n of H. Spencer's P r i n c i p l e s of Psychology, and 
Darwin's O r i g i n of S p e c i e s . Bain's two books, though s e p a r a t e , 
r e p r e s e n t a c h i e f book on psychology. 
(113) The Senses and the I n t e l l e c t , i n t r o d u c t i o n C h . l , Sec.2. 
(114) i b i d , s e c t 3. 
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crxmxnatxon, or sense of d i f f e r e n c e , shown by our being 
conscious of one sensatxon as more xntense than another"; 
(2) "Sxmxlarxty, or sense of agreement"; ( 3 ) "Retentxveness, 
commonly understood by the famxlxar names memory and 
r e c o l l e c t x o n ; t h i s power i s e s s e n t i a l to the o p e r a t i o n of 
the two f o r m e r " . D i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n v o l v e s an important 
mental p r i n c i p l e - The Law of R e l a t i v i t y : "As change of 
impression i s an i n d i s p e n s a b l e c o n d i t i o n of our being 
c o n s c i o u s , or of being mentally a l i v e to f e e l i n g and thought, 
every mental experience i s n e c e s s a r i l y two-fold. We can 
n e i t h e r f e e l nor know heat, except i n the t r a n s i t i o n from 
c o l d . I n every f e e l i n g there a r e two c o n t r a s t i n g s t a t e s ; xn 
every a c t of knowledge two t h i n g s are known toge t h e r " . 
B a i n gave four laws of mind. These a r e : (1) The law 
of c o n t i g u i t y , which i s "The law of a s s o c i a t i o n proper, of 
adhesion, mental ad h e s i v e n e s s , or a c q u i s i t i o n " , i s s t a t e d 
t h u s : " A c t i o n s , s e n s a t i o n s , and s t a t e s of f e e l i n g , o c c u r r i n g 
together or i n c l o s e s u c c e s s i o n , tend to grow together, or 
cohere, i n such a way t h a t , when any one of them i s a f t e r w a r d s 
presented to the mind, the o t h e r s are apt to be brought up i n 
l d e a " . ^ 1 1 ^ (2) The other law xs of Agreement: "Present 
(115) xbxd. 
(116) xbxd. S e c t 6. 
(117) xbxd. Ch.I, S e c t . I . 
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a c t i o n s , s e n s a t i o n s , thoughts, or emotions tend to r e v i v e 
t h e i r l i k e among previous impressions".''"''"1*^ ( 3 ) Bain's 
t h i r d p r i n c i p l e i s the law of compound a s s o c i a t i o n : "Past 
a c t i o n s , s e n s a t i o n s , thoughts or emotions are r e c a l l e d more 
e a s i l y when a s s o c i a t e d e i t h e r through c o n t i g u i t y or 
s i m i l a r i t y , w i t h more than one present o b j e c t or lmpression"^ 1" 1"^, 
( 4 ) The f o u r t h p r i n c i p l e , c o n s t r u c t i v e Imagination i s s t a t e d 
as f o l l o w s : "By means of a s s o c i a t i o n the mind has the power 
to form new combinations or aggregates, d i f f e r e n t from any 
t h a t have been presented to i t i n the course of experience','^"^^ 
T h i s o p e r a t i o n i s known as imagination, c r e a t i o n , 
c o n s t r u c t i v e n e s s , and o r i g i n a t i o n or i n v e n t i o n ; i t i s the 
process whereby we put together new forms of mental imagery. 
Bain a f f i r m s t h a t the i n t e l l e c t u a l f o r c e s operating m these 
c r e a t i o n s a r e no other than the a s s o c i a t i n g f o r c e s a l r e a d y 
d i s c u s s e d ; the new combinations grow out of elements a l r e a d y 
possessed by the mind, and brought forward according to the 
laws above l a i d down. I n h i s p s y c h o l o g i c a l treatment, B a i n 
p l a c e s the a c t i v e s i d e of mind ahead of the i n t e l l e c t u a l i n 
h i s a n a l y s i s . T h i s order has p e c u l i a r s i g n i f i c a n c e i n h i s 
(118) i b i d Ch.2, Sect I . 
(119) i b i d Ch.3, Sect I . 
(120) i b i d Ch.4, Sect I . 
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system. His a n a l y s i s of the d i s t i n c t i o n between s u b j e c t 
and o b j e c t , forms an i n t e r e s t i n g c o n t r a s t w i t h t h a t of 
J . S . M i l l . He f i n d s t h a t these two s i d e s a r e separated 
i n experience by thr e e independent c r i t e r i a : ( 1) o b j e c t s a r e 
c h a r a c t e r i s e d by "movement ... as contrasted w i t h p a s s i v e 
emotion" which c h a r a c t e r i s e s the s u b j e c t . (2) " D e f i n i t e 
f e e l i n g s connected w i t h movements" c h a r a c t e r i s e the o b j e c t , 
i n c o n t r a s t w i t h " f e e l i n g s independent of our movements ..." 
( 3 ) "Experience common to a l l ( o b j e c t ) , as a g a i n s t 
experience s p e c i a l to each ( s u b j e c t ) " . ^ ^"^ Emotions, 
accor d i n g to him, are complex m a n i f e s t a t i o n s of f e e l i n g . The 
d i r e c t e x t e r n a l s t i m u l u s , which i s the prominent p h y s i c a l 
element i n s e n s a t i o n , i s l a c k i n g i n emotion, and i n i t s 
p l a c e we f i n d the "outward m a n i f e s t a t i o n s of d i f f u s e d wave 
of e f f e c t s " . ( 1 2 2 ) 
The s a l i e n t p o i n t s i n Bain's p o s i t i o n a r e : ( 1 ) the 
key to h i s psychology i s found i n the r e l a t i o n which he 
assumes between experience and motor impulse. ( 2 ) D i s c r i m i n a t i o n , 
the elemental f a c t of i n t e l l e c t , i s an o r i g i n a l element i n a l l 
(121) The Emotions and the W i l l , Ch. on c o n s t r u c t i o n , 
Sec. 28. 
(122) i b i d , Ch. 1, Sec. 2. 
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e x p e r i e n c e . (3) The r e v i v a l of impressions without renewal 
of the e x t e r n a l s t i m u l u s , r e s u l t i n g i n i d e a s , i s a f a c t 
e x p l i c a b l e i n p h y s i o l o g i c a l terms, and i t s p s y c h o l o g i c a l 
f o r m u l a t i o n appears i n the law of A s s o c i a t i o n . ( 4 ) Motor 
c o - o r d i n a t i o n and v o l u n t a r y c o n t r o l r e s u l t from the 
a s s o c i a t i o n of ideas w i t h motor impulses according to the 
same laws. ( 5 ) the emotions are t r a c e a b l e to c o m p l i c a t i o n s 
of p r i m i t i v e f e e l i n g , motor impulse, and d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . 
( 6 ) The fundamental f a c t s of consciousness thus appear to be 
p r i m i t i v e f e e l i n g , d i s c r i m i n a t i o n and a s s o c i a t i v e r e v i v a l . 
To complete the p i c t u r e of modern empiricism i t i s 
n e c e s s a r y to mention i n p a s s i n g , some of Bain's younger 
contemporaries. One of these i s Samuel B a i l e y (1791-1870) 
a w r i t e r on psychology and other d i s c i p l i n e s . He v i g o r o u s l y 
a t t a c k e d the " f a c u l t y " i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of mind. His 
e m p i r i c i s m l e d him to q u e s t i o n B e r k e l e y ' s theory t h a t d i s t a n c e 
p e r c e p t i o n i s an i n f e r e n c e . Another a s s o c i a t i o n i s t i s John 
D a n i e l Morell (1811-1891), whp saw t h a t the s t r e n g t h of an 
a s s o c i a t i o n may be i n every c a s e be s t a t e d as equal to the 
amount of the a c t i o n and of the a s s o c i a t e d i d e a s . Another 
t h i n k e r i s George Croom Robertson (1842-1892). He devoted 
h i m s e l f mainly to psychology; but not on a wide s c a l e . He 
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never covered the whole f x e l d of p s y c h i c phenomena, 
Thomas Fowler (1832-1904), r e p r e s e n t e d a moderate 
u t i l i t a r i a n i s m . L i k e M i l l before, he pledged h i m s e l f to 
m o r a l i t y more than anything e l s e . He supported 
a s s o c i a t i o n i s m . 
To sum up,James M i l l ' s psychology was i n f l u e n c e d 
by a g n o s t i c i s m which made him go f u r t h e r towards m e c h a n i s t i c 
theory. He reduced mental l i f e to elementary sensory 
p a r t i c l e s . He, to some degree, i n f l u e n c e d B a i n . I n him 
(123) 
" a s s o c i a t i o n i s m and hedonism were thoroughly fused", 
and every experience was conceived to be r e d u c i b l e to 
sensory components under the guidance of the p l e a s u r e - p a i n 
p r i n c i p l e . The machinery of the mind i s the a s s o c i a t i v e 
p r o c e s s . He made no attempt to c o r r e l a t e the mental p r o c e s s e s s 
w i t h the b r a i n processes as H a r t l e y d i d . His a n a l y s i s of 
consciousness i s i n t r o s p e c t i v e and i n t h i s he followed Brown. 
His view of a s s o c i a t i o n i s m enabled him to a n a l y s e the 
higher mental p r o c e s s e s , such as conception and reasoning, 
w i t h b e t t e r s u c c e s s than has p r e d e c e s s o r s , A concept i s a 
c l u s t e r of i d e a s , and reasoning i s the a s s o c i a t i o n of the 
terms of p r o p o s i t i o n s . Other a s s o c i a t i o n i s t s , however, were 
opposed to h i s instrument of r e s e a r c h , but no one more 
(123) G. Murphy, o p . c i t . pp 102-104. 
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v i g o r o u s l y than h i s son, John S t u a r t M i l l . I n a d d i t i o n to 
the e m p i r i c a l , a s s o c i a t i o n i s t psychology w i t h i t s hedonism, 
egoism, and determinism, one f i n d s l e a n i n g s towards 
i n t e n t i o n i s m , p e r f e c t i o n i s m , a l t r u i s m , and f r e e w i l l . J S . M i l l 
was above a l l a l o g i c i a n . He transformed h i s f a t h e r ' s 
system w i t h emendation ; he brought a psychology r e s t i n g on 
a b a s i s of h i s own c o n s t r u c t i o n . He developed the 
chemical theory of mental s t a t e s as h i s f a t h e r before him 
developed the mechanical theory of mind. The p s y c h o l o g i c a l 
arguments of the two M i l l s were taken over by Alexander B a i n 
whose psychology showed i n many r e s p e c t s an advance beyond 
the former p o s i t i o n and pointed forward to the f u t u r e of 
e v o l u t i o n i s m and v o l u n t a r i s m . His t a s k c o n s i s t e d i n the f a c t 
t h a t he gave a more modern t u r n to the e m p i r i c a l psychology. 
He emphasised the P h y s i o l o g i c a l Concomitants of mental 
p r o c e s s e s , and i n t h i s h i s p o s i t i o n p r e s e n t s a sharp c o n t r a s t 
to the M i l l s and Brown. With B a i n , b r a i n a c t i v i t y was no 
longer conceived of as a mechanical v i b r a t i o n , and the n o t i o n 
of d i f f u s i o n of nervous impulses had a r i s e n to account f o r 
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the emotions. To him every s e n s a t i o n i s accompanied by 
a tendency to movement, which grows i n s t r e n g t h w i t h the 
i n c r e a s e d i n t e n s i t y of f e e l i n g . The a s s o c i a t i v e a n a l y s i s 
was a fundamental element i n h i s system. "Perhaps B r i t i s h 
psychology would have advanced more r a p i d l y and more s u r e l y 
(124) 
i f i t had more c l o s e l y followed Bam" as Hearnshaw has 
r i g h t l y judged. Undoubtedly, Bain's work r e p r e s e n t s the 
climax of the p u r e l y a s s o c i a t i o n i s t movement. 
However, the c e n t r a l themes of the a s s o c i a t i o n school 
were p l e a s u r e and p a i n . Emotions or " p a s s i o n s " a l s o 
loomed l a r g e . Two kinds of emotions were d i s t i n g u i s h e d : 
simple and compound. A l l m a n i f e s t a t i o n s of moral f e e l i n g 
* I n the Senses and the I n t e l l e c t B a i n d e a l t thoroughly w i t h 
" i n s t i n c t s " . He d e f i n e d i n s t i n c t as "the untaught a b i l i t y 
to perform a c t i o n s of a l l k i n d s , and more e s p e c i a l l y such as 
ar e n e c e s s a r y or u s e f u l to the animal". Whether t h i s i s 
e n t i r e l y a c c e p t a b l e or not w i l l , however, be considered i n 
another p l a c e i n connection w i t h the i n s t i n c t i v e concepts. 
(124) A Short H i s t o r y of B r i t i s h Psychology, o p . c i t . p.14 
** The term " p a s s i o n " was used by o l d e r p s y c h o l o g i s t s to 
mean " i n s t i n c t s " , " a p p e t i t e s " , "emotions", and other 
modern terms. I t was employed, however, by d i f f e r e n t 
w r i t e r s to express d i f f e r e n t meanings. 
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a r e encountered among the l a t t e r category. The w i l l was 
thought to be rooted m the a c t i v i t y of the organism as a 
whole; y e t i t may emerge from p a s s i o n s as w e l l . Voluntary 
f a c t s a r e s u b j e c t to the u n i v e r s a l law of c a u s a l i t y . 
A s s o c i a t i o n i s m of some kind, however, i s the o l d e s t f a c t o r 
i n p s y c h o l o g i c a l theory. From the v a r i o u s arguments i t may 
be concluded t h a t the a s s o c i a t i o m s t s t r i e d , each i n h i s own 
way, to hold together the two fundamental a s p e c t s of l i f e : 
form and matter, or, a c t and content, to use p s y c h o l o g i c a l 
(125) 
terms. By a s s o c i a t i o n i t was almost always understood t h a t 
the r e c a l l or reproduction of i d e a s a l r e a d y formed takes p l a c e 
a c c o r d i n g to f i x e d laws, and not a t random. 
* I t i s worth noting t h a t the a p o s t e r i o r i s c h o o l does not go 
w i t h the " s e n s a t i o n a l i s t s " , l i k e Locke and C o n d i l l a c , nor 
does i t go w i t h the " r a t i o n a l i s t s " , such as D e s c a r t e s and 
L e i b n i t z , nor w i t h the " c r i t i c s " l i k e Kant. 
(125) ( l ) B r a d l e y , F.H., " A s s o c i a t i o n and Thought" MIND, 
Vol X I I , No. 46, (1887) p. 381. 
( n ) B a m , A. The same v o l . "On A s s o c i a t i o n " , pp 161ff; 
( n i ) B r e t t , S. " A s s o c i a t i o n i s m and Act Psychology" 
Psychologies of 1930, ed by C a r l Hutchison, 
Worcester, Mass., C l a r k Univ. 
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CHAPTER I I 
THE RI S E OF EVOLUTIONARY AND COMPARATIVE 
PSYCHOLOGY• 
1. The Concept of E v o l u t i o n and S c i e n t i f i c Thought 
Before Darwin. 
The concept of e v o l u t i o n has come to be w e l l 
e s t a b l i s h e d ever s i n c e C h a r l e s Darwin (1809-1882) p u b l i s h e d h i s 
O r i g i n of S p e c i e s i n 1859. The Darwinian theory, which was epoch-
making, has now i t s own i m p l i c a t i o n s i n modern psychology. 
Undoubtedly, the e v o l u t i o n a r y s p e c u l a t i o n s a r e deeply rooted i n the 
h i s t o r y of philosophy. I n the second h a l f of the n i n e t e e n t h 
century such s p e c u l a t i o n s became f i r m l y supported by f a c t u a l 
evidence a v a i l a b l e i n Darwin's w r i t i n g s . T h e e v o l u t i o n a r y movement, 
(2 ) 
as e x p l a i n e d by Darwin, i s regarded^"a new and l u x u r i o u s shoot" 
which has i t s r o o t s i n "the same s o i l as o l d e m p i r i c i s m " . 
(1 ) ( l ) L.S.Hearnshaw, o p . c i t . , p.32. 
( n ) E. Heidbreder, o p . c i t . , pp.105-106. 
( m ) Wm. McDougall, "Mental E v o l u t i o n " i n E v o l u t i o n m the l i g h t 
of Modern Knowledge, London, (1925), pp.321-322. 
(2) ( l ) R.Metz, o p . c i t . , p.95. 
( n ) J.B.S.Haldane, The Causes of E v o l u t i o n , London, Longman's 
(1932), p p . I f f . 
( m ) J.C.Flu'gel, A Hundred Y e a r s of Psychology, o p . c i t . , p.113. 
( I V ) A l f r e d R u s s e l l Wallace, Darwinism, London, MacMillan, (1889), 
pp.3ff. 
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I n the f i e l d of philosophy e v o l u t i o n came 
from Herbert Spencer, who a n t i c i p a t e d Darwin's p o s i t i o n . 
I n the f i e l d of s p e c i a l s c i e n c e s i t belongs to C h a r l e s 
Darwin and A l f r e d R u s s e l l Wallace. I n a j o i n t paper i n 
1858 they took the b i o l o g i c a l world by s u r p r i s e i n 
announcing the m o d i f i c a t i o n of s p e c i e s by n a t u r a l s e l e c t i o n . 
The g e n e r a l p o i n t of i n t e r e s t i s t h a t the a l l i a n c e which 
philosophy now entered i n t o w i t h biology proved to be as 
f r u i t f u l as t h a t which was forged between mathematics and 
p h y s i c s a t the time of D e s c a r t e s and Newton. Phi l o s o p h e r s 
now app r o p r i a t e d and employed the r e s u l t s of the s p e c i a l 
s c i e n c e s , and s c i e n t i s t s passed beyond the boundaries of t h e i r 
e n q u i r i e s to the general p h i l o s o p h i c a l consequences of t h e s e . 
The p i c t u r e seems to be as Metz put i t , "the forces of 
e v o l u t i o n marching as i t were i n two columns, at f i r s t 
(3) 
s e p a r a t e l y , l a t e r u n i t e d " . Before c o n s i d e r i n g Darwin's 
e s s e n t i a l i n f l u e n c e on Psychology today, the que s t i o n i s : 
What i s meant by e v o l u t i o n , and how has i t come to have a 
weighty impact on l i f e as a whole ? 
(3) ( l ) Metz, R., o p . c i t , p 95 ; see a l s o : 
( n ) Merz, J . Th., H i s t o r y of European Thought i n the 
X l X t h Century, London, Blackwood, 
(1896), Vol 3, p 461. 
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Previous to the Darwinian age, Lamarck (1744-
1829) t r i e d to prove t h a t a l l animals a r e descended from 
other s p e c i e s of animals. He a t t r i b u t e d the changes of the 
s p e c i e s c h i e f l y to the e f f e c t of changes i n the c o n d i t i o n s of 
animals' l i f e - such as c l i m a t e and food. He a l s o a s c r i b e d 
the change to the d e s i r e s and e f f o r t s of those animals 
themselves to improve t h e i r own c o n d i t i o n s and to modify t h e i r 
own form or s i z e . I n so t h i n k i n g , Lamarck seems to have been 
l e d by the well-known p h y s i o l o g i c a l law t h a t a l l organs a r e 
strengthened or weakened acco r d i n g to t h e i r use or d i s u s e . 
D espite the f a c t t h a t such a view was adopted by some, y e t the 
argument d i d not s a t i s f y the m a j o r i t y of n a t u r a l i s t s . Lamarck's 
(4 
other argument t h a t a c q u i r e d c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s are t r a n s m i s s a b l e 
from one generation to another was met w i t h much s c e p t i c i s m . 
The main disadvantage of Lamarck's theory was t h a t i t was 
l a r g e l y assumption; i t was unsupported by any f a c t u a l evidence. 
Moreover, subsequent experimental s t u d i e s , such as those by Mc-
Dougall, and based e s s e n t i a l l y on some of Lamarck's hypotheses, 
y i e l d e d no s a t i s f a c t o r y r e s u l t s . 
( 4 ) ( I ) W allace, A.R., Darwinism, o p . c i t , pp 3-4. 
( n ) , N a t u r a l S e l e c t i o n and T r o p i c a l Nature, 
London, MacMillan (1870), pp 31-32. 
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Anyhow, p r e f a c i n g The O r i g i n of S p e c i e s (1859), 
Darwin c r e d i t e d Lamarck w i t h "the eminent s e r v i c e of 
a t t e n t i o n to the p r o b a b i l i t y of a l l change i n the o r g a n i c , as 
w e l l as i n the i n o r g a n i c world, being the r e s u l t of law, and 
not of miraculous i n t e r p o s i t i o n " . Yet Darwin e q u a l l y 
d i s c a r d e d as "nonsense" Lamarck's a s c r i p t i o n of e v o l u t i o n to 
the organism's "needs" which stem from " i n n e r f e e l i n g s " . 
Darwin b e l i e v e d t h a t , by so t h i n k i n g , Lamarck had precluded the 
kingdom of p l a n t s . 
I t was argued a t the time, c h i e f l y by Robert 
Chambers i n : V e s t i g e s of C r e a t i o n , t h a t the v a r i o u s s p e c i e s 
of animals and p l a n t s had been produced i n o r d e r l y s u c c e s s i o n 
from each other by the a c t i o n of unknown laws of development, 
aided by the a c t i o n of e x t e r n a l c o n d i t i o n s . T h i s view i s 
( 5 ) 
judged to be as of l i t t l e i n f l u e n c e upon n a t u r a l i s t s . P r i o r 
to both Lamarck and Robert Chambers, Erasmus Darwin (1731-1802) 
(6 ) 
was mentioned f o r h i s e v o l u t i o n a r y views, as a l r e a d y 
i n d i c a t e d . 
* No date of p u b l i c a t i o n has been given by A.R.Wallace; 
Hearnshaw g i v e s the year (1844), o p . c i t . p.32 
(5) Wallace, A.R., Darwinism, o p . c i t . pp 4-5. 
(6Xi)Hearnshaw, L.S., o p . c i t . p 32. 
( n ) Merz, J.Th., V o l . 4, pp 235, 515 f f . 
( m ) S m i t h , Sydney, Elementary Sketches of Moral Philosophy, 
L e c t u r e s d e l i v e r e d a t The Royal I n s t i t u t e i n the years 
1804, 1805, 1806; London, Longman5, (1850), pp 251 f f . 
- 61 -
A l f r e d R u s s e l l Wallace, proponent of the theory 
( 7 ) 
of n a t u r a l s e l e c t i o n , b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e r e i s a tendency i n 
nature to the continued p r o g r e s s i o n of c e r t a i n c l a s s e s of 
v a r i e t i e s from the o r i g i n a l type. I n Wallace's view, t h i s 
p r o g r e s s i o n f o l l o w s "minute s t e p s " i n v a r i o u s d i r e c t i o n s ; 
( 8 ) 
w i t h L l o y d Morgan i t i s always " s t e p - l i k e or jumpy", and 
th a t each step i s accompanied by new q u a l i t i e s and p r o p e r t i e s 
t h a t c h a r a c t e r i s e the new e n t i t y which l e a p s i n t o being without 
l o s s of some of i t s o l d t r a i t s . T h i s s t e p - l i k e advance i s what 
L l o y d Morgan l a t e r c a l l e d "emergent e v o l u t i o n " . H.S. Jennings 
( 9 ) 
who saw th a t " e v o l u t i o n i s never c l o s e d " , d i s t i n g u i s h e d 
between mechanical e v o l u t i o n and emergent e v o l u t i o n . According 
to the f i r s t , the u n i v e r s e i s a physico-chemical mechanism, 
oper a t i n g w i t h i n v a r i a b l e laws, i t s e n t i r e o p e r a t i o n c a l c u l a b l e 
(7) N a t u r a l S e l e c t i o n , o p . c i t . p 33. 
(8) ( l ) Conway L l o y d Morgan, "Emergent E v o l u t i o n " MIND, N.S., 
Vol XXXIV, No. 133, January ( 1 9 2 5 ) , p.71 
( n ) , "Biology" E v o l u t i o n i n the L i g h t of 
Modern Knowledge, A c o l l e c t i v e work, London, 
B l a c k and Co., (1925), p.108 
( m ) , Emergent E v o l u t i o n , The G i f f o r d 
L e c t u r e s , Vol.1, London, W i l l i a m s Norgate (1923), 
PP 2-3. 
(9) The B i o l o g i c a l B a s i s of Human Nature, London, Fabre and Fabre 
( 1 9 3 0 ) , pp. 268, 361-363, 363-371. 
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xn advance. F u r t h e r o p e r a t i o n s , f u r t h e r e x i s t e n c e s , a r e as 
d e f i n i t e l y determined as are present and past ones. A l l t h a t 
i s c a l l e d mental has no i n f l u e n c e on the course of eve n t s . 
Things which a r e mental have no r o l e i n the op e r a t i o n of the 
u n i v e r s e , no r o l e i n e v o l u t i o n . The t y p i c a l d o c t r i n e of 
emergent e v o l u t i o n holds t h a t new p r o p e r t i e s and modes of 
a c t i o n appear when the st e p s a r e made from atoms to molecules, 
from simple molecules to complex ones, from i n o r g a n i c to 
org a n i c . I t holds too, t h a t the p r o p e r t i e s of l i v i n g t h i n g s 
depend on those of t h e i r physico-chemical c o n s t i t u e n t s when 
the l a t t e r are m l i v i n g t h i n g s ; t h e a c t i v i t i e s of the t h i n k i n g 
beings are the a c t i o n of t h e i r p h y s i o l o g i c a l c o n s t i t u e n t s when 
the l a t t e r are p a r t of a t h i n k i n g being; the a c t i v i t i e s of 
s o c i e t i e s are those of t h e i r u n i t i n d i v i d u a l s when those 
i n d i v i d u a l s form p a r t of s o c i e t y . 
The theory of e v o l u t i o n appeared to Henry Sidgwick^" 1"^ 
as e x c l u s i v e of s p e c i a l c r e a t i o n ; there i s here a h i n t t h a t 
Sidgwick i s r e f e r r i n g to Spencer's notion t h a t t h e r e should be 
a choice between two hypotheses - the hypothesis of s p e c i a l 
c r e a t i o n and the hypothesis of e v o l u t i o n . Sidgwick's i n t e r e s t i n 
(10) "The Theory of E v o l u t i o n i n i t s A p p l i c a t i o n to P r a c t i c e " 
MIND, Vol I , No.I, January (1876), p 53. See a l s o : 
F . P o l l o c k , " E v o l u t i o n and E t h i c s " MIND, Vol I , No.3, (1876), 
p.337. 
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e v o l u t i o n a l theory, however, was an e t h i c a l one. W i l l i a m Morton 
Wheeler thought t h a t e v o l u t i o n was concerned and mainly 
connected w i t h mental a f f a i r s . ^ So d i d W i l l i a m M c D o u g a l l ^ 1 ^ 
(12) 
and L e s t e r F . Ward. D i f f e r e n t names by d i f f e r e n t t h i n k e r s 
have been suggested f o r d i f f e r e n t a s p e c t s of the theory of 
e v o l u t i o n , such as "emergent e v o l u t i o n " (L.Morgan), " e v o l u t i o n a r y 
n a t u r a l i s m " , (R.W.Sellers) , " c r e a t i v e s y n t h e s i s " ^ 1 ^ 
(E.G.Spauldmg), "emergent v i t a l i s m " (C.D.Broad), "organism" 
(15) 
(J.Henderson). These v a r i o u s modes of emphasis, however, 
(11) "Emergent E v o l u t i o n and the S o c i a l Factor', 1 Psyche V o l . V I I , 
No.3, January, (1927) p.28 
(12) "Mental E v o l u t i o n " E v o l u t i o n i n the L i g h t of Modern Knowledge, 
o p . c i t . pp 321ff. 
(13) ( l ) MIND Vol I X , No.36, October, (1884), p. 563. 
See a l s o ; ( n ) H.W. Carr and G.D.Hicks i n a symposium 
on "The Nature and Range of E v o l u t i o n " , i n 
A r i s t o t e l i a n S o c i e t y , Vol I I , No. 4, (1894) pp 132-151. 
( m ) G . E l l i o t Smith, "Anthropology" P r e s i d e n t i a l Address i n : 
Rep.Brit.Asso. (1912), pp 575-598. 
I n t h i s paper Smith began h i s t a l k on e v o l u t i o n and the 
connotations t h i s word i n v o l v e s . 
(14) E v o l u t i o n a r y Naturalism, Chicago and London, (1922). 
(15) The New R a t i o n a l i s m , N.Y. (19 1 8 ) . 
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have " f a m i l i a n s e d us w i t h the notion of spontaneous v a r i a t i o n s 
i n animals and p l a n t s . T h i s phenomenon i s a l s o found i n 
Psychology - i n the i n t e l l e c t u a l order, i n the emotional order, 
i n the order of a c t i o n " . Both Spencer and Darwin^ 1"^ 
formulated the d o c t r i n e s of the " s u r v i v a l of the f i t t e s t " and 
(18) 
" n a t u r a l s e l e c t i o n " , which a r e now admitted by a l l . As 
Darwinism was i n the a i r t h e r e came neo-Darwinism which has 
(19) 
r e c e n t l y been re-named "the s y n t h e t i c theory". The new-
Darwinism i s p u r i f i e d by the e l i m i n a t i o n of Lamarckism. I t 
(16) ( l ) W i l l i a m Morton Wheeler, o p . c i t . p.28 
( n ) , S o c i a l L i f e among I n s e c t s , N.Y. ( 1 9 2 3 ) . 
(17) Th.Ribot, The Psychology of the Emotions, Eng. t r a n s , 
London, Walter S c o t t , (1897) p.193. 
(18) ( I ) Harold Hoffdmg, Modern P h i l o s o p h e r s , London, Macmillan, 
(1920), p. 229 
( n ) J.Mark Baldwin, "Determinate E v o l u t i o n " Psych.Rev., 
Vol IV, No.4, J u l y (1897) o p . c i t , p.393 
( m ) D.G.Ritchie, "Darwin and Hegel" The A r i s t o t e l i a n S o c i e t y , 
Vol.1, No.l, (1891) p.57 
For f u r t h e r r e a d i n g see J.Th.Merz, Vol.2 and Ch.VI of Vol.3 
both o p . c i t . 
(19) Grene, M a r j o r i e , "Two E v o l u t i o n a r y T h e o r i e s " p a r t I , The 
B r i t i s h J o u r n a l f o r the Philosophy of S c i e n c e , Vol IX, 
(1958-9), pp 110-127. See a l s o : d i s c u s s i o n s by 
d i f f e r e n t w r i t e r s of the paper above, the same J o u r n a l 
Vol.XIV (1963-4), pp. 1 4 0 f f , 1 4 6 f f . 
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teaches t h a t s e l e c t i o n alone, or the p r i n c i p l e of s u r v i v a l 
of the f i t t e s t i n the s t r u g g l e f o r e x i s t e n c e , i s the s o l e 
p r i n c i p l e of o r g a n i c e v o l u t i o n . The terms " s e l e c t i o n " and 
" s t r u g g l e " , as used by the new s c h o o l , are j u s t metaphors. 
(19) 
T h i s s c h o o l , which was l e d by August Weismann, l e f t no 
more scope f o r the operation of i n t e l l i g e n t purpose. Perhaps 
t h i s was the major reason why McDougall d i s a g r e e d w i t h i t s 
t e a c h i n g s e n t i r e l y . Despite a l l t h i s , i n i t s e s s e n t i a l s , the 
new movement i s s t i l l Darwinism. The two movements -
o r i g i n a l Darwinism and i t s d e r i v a t i o n - seldom d i s a g r e e about 
the f a c t s d i s c u s s e d . 
2. Darwinism and I t s Impact on Comparative P s y c h o l o g i c a l 
S t u d i e s . 
Darwin's conception of e v o l u t i o n was reached as 
a r e s u l t of h i s own observ a t i o n s and r e s e a r c h e s i n n a t u r a l 
s c i e n c e . The g r e a t e s t advance he made was by p u t t i n g forward 
s u f f i c i e n t evidence proving t h a t the e n t i r e world of l i v i n g 
(19) ( I ) McDougall, Wm. "Mental E v o l u t i o n " i n E v o l u t i o n 
i n the L i g h t of Modern Knowledge, o p . c i t , pp 327-8. 
( n ) WeismannjAugust, E s s a y s Upon Heredity, Oxford, 
Clarendon P r e s s , (1889), pp 316-385. 
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thi n g s i s p a r t of one order of e x i s t e n c e . T h i s order i s 
c a l l e d "Nature". His view i s t h a t animals and p l a n t s 
now e x i s t i n g have a r i s e n by tr a n s f o r m a t i o n from p r e v i o u s l y 
(21) 
e x i s t i n g k i n d s . The o r i g i n of man i s s u b j e c t to t h i s law. 
One of h i s most p o s i t i v e statements was : "As soon as I had 
become, i n the year 1837 or 1838, convinced t h a t s p e c i e s were 
mutable productions, I could not avoid the b e l i e f t h a t man 
.. (22) , must come under the same law . Darwin s s p e c i f i c 
statements show t h a t s p e c i e s ( t h e human s p e c i e s i s i n c l u d e d ) , 
had been c r e a t e d n a t u r a l l y ; n a t u r a l s e l e c t i o n had been the 
c h i e f agent of change. I n the days before Darwin, e v o l u t i o n 
..(23) 
was merely a w i l d s p e c u l a t i o n as McDougall d e s c r i b e d i t . 
(20) See; R i t t e r , W i l l i a m Emerson, C h a r l e s Darwin and the 
Golden Rule, Washington, S c i e n c e S e r v i c e s , 
(1954,) Ch.5 
(21) De Beer, S i r Gavin, " C h a r l e s Darwin: Master Mind" 
Proc.Brit.Academy, Vol XLIV, (1958), 
pp 163-183. 
(22) Darwin, F r a n c i s , The L i f e and L e t t e r s of C h a r l e s Darwin, 
2 v o l s , ( 1 8 9 8 ) . New York, Appleton, Vol I , 
pp 7 5 f f , 
(23) An O u t l i n e of Psychology, London, Methuen, ( 1 9 2 3 ) , p.129. 
See a l s o : 
( l ) Jevons, Frank B., E v o l u t i o n , London, Methuen (1900), 
pp 7 5 f f . 
( n ) Rignano, Eugenio, B i o l o g i c a l Memory, London, Kegan 
P a u l , (1926), pp 2 6 f f . 1 2 2 f f . 
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The attempt Darwin made was to e x p l a i n the 
process by which the t o t a l i t y of th i n g s has come to be 
what i t i s , I t d i f f e r s from most other attempts i n i t s 
s u c c e s s i n g i v i n g a s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n of the p r o c e s s . 
Probably t h i s i s why e v o l u t i o n i s m and Darwinism a r e 
(24) 
f i r m l y b e l i e v e d to be synonymous. More important s t i l l 
i s t h a t Darwin wrote a t a time when the i n t e l l e c t u a l world 
was j u s t becoming ready to c o n s i d e r , and e v e n t u a l l y to 
accept, the c o n s i d e r a b l e change i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l outlook. 
"But i t was i n the f i r s t p l a c e i t s common sense, down-to-earth 
q u a l i t y which gave Darwin's Theory i t s impetus towards winning 
..(25) 
agreement, s a i d Waddmgton who a l s o c i t e d G.G.Simpson as 
s a y i n g "How very s i l l y we were not to have thought of t h a t 
o u r s e l v e s " . 
As i t i s w e l l known, the t i t l e of C h a r l e s 
Darwin's great work was On the O r i g i n of S p e c i e s by Means of 
N a t u r a l S e l e c t i o n and the P r e s e r v a t i o n of Favoured Races i n 
(24) ( l ) Waddmgton, C.H. "Theories of E v o l u t i o n " i n 
A Century of Darwin, ed. by B a r n e t t , S.A., 
London, Herman, (1958), p . l 
( n ) Murphy, G., o p . c i t . , p 11. 
(25) C.H. Waddington, o p . c i t , pp 1-2, The quotation Waddington 
has taken from Simpson's : The Meaning of 
E v o l u t i o n ( 1 9 4 9 ) . 
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The Stru g g l e f o r L i f e (1859); and the context i n which h i s 
e v o l u t i o n a r y theory was f i r s t p resented was t h a t of the 
d o c t r i n e of the constancy of s p e c i e s . I n t h i s book Darwin 
brought together v a s t l y more f a c t u a l m a t e r i a l than had been 
p r e v i o u s l y assembled. His mam c o n t r i b u t i o n was to suggest a 
p l a u s i b l e mechanism by which the changes might be produced. 
He found the c l u e i n the work of Thomas R. Malthus (1766-1834) 
who, i n h i s noteworthy E s s a y on the P r i n c i p l e of P o p u l a t i o n 
(1 7 9 8 ) , had argued t h a t man would always tend to i n c r e a s e i n 
numbers to the l i m i t s e t by the amount of f o o d s t u f f s which he 
could produce from the r e g i o n he i n h a b i t e d . No sooner d i d 
Darwin formulate h i s theory than i t was accepted almost a t 
once by T.H. Huxley (1825-1895) and other l e a d i n g b i o l o g i s t s . ^ 
Darwin c o n s i s t e n t l y kept s a y i n g t h a t i n the l i f e 
of the organism t h e r e a r e two f a c t o r s , namely, "the nature of 
(26) ( l ) C.H. Waddmgton, o p . c i t pp 3 f f . 
( n ) A.R. Wallace, Darwinism, o p . c i t , pp 1-2. 
( m ) N a t u r a l S e l e c t i o n , o p . c i t . Chapter I I . 
( I V ) Thomas H. Huxley, L e c t u r e s and Lay Sermons, London, 
Dent, (1910) l a s t r e p r i n t e d ( 1 9 2 6 ) , pp 99-114. 
( v ) C D . D a r l i n g t o n , i n h i s i n t r o d u c t i o n to The O r i g i n 
of S p e c i e s , pp XV, XVI, XIX. 
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the organism" i t s e l f , and "the nature of the conditions",, The 
former i s more eminent from h i s s t a n d p o i n t . Every o r g a n i c 
being i s s a i d to be s t r i v i n g "to the utmost to i n c r e a s e i n 
numbers; t h a t each l i v e s by a s t r u g g l e a t some p e r i o d of i t s 
(27) 
l i f e " . S e v e r a l w r i t e r s have misapprehended.or obje c t e d to 
(28) 
the term N a t u r a l S e l e c t i o n , a term Darwin s u b s t i t u t e d 
(29) 
f o r "the P r i n c i p l e of P r e s e r v a t i o n " f o r the sake of b r e v i t y . 
He maintained t h a t a l l o r g a n i c beings have been formed on two 
great laws - "Unity of Type" and "The Conditions of E x i s t e n c e " . 
By u n i t y of type Darwin meant t h a t fundamental agreement i n 
s t r u c t u r e which i s seen i n o r g a n i c beings of the same s p e c i e s , 
and which i s q u i t e independent of t h e i r h a b i t s of l i f e . On 
Darwin's theory, u n i t y of type i s e x p l a i n e d by u n i t y of descent. 
By the c o n d i t i o n s of e x i s t e n c e he meant t h a t the a d a p t a t i o n s 
were aided i n many c a s e s by the i n c r e a s e d use or d i s u s e of 
p a r t s , being a f f e c t e d by the d i r e c t a c t i o n of the e x t e r n a l 
growth and v a r i a t i o n ; the law of the c o n d i t i o n s of e x i s t e n c e 
. t i i (30) Darwin c o n s i d e r s as the higher law . 
(27) The O r i g i n of S p e c i e s , London, John Murray, (1859) l a s t 
r e p r i n t 1920, pp 6-57. 
(28) i b i d , p 58. 
(29) i b i d , p 111. 
(30) i b i d , p 156. 
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. (31) 
Darwin s book, d e s c r i b e d as the p i l o t 
.. (32) 
b a l l o o n to a g r e a t e r machine , i s devoted to show t h a t 
not one l i v i n g s p e c i e s w i l l t r a n s m i t i t s u n a l t e r e d l i k e n e s s 
(33) 
to a d i s t a n t f u t u r i t y . The world of animals i s 
contemplated as engaged i n one v a s t unceasing s t r u g g l e f o r 
e x i s t e n c e . A l l o r g a n i c beings a r e exposed to s e v e r e 
competition, e i t h e r of one i n d i v i d u a l w i t h another of the 
same s p e c i e s , or w i t h i n d i v i d u a l s of d i f f e r e n t s p e c i e s , or 
w i t h the p h y s i c a l c o n d i t i o n s of l i f e . Here occurs the 
d o c t r i n e which Malthus a p p l i e d to the whole animal and 
(34) 
vegetable kingdoms. 
The impact of Darwin's theory on Psychology during 
the l a s t q u a r t e r of the X l X t h Century probably d i d as much as 
any other s i n g l e f a c t o r to shape the s c i e n c e as i t e x i s t s today. 
(31) ( 1 ) The O r i g i n of S p e c i e s , o p . c i t . pp 3 0 0 f f . 
( n ) The Athenaeum, November, (1859) pp 659-660. 
A note on "The O r i g i n of S p e c i e s " . 
( l i i ) T.H.Huxley, "The Darwinian H y p o t h e s i s " i n The Times, 
December 26, ( 1 8 5 9 ) . 
(32) The Athenaeum, o p . c i t p 660. 
(33) The O r i g i n of S p e c i e s , o p . c i t , Ch IV, pp 5 7 f f . 
(34) The Athenaeum, o p . c i t , p 659. 
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Psychology was c e r t a i n to become c o n s i s t e n t l y more b i o l o g i c a l . 
Mental p r o c e s s e s tended more and more to be s t a t e d i n terms of 
(35) 
the f u n c t i o n s s e r v e d i n the t a s k of a d j u s t i n g to the world. 
The Darwinian theory has i t s own i m p l i c a t i o n s i n psychology; i t 
taught t h a t man must not be considered as an i s o l a t e d element 
of h i s environment, but i n r e l a t i o n to the many f o r c e s t h a t 
mould him. Darwin gave psychology another p a t t e r n a f t e r i t had 
been moulded i n terms of m e c h a n i s t i c nature under other 
( 3 6 ) . 
i n f l u e n c e s . 
Again, Darwin's s p e c i f i c c o n t r i b u t i o n to c h i l d 
psychology was a specimen of h i s method i n the study of one of 
(37) 
h i s own i n f a n t s . He observed t h a t during the f i r s t seven 
days v a r i o u s r e f l e x a c t i o n s , such as sn e e z i n g , yawning, s t r e t c h i n g , 
b e s i d e s sucking and screaming, were w e l l performed by h i s son. 
On the seventh day, Darwin touched the naked s o l e of the i n f a n t ' s 
(35) ( l ) G. Murphy, o p . c i t , pp 113-116. 
( n ) B r e t t ' s H i s t o r y of Psychology, o p . c i t , p 585. 
( m ) J.C. F l u g e l , o p . c i t , p 113. 
(36) Heidbreder, E. o p . c i t , pp 105, 106. 
(37) B r e t t ' s H i s t o r y of Psychology, o p . c i t , p 638. 
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foot w i t h a pxece of paper, and the i n f a n t j e r k e d i t away, 
c u r l i n g h i s toes a t the same time, " l i k e a much o l d e r c h i l d 
when t i c k l e d " . On Darwin's view, "The p e r f e c t i o n of t h e s e 
r e f l e x movements shows t h a t the extreme i m p e r f e c t i o n of the 
v o l u n t a r y ones i s not due to the s t a t e of the muscles or of 
the c o - o r d i n a t i n g c e n t r e s , but to t h a t of the s e a t of the 
w i l l . At t h i s time, though so e a r l y , i t seemed to me t h a t a 
warm s o f t hand a p p l i e d to h i s f a c e e x c i t e d a w i s h to suck. 
T h i s must be considered as a r e f l e x or an i n s t i n c t i v e a c t i o n , 
f o r i t i s i m p o s s i b l e to b e l i e v e t h a t experience and 
a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h the touch of h i s mother's b r e a s t could so 
soon have come i n t o p l a y . 
Darwin's ob s e r v a t i o n s showed t h a t the wants of 
an i n f a n t a r e a t f i r s t made i n t e l l i g i b l e by " i n s t i n c t i v e 
c r i e s " , which a f t e r a time are modified i n p a r t u n c o n s c i o u s l y , 
and i n p a r t , v o l u n t a r i l y as a means of communication, - by 
the unconscious e x p r e s s i o n of the f e a t u r e s , - by g e s t u r e s and 
i n a marked manner by d i f f e r e n t i n t o n a t i o n s , - l a s t l y by words 
of a general nature intended by h i m s e l f , then of a more p r e c i s e 
(38) C h a r l e s Darwin, "A B i o g r a p h i c a l Sketch of an I n f a n t " 
MIND, Vol I I , No.7, J u l y (1877), pp 286-294. 
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(39) nature xmxtated from those whom he h e a r s . Darwxn 
b e l i e v e d t h a t an i n f a n t can understand a t a very e a r l y p e r i o d , 
the meaning or f e e l i n g s of those who tend him, by the 
e x p r e s s i o n of t h e i r g e s t u r e s . 
I n the Descent of Man and S e l e c t i o n i n R e l a t i o n 
to Sex (1871), Darwin s t r e s s e d the s i m i l a r i t y between the 
mental p r o c e s s e s of man and those of animals; he emphasised 
the importance of s e x u a l s e l e c t i o n as a f u r t h e r f a c t o r i n 
e v o l u t i o n . To the higher l i f e of s o c i a l and moral conduct, 
Darwin made a s i g n i f i c a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n i n t h i s book. His 
chapters on the "Comparison of the mental powers of man and 
the lower Animals" l a i d a strong and broad foundation f o r a l l 
the work which has subsequently developed knowledge of animal 
s o c i e t i e s , human s o c i e t i e s , and of the r e l a t i o n s between these 
i n r e f e r e n c e p a r t i c u l a r l y t o the p a r t played by i n s t i n c t . 
According to Darwin, a l l animals f e e l "wonder" and e x h i b i t 
" c u r i o s i t y " . The p r i n c i p l e of " i m i t a t i o n " i s strong i n man, 
(40) 
and e s p e c i a l l y w i t h the savages. 
(39) i b i d , pp 293, 294. 
(40) ( l ) The Descent of Man and S e l e c t i o n i n r e l a t i o n t o Sex, 
(1871) l a s t p u b l . ( 1 9 2 2 ) , pp 108,110,319,371. 
( n ) CM. W i l l i a m s , E v o l u t i o n a l E t h i c s , London, 
Macmillan, (1893) pp 2-12. 
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Darwin suggested, i n The E x p r e s s i o n of the 
Emotions i n Man and Animals (1 8 7 2 ) , an e v o l u t i o n a r y 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the changes of f e a t u r e s and of posture 
t h a t a r e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the major emotions. The t h r e e 
main p r i n c i p l e s which Darwin thought as accountable f o r 
most of the i n v o l u n t a r y e x p r e s s i o n s and g e s t u r e s used by 
man and the lower animals a r e : ( 1 ) The p r i n c i p l e of 
s e r v i c e a b l e a s s o c i a t e d h a b i t s - c e r t a i n complex a c t i o n s a r e 
of d i r e c t or i n d i r e c t s e r v i c e under c e r t a i n s t a t e s of the 
mind, i n order to r e l i e v e or g r a t i f y c e r t a i n s e n s a t i o n s , 
d e s i r e s , e t c . ( 2 ) The p r i n c i p l e of A n t i t h e s i s - c e r t a i n 
s t a t e s of the mind l e a d to c e r t a i n h a b i t u a l a c t i o n s , which a r e 
of s e r v i c e , as under the f i r s t p r i n c i p l e . ( 3 ) The p r i n c i p l e 
of a c t i o n s due to the c o n s t i t u t i o n of the nervous system, 
independently from the f i r s t of the w i l l , and independently 
(41) 
to a c e r t a i n extent of Habit. 
Although these two books together w i t h h i s 
B i o g r a p h i c a l Sketch of an I n f a n t a r e perhaps the most 
p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y o r i e n t e d of a l l h i s w r i t i n g s , Darwin never l o s t 
s i g h t of the importance of mental f a c t o r s i n e v o l u t i o n . The 
(41) ( l ) Darwin, The E x p r e s s i o n of the Emotions i n Man and 
Animals, (1872), p 28; see a l s o ; 
( n ) Young, P.T., Emotion m Man and Animal, New York, 
J . Wiley and Son ( 1 9 4 3 ) . 
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elements of h i s d o c t r i n e - n a t u r a l s e l e c t i o n , the 
s u r v i v a l of the f i t t e s t , a d aptation to environment, the 
i n h e r i t a n c e of favourable c h a r a c t e r s , and so on - had 
been i n v a r i o u s ways a n t i c i p a t e d i n e a r l i e r r e s e a r c h and 
s p e c u l a t i o n , but the g a t h e r i n g of them together i n t o a 
s i n g l e i m p r e s s i v e p i c t u r e of the o r i g i n and development of 
l i v i n g c r e a t u r e s was Darwin's remarkable achievement. 
Darwin's i n f l u e n c e on psychology, t h e r e f o r e , "extended, 
indeed", to quote Hearnshaw, " f a r beyond the s p e c i a l f i e l d 
of comparative psychology. He introduced a new way of 
l o o k i n g a t mind, as something f u n c t i o n a l and dynamic, as 
something deeply i n v o l v e d i n the s t r u g g l e f o r e x i s t e n c e 
and the process of a d a p t a t i o n to the environment. He pointed 
to the s i g n i f i c a n c e of i n d i v i d u a l d i f f e r e n c e s and i n h e r i t e d 
v a r i a t i o n s , and thus opened the way f o r the development of 
d i f f e r e n t i a l psychology". 
Another and i n t e r e s t i n g t h i n k e r on e v o l u t i o n , 
one whose l i f e and work overlapped t h a t of Darwin, was 
Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), of whom i n 1923 W i l l i a m McDougall 
(42) A Short H i s t o r y of B r i t i s h Psychology, o p . c i t , p 40. 
See a l s o : T h i l l y , H i s t o r y of philosophy, o p . c i t , 
p 5 4 2 f f . 
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(43) c ould w r i t e "the f o r l o r n f i g u r e of Herbert Spencer". 
Spencer's i d e a l of knowledge i s t h a t of a completely 
u n i f i e d system of thought. Knowledge must be connected and 
c o n s i s t e n t . S c i e n c e f u r n i s h e s us w i t h p a r t i a l l y u n i f i e d 
knowledge; Philosophy i s completely u n i f i e d knowledge; an 
org a n i c system: i t s problem i s to d i s c o v e r the h i g h e s t 
t r u t h s from which the p r i n c i p l e s of mechanics, p h y s i c s , 
biology, s o c i o l o g y , and e t h i c s can be deduced. A l l these 
p r o p o s i t i o n s must be i n harmony w i t h one another. I n the 
F i r s t P r i n c i p l e s (1860-1862), which forms the b a s i s of the 
e n t i r e system, the fundamental axioms a r e s e t f o r t h , which 
ar e a f t e r w a r d a p p l i e d m the P r i n c i p l e s of Biology (1864-
1867), P r i n c i p l e s of Psychology (1855), P r i n c i p l e s of 
Sociology (1876-1896), P r i n c i p l e s of E t h i c s (1879-1893). 
Spencer c a l l s h i s philosophy " s y n t h e t i c philosophy", whereby 
i s meant the f u n c t i o n of such a u n i v e r s a l s c i e n c e to 
combine i n t o a c o n s i s t e n t system the u n i v e r s a l t r u t h s 
(44) 
a r r i v e d at by the p a r t i c u l a r s c i e n c e s . Spencer dominated 
(43) An o u t l i n e of psychology ( 1 9 2 3 ) , o p . c i t , p 29. 
(44) ( l ) T h i l l y , o p . c i t , p 5 3 5 f f . 
( n ) C.M.Williams, E v o l u t i o n a l E t h i c s , ( 1 8 9 3 ) , 
o p . c i t . pp 2 8 f f . 
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the p h i l o s o p h i c a l f i e l d i n England i n the l a s t few decades 
of the X l X t h Century i n much the same way as M i l l , 
Hamilton, Bentham, Reid, and Hume had done m t h e i r day. 
He i s one of the few B r i t i s h p h i l o s o p h e r s whose fame spread 
beyond B r i t a i n i n t h e i r own l i f e t i m e . Indeed, he a c q u i r e d 
a u n i v e r s a l r e p u t a t i o n and h i s works were t r a n s l a t e d i n t o 
(45) 
n e a r l y a l l the languages of developed peoples. 
N a t u r a l i s t i c e v o l u t i o n i s m found i t s s p e c i f i c a l l y 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l embodiment i n the system which Spencer 
formulated and was the c u l m i n a t i n g p o i n t . I t was Spencer who 
brought to a focus the s e v e r a l l i n e s of thought r e l e a s e d by 
the Darwinian Theory and s k i l f u l l y worked them up i n t o an 
i m p r e s s i v e p h i l o s o p h i c a l system. As an " e v o l u t i o n i s t Spencer 
was i n f a c t f i r s t i n the f i e l d . " I n h i s a r t i c l e on The 
Development Hypothesis i n 1852, Spencer advocated development 
by s u c c e s s i v e m o d i f i c a t i o n s r a t h e r than s p e c i a l c r e a t i o n , and 
put forward a Lamarckian e x p l a n a t i o n i n terms of the 
i n h e r i t a n c e of a c q u i r e d c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . 
(45) ( l ) R. Metz : o p . c i t , p 9 8 f f . 
( n ) C.M.Williams, o p . c i t , pp 4 8 f f . 
( m ) H.C. Warren, o p . c i t , pp 1 2 1 f f . 
(46) L.S. Hearnshaw, o p . c i t , p 40. 
(47) ( l ) i b i d pp 40-41. 
( n ) Th.Ribot, E n g l i s h Psychology, o p . c i t , pp 134-139. 
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Spencer accepted the a s s o c i a t i v e p r i n c i p l e which 
was c u r r e n t a t h i s time. He noted v a r i o u s phases i n the 
p r o c e s s of e v o l u t i o n which a f f e c t e d the psychology of 
a s s o c i a t i o n : (1) c o n c e n t r a t i o n , as i n the formation of a 
c l o u d , and i n the sand-heap; (2 ) d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , on the 
s e p a r a t i o n of the mass from i t s environment, and the 
formation of s p e c i a l masses w i t h i n i t ; ( 3 ) determination, the 
formation of the d i f f e r e n t i a t e d p a r t s i n t o a u n i f i e d , 
o r ganised whole. A l l the t h r e e p a r t s a r e subsumed under : 
(48) / Law of E v o l u t i o n . The e v o l u t i o n ' psychology, as worked 
out by Spencer, i s based e s s e n t i a l l y on the b i o l o g i c a l analogy. 
I t i s "mechanical" only m the w i d e s t sense of the term - not 
p h y s i c a l , l i k e the a s s o c i a t i o n i s m of James M i l l and Bam, nor 
c h e m i c o - p h y s i c a l , l i k e t h a t of the other e a r l i e r a s s o c i a t i o n i s t s , 
(49) 
but bio-chemical and p h y s i c a l . 
Spencer analysed the components of mind i n t o 
" f e e l i n g s " and " r e l a t i o n s between f e e l i n g s " . "A f e e l i n g 
(48) T h i l l y , o p . c i t , p 541. 
(49) H.C. Warren, o p . c i t . p 120. 
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cannot form an element of mxnd a t a l l " ^ ^ except t h a t xt 
xs assocxated wxth pre d e c e s s o r s whxch a r e more or l e s s the 
same xn n a t u r e . By composxtxon of the r e l a t x o n s and xdeas 
of the r e l a t x o n s , x n t e l l x g e n c e a r x s e s . By composxtxon of 
(51) 
f e e l x n g s and xdeas of f e e l x n g s , emotxons a r x s e . 
Assocxatxon accordxng to Spencer xnvolves two 
problems ( 1 ) the assocxatxon of f e e l x n g s , both vxvxd and 
f a x n t ; (2) the a s s o c x a t i o n of the r e l a t x o n s between 
(52) 
f e e l x n g s . Conscxousness xs d i v i d e d i n t o two c l a s s e s -
f e e l x n g s and cognxtxons, the l a t t e r being s t a t e s whxch 
correspond to the r e l a t x o n s of f e e l x n g s . The former c o n s i s t 
of ( 1 ) p r e s e n t a t i v e f e e l i n g s , or s e n s a t i o n s ; (2) p r e s e n t a t i v e -
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e f e e l i n g s , embracing a great p a r t of what 
a r e commonly c a l l e d emotions; ( 3 ) r e p r e s e n t a t i v e or 
i d e a t i o n a l f e e l i n g s ; and ( 4 ) r e - r e p r e s e n t a t i v e f e e l i n g s , the 
most complex s t a t e s of a l l , which i n c l u d e the higher 
(50) Herbert Spencer, The P r i n c i p l e s of Psychology, London, 
Longman (1855) pp 584-592, 1 s t ed. xn one 
volume; 2nd ed, 1870, e s s e n t x a l l y r e - w r x t t e n , 
xn two volumes; 3rd ed, enlarged, 1880. 
(51) xbxd p 104. See a l s o CM. Wxllxams, op.cxt, p 51. 
(52) ( x ) xbxd 1 s t ed, pp 584ff; 3rd ed p 1 0 4 f f . 
( i x ) see a l s o : Hoffdxng: Vol I I , o p . c i t , p 4 6 2 f f . 
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(53) sentiments, such as j u s t i c e . 
Important i n i t s b e a r i n g on the law of 
a s s o c i a t i o n i s Spencer's d i s c u s s i o n of c o - e x i s t e n c e and 
s u c c e s s i o n . He regards a s s o c i a t i o n as the r e v i v a l of 
s i m i l a r e x p e r i e n c e s . To t h i s he adds the r e l a t i o n of 
ex p e r i e n c e s , which i s "The con j u n c t u r e of contiguous " 
ex p e r i e n c e s . I n the higher m a n i f e s t a t i o n s of 
consciousness t h i s c o n t i g u i t y tends more and more to the 
form of s u c c e s s i o n , w i t h corresponding l o s s on the s i d e 
of c o - e x i s t a n c e . He s t a r t s w i t h " r e f l e x a c t i o n " as the 
lowest form of p s y c h i c a l l i f e ; i t i s the "most n e a r l y 
r e l a t e d to p h y s i c a l l i f e " . ^ ^ The next higher form, 
" i n s t i n c t s " , i n c l u d e s compound r e f l e x a c t i o n s . Memory 
a r i s e s when the s t i m u l u s i s so complicated t h a t the nervous 
c e n t r e cannot r e c e i v e a l l the impressions a t the same 
+ + (55) i n s t a n t . 
(53) ( l ) i b i d , 3rd ed, pp 104-5. 
( n ) see a l s o : Hearnshaw, o p . c i t , pp 43-44. 
( m ) H.C.Warren, o p . c i t , pp 121-124. 
( I V ) Herbert Spencer, "Comparative Psychology of Man" 
i n MIND, Vol I , No 1, (1876). 
(54) F i r s t P r i n c i p l e s of Psychology, pp 105, 108, 109. 
(55) i b i d pp 108-109. 
- 81 -
I t i s true,Spencer's psychology was "a 
., (56) 
prolegomenon to other s t u d i e s , as Hearnshaw has 
observed. Spencer's e a r l i e s t and most enduring i n t e r e s t 
was m e t h i c a l q u e s t i o n s . Throughout the data of e t h i c s , 
as throughout every e t h i c a l t r e a t i s e , ends a r e c o n s t a n t l y 
(57) 
i n view. Spencer was of the opinion t h a t the s c i e n c e s 
of b i o l o g y , psychology, and s o c i o l o g y show us, i n the 
f i r s t p l a c e , a supreme or u l t i m a t e end to the r e a l i s a t i o n 
of which human a c t i o n s a r e u n i v e r s a l l y or normally d i r e c t e d ; 
such s c i e n c e s enable us, i n the second p l a c e , to determine 
the kind of conduct by which t h i s end may be a t t a i n e d i n 
(58) 
the h i g h e s t p o s s i b l e degree. Sidgwick l a t e r c i t e d w i t h 
approval Spencer's d e f i n i t i o n of conduct as "the 
„ (59) 
adjustment of a c t s t o ends . 
(56) A Short H i s t o r y of B r i t i s h Psychology, o p . c i t , p 45. 
(57) Herbert Spencer, " R e p l i e s to C r i t i c i s m s on the Data of 
E t h i c s " i n MIND, Vol V I , No.21, January (1881) p 83. 
(58) Henry Sidgwick, "Mr Spencer's E t h i c a l System", MIND 
Vol V, No.18, A p r i l , (1880) p 217. 
(59) i b i d , p 217; see a l s o t h i s volume, No.20, "Another 
view of Mr.Spencer's E t h i c s " by A l f r e d W. Benn, 
pp. 489-512. 
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The higher m a n i f e s t a t i o n s of mind a r e regarded 
as a s s o c i a t i o n s and r e l a t i o n s of lower forms of 
m a n i f e s t a t i o n s , very much as H a r t l e y and the M i l l s regarded 
(60) 
them. Although Spencer was not a t r a i n e d p s y c h o l o g i s t , 
h i s p s y c h o l o g i c a l w r i t i n g s , however, must be a p p r e c i a t e d m 
"The breadth and magnificance of Spencer's v i s i o n " . 
The most important r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of 
ev o l u t i o n i s m a f t e r Spencer i s George Henry Lewes (1817-1878). 
He belongs as much to l i t e r a t u r e as to philosophy. He i s 
w e l l known i n philosophy and psychology f o r h i s B i o g r a p h i c a l 
H i s t o r y of Philosophy (1845-6), r e p r i n t e d ( 1 8 5 7 ) , The 
H i s t o r y of Philosophy, l a s t p r i n t (1880) - 2 v o l s -
Physiology of Common L i f e (1859-60), and a s e r i e s of volumes 
e n t i t l e d : Problems of L i f e and Mind (1874-9). T h i s l a s t 
work develops m d e t a i l the w r i t e r ' s views of the nature 
of mind and h i s system of psychology. He came under the 
(60) ( l ) H, Spencer: P r i n c i p l e s of Psychology, o p . c i t , 1 s t ed, 
pp 504, 533, 539. 
( l i ) H.C. Warren, o p . c i t , pp 168-172, 121-137. 
( m ) L.S. Hearnshaw, o p . c i t . pp 42-45. 
( I V ) Harold Hoffding, o p . c i t , pp 4 5 2 f f . Vol I I . 
(61) J.C. F l u g e l , o p . c i t . p 116. 
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i n f l u e n c e of Spencer a f t e r he had been f o r some time 
a f f e c t e d by Combe's system. I n the end he went h i s own 
(62) 
way. 
Lewes's arguments covered b i o l o g i c a l and 
p s y c h o l o g i c a l as w e l l as p h i l o s o p h i c a l m a t t e r s . His 
d i s c u s s i o n s teemed w i t h " i d e a s , many of them important", 
.. (63) 
but as a whole they l a c k e d c o n s i s t e n c y and compactness . 
I t was he who coined the term " m e t a p h y s i c a l " f o r t h a t which 
l i e s beyond experience. Yet he d i d not deny a l t o g e t h e r 
m etaphysical problems a p l a c e m p h i l o s o p h i c a l s p e c u l a t i o n s . 
I n the p s y c h o l o g i c a l f i e l d Lewes's s t u d i e s were 
of u n c e r t a i n n a t u r e . Yet from time to time he was 
"acclaimed and r e - d i s c o v e r e d " . "Lewes", w r i t e s Warren, 
"deserves f a r more study than has been accorded him by r e c e n t 
w r i t e r s ; and e s p e c i a l l y does he deserve the a t t e n t i o n of 
( 65 ) 
g e n e t i c psychology". The same view was h e l d byboth 
S u l l y and L l o y d Morgan. (62) ( I ) L.S. Hearnshaw, o p . c i t , p 46. 
( n ) R. Metz, o p . c i t , p 120. 
( m ) H.C. Warren, o p . c i t , pp 137-8. 
(63) R. Metz, o p . c i t , p 120. 
(64) L.S. Hearnshaw, o p . c i t , p 46. 
(65) H.C. Warren, o p . c i t , p 152; i t i s a l s o quoted by 
Hearnshaw on p 46. 
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Lewes*s e v o l u t i o n a r y a s s o c i a t i o n i s m i s to be 
found i n Volume V of : Problems of L i f e and Mind. Though not 
complete i n i t s e x p o s i t i o n , i t comprises most of the e s s e n t i a l 
p o i n t s of h i s psychology, and c o r r e c t s many of h i s e a r l i e r 
i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s . Hearnshaw a s c r i b e s the reason why Lewes has 
been passed i n t o o b l i v i o n "to the f a c t t h a t Lewes' p r i n c i p a l 
p s y c h o l o g i c a l work, Problems of L i f e and Mind (1874-9), 
appeared l a t e r i n time, when the B r i t i s h e m p i r i c a l t r a d i t i o n 
was on the p o i n t of being submerged i n the i d e a l i s t i c f l o o d " . 
Again, as he a s c r i b e s i t p a r t l y to "a r e s u l t of the 
,. (66) 
inadequacy of the l a b e l s w i t h which Lewes has been marked . 
He has been d e s c r i b e d by Ward as a m a t e r i a l i s t , by Warren 
an a s s o c i a t i o n i s t , by Ribot a p o s i t i v i s t , by Metz an 
( 67) 
e v o l u t i o n i s t . A more important reason f o r Lewes's n e g l e c t 
i s perhaps t h a t he was " r e p e t i t i o u s , verbose, and 
+ (68) unsystematic . 
Hearnshaw's argument here does not seem to be 
d e f e n s i b l e enough. "The i d e a l i s t i c f l o o d " at Lewes's time 
(66) L.S. Hearnshaw, o p . c i t , p 46 
(67) ( l ) i b i d , p 46. 
( n ) R. Metz, pp 120ff. 
(68) Hearnshaw, o p . c i t , p 46. 
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was never s t r o n g e r than xt had been a t the txrae of, say, 
Berkeley or H a r t l e y . Both these w r x t e r s , as xt xs now 
known, xntroduced some psychologxcal vxews whxch a r e s t x l l 
apprecxated and recognxsed. I n Lewes's case xt appears to 
be ( 1 ) t h a t he was deeply xndulging xn phxlosophxcal realms 
so t h a t he was d x s t r a c t e d from consxderxng p u r e l y psychologxcal 
questxons; (2) t h a t he t r x e d to grope wxth many f x e l d s t h a t 
X 
were of a general nature xnstead of concetratxng on 
specxfxc psychologxcal xssues; and ( 3 ) perhaps he dxd not 
have the bent f o r such dxscxplxnes as psychology, despxte 
the f a c t t h a t he sometxmes dxscussed x t . 
"Psychology xs the scxence of Mxnd", wrxtes Lewes. 
"Thxs scxence may seek ... xmportant means of investxgatxon 
xn the laws of physxology, ... physxology x t s e l f must seek 
xmportant axds xn chemxstry and physxcs. But as an 
xndependent branch of xnquxry, x t s r e s u l t s cannot be amenable 
to physxologxcal canons; thexr v a l x d x t y cannot be d e c l a r e d 
by agreement or dxsagreement wxth physxologxcal laws. To 
c x t e an example : Psychology announces t h a t the mxnd has 
d x f f e r e n t f a c u l t x e s . That f a c t seems e s t a b l x s h e d on ample 
evxdenoe, and xs v a l x d xn psychology, although h x t h e r t o no 
„ (69) 
correspondxng f a c t xn physxology has been dxscovered . 
(69) ( x ) G.H.Lewes, Physxology of Common L x f e (1859) pp.2,3 
xt xs a l s o cxted by Th.Rxbot : Englxsh Psychology, 
p.292. 
(xx) The Study of Psychology, London, Kegan P a u l , 
(1890) pp.5, 158ff; the book was publxshed posthumously. 
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Lewes concedes independence to the two s c i e n c e s , although 
he i n s i s t s upon t h e i r r e l a t i o n . N e v e r t h e l e s s , the 
foundations of h i s psychology have both b i o l o g i c a l and 
p h y s i o l o g i c a l a s p e c t s . Lewes' p s y c h o l o g i c a l d o c t r i n e s 
are to be embodied under : (1 ) "of the nature of l i f e , and X 
of the v i t a l p r i n c i p l e ; (2) of consciousness and of i t s 
forms; (3) of s l e e p ; and (4 ) of h e r e d i t y from a p s y c h o l o g i c a l 
(71) 
point of view. The theory of consciousness i n p a r t i c u l a r 
had a prominent p l a c e i n Lewes' psychology. He examined 
the q u e s t i o n of l a t e n t or i n s e n s i b l e p e r c e p t i o n s , and he 
d i s t i n g u i s h e d a v a r i e t y of such p e r c e p t i o n s m the 
(72) 
h i e r a r c h y of c o n s c i o u s n e s s . 
I n Lewes*s view t h e r e a r e no n a t u r a l boundaries 
between psychology and physiology. N e v e r t h e l e s s , he 
emphasised t h e i r independence, as mentioned above. No doubt 
a p u r e l y p h y s i o l o g i c a l a c t , such as c i r c u l a t i o n , d i f f e r s 
e n t i r e l y from a p u r e l y p s y c h o l o g i c a l a c t , such as deductive 
(70) L.S. Hearnshaw, o p . c i t , pp 48, 49, 
(71) Th.Ribot, o p . c i t , p 292. 
(72) ( l ) G.H.Lewes "What i s S e n s a t i o n ? " MIND, Vol 1, No.2, 
A p r i l 1876, p 157. 
( l i ) Th.Ribot, o p . c i t , pp 2 9 6 f f . 
( i n ) James S u l l y , The Human Mind, A text-book of Psychology, 
London, Longmans, 1892, Vol I , p 70 footnote; 
( I V ) , O u t l i n e s of Psychology, London, Longmans(1898) 
p. 38 
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reasoning, but there i s an entire order of f a c t s , insensible 
perceptions, r e f l e x actions, i n s t i n c t s and the l i k e , by 
(73) 
means of which the two l i n e s mingle and are confounded. 
In summary, however, the mam features of Lewes's 
psychology are : 
1. He t r i e d to frame the concept of biological evolution with 
his own discussions. 
2. He formulated the grouping (or associative function) of 
mental phenomena. 
3. He indicated that images are individual and s p e c i f i c . 
4. He pointed out that ideas are both general and abstract. 
5. Images imply memories and imagination, and ideas imply 
judgements and reasoning. 
Generally, Lewes's associative psychology i s akin to 
modern philosophy which "opens with a method, and ends with a 
method; and i n each case t h i s method leads to positive science, 
(74) 
and sets metaphysics aside". 
(73) ( l ) G.H. Lewes, Problems of L i f e and Mind, Vol I I , pp 44ff. 
( n ) Th.Ribot, op.cit, pp 301ff. 
(74) ( l ) Lewes, G.H., Biographical History of Philosophy, op.cit, 
p 663. 
( n ) Warren, H.C., op.cit, pp 138-152, 172-175. 
( m ) Hearnshaw, L.S. op.cit, pp 51-53. 
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3. Other Contemporaries of Darwin. 
An immediate consequence of the formulation of mental 
evolution, prompted by Darwin's influence, was a more active 
study of the mental l i f e of animals. This was associated with 
a quickening of interest i n Psychology i n general, especially 
i n comparative psychology. I n t h i s movement, George John 
Romanes (1848-1894) led the way, and was followed by many others. 
Romanes was the most systematic comparative psychologist of 
his age. He experimented and collected detailed observations. 
He also "attempted to map the t e r r i t o r y of animal psychology 
(75) 
des c r i p t i v e l y and t h e o r e t i c a l l y " . Although he was 
designated as an "anecdotalist", mainly because of his popular 
writings, most of his views are comparable with those of 
Darwin, T.H.Huxley, H.Spencer, G.H. Lewes, F.Galton, and other 
(76) 
leading scholars. 
(77) 
In a lecture on "Animal I n t e l l i g e n c e " Romanes 
pointed out that the int e r e s t i n those days attaching to the 
(75) Hearnshaw, L.S. op.cit, p 92. 
(76) ( l ) i b i d , p 92. 
( n ) See also : "Mental Evolution" i n Evolution m the 
Light of Modern Knowledge, op.cit, p 324. 
(77) Delivered i n the Hulme Town Hal l , Manchester, March 
12th, (1879), p 151. (pamphlet). 
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study of animal intelligence arose from the importance of 
"descent"; for as t h i s theory was - and s t i l l i s - accepted, 
comparative psychology, l i k e the science of comparative 
anatomy, was placed on a completely new foundation. No 
longer was i t enough to say that a c e r t a i n action of an 
animal was determined by i n s t i n c t , and other acts were beyond 
the reach of further explanation. Now the very thing to be 
explained was the character and origin of i n s t i n c t , "the 
causes which led to i t s development, i t s continuance, i t s 
precision, and i t s use". No longer was i t enough to consider 
the i n s t i n c t s manifested by one animal as an isolated body of 
phenomena, devoid of any s c i e n t i f i c meaning. "The whole 
s c i e n t i f i c import of i n s t i n c t s as manifested by one animal now 
depends on the degree m which they are connected by general 
principles with the i n s t i n c t s which are manifested by other 
animals". The marks of Romanes's observations can be r e a l i s e d 
i n (1) the emphasis l a i d on evolutionary arguments m 
general; (2) the in t e r e s t attached to the comparative studies 
of man and animals; (3) the considerable s t r e s s put on 
i n s t i n c t s as movers of behaviour both i n man and animals. 
Darwin's followers maintained that a l l organisms are 
a l i k e products of a natural genesis. Wallace's followers 
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maintained that a d i s t i n c t exception must be made to th i s 
general statement m the case of human mind. Thus the 
school of evolutionists was divided into two sects, according 
to one of which the mind of man slowly evolved from lower 
types of mental l i f e ; according to the other, the mind of 
man stands apart from a l l other types of mental l i f e . In 
re l a t i o n to these two factions, Romanes took a middle ground. 
He consented to allow that the mind of man d i f f e r s from that 
of the lower animals only i n the degree to which i t i s 
developed. 
Romanes saw no reason why a d i s t i n c t i o n i s to be made 
(79) 
between human and animal psychology. Yet the difference i n 
mentality i s o b v i o u s o n l y m the formation of ideas and 
f 81) 
benefiting from experience. He distinguished between two 
(78) ( i ) i b i d , p 152. c f . p 159. 
( i i ) A.R.Wallace, Darwinism, op.cit, pp 131, 139. 
( m ) G.J.Romanes, Mental Evolution i n Animals, London, (1883). 
(79) G.J.Romanes, Mental Evolution m Man, London, Kegan Paul, 
(1888), p 13. 
(80) i b i d , pp 16-17. 
(81) i b i d , pp 20-21. 
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types of ideas, p a r t i c u l a r and general; the former include 
( 82) 
"percepts", whereas the l a t t e r r efer to concepts. He 
tended to show that conscious ideation i s concerned with 
(83) (84) grouping. He further c l a s s i f i e d ideas into : (1) 
simple ideas, or ideas of p a r t i c u l a r perceptions; 
(2) abstract ideas, or ideas of general quality; (3) these 
l a t t e r c l a s s Romanes subdivided into (a) ideas which may be 
developed by simple feelings, and (b) ideas which can only 
be developed by the aid of signs. To Romanes ideas, however, 
are "the psychological units which compose the whole 
,. (85),, 
structure i n t e l l e c t u a l , m the mind of animals and i n 
the mind of infants there i s a world of images standing as 
,. (86) 
signs of outward objects ; but the mind i s not mature 
enough to move through "the higher and tenuous medium of 
(82) i b i d , p 23. 
(83) i b i d , pp 40, 59. 
(84) G.J.Romanes, "Animal In t e l l i g e n c e " , An Evening Lecture 
delivered before The B r i t i s h Association at Dublin, 
August 16, 1878, Published i n : The XlXth Century, Vol. 
IV, No. XX, pp 653-672. 
(85) i b i d , p 655. 
(86) Mental Evolution i n Man, op.cit, p 196. 
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introspective thought". These are the views that James 
(87 ) 
Sully also maintains. This once again indicates 
Romanes' b e l i e f that both man and the animals have much 
in common. 
In his Animal Intelligence (1882), Romanes 
presented a great mass of data on animal behaviour. By 
so doing, he l a i d the groundwork for a subsequent 
argument on the r e l a t i o n of animals to man. The book was 
written i n the b e l i e f that comparative psychology i s as 
important as comparative anatomy. In Mental Evolution i n 
Animals (1883), Romanes endeavoured to indicate continuity 
among animal forms. Far from being a mere anecdotalist, he 
conducted an important experiment on " j e l l y - f i s h " , a 
research on a primitive nervous system. I t was summarised 
in book-form i n J e l l y - f i s h , S t a r - f i s h and Sea-Urchins (1885). 
Basing his idea on the experiments he did, Romanes was able 
(88) 
to suggest that "summation of s t i m u l i " might apply 
throughout Psychology. The fourth book, Mental Evolution i n 
Man (1888), completed the s e r i e s and was the most important 
from the point of view of the argument about evolution. His 
(87) i b i d , pp 201-3. 
(88) J e l l y - f i s h (1885) p 53; See also L.S.Hearnshaw, op.cit, 
p. 93. 
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general conclusion was that 'simple ideas", l i k e sensory 
impressions, perceptions and the memories of perceptions, 
are common to a l l animals and man; that "complex ideas", 
belong to some animals and to man; and that "notional 
ideas", the concepts of abstract and general thinking, are 
the "unique prerogative of man".^^^ I t was largely for 
(90) 
using such terms that he was sometimes classed with Locke 
and the other a s s o c i a t i o n i s t s ; but his experimental and 
d i s t i n c t i v e theoretical approach have assured him of a 
secure place i n the history of Psychology, 
Among the s c i e n t i s t s who took to the new idea of 
evolutionism and elaborated i t was Thomas Henry Huxley 
(91) 
(1825-1895). Both he and Spencer were among the notable 
writers who ably defended Darwin against the storm of 
c r i t i c i s m following the publication of the Origin of Species. 
Huxley was a distinguished zoologist, and was probably the 
most important and most outspoken advocate of the new view of 
(89) E.G.Boring, op.cit, pp 473-474. 
(90) "Animal I n t e l l i g e n c e " i n : The XlXth Century, op.cit, 
p 670. 
(91) ( l ) E.G. Boring, op.cit, p 471. 
( n ) R. Metz, op.cit, p 110. 
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the universe. He accepted Darwin's conception of the 
struggle for existence; but he was rather more s c e p t i c a l 
(92) 
of the doctrine of natural selection. 
Huxley has been described as Darwin's "general agent", 
(93) 
"bull-dog", and "knight-at-arms". In his chapter "on 
the Reception of *The Origin of S p e c i e s ' ^ ^ " , he c a l l e d 
Darwin the "Newton of Biology". He added, "the oldest of a l l 
philosophies, that of Evolution, was bound hand and foot and 
cast into utter darkness during the millennium of theological 
scholasticism. But Darwin poured new l i f e into the ancient 
home; the bonds burst, and the r e v i v i f i e d thought of ancient 
Greece has proved i t s e l f to be a more adequate expression of 
the universal order of things than any of the schemes which 
have been accepted by the credulity and welcomed by the 
superstition of seventy l a t e r generations of men. The 
emergence of the philosophy of Evolution i n the attitude of 
claimant to the throne of the world of thought, i s the most 
portentUous event of the nineteenth century". X 
(92) ( I ) J.Th. Merz, Vol I I I , op.cit, p 30. 
( n ) R. Metz, op.cit, pp 110-111. 
( m ) H.Hoffding, Vol I I , op.cit, pp 445, 452. 
(93) B a s i l Willey, Darwin and Butler, Chatto, London, (1960) p.33. 
(94) T.H.Huxley, Collected Essays 9 vols., (1893-4), Vol I I , 
Ch.5, also c i t e d by B. Willey, op.cit, pp 33-34. 
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Huxley's admiration of Darwin's evolutionary theory 
never prevented him from turning a spot-light on a few 
points of Darwin's l i t t l e p i t f a l l s . That which struck Huxley 
most forcibly on his f i r s t perusal of The Origin of Species, 
was the conviction that "Teleology" as commonly understood, 
(95) 
"had received i t s death blow at Mr.Darwin's hands". For 
Huxley the te l e o l o g i c a l argument runs thus : an organ or 
organism (A) i s p recisely f i t t e d to perform a function or 
purpose (B); therefore i t was s p e c i a l l y constructed to perform 
that function. For the notion that every organism has been 
created as i t i s and launched straight at a purpose, Darwin 
substitutes the conception of something which Huxley termed 
"a method of t r i a l and error". "Organisms vary incessantly", 
Huxley argues; "of these variations the few meet with 
surrounding conditions which s u i t them and thrive; the many 
.. (96) 
are unsuited and become extinguished . According to 
teleology each organism i s l i k e "a r i f l e b ullet f i r e d straight 
at a mark", "according to Darwin", Huxley adds, "organisms 
are l i k e grapeshot of which one h i t s something and the re s t 
(95) T.H.Huxley, Lectures and Lay Sermons; "Criticisms on 
The Origin of Species", op.cit, p.100. 
(96) i b i d , pp 100-101, see also : Cohen, Jonathan, 
"Teleological Explanation", Proc.Arist.Society, 
Vol L I (1950), pp 255-292. 
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f a l l wide". For the te l e o l o g i s t , an organism e x i s t s because 
i t was made for the conditions i n which i t i s found; for the 
Darwinian an organism e x i s t s , because out of the many 
natural variations, i t i s the only one which has been able 
(97) 
to p e r s i s t i n the conditions i n which i t i s found, 
T.H.Huxley was among the f i r s t to focus attention on 
what he called "persistent types" - animals or plants which 
remain unchanged over enormous periods of time while the l i f e 
around them i s changing and evolving. Already i n 1862 he 
(98) „ 
wrote: In view of the immense d i v e r s i t y of known animal 
and vegetable forms, and the enormous length of time 
indicated by the accumulation of f o s s i l i f e r o u s s t r a t a , the 
only circumstances^ to be wondered at i s not that the changes A 
of l i f e have been so great, but that they have been so small". 
In 1870, he reviewed the whole subject. After pointing out 
that "so long ago as the Miocene epoch, every important 
group i n every important order of Mammalia was already 
represented", he concluded, "the significance of persistent 
types, and the small amount of change which has taken place 
(97) Huxley, Lectures, op.cit, p.101 
(98) Huxley, J u l i a n , Evolution i n Action, Pelican ed., 
(1963), p.132. 
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even in those forms which can be shown to have been 
modified, becomes greater and greater i n my eyes the 
(99) longer I occupy myself with the biology of the past". 
By persistence of type i s meant the demonstration of the 
fact that natural selection can and does produce s t a b i l i t y 
as well as change, and that the r e s t r i c t i o n of improvement 
i s a commoner phenomenon than i t s continuancy. Two types 
of persistence J u l i a n Huxley has distinguished : there i s 
the persistence of a few survivors from a once abundant 
group which he cal l e d " l i v i n g f o s s i l s " , l i k e the duck-bill 
platypus; and that of a whole successful group without 
reduction in numbers of species and without any important 
change m type, an example of th i s i s the ants. Huxley 
.. ( 1 0 0 ) 
spoke simply of what he cal l e d persistent groups . 
In the sphere of philosophy, Huxley brought about 
a close connection between evolutionism and the old t r a d i t i o n 
by going back to Hume, the "prince of agnostics", as he 
call e d him. With Hume he agreed i n general and to some 
extent i n p a r t i c u l a r . He accepted Hume's fundamental position 
that a l l r e a l knowledge i s confined to the world of experience . 
(99) i b i d , p 132. 
(100) i b i d , p 133. 
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Like Hume he had scepticism ingrained i n his nature. Yet 
unlike Hume, he provided phenomenalism with a physiological 
and therefore m a t e r i a l i s t i c foundation. According to 
Huxley a l l mental states or events are the effects of 
bodily causes, so that th e i r origin and manner of functioning 
are comprehended by studying the changes of the nervous 
system. I t was he who f i r s t characterised the mind as an 
"epiphenomenon", a phenomenal by-product of the brain. ^ "^^ 
I t i s on th i s basis that his doctrine was decriued as 
m a t e r i a l i s t i c . 
To the evolutionary theory of morals Huxley made a 
valuable contribution in his famous Romanes Lecture of 1893, 
Evolution and Et h i c s . Here while agreeing that the law of 
Evolution holds good i n the sphere of moral action as in a l l 
other spheres, he maintained that i n the moral i t i s r e a l i s e d 
i n a quite different manner. The realm of the natural i s 
dominated by an inexorable struggle for existence. But in the 
s o c i a l l i f e of man, for a l l i t s natural origin and i t s 
exposure to the pressure' of natural forces, a realm sui generis 
(102) 
emerges, a realm with i t s own uniformities and norms. 
(101) R. Metz, op.cit, pp 111-112. 
(102) T.H. Huxley, "Evolution and E t h i c s " the Romanes 
Lecture, i n a book of the same t i t l e , pp 46-58. 
"Man", Huxley writes, "the animal, i n f a c t , has worked his 
way to the headship of the sentient world, and has become 
the superb animal which he i s , m virtue of hi s success m 
„ (103) 
the struggle for existence . Huxley suspected the 
fa l l a c y which appeared to him to pervade the "ethics of 
evolution", namely, the notion that men must look for thei r 
perfection at the struggle taking place i n the world of 
animals and plants. He rather advised that men should be 
subject to the e t h i c a l process rather than the cosmic process; 
the end of the former i s the sur v i v a l of those who are 
e t h i c a l l y the best. 
In t h i s frame of mind T.H.Huxley wrote "Science and 
Morals" (1886), "The Struggle for Existence i n Human Society" 
(1888), "Evolution and Ethics : Prolegomena" (1894), and his 
l e t t e r s to The Times m December/January of (1890). 
Another writer who revealed great i n t e r e s t i n 
evolution, though he himself was not a devout evolutionist, 
was Samuel Butler (1835-1902), better known as a romantic 
novelist and writer than as a s c i e n t i s t . He wrote earnestly 
(103) i b i d , p 51. 
(104) i b i d , pp 79-83. 
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on behalf of the identxfxcatxon of memory with heredxty. 
As Hearnshaw has said, " i t would be a mxstake to take 
Butler too serxously as a psychologxst",^ 1 0^ 
In hxs note-books, l a t e l y publxshed xn the : New 
Quarterly Revxew V o l . I l l , No,9, Butler summarxsed hxs 
work i n bxology:^ 1 0^ "To me xt seems that my contrxbutxons 
to the theory of evolutxon have been maxnly these, 
"1. The xdentxfxcatxon of heredxty and memory, and the 
corollarxes relatxng to sports, the reversion to remote 
ancestors, the phenomena of old age, the causes of the 
sterx l x t y of hybrids, and the principles underlying longevity 
- a l l of which follow as a matter of course. This was 'Lxfe 
and Habxt' (1877)". 
"2. The re-introductxon of teleology xnto organxc l i f e , whxch 
to me seems hardly, xf at a l l , l e s s xmportant than the *Lxfe 
and Habxt* theory. Thxs was 'Evolutxon Old and New* (1879). 
"3. An attempt to suggest an explanatxon of the physxcs of 
memory. Thxs was 'Unconscious Memory* (1880) ( 1 0 ^ o 
(105) A Short Hxstory of Brxtxsh Psychology, op.cxt, p 53. 
(106) See preface to: Lxfe and Habxt (1878), although the 
orxgxnal edxtxon of " L i f e and Habit" i s dated as 
above, the book was actually published i n December, 
1877. 
(107) i b i d pp V I I I - I X . 
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Of a l l Butler's s c i e n t i f i c ventures, L i f e and Habit, 
i s perhaps the most important. I t s theme has been 
summarised m Unconscious Memory; (1) The oneness of 
personality between parent and offspring; (2) memory on the 
part of the offspring of certain actions which i t did when m 
the persons of i t s forefathers; (3) the latency of that 
memory u n t i l i t i s re-kindled by a reccurrence of the / 
associated ideas, (4) the unconsciousness with which habitual 
actions come to be performed. To these there has been added 
the purposiveness of the actions of l i v i n g beings, as of the 
(108) 
machines which they make or s e l e c t . 
In L i f e and Habit, which Butler regarded as "a 
valuable adjustment to D a r w i n i s m " ^ ^ , he contended that 
"our own progress - or variation - i s due not to small, 
fortuitous inventions or modifications which have enabled 
th e i r fortunate possessors to survive in times of d i f f i c u l t y , 
not, in f a c t , to strokes of luck, but to strokes of cunning 
to a sense of need, and to study of the past and present which 
have given shrewd people a key with which to unlock the 
(108) Marcus Hartog, Introduction to : Unconscious 
Memory, pp IX-X. 
(109) p 33. 
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„ (110) 
chambers of the future , Butler wrote : Evolution, 
Old and New (1879) prompted by his own conviction that 
scant j u s t i c e had been done by Charles Darwin and Alfred 
Russell Wallace and th e i r admirers to the pioneering 
work of Buffon, Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck. To repair 
t h i s , from his own standpoint, he presented an exposition 
of what seemed to him the most valuable portion of their 
teachings on e v o l u t i o n . ^ ^ An example from L i f e and 
Habit may i l l u s t r a t e the case : "Lamarck's wonderful 
conception was hampered by an unnecessary adjunct", writes 
Butler, "namely, a b e l i e f i n an inherent tendency towards 
progressive development i n every low organism. He was thus 
driven to account for the presence of many very low and very 
ancient organisms at the present day, and f e l l back upon 
the theory, which i s not yet supported by evidence, that such 
low forms are s t i l l continually coming into existence from 
(110) i b i d pp 248-249. 
(111) ( l ) i b i d Chapter X I I I "Lamarck and Mr.Darwin" 
( n ) Unconscious Memory, Ch.IV, "Mr.Darwin and 
Evolution" etc. 
( i n ) "Thought and Language" (1890) and 
( I V ) The Deadlock i n Darwinism both i n : Essays on 
L i f e , Art and Science (1890) ed. by R.A.Streatfleld, 
Grant Richards, London (1904). 
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inorganxc m a t t e r " . B u t l e r ' s statement above i s gxven 
as a j u s t i f i c a t i o n to Lamarck's t h e o r y ^ ^ ^ t h a t "the more 
simple bodies a r e e a s i l y formed, and t h i s being the c a s e , i t 
i s easy to conceive how i n the l a p s e of time animals of a 
more complex s t r u c t u r e should be produced, f o r i t must be 
admitted as a fundamental law, t h a t the production of a new 
organ i n an animal body r e s u l t s from any new want or d e s i r e 
i t may e x p e r i e n c e . The f i r s t e f f o r t of a being j u s t 
beginning to develop i t s e l f must be to procure s u b s i s t e n c e , 
and hence i n time t h e r e comes to be produced a stomach or 
a l i m e n t a r y c a v i t y ... other wants occasioned by 
circumstances w i l l l e a d to other e f f o r t s , which i n t h e i r 
t u r n w i l l generate new organs". According to Lamarck then, 
genera and s p e c i e s have been evolved, i n the main, by e x a c t l y 
the same pro c e s s as t h a t by which human i n v e n t i o n s and 
c i v i l i s a t i o n s a r e now p r o g r e s s i n g ; t h i s i n v o l v e s t h a t 
i n t e l l i g e n c e and i n g e n u i t y , f o r example, should have had the 
main share m the development of every l i v i n g c r e a t u r e 
around us. 
(112) L i f e and Habit, o p . c i t , pp 253-254. 
(113) c i t e d by B u t l e r on p. 253 i n L i f e and Habit, from 
V o l . XXXVI, N a t u r a l i s t ' s L i b r a r y , Edinburgh, (1843). 
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Unconscious Memory (1880) was l a r g e l y wrxtten 
to develop a hypothesis t h a t memory has f o r i t s u n d e r l y i n g 
mechanism s p e c i a l v i b r a t i o n s of the protoplasm, and the 
acq u i r e d c a p a c i t y to respond to such v i b r a t i o n s once f e l t 
upon t h e i r r e p e t i t i o n . To such an h y p o t h e s i s , e x i s t i n g i n 
name only, B u t l e r gave i t a warm and an e n t h u s i a s t i c 
r e c e p t i o n i n Chapter V, wherein he w r i t e s : "The view which 
connects memory w i t h v i b r a t i o n s may tend to throw l i g h t 
upon t h a t d i f f i c u l t q u e s t i o n , the manner i n which neuter 
bees a c q u i r e s t r u c t u r e s and i n s t i n c t s , not one of which was 
possessed by any of t h e i r d i r e c t a n c e s t o r s " . S u c h 
being h i s h y p o t h e s i s , he shows c l e a r l y how much prominence 
he a t t a c h e s to i t . T h i s r e f l e c t s the e s s e n t i a l s of the book 
as a c o n t r i b u t i o n to b i o l o g i c a l philosophy. The f i n a l 
c h apters of the book c o n t a i n a l u c i d statement of o b j e c t i o n s 
to h i s theory as they might be put by a r i g i d n e c e s s i t a r i a n , 
and a r e p u t a t i o n of t h a t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n as a p p l i e d to human 
a c t i o n . 
Another book of B u t l e r ' s completes the s e r i e s of h i s 
own b i o l o g i c a l o b s e r v a t i o n s . That i s Luck, or Cunning, as the 
Main Means of Organic M o d i f i c a t i o n s ? (18 8 4 ) . I t p r e s e n t s 
B u t l e r ' s d o c t r i n e of continued p e r s o n a l i t y from ge n e r a t i o n to 
(114) Unconscious Memory, p 58. 
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g e n e r a t i o n , and of the working of unconscious memory 
throughout, he i n d i c a t e d t h a t , w h i l e t h i s i s i m p l i c i t i n 
much of the t e a c h i n g of Spencer, Romanes, and o t h e r s , i t 
was nowehere e x p l i c i t l y r e c o g n i s e d by them. I t i s not 
Luck, but Cunning, not the u n i n s p i r e d weeding out by 
N a t u r a l S e l e c t i o n but the i n t e l l i g e n t s t r i v i n g of the 
organism which i s a t the bottom of the u s e f u l v a r i a t i o n s of 
o r g a n i c l i f e . His u n f a i r remarks o\ D a r w i n ^ 1 ^ a r e y 
sometimes a s c r i b e d to h i s l a c k of p e r s o n a l f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h 
the b i o l o g i s t s of the day and t h e i r modes of thought and 
work. 
B u t l e r ' s : The Way of A l l F l e s h (1903), l a r g e l y 
a u t o - b i o g r a p h i c a l i n content, provides a c l a s s i c case-study 
of the Oedipus, f a m i l y c o m p l e x . " M y most implacable 
(115) ( l ) Unconscious Memory, I n t r o d u c t i o n , o p . c i t , 
( n ) B a s i l W i l l e y , Darwin and B u t l e r , London, Chatto, 
(1960), L e c t u r e IV. 
( l i i ) G i l b e r t Cannan, Samuel B u t l e r : A C r i t i c a l Study, 
London, Martin Seeker, Chapter IV. 
(116) See, f o r examples, Chapters 29, 30, 31 ; i t i s t o be 
noted here t h a t The Way of A l l F l e s h was p u b l i s h e d 
posthumously i n (1903), although B u t l e r began to w r i t e 
i t about the year 1872, and was engaged upon i t 
i n t e r m i t t e n t l y u n t i l 1884. 
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enemy from childhood onward has c e r t a i n l y been my f a t h e r ", 
he commented i n h i s note-books. The c o n f l i c t s n e s t l e d 
w i t h i n h i s bosom were generated by the p a r e n t a l s u p p r e s s i o n 
to which he was exposed. T h i s was r e f l e c t e d a g a i n s t a l l t h a t 
was orthodox, a g a i n s t s o c i e t y and i t s i n s t i t u t i o n s i n h i s : 
Erewhon^''"''"^ (18 7 2 ) , and a g a i n s t the Darwinian e v o l u t i o n a r y 
creed; t h i s i s c l e a r l y shown i n L i f e and Habit, E v o l u t i o n , 
Old and New, Unconscious Memory, and other works, as a l l u d e d 
to above. The p o s i t i o n seems to be,however, t h a t i t i s 
f o r "Erewhon and The Way of A l l F l e s h t h a t Samuel B u t l e r i s 
l i k e l y to be remembered r a t h e r than f o r L i f e and Habit and 
Unconscious Memory",^ 1 8^as Hearnshaw remarks. 
I t can be d e f i n i t e l y s a i d t h a t Darwin succeeded i n 
a r o u s i n g the i n t e r e s t i n the problems of h e r e d i t y and mental 
i n h e r i t a n c e . I n t h i s , and i n other f i e l d s , F r a n c i s Galton 
(1822-1911), Darwin's h a l f - c o u s i n , became the l e a d e r . I n 
e v o l u t i o n Galton i n s i s t e d upon what he c a l l e d " t r a n s i l i e n c i e s " 
as a p r e s e r v i n g v a l u e . D i s c u s s i n g the degree and the 
c h a r a c t e r of v a r i a t i o n s i n the l i v i n g beings, he h i g h l y \ 
(117) B u t l e r i a n a (1932). 
(118) A Short H i s t o r y of B r i t i s h Psychology (1 9 2 1 ) , o p . c i t , 
p. 55 
(119) " D i s c o n t i n u i t y m E v o l u t i o n " MIND, N.S., Vol I I I , No.2 
(1894), p.372. 
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valued Darwin's P l a n t s and Animals Under Demostication. 
U n l i k e the Wundtians, f o r i n s t a n c e , who were i n t e r e s t e d i n 
the g e n e r a l i s e d human mind, Galton was convinced t h a t 
i n d i v i d u a l minds show a wide range of v a r i a t i o n s . T h i s 
may w e l l r e f l e c t the d i r e c t i n f l u e n c e of Darwin to whom 
e v o l u t i o n meant, among other t h i n g s , an emphasis upon 
i n d i v i d u a l d i f f e r e n c e s - a point which i s so important i n 
Psychology a t the present time. 
Galton, d o u b t l e s s , was endowed w i t h discernment and 
v e r s a t i l i t y , so t h a t he could apply p s y c h o l o g i c a l r e s e a r c h e s 
to the problems of human e v o l u t i o n . I t was from t h i s point 
of view t h a t he wrote : H e r e d i t a r y Genius (1869) which was 
o r i g i n a l l y based on a paper e n t i t l e d : "He r e d i t a r y T a l e n t and 
(122) 
C h a r a c t e r " ( 1 8 6 5 ) . I n t h i s book a t l e a s t two major 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s a r e i n c o r p o r a t e d . 
(120) MIND, N.S. V o l . I l l , ( 1894), the r e f e r e n c e was made to the 
ide a i n Darwin's : The E x p r e s s i o n of the Emotions i n Man 
and Animals, pp.33-34. 
(121) ( l ) Boring, E.G., o p . c i t , p.461. 
( n ) Heidbreder, E., o p . c i t . p.107. 
(122) Published i n the MacMillan Magazine of t h a t year; s ee 
Burt , S i r C y r i l , " F r a n c i s Galton and h i s c o n t r i b u t i o n s 
to Psychology". B.J, of S t a t i s t . Psych. Vol.XV, P a r t 
I , ( 1962), pp.1-49. 
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( a ) A c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of mental t r a i t s i n t o : (1) the a b i l i t y 
to work; (11) an i n t e r e s t i n the work i t s e l f ; ( l i i ) the w i l l 
to do the work. 
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to n o t i c e t h a t the above t h r e e 
d i v i s i o n s c l o s e l y correspond to the modern p a r t s of mind i n t o 
(I) c o g n i t i v e , (11) a f f e c t i v e , (111) c o n a t i v e , 
(b) A c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n between : (1) g eneral a b i l i t y ; 
( I I ) s p e c i a l a b i l i t y . 
(123) 
Such a d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n Galton emphasised, and the 
i d e a , e s p e c i a l l y t h a t of "general a b i l i t y " , was borrowed by 
A. B m e t and C. Spearman. 
Galton a l s o managed to advance s t a t i s t i c a l Psychology. 
I t was he who f i r s t suggested t h a t people can be graded 
(124) 
a c c o r d i n g to the normal curve of d i s t r i b u t i o n , a curve 
t h a t has such an important r o l e i n s t a t i s t i c a l psychology 
today. He could apply h i s s t a t i s t i c a l views to more s p e c i f i c 
q u e s t i o n s contained i n h i s : E n g l i s h Men of S c i e n c e : T h e i r 
Nature and Nurture ( 1 8 7 4 ) . The f o l l o w i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s a r e 
(123) i b i d , pp 16-17. 
(124) ( I ) H e r e d i t a r y Genius, o p . c i t , 
( l i ) B u r t , C y r i l , B . J . S t a t i s t . P s y c h . Vol XV (1962) 
o p . c i t . 
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presented as a s s o c i a t e d w i t h s c i e n t i f i c eminence, 
1, P h y s i c a l and Mental Energy; 2. Health; 3. Perseverance; 
4. B u s i n e s s Habit; 5. Memory; 6. Independence of c h a r a c t e r ; 
7. Mechanical A p t i t u d e . 
Many of Galton's i d e a s , l a t e r on e l a b o r a t e d and 
sys t e m a t i z e d by K a r l Pearson and h i s s c h o o l , u n d e r l i e many 
re c e n t developments i n s t a t i s t i c s . He adopted s t a t i s t i c s as 
"the only t o o l s by which an opening can be cut through the 
formidable t h i c k e t of d i f f i c u l t i e s t h a t bars the path of 
„ (125) 
those who pursue the s c i e n c e of man . T h i s statement i s 
quoted from Galton's N a t u r a l I n h e r i t a n c e , (1889), wherein he 
could amass much data s c i e n t i f i c a l l y to d i s c u s s the b a s i c 
b i o l o g i c a l t r a n s m i s s i o n s c i e n t i f i c a l l y . 
Galton i s sometimes c a l l e d the " f a t h e r of mental 
t e s t s " . There seems to be much j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n such a 
d e s i g n a t i o n . He conceived of the importance of q u a n t i t a t i v e 
methods and was oft e n a b l e to grasp t h e i r e s s e n t i a l s . He 
could w r i t e , " u n t i l the phenomena of any branch of knowledge 
have been submitted to measurement and number, i t cannot 
assume the s t a t u s and d i g n i t y of a s c i e n c e " . His 
(125) N a t u r a l I n h e r i t a n c e , (1889) pp 62-63. 
(126) B r a i n , Vol 2, (1879). 
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(127 ) 
"proposed s t a t i s t i c a l s c a l e " was f i r s t e x p l a i n e d i n a 
l e c t u r e a t the Royal I n s t i t u t i o n i n 1874. T h i s was 
(128 ) 
followed by a l e t t e r to Nature (1874), and d e s c r i b e d 
(129) 
more f u l l y i n P h i l o s o p h i c a l Magazine (18 7 5 ) . The 
s t a t i s t i c a l methodology j u s t r e f e r r e d to, Galton d e s c r i b e d 
i n an ela b o r a t e d manner i n h i s : Memories of my L i f e ^"^^ 
(1908); t h e r e i n he s t a t e d t h a t "the l e a d i n g idea was t h a t 
the measurements should sample a man w i t h reasonable complete-
ness; they should measure a b s o l u t e l y wherever p o s s i b l e , 
otherwise r e l a t i v e l y among h i s c l a s s f e l l o w s ; t h a t i s , by 
rank or p e r c e n t i l e grades". Galton's i d e a quoted here, seems 
to r e p r e s e n t views apparent i n a l l h i s works, i n c l u d i n g : 
E n q u i r i e s i n t o Human f a c u l t y and i t s Development (18 8 3 ) . 
Among many other t o p i c s , two mam themes a r e to be noted, 
( l ) i n d i v i d u a l d i f f e r e n c e s , ( l i ) an a n a l y s i s of the 
i n d i v i d u a l p e r s o n a l i t y as a r e s u l t a n t of the two f a c t o r s , 
'nature' and 'nurture*. 
(127) The f u l l t i t l e was "On a Proposed S t a t i s t i c a l S c a l e ' . 
(128) "Psychometric Experiments' Vol IX, pp 3 4 2 f f . 
(129) Vol XLIX, pp 33-46. 
(130) London, Methuen, p 267, see a l s o : Bur t , C y r i l , 
B . J . S t a t i s t . P s y c h . Vol XV, (1962), o p . c i t . 
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I t may be s a i d / 1 3 1 ^ h o w e v e r , t h a t Galton was a 
b r i l l i a n t and o r i g i n a l s c h o l a r , whose r e s e a r c h and 
d i s c u s s i o n s l e d to new avenues i n the f i e l d s of i n v e s t i g a t i o n s , 
I t seems t h a t Hearnshaw i s much j u s t i f i e d i n h i s c o n c l u s i o n 
t h a t "there can be no q u e s t i o n t h a t Galton's work i s one of 
the foundation stones of modern Psychology; and t h a t both 
d i f f e r e n t i a l psychology and psychometrics l a r g e l y d e r i v e 
from i t " . ( 1 3 2 ) 
Although Leonard Trelawny Hobhouse (1864-1929) i s 
(133 ) 
at times counted as a comparative p s y c h o l o g i s t , he, i n 
f a c t , i s f r e q u e n t l y considered as an e n c y c l o p a e d i c 
p h i l o s o p h e r . ^ 1 3 ^ y e t i t i s t r u e t h a t he took s p e c i a l 
i n t e r e s t i n Psychology and was s u c c e s s f u l . 
(131) For f u l l a p p r e c i a t i o n of Galton's wide i n t e r e s t s and 
v i v i d imagination see : 
Pearson, K a r l , The L i f e , L e t t e r s and Labours of F r a n c i s 
Galton, Vol.1, (1914), Vol.11 (1924) V o l s . I l l and IV, 
(1930), Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s . 
(132) A Short H i s t o r y of B r i t i s h Psychology, o p . c i t . p.66. 
(133) S. Hearnshaw, o p . c i t . p.101. 
(134) R. Metz, o p . c i t . pp.150-151. 
(135) See h i s a r t i c l e on "Comparative Psychology" i n 
E ncyclopaedia B r i t a n n i c a . ( 1 9 2 9 ) . 
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Hobhouse's p h i l o s o p h i c a l achievement i s 
d i s t i n g u i s h e d f o r i t s breadth of view and f o r the 
comprehensive scope and wide v a r i e t y of i n t e r e s t s which i t 
m a n i f e s t s . "His thought was always b u i l t upon the s o l i d 
foundation of exact i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t o some region of 
e m p i r i c a l f a c t , and was c o n s t a n t l y being r e j u v e n a t e d a t 
the w e l l of experience; y e t i t never, on the other hand, 
stopped a t the mere f a c t but always f e l t i m p e l l e d t o 
advance a f r e s h to a p h i l o s o p h i c a l conspectus and 
(136) 
s y n t h e s i s " . On Hobhouse's view, philosophy has as i t s 
goal the s y n t h e s i s of the s c i e n c e s , a s y n t h e s i s which stands 
i n harmony w i t h the r e s u l t s of s p e c i a l i s t r e s e a r c h , and i s 
b u i l t upon them as a foundation. His approach to the 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l elements and the d i f f e r e n t s u b j e c t s always 
bear the stamp of h i s own mind. The ev o l u t i o n i s m of Herbert 
Spencer determined Hobhouse's i d e a s more e f f e c t i v e l y . 
N a t u r a l l y i t would be an e x t e n s i v e t a s k to d e a l 
w i t h the v a r i o u s r a m i f i c a t i o n s of Hobhouse's d i v e r s e 
a c t i v i t i e s , which covered numerous f i e l d s . At the moment, a 
resume of the e s s e n t i a l f e a t u r e s of h i s g e n e r a l 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l adventures w i l l be attempted. 
(136) R. Metz, o p . c i t . p 152. 
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Hobhouse's l o g i c a l e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l and 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l views are expounded i n h i s : Theory of 
Knowledge (1 8 9 6 ) . T h i s book, which i s sometimes d e s c r i b e d 
(137) 
as " c r i t i c a l r e a l i s m " , begins w i t h immediate 
consciousness or apprehension; the knowledge of t h a t which 
i s d i r e c t l y p r e s e n t or found i n c o n s c i o u s n e s s . A l l 
c o g n i t i o n begins w i t h apprehension and r e t u r n s to i t i n the 
end. "To be apprehended" i s e x a c t l y the same as "to be 
(138) 
the content of a c o n s c i o u s n e s s " . I n Mind m E v o l u t i o n 
(1901), Hobhouse argued out many of L l o y d Morgan's and 
G.J.Romanes' views, and presented some of h i s own 
experiments. These experiments were of the same type as 
i > (139) 
L l o y d Morgan's, and are not u n l i k e K o h l e r ' s on apes 
(1917), although they l a c k the added s i g n i f i c a n c e of being 
r e l a t e d to a new G e s t a l t system of Psychology. What 
Hobhouse meant by " c o n s i l i e n c e " i s the mutual interdependence 
of the p a r t s w i t h i n a whole system. The e v o l u t i o n a r y 
endeavour i s but a movement towards g r e a t e r i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s h i p 
and connectedness, l e a d i n g to a wider scope. For him "every 
(137) Metz, R., o p . c i t , p 157. 
(138) Theory of Knowledge, (1896) 3rd ed, ( 1 9 2 1 ) . 
(139) See Smith, F.V. E x p l a n a t i o n of Human Behaviour, 
o p . c i t . Ch.IX. 
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organism i s so b u i l t , on mechanical p r i n c i p l e s , or not, 
t h a t every d e v i a t i o n from the e q u i l i b r i u m point s e t s up 
a tendency to r e t u r n ^ ^ ^ t o a s o r t of a d a p t a b i l i t y which 
he terms "homeostatic". T h i s view bears resemblance to 
L l o y d Morgan's idea of e v o l v i n g mind. Mind i s known by 
i t s f u n c t i o n s . "Where the r e i s mind t h e r e i s order and 
system, c o r r e l a t i o n and proportion, a harmonising of 
f o r c e s , and an i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n of p a r t s . The organism 
which i s g i f t e d w i t h i n t e l l i g e n c e shows i t by a r r a n g i n g 
i t s a c t i o n s on a c e r t a i n p l a n . I t adapts i t s means to 
e n d s " . T h r e e p o i n t s may now emerge from the statement 
quoted here : 
1. The sentence "where t h e r e i s mind th e r e i s order and 
system", i s a c l e a r r e f l e c t i o n of McDougall's dictum: "where 
t h e r e i s l i f e , t h e r e i s mind". 
2. The whole argument i s based upon e v o l u t i o n a r y foundations; 
T h i s shows the impact of Darwin's d i s c u s s i o n s on the s u b j e c t . 
3. Hobhouse, i n l i n e w i t h both Darwin and McDougall, t r i e d 
to emphasise t h a t the growth of mind i n l i f e i s d i s p l a y e d i n 
the wider i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n . 
(140) Mind i n E v o l u t i o n , London, Macmillan, (1901), p.24. 
(141) i b i d , p 6. 
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Hobhouse's e t h i c s , the more e m p i r i c a l s i d e of which 
i s expressed i n Morals i n E v o l u t i o n (1906), and the more 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n The R a t i o n a l Good (1921), i s i n f u l l 
agreement w i t h the main p r i n c i p l e of h i s philosophy. His 
l i n e of enquiry i s i n t h r e e s t a g e s : "morphology", 
"development" and " e v a l u a t i o n " . The q u e s t i o n of morphology 
he t r e a t e d i n S o c i a l Development (1924), and m : Development 
and Purpose (1913). I n Morals i n E v o l u t i o n , which i s not 
o n l y a t r e a t i s e on morals, but on comparative s o c i o l o g y , the 
method simply i s an account of the h i s t o r i c a l e v o l u t i o n of 
the f a c t s of m o r a l i t y based on a wide e m p i r i c a l s u r v e y . His 
e t h i c a l philosophy i s given only i n b r i e f e s t o u t l i n e and i s 
interwoven w i t h h i s account of the h i s t o r y of e t h i c a l i d e a s . 
He was aware, however, t h a t the problem needed independent 
d i s c u s s i o n and he t h e r e f o r e r e t u r n e d to i t i n The R a t i o n a l 
Good (1921) and m Elements of S o c i a l J u s t i c e ( 1 9 2 2 ) . I n 
the former he defends the view t h a t a r a t i o n a l and 
demonstrable standard of v a l u e i s d i s c o v e r a b l e , and i n the 
l a t t e r book, he t r i e s to show i t s a p p l i c a t i o n to the b a s i c 
problems of s o c i a l o r g a n i s a t i o n , both p o l i t i c a l and 
economic. 
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I n d i v i d u a l impulse and s o c i a l t r a d i t i o n a r e the 
(142) 
two poles between which we move. The c h a r a c t e r of man 
i s the b a s i s of the moral standard. The l a t t e r i s a 
p r i n c i p l e , which i n h i s view, has been but l i t t l e 
(143) 
understood i n modern e t h i c s and should be f u l l y a p p r e c i a t e d . 
Hobhouse shows t h a t r a t i o n a l elements such as purpose and 
d e l i b e r a t i o n p l a y a p a r t as grea*t as i n s t i n c t i v e f e e l i n g . 
C l e a r t h i n k i n g i s as i n d i s p e n s a b l e i n conduct as r i g h t 
f e e l i n g , "The most s e n s e l e s s human being i s not act u a t e d 
simply and s o l e l y from impulse". I n human s o c i e t y "the 
co n d i t i o n s r e g u l a t i n g conduct a r e from the f i r s t g r e a t l y 
modified. I n s t i n c t , becoming vague and more g e n e r a l , has 
evolved i n t o ' c h a r a c t e r * , w h i l e the i n t e l l i g e n c e f i n d s 
i t s e l f confronted w i t h customs, to which i t has to accommodate 
(144) 
conduct". A r a t i o n a l standard of moral e t h i c s i s a 
,sure guide f o r i n d i v i d u a l s i n human s o c i e t y , whereas 
tendencies .of higher animals do not s e t down r i g i d l i n e s of 
behaviour which a r e p e r f e c t from the o u t s e t . I n t e l l i g e n c e 
(145) 
i n t e r v e n e s and modifies as w e l l . He f i n d s the beginnings 
(142) Morals i n E v o l u t i o n , p 14. 
(143) i b i d , p 14. 
(144) i b i d , p 12. 
(145) i b i d , p 7. 
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of moral r a t i o n a l i t y a l r e a d y i n t h a t conscious purposeful 
behaviour which i s to be seen i n the lower as w e l l as the 
higher stages of the moral l i f e . 
I n : S o c i a l E v o l u t i o n and P o l i t i c a l Theory (1911), 
as elsewhere.Hobhouse complies w i t h the n a t i o n a l t r a d i t i o n . 
Here he becomes the t y p i c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of a democratic 
s t a t e . I n S o c i a l Development (1924), as i n : The 
Metaphysical Theory of The S t a t e (1918), and Development and 
Purpose (1913), before, and The Elements of S o c i a l J u s t i c e 
(1922) a f t e r w a r d s , Hobhouse endeavoured to l a y down laws and 
customs t h a t a r e p o s s i b l e to be spoken of as i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
He saw t h a t (1) a theory of "the End, purpose, or value of 
s o c i a l l i f e " i s one t h i n g and a theory of i t s a c t u a l 
c o n d i t i o n s i s another. ( 2 ) Both i n q u i r i e s a r e l e g i t i m a t e and 
n e c e s s a r y to the f u l l understanding of s o c i a l l i f e ; and (3) 
the q u e s t i o n of supreme i n t e r e s t i s the r e l a t i o n between the 
(146) 
r e s p e c t i v e r e s u l t s of the two e n q u i r i e s i n q u e s t i o n . 
Another t h i n k e r i n the l i n e of e v o l u t i o n a r y and 
comparative psychology i s Conway Llo y d Morgan (1852-1936). 
Morgan, however, was a genuine s c i e n t i s t and s p e c i a l i s t who 
(146) S o c i a l Development, London, George A l l e n & Unwin (1924) 
pp. 12-48. 
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had occupied h i m s e l f w i t h s e v e r a l s p e c i f i c a l l y s c i e n t i f i c 
f i e l d s of study, such as P h y s i c s , E n g l i s h L i t e r a t u r e , 
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l H i s t o r y , Geology, Biology, and Zoology. 
L a t e r he devoted h i m s e l f to p s y c h o l o g i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n s , 
which r e s u l t e d i n numerous w r i t i n g s by which d i f f e r e n t 
branches of the s c i e n c e were p o w e r f u l l y s t i m u l a t e d and 
advanced. 
Although Morgan owes most to Huxley, he i s s t r o n g l y 
rooted i n the e a r l i e r B r i t i s h t r a d i t i o n ; he goes back to 
the phenomenalism of Ber k e l e y and Hume. His d o c t r i n e , 
although i n the mam i n harmony w i t h Hume's p o s i t i o n , i s 
expressed m a much more d e f i n i t e manner. He, i n a c t u a l 
f a c t , has formed a p h i l o s o p h i c a l terminology which i s very 
d e f i n i t e . He has introduced many terms which have enabled 
him to express h i s i d e a s i n a p r e c i s e form. 
The mistakes t h a t G.J.Romanes made were i n d i c a t e d 
(147) 
and c o r r e c t e d by L l o y d Morgan. I n an a r t i c l e i n MIND 
(1886) Morgan noted s e v e r a l such mistakes i n Romanes' Animal 
I n t e l l i g e n c e and Mental E v o l u t i o n m Animals, both a l l u d e d 
to above. He c o r r e c t e d , f o r example, Romanes' notion of 
(147) MIND, Vol X I , No 42, A p r i l , 1886, pp 174, 182, 
183, 184. 
"Reflex Act", " I n s t i n c t " and "Intel l i g e n c e " . Romanes for 
example, ascribed consciousness to these three elements. 
Morgan denied i t to the re f l e x action at l e a s t . He 
disapproved of Romanes' usage of ref l e x i n the sense of 
i n s t i n c t . According to Morgan, re f l e x actions are "those 
which are of the nature of organic responses to more or 
le s s definite s t i m u l i , and which involve rather the organs 
of an organism than the organism as a whole". Whereas, 
" i n s t i n c t i v e actions are those which are performed, through 
the influence of inherited habit, by the individual m 
common with a l l the other members of the same more or le s s 
r e s t r i c t e d group, i n adaptation to certain oft-recurring 
circumstances". ^ "^^ Instead of "Reason" as employed by 
Romanes, Morgan used " i n t e l l i g e n c e " . He maintained that 
i n t e l l i g e n t actions are those which are performed by the 
individual, i n virtue of his i n d i v i d u a l i t y , m spec i a l 
adaptation to special circumstances. This shows c l e a r l y 
that on Morgan's view, both int e l l i g e n c e and i n s t i n c t are 
f l e x i b l e and adaptable. When Romanes wrote of his 
monkey discovering "the mechanical p r i n c i p l e of the screw", 
(148) i b i d , p 184 
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Morgan considered thxs as "an unsatisfactory misuse of 
terms". Morgan's reaction against Romanes* mistakes i s 
found most c l e a r l y i n his : Animal L i f e and Intelligence 
(1890), which he l a t e r revised under the t i t l e : Animal 
Behaviour (1900). 
Morgan's general psychology that deals i n d e t a i l 
with the r e l a t i o n of the animal to the human mind i s 
contained i n his : Introduction to Comparative Psychology 
(1894). In t h i s book he undertook to offset "the 
anthropomorphic" tendency i n the interpretation of the 
animal mind. He did t h i s by an appeal to the "law of 
parsimony", known as "Lloyd Morgan's Canon" for which he i s 
so well known. The formulation of the canon i s as follows: 
"in no case may we interpret an action as the outcome of 
the exercise of a higher psychical faculty, i f i t can be 
interpreted as the outcome of the exercise of one which 
(149) 
stands lower i n the psychological s c a l e " . 
In the same book,Morgan argued that problems are 
to be s e t t l e d "not by any number of anecdotes, but by 
ca r e f u l l y conducted experimental observations, carried out 
(149) Ll»yd Morgan, An Introduction to Comparative 
Psychology, London, The Walter Scott Publishing Co. 
(1894), p 53. 
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as far as possible under nicely controlled conditions". 
Although he favoured an experimental approach, Morgan's 
experiments were not extensive and were, m f a c t , l e s s 
important than his methodological contributions. 
In h is Comparative Psychology. Morgan assumed a 
monistic point of view. Unlike the d u a l i s t who s t a r t s with 
the assumption of the independence of subject and object, 
the monist looks upon subject and obj'ect as distinguishable 
aspects of that which in experience i s i n d i v i s i b l e . They 
are d i s i n c t i v e t but are nowise independent and separate i n 
existence. Such i s a "monistic theory of knowledge",^ 1 5 1^ 
(152) 
which Morgan accepts and adopts. He accepts a 
"monistic interpretation of Nature" as w e l l . Again unlike 
the dualist who contends that mind i s a separable existence, 
s u i generis, forming no part of the natural world into which 
i t i s temporarily introduced, the monist argues that, a l i k e , 
i n i t s b iological and i t s psychological aspect, the 
organism i s the product of evolution; that the mind i s not 
(150) i b i d , p 359. 
(151) i b i d , pp 1-3. 
(152) i b i d , pp 3-5. 
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"extra-natural" nor "supra-natural", but one of the aspects 
of natural exxstence, A t h i r d aspect of monxsm^^^^whxch 
Morgan accepts consxsts xn an analysis of Nature, which xs the 
object of knowledge: Nature as knowledge and knowable. 
According to the monistic assumption, then, the organism i s 
one and i n d i v i s i b l e , but i s polarizable i n a n a l y t i c thought 
into a bodily and a mental or conscious aspect. Body and 
Mind, l i k e object and subject, are distinguishable but not 
separable. 
I t i s interesting to note that Lloyd Morgan allowed 
for two main kinds of learning, "there are two important 
processes", he observed, "which f a l l under the head of 
acquisition. We acquire experience, and we acquire s k x l l . 
The f x r s t xnvolves the correlation of xncomxng data from the 
specxal senses, from the motor organs, and from the v i s c e r a . 
The second implies the more or l e s s accurate co-ordxnatxon of 
(154 
outgoxng impulses to the vxscera and to the motor organs." 
The word "habxt" he used xn two dxfferent senses, xn a general 
sense for describing the various actxvxtxes and the behaviour 
(153) i b i d , pp 5-6 
(154) Habit and I n s t i n c t , London, Edward Arnold, (1896), 
P. 
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of animals; he also used i t in a more r e s t r i c t e d meaning 
which indicates that mode of behaviour which ensues from 
the r e p e t i t i v e course of any individual experience. To 
the l a t t e r sense, he limited the term "habit" as technical. 
By t h i s term he meant that i t becomes stereotyped through 
(155) 
repetition. He pointed out that the word " i n s t i n c t " i s 
also used in various ways. I t i s used in a popular sense, 
where i t indicates the difference between the actions of 
animals and the ways of man, although not a l l man's acts 
are r a t i o n a l ; and i t i s used i n describing that part of 
human "character and conduct which i s not the outcome of a 
„ (156) 
consciously r a t i o n a l process . Contradicting William 
James's theory on emotions,^Morgan stated that "The 
bodily changes follow d i r e c t l y the perception of the existing 
f a c t , and that our feeling of the same changes as they 
„ (158) occur i s the emotion . 
(155) i b i d , p 1. 
(156) i b i d , p 2. 
(157) published i n MIND (1884), Vol IX, pp 188ff, l a t e r 
elaborated i n his : P r i n c i p l e s of Psychology (1890). 
(158) Habit and I n s t i n c t , op.cit, p 189; Morgan summarised 
the argument i n a s e r i e s of numbered paragraphs 
pp 319-320. 
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The i n s t i n c t i v e act was a subject on whxch Morgan 
focused his attention. The question of an underlying 
impulse he regarded as a metaphysical not a s c i e n t i f i c 
matter. In I n s t i n c t and Experience (1912) Morgan observed 
that " I n s t i n c t i v e behaviour, which has i t s roots i n organic 
evolution, affords the rude outline sketch of that far l e s s 
imperfect and far more f u l l y serviceable behaviour, the 
fin i s h i n g touches of which are supplied by practice under 
the guidance of i n t e l l i g e n c e . The net re s u l t ... i s a j o i n t 
product of i n s t i n c t and in t e l l i g e n c e , in which the 
co-operating factors are inseparable, but none the l e s s 
„ (159) 
genetically distinguishable . He maintains that every 
organic movement, however new, i s related to the foregoing 
organic changes. He believes that i n a l l cases "an 
i n s t i n c t i v e act i s , from the biological and physiological 
point of view, nothing but a r e f l e x . But from the 
psychological point of view, i t i s always something more than 
a r e f l e x , i n so far as i t affords data to conscious 
experience". fje approaches the problem of the genesis 
(159) I n s t i n c t and Experience (1912) p.26 
(160) i b i d p 18. 
(161) i b i d p 22. 
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of experience i n the individual mind along l i n e s that are 
purely n a t u r a l i s t i c , through "the avenue of biological and 
psychological considerations". He believed i t i s 
necessary to distinguish between the view of the genesis 
(163) 
of experience and that of metaphysics. This 
apparently shows that Morgan's views are throughout 
tinctured with an effectual element of evolutionary flavour. 
Nor does t h i s l e s s appear m his : L i f e , Mind and S p i r i t 
(1926), wherein the history of the world i s conceived as an 
evolutionary process i n which at a number of c r i t i c a l 
points, something d e f i n i t e l y new emerges. Strangely,Morgan 
sometimes t r i e s to avoid the issue of the emergence of mind. 
With t h i s view, Hobhouse seems to have been in f u l l 
(164) 
agreement. For McDougall, of course, there was no 
problem, since wherever there i s l i f e , there i s mind. 
(162) "The Natural History of Experience" B.J.Psychol. 
Vol I I I , part I , December 1909, p . l 
(163) i b i d p.2 
(164) MIND, N.S., (1926) Vol XXXV, No 130, pp 355, 360. 
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In Lloyd Morgan's investigations, both 
naturalism and atheism j o i n hands. His position i s 
more or l e s s agnostic. I n the three stages of 
development, matter, l i f e and mind, he saw a form of 
association which unites them. His keenly analytic 
mind enabled him to reconcile two different yet 
complementary eras, the Darwinian era and that of 
modern Psychology. 
However, Darwin's theory of evolution, which 
"took the world by storm", l e f t i t s stamp 
almost on every avenue of thought. I t s traces can be 
found, m one way or another, in the writings of 
(165) Boring, E.G., op.cit, p 470. 
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(166) many other XlXth century Ethxcists and Psychologxsts. 
Perhaps most notable among them - to mention only two -
were Alexander Sutherland (1852-1902), best know for his 
book: The Origin and Growth of Moral I n s t i n c t (1898), and 
(166) See: 
( l ) Ginsberg, Morris, "The Concept of Evolution in 
Sociology" Proc.Asist.Society, VolXXXI, 1930-31, 
pp 201-224. 
( n ) Boring, E.G. op.cit, pp 470ff. 
( i n ) Smith, John Maynard, The Theory of Evolution, 
Pelican ed, 2nd ed. (1966). 
( I V ) R u s s e l l , Bertrand, History of Western Philosophy, 
London, George Allen (1946), pp 752ff. 
(v) Driesch, Hans, The Science and Philosophy of the 
Organism, Gifford Lectures, A & C Black 2nd ed 
(1929), pp 168-175, 181. 
( v i ) Myers, Charles S. "Vitalism : A Brief H i s t o r i c a l and 
C r i t i c a l Review" MIND N.S. Vol IX No.34, (1900) 
pp 233, 328. 
( v n ) James, Wm., "Are We Automata?" MIND, Vol IV No.13 
(1879), pp 2,7. 
( v m ) A Symposium i n Proc.Ar i s tot. Society, Vol I , part 3, 
(1890) e n t i t l e d : " I s there Evidence of Design xn 
Nature?". See also; a symposxum xn Vol I I I (1896). 
(xx) A Symposium i n Proc.Aristot.Society, Vol I I , (1893), 
e n t i t l e d : 
"Does Law in Nature Exclude the P o s s i b i l i t y of 
Miracle?". 
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Sxr Leslxe Stephen (1832-1904). He xs well known for 
hxs : The Scxence of Ethxcs (1882) and the valuable 
Hxstory of Englxsh Thought xn the X V I I I t h Century 
(2 vols., 1876). 
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CHAPTER I I I 
ESTABLISHMENT OF MODERN PSYCHOLOGY AT THE TURN 
OF THE CENTURY. 
1. Philosophical Psychology. 
From i t s beginnings, the development of Psychology 
in B r i t a i n seems to have followed a somewhat dire c t course. I t 
proceeded on a l i n e p a r a l l e l to the emp i r i c i s t , philosophical 
t r a d i t i o n . I t was continued by the two M i l l s , enriched by 
Darwin's evolutionary investigations, and brought to a conclusion 
by authors such as Bain, James S u l l y , James Ward, George F.Stout, 
and others. 
I t has been suggested^ 1^ that i t was i n the hands of 
J . Sully (1842-1923) that philosophical psychology remained 
popular for a long time. Yet Sully was not so much a philosopher 
as a s c i e n t i f i c and empirical investigator. Like Bain, he could 
amass fresh material, or work over the old m accordance with 
the l a t e s t ideas. Following A.Schopenhauer, the pessimist, m 
(2) 
his Pessimism : A History and a C r i t i c i s m (1877), Sully dealt 
with two kinds of pessimism : ( I ) "The popular and i n s t i n c t i v e " , 
(1) ( I ) Merz, J.Th., V o l . I l l , pp.75,78, Vol.IV, op.cit., p.394. 
( n ) Metz, R. op.cit., p.747. 
( m ) Boring, E.G., op.cit., pp.459-460. 
(2) London, Henry S. King and Co., pp.2-3. 
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and ( I X ) "The phxlosophxc and reasoned". These two types are 
dependent upon each other. He also was xnclxned to speak of 
what he ca l l e d "the new and speculatxve pessxmxsm", which must 
be studxed xn connectxon wxth the older pessxmxsm. Hxs 
xntentxon was to show that the "fundamental contrast xn the 
estxmate of collectxve human lx f e shows x t s e l f not only xn the 
vxew of the object as a whole, but also xn the estxmatxon of 
(3) 
certaxn of xts departments or aspects". 
Sully conceded that our xdea of pleasure owes 
somethxng to the known contrast between pleasure and paxn. Lxke 
the hedonxsts, he emphasxsed the role that paxn and pleasure 
play xn the xndxvxdual's l x f e . I t seems that he regards pleasure 
as a motxve. "We may say that pleasure xs a l l the more 
precxous because xt xs the opposxte" and "the negatxon or 
exclusxon of paxn". Yet xt seemed to hxm that "pleasure would 
s t x l l be pleasure, s t x l l be estxmable and desxrable, even were 
there no such thxng as paxn". In so thxnkxng, Sully belxeved 
that "the mxnd may gaxn a dxstxnct xdea of any aspect of xts 
.. ( 4 ) 
xmpressxons or experxences . 
Su l l y opened hxs f x r s t book : Sensatxon and Intuxtxon ; 
(5) 
Studxes xn Psychology and Aesthetxcs (1874) wxth 
(3) xbxd, p.13. (4) xbxd, p.261. 
(5) (1880), 2nd ed., London, Kegan Paul. 
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a chapter on "The Relatxon of the Evolutxon hypothesxs to 
Human Psychology". To hxm, "Psychology holds a unxque rank 
( 6 ) 
xn the hxerarchy of the Scxences". I t xs xn xts 
scxentxfxc aspect that psychology presents x t s e l f to the 
evolutxonxst. He apprecxated Spencer's way of dxscussxng the 
phenomena of consciousness through a l l xts manxfested 
gradatxons xn the anxmal serxes; he approved of Spencer's 
affxlxatxon of hxs conclusxons to hxs general system of 
evolutxonary xdeas. He saw that certaxn aspects of mental 
evolutxon xn connectxon wxth the orxgxn of man and the 
phenomena of emotxonal expressxons were dxscussed by Darwxn xn 
a l e s s systematxc manner. Hxs own versxon xs that the 
hypothesxs of evolutxon, "besxdes explaxnxng the general nervous 
condxtxons of mental phenomena xn the human organxsm, seeks to 
account for some of those modes of feelxng whxch, as observed, 
do not appear to be the effects of causes actxng wxthxn the 
(7) 
lxmxts of the xndxvxdual l x f e " . Thxs xt does by help of the 
theory of heredxtary transmxssxon. To Sully there seemed to be 
two prxncxpal mental condxtxons of a general xmpartxal xnterest 
xn human character, namely, prevxous moral culture wxth xts 
accompanyxng enlargement of sympathy; and a certaxn development 
(6) Sensatxon and Intuxtxon (1874), p . l . 
(7) xbxd, pp.2,3,5 ; see also : pp.17,18,20,21. 
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of i n t e l l e c t u a l c u r i o s i t y . The chief psychological force in 
the production of int e r e s t i n human character i s of an 
i n t e l l e c t u a l kind. The mind i s the active factor i n 
distinguishing between the inner and the outer aspects of 
human nature. Without the capability of the mind in thinking 
steadily, an individual w i l l be unable to appreciate any of 
the proper aspects of character. This capability of making 
mind a d i s t i n c t object of thought i s a l a t e acquirement in 
human progress. This point seems to be i l l u s t r a t e d m the 
growth of language, since many of the terms and phrases 
denoting mental processes, such as were o r i g i n a l l y borrowed / 
(8) 
from tangible things. I t i s obvious too, that Sully turned 
(9) 
his attention to aesthetics and thus opened up for empiricism 
a province which was new or at le a s t much neglected since 
the X V I I l t h Century. 
In his treatment of Psychology, Sully i n the main 
followed the physiological principles and the association 
method of Alexander Bam. He considered psychology at f i r s t i n 
(8) i b i d , pp.248, 249, 250ff. 
(9) ( l ) i b i d , pp.247-283. 
( n ) see also his a r t i c l e on Aesthetics written for the 9th ed. 
of Encyclopaedia Britannica (1886). 
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xts outline^, and then xn a comprehensxve presentation as 
the science of human m x n d . P s y c h o l o g y , he regarded as 
the foundation of a l l the knowledge which aims at leading and 
influencing thought, feeling, and action. " A l l that the mind 
does can be brought under one or more of the following heads : 
(a) knowing, cognition, or i n t e l l e c t i o n ; (b) Feeling, states 
of pleasure and pain, or a f f e c t i v e states; and (c) Willing, 
(12) 
conation, or active processes". Psychology he defined as 
"the science that investigates and explains the phenomena of 
mind, or the inner world of our conscious experience". These 
phenomena include our feelings of joy and sorrow, love, and so 
on. "Mental Science" i s to supply a general theory of this 
(13) 
group of phenomena. 
Sully also touched upon various psychological 
(14) (15) topics such as laughter, i l l u s i o n , studies of 
(10) J.Sully, Outlines of Psychology, London, Longmans, 1st ed., 
(1884), new impression (1898). 
(11) , The Human Mind, a Text-book of Psychology, London, 
Longmans, 2 vols (1892). 
(12) Outlines of Psychology, op.cit., p.32. 
(13) The Human Mind, Vol.1, pp.Iff; see also Vol.11, pp.Iff. 
(14) An Essay on Laughter, London, Longmans, (1902). 
(15) I l l u s i o n : A Psychological Study, London, Longmans, (1881). 
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chxldhood, (16) as well as education (17) and moral character. 
He made the basis of his theories evolutionary, especially 
in laughter and studies of childhood. The wide range of 
subjects which he discussed c l e a r l y show that he was 
e s s e n t i a l l y s c i e n t i f i c . He was a thorough researcher and 
not merely a writer of text-books, as E.G. Boring (18) unfairly 
judged him. I t i s a recognised fact that encouragement of 
c h i l d study i s largely due to him and to McDougall. (19) His 
discussions of mental processes, namely, cognition, affection, 
and conation, represent a l i n k in the whole chain of B r i t i s h 
psychological thought. 
I t may be said with certainty that some of Sully's 
views were continued and f u l l y discussed by James Ward (1843-
1925). He was one of the so-called "systematizers". His 
works r e f l e c t a strong influence of biology. His studies i n 
Psychology were far superior to his philosophical works. He 
(16) Studies of Childhood, London, Longmans, (1895), new impression, 
(1904). 
(17) The Teacher's Handbook of Psychology, London, Longmans, (1886). 
(18) op.cit., p.467. 
(19) Davidson, M.A. "Current Trends i n C l i n i c a l Psychology", Current 
Trends m B r i t i s h Psychology, ed. by Mace, C.A. and Vernon, P.E., 
London, Methuen, (1953), p.73. 
(20) Brett's History of Psychology, op.cit., p.585. 
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f x r s t presented his psychological views xn an a r t i c l e 
(21) publxshed i n the 9th edxtion of Encyclopaedia Britannica 
(1886). The a r t i c l e was elaborated and reached i t s f u l l 
a mplification i n hxs Psychologxcal Principles (1918), which 
ranks as a classic. 
The a r t i c l e i n question gained recognition even 
from Ward's opponents as "among the masterpieces of the 
(22) 
philosophy of the human mind". This was Bain's remark. 
Yet defending his position on mental a c t i v i t i e s against Ward's 
observations, Bain held "our education from f i r s t to last 
takes p r i n c i p a l l y the form of adding u n i t to u n i t , under the 
retentive or adhesive a t t r i b u t e of nature, with which we are 
so marvellously g i f t e d ; and any other process of development 
.. (23) 
is quite secondary i n comparison . 
(24) 
Ward's ideas seem to have shaped the outlook 
of B r i t i s h Psychologists. McDougall, for example, regarded his 
(21) The same a r t i c l e was also revised for the 11th ed. of 
Encyclopaedia Britannica, (1911). 
(22) Bam, A., "Mr. James Ward's Psychology" Mind, Vol.XI, 
No.44, (1886), pp.461ff. 
(23) Bain, A., Mind, Vol.XII, (1887), pp.46lff. 
(24) See his a r t i c l e "Psychological Principles" MIND, V o l . V I I I , 
Nos.30,32, A p r i l (1883), pp.153-169, 465-486, respectively. 
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Outline of Psychology (1923) as "an endeavour to carry to 
i t s l o g i c a l conclusion that c r i t i c a l r e j e c t i o n of the mosaic 
psychology which had been a main theme of the psychological 
w r i t i n g of James Ward". Charles S. Myers i n his Presidential 
(25) 
address on "the Nature of Mind" at the B r i t i s h Association 
put forward views which were i n l i n e with Ward's arguments. 
In 1947, R.J. B a r t l e t t presiding at the B r i t i s h Psychological 
Society made several favourable references to Ward and so too, 
have many of his contemporaries. 
In nearly a l l i t s essential points, Ward's 
psychology was i n opposition to the e a r l i e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of 
psychical and mental l i f e . The psychology he advocated may be 
variously described as organic, teleological or hormic. Like 
(26) 
Sully, he divided the subject-matter of Psychology i n t o 
cognition, f e e l i n g , and conation. Yet unlike Sully, he f u l l y 
elaborated on the topic. He argued that Psychology deals with 
(1) a "Subject" i n v o l u n t a r i l y attending to changes m "the 
sensory continuum" (Cognition); (2) i n consequence being either 
(25) (1931), Sect, J. 
(26) ( I ) E.G.Boring, op.cit., p.463. 
( n ) R. Metz, op.cit., pp.747-748, 399-402. 
( m ) L.S. Hearnshaw, op. c i t . , p.136. 
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pleased or pained ( f e e l i n g ) ; and (3) by voluntary attention 
producing changes i n "the motor continuum" (conation). The 
(27) 
word "Subject" seems to have been used by Ward i n the 
sense of ego which i s conscious of what i s going i n the mind; 
and to t h i s ego i s referred everything that i s mental. To 
Ward, three varieties of ego appeared to be distinguishable. 
1. The metaphysical conception of the soul. 
2. The bio l o g i c a l or empirical ego. 
3. The psychological self to which a l l objects are presented. 
From the point of view of the object, there are 
(1) cognition, which is the presentation of sensory objects, 
(2) conation i s the presentation of motor objects, and (3) 
fee l i n g i s not a presentation, because i t does not l i e i n 
experience, but is the primordial consequent of "sensory 
( 28 ) 
presentation" and the condition of "motor presentation". 
About consciousness and experience, Ward writes "A mouse, we 
believe, f e e l s , and s t r i v e s ; f e e l i ng and s t r i v i n g are then 
factors of i t s experience, but we have no reason to think that 
(27) McDougall, Wm., "A Contribution Towards An Improvement In 
Psychological Method", MIND, Vol.VII, (1898), p.17. 
(28) ( I ) J.Ward, Psychological Principles, 2nd ed., London, (1920), 
1st publ. 1918, pp.21-22, 57, 45-51. 
( n ) See also his a r t i c l e i n Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th 
ed. (1911), Vol.XXII, pp.547-604. 
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they are objects of i t s knowledge. They may become such for 
a man no doubt; but there i s much, even i n his experience, of 
which we should say that he i s conscious no longer or not 
(29) 
conscious as yet". On Ward's theory " f e e l i n g " may be used 
i n various meanings: i t may denote (a) a touch, as feeling of 
roughness; (b) an organic sensation, as feeling of hunger; 
(c) an emotion, as feeling of anger; (d) any purely subjective 
state, as f e e l i n g of certainty or of a c t i v i t y ; (e) the one 
subjective state that i s purely " a f f e c t i v e " , as the feeling of 
(30) 
pleasure or pain. The simplest form of psychical l i f e 
involves not only a subject f e e l i n g , but a subject having 
q u a l i t a t i v e l y distinguishable objective presentations which are 
the causes of i t s f e e l i n g . Ward, therefore, regards "feeling 
(31) 
and v o l i t i o n " as sensations or complexes of sensations. This 
is why he regarded modern Psychology as having a special mission (29) Psychological Principles, op.cit., pp.21-22. 
(30) i b i d , p.41. 
(31) ( I ) J.Ward, "Modern Psychology : A Reflexion" MIND, N.S., 
vol.11, No.5, (1893), p.56. 
( n ) , Psychological Principles, op.cit., pp.45, 123. 
( i n ) , Psychological Principles, MIND, Vol.XII, No.46, 
(1887). 
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to carry out, namely, to reduce " a l l psychical l i f e to a more 
.. (32) 
looking on physical brain-processes . Modern psychology 
makes a great show of system i n t h i s procedure (1) by 
i n s t i t u t i n g a p a r a l l e l between the subject of Psychology and 
the substance of Physics; (11) by i n s i s t i n g that Psychology as 
a science can deal only with events, and not with e f f i c i e n t 
(33) 
causes. 
Referring to pleasure and pain, Ward showed that 
from Plato onwards, psychologists and moralists have been fond 
(32) MIND, Vol.11, No.5, (1893), op.cit., p.79. 
(33) ( l ) i b i d , pp.59-60. 
( n ) See also his a r t i c l e "Assimilation and Association" 
being part I i n MIND, N.S., V o l . I I , No.7, (1893), 
pp.347ff. where he rejected A. Bain's idea that 
present impressions revive t h e i r l i k e among previous 
impressions, as he refuted Hoffdmg's " t i e d ideas". 
( i n ) See also his part I I of the same a r t i c l e i n MIND, N.S., 
V o l . I l l , No.12, (1894), where he e n t i r e l y rejects the 
association of ideas. 
(xv) His a r t i c l e "On the D e f i n i t i o n of Psychology" m 
B.J.Psychology, Vol.1, part I , (1904), pp.3ff., cf. 
F.H. Bradley's a r t i c l e i n MIND, N.S., 1899, and 
Wm. McDougall's a r t i c l e i n MIND, N.S., (1901) about 
ideation. 
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of t r e a t i n g of these subjects. Pleasure i s p r i o r and posit i v e , 
and pain only the negation of pleasure. Emotion i s a complete 
state of mind, a psychosis, and not a psychical element. Such 
a wide range of psychological topics did Ward t r e a t . Under 
(34) 
"the theory of psychophysical parallelism". Ward showed 
that the various theories of parallelism attempt to answer the 
question: How are psychical changes related to the physical 
changes i n the organism ? A l l such theories s t a r t from the 
Cartesian doctrine of the essential disparateness and 
distinctness of matter and of mind. The psychological laws of 
mind Ward tended to apply to education which would r e s u l t i n the 
(35) 
acquired perfection of man. 
Nor did Ward completely abandon philosophical 
excursions. Of the twelve papers - published between 1889 and 
( 36 ) 
1925 - nine at least may be grouped about three mam topics: 
(34) Being a chapter i n : Naturalism and Agnosticism, a 
Gifford Lecture Book, Vol.11, delivered 1896-8, 3rd 
ed. 1906, London, Adam and Charles Black, p.3. 
(35) Psychology Applied to Education, A series of lectures 
given during the Easter Term (1880) at Cambridge, 
compiled and published i n the year (1926). Cambridge 
Univ.Press, ed. by G. Dawes Hicks, pp.1, 5 f f . 
(36) Afterwards published i n book-form e n t i t l e d : Essays i n 
Philosophy, Cambridge, (1927). 
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(1) the nature, method, and modern tendencies i n Philosophy; 
(2) the contrast and r e l a t i o n between "the realm of nature" 
and "the realm of ends"; (3) f a i t h , or the religious factor 
i n action and thought. In "philosophical orientation and 
(37) 
S c i e n t i f i c Standpoint", Ward suggests that philosophy, 
however far i t attempts to reach i n speculation, must s t i l l 
be worked out from the point of view of the human experience 
and human l i f e . Our ultimate i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the world 
must s t i l l be anthropomorphic. By f a i t h , Ward meant 
"personal t r u s t and confidence i n an Unseen Being to which the 
religious i n a l l ages have a t t r i b u t e d to t h e i r power to overcome 
.. (38) 
the world . As he saw i t , Modern philosophy i s quite as 
.. (39) 
t r u l y a new b i r t h as modern science . He clearl y 
distinguished between "monism" and "monadism" ; the one offers 
us unity by way of substance, the other offers us unity by way 
of organisation. He observed that "Purpose carries.with i t the 
notion of good or worth, the supreme category i n the world of 
(37) ( i ) incorporated i n the book above, pp,198ff. 
( n ) see also: H.Barker, ( C r i t i c a l Notice) i n MIND, N.S., 
Vol.XXXVI, No.144, 1927, pp.480ff. 
(38) "Can Faith Remove Mountains ?" The above book - p.101. 
(39) "The Progress of Philosophy", op.cit., p.116. 
- 142 -
history". Looked at broadly, the history of philosophy 
(41) 
may be regarded as 'philosophy experimenting". In Ward's 
philosophy "the human self and i t s a c t i v i t y were facts to 
be accepted as such, for Ward did not profess to have any 
(42) 
metaphysical insight into t h e i r nature ..." 
(43) 
In Naturalism and Agnosticism, Ward treated 
of N a t u r a l i s t i c Philosophy. He conceived of i t as consisting 
i n the union of three fundamental theories: (1) the theory 
that nature i s ultimately resolvable in t o a single vast 
(44) 
mechanism; (2) the theory of evolution, as the working of 
thi s mechanism; and (3) the theory of psycho-physical 
parallelism, or conscious automatism, according to which theory, 
mental phenomena occasionally accompany but never determine the 
(45) 
movements and interactions of the material world. His (40) "Mechanism and Morals" op.cit., p.232. 
(41) "The Progress of Philosophy", op.cit., p.117. 
(42) ( I ) H. Barker, MIND, N.S., Vol.XXXVI, No.144, (1927), op.cit., 
p.483. 
( n ) F.C. B a r t l e t t , "James Ward 1843-1925", Amer.J. of Psychol., 
Vol.36, No.3, 1925, pp.449-453. 
(m)A.H. Murray, The Philosophy of James Ward, (1925). 
(43) op.cit., Vol.1, p.186. 
(44) i b i d , Vol.1, pp.186-7, 205, 212-242, 243-271, 274-275. 
(45) i b i d , Vol.11, p.186. 
- 143 -
r e f u t a t i o n of materialism and dualism i s urged by his f i r m 
b e l i e f i n "a s p i r i t u a l i s t i c monism" which is tonable and the -/ 
only stable position. "Nature is S p i r i t " , He concluded, 
with Darwin, that "Natural selection without teleological 
(47) 
factors is not adequate to account for biological evolution". 
His a t t i t u d e i s shaped i n a form that "Naturalism and Agnosticism" 
are powerful guides. Ward's whole argument has been 
commented on as being "thoroughly coherent, and the r e f u t a t i o n 
of Dualism and the constructive suggestion put forward i n the 
(49) 
end to be of the very greatest interest and importance". 
In The Realm of Ends or Pluralism and Theism^^^ 
(1907-10) Ward again touched, a l b e i t l i g h t l y , on the question of 
evolution. Consistently he regarded evolution as (46) i b i d , preface, p.XII, Vol.11, pp.97-151. 
(47) i b i d , p.302. 
(48) i b i d , Vol.11, p.283, cf . ( l ) "Does Law i n Nature exclude the 
P o s s i b i l i t y of Miracle *?" A symposium i n Proc.Aristotelian 
Society, Vol.11, No.2, (1893), pp.31-42. 
( n ) Hans Driesch, The History and Theory of Vitalism, Eng. 
Trans. (1914), London. 
(49) E.E.C. Jones, "Dr.Ward's Refutation of Dualism" MIND, N.S., 
vol.IX, No.35, (1900), p.370; see also : T. Loveday, 
"Theories of Mental A c t i v i t y " , MIND, N.S., Vol.X, 1901. 
(50) The Gifford Lectures, published (1911) Cambridge. 
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"epigenesis and e q u i l i b r a t i o n " . The lectures contained 
i n t h i s book serve as a sequel to the course delivered i n 
Naturalism and Agnosticism. The difference i s that i n the 
early lectures, Ward's endeavour was to establish the p r i o r i t y 
of the " i d e a l i s t i c " or "the s p i r i t u a l i s t i c standpoint" ; and i n 
"The Realm" he t r i e d to ascertain the idea of the world as to 
be "interpreted throughout and s t r i c t l y i n terms of Mind". 
(52) 
Ward acknowledges as "more honest" F.H. Bradley's 
(53' 
conclusion i n his metaphysical essay : Appearance and Reality 
(1893) that science i s a poor thing i f measured by the wealth 
of the real Universe; Bradley finds that " i n the end Reality 
i s inscrutable", and i s confined i n the " i r r e s i s t k b l e 
impression that a l l i s beyond us". This view of Bradley's 
inspired Ward to review the progress of the natural sciences 
since the times of Galileo and Descartes. 
In b r i e f , Ward's Psychological system has i t s own 
characteristics. I t i s enriched with terms and concepts which 
seem to have affected subsequent psychology, and most of them 
are s t i l l v a l i d . He used, for example, such terras as " s t r i v i n g " 
(51) J. Ward, The Realm of Ends, Lecture V, pp.97-116. 
(52) i b i d , p . l . 
(53) 2nd ed., London, Swan Sonnoschein (1908), book I I , Chapters: 
X I I I , XIV, and XV. 
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"purpose", "presentation", and the l i k e . The f i r s t two are 
among the key words i n McDougall*s hormic system. By the 
l a t t e r word, Ward meant the individual's consciousness and 
awareness of what i s going i n mind and i n the environment at 
large. His r e j e c t i o n of materialism and dualism, on the one 
hand, and his adoption of parallelism and monadism, on the 
other, bring his scheme closer to that of McDougall's. Taken 
as a whole, Ward's treatment of Psychology can be regarded as 
a big step i n the di r e c t i o n of presentation, methodology and 
improvement. 
While discussing Philosophical Psychology, i t can 
be said, however, that the history of B r i t i s h Psychology i s 
always studded with the names of important philosophers. Among 
the more recent figures, the names of Thomas H i l l Green (1836-
1882), of Oxford, Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900), of Cambridge, and 
Carveth Read (1848-1931) - to mention only three - may be 
indicated. 
(54) 
Green, f o r instance, was primarily a moralist . 
Therefore he attacked both empiricism and hedonism on the 
ground that they are inadequate f o r explaining l o f t y moral 
(54) Green, T.H., Prolegomena to Ethics, Posthumously ed. by 
Bradley, A.C., (1883); see also : 
Metz, R., A Hundred Years of B r i t i s h Psychology, op. c i t . , 
pp.268ff. 
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issues. Pleasure, he thought, i s i r r e l e v a n t to morals. 
He taught that i n s t i n c t s and impulses must be tamed and 
subjected to e t h i c a l dominance. The topic i s rather subtle 
and complicated; but i n the same sense, although more 
cl e a r l y , McDougall indicated that i n s t i n c t s i n the human 
being are better curbed and modified by the formation of 
sentiments, p a r t i c u l a r l y that of self-respect. 
The impact of H. Sidgwick upon modern Psychology 
appears to be considerable. Like Green, he was mostly 
interested i n e t h i c a l questions. His c r i t i c a l and analytical 
(55) 
method seems to have influenced the l a t e r thinkers of 
Cambridge, including McDougall who attended his lectures on 
Moral Philosophy. 
(56) 
Ethics with Sidgwick may be called 
" s c i e n t i f i c " , but he preferred to c a l l i t a "study" rather than 
a "science". In so thinking, he belived that e t h i c a l study; 
can embrace two mam disc i p l i n e s : ( l ) Psychology which, to him, 
(55) See ( I ) McDougall, Wm., An Introduction to Social Psychology, 
o p . c i t . j pp.326, 327. 
( n ) Metz, R., A Hundred Years of B r i t i s h Philosophy, 
op. c i t . , pp.83-85. 
(56) The Methods of Ethics, (1874), 6th ed., Posthumous (1901), 
page 1. 
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deals with voluntary action and i t s springs, on the one hand, 
and with "moral sentiments" and "judgements", on the other. 
Motives, moral sentiments and judgements are a l l "actual 
phenomena of individual human mind". (11) Sociology which deals 
with similar phenomena as they are manifested by normal 
(57) 
members of human societies. Ethics must also free from 
(58) 
error the apparent cognitions which are characteristic 
of man. The cognitions, which he termed "dictates" or 
"imperatives", are normally accompanied by emotions of various 
types. I t seems that such emotions Sidgwick called "moral 
sentiments". Such an in t e r p r e t a t i o n appears to have been taken 
as a guide l i n e by McDougall, who improved and elaborated the 
theory of sentiments generally. A big difference i s to be noted, 
namely, i n Sidgwick's contentions, a sentiment i s based on 
emotions which are unstable, whereas i n McDougall's system a 
sentiment i s f i r m l y founded upon certain i n s t i n c t s which are 
originated i n the individual's disposition and c o n s t i t u t i o n . 
(57) ( i ) i b i d , pp.1-2. 
( n ) Lectures I and I I I i n : Philosophy ; I t s Scope and 
Relations, posthumous, ed. by J.Ward, (1902), London, 
MacMillan (XII Lectures). 
(m)Philosophy ; I t s Scope and Relations, op.cit., 
(58) ( l ) The Methods of Ethics, op . c i t . , pp.2ff, 40ff. 
( n ) Outlines of the History of Ethics, London, MacMillan, 
(1886). 
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Another a f f i n i t y of Sidgwxck's scheme wxth that 
(59) 
of McDougall's, exxsts xn the dxscussxon of Mxnd. Sxdgwxck 
argued that mxnd may be consxdered exther (1) xn x t s e l f , or 
(2) xn relatxon to matter. By matter Sxdgwxck seems to have 
meant the body. In order to examxne the relatxon of Mxnd to 
xts body, the help of both Phxlosophy and Psychology must be 
sought. In such a way the two subjects can co-operate. 
Indeed, from such a poxnt of vxew — the phxlosophxcal and the 
psychological - dxd McDougall dxscuss the problem of the 
(60) 
Body and Mind thoroughly. 
Agaxn, l i k e Green, Sxdgwxck outlxned varxous 
vxews on moralxty, pleasure and paxn, xmpulses, and the l i k e . 
(62) 
Lxke McDougall, he crxtxcxsed hedonxc doctrxne on the 
ground that volxtxon i s not always determined by pleasures or 
pains. He indicated what he called "Psychological hedonism", 
(59) Lecture I i n Philosophy; I t s Scope and Relations, op.cit., 
(60) London, Methuen, (1911), a r e p r i n t as a Beacon paperback, 
(1961). 
(61) ( I ) Outlines of the History of Ethics, o p . c i t . , pp.lOff. 
(xx) The Ethxcs of T.H. Green and H. Spencer, London, MacMxllan, 
(1902), publxshed posthumously. 
(xxx) Lectures on the Phxlosophy of Kant, ed. by J.Ward, London, 
MacMillan (1905). 
(xv) "Green's Ethxcs" Mxnd, Vol.IX, No.34, (1884), pp.170,175. 
(62) An Introduction to Socxal Psychology, London, Methuen, 25th ed. 
(1943), pp.233,455. 
An Outlxne of Psychology, London, Methuen, (1923), pp.219,268. 
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"Egoistic hedonism", "Empirical hedonism" and "Deductive 
hedonism". To him there seemed to be no difference between 
these types of hedonism; i n content a l l these kinds r e l y upon 
„ „ (63) impulsive actions , which might turn to be against the 
ethi c a l doctrines. I n point of f a c t , psychological hedonism 
was a target for McDougall's^ 6 4^ l a t e r c r i t i c i s m s . As has 
been pointed out, Sidgwick's philosophical contentions seem 
to have much i n common with McDougall's subsequent 
philosophical and psychological arguments. 
Carveth Read i s another thinker, whose views on 
Psychology may be regarded as an extension of other authors 
l i k e Hume, the M i l l s , Sidgwick and others. His psychological 
ideas are scattered throughout his philosophical arguments. 
(63) ( I ) "Hedonism and Ultimate Good" Mind, Vol.11, No.5, (1893), 
p.33ff. 
(n)—"Unreasonable Actions", Mind,„N.S., Vol.11, No.6, 
(1893), pp.l74ff. 
( m ) Practical Ethics, London, (1897), Ch.IX. 
(64) An Introduction to Social Psychology, op.cit., pp.7,12,14,313. 
(65) ( I ) See: The Metaphysics of Nature, London, Adam and Charles 
Black, (1905). 
( n ) Natural and Social Morals, London, Adam and Charles 
Black (1909). 
( m ) "On the Difference Between Percepts and Images" B r i t . J . 
Psych., Vol.11, part 4, (1908). 
(IV) The Origin of Man and of his Superstitions, London, 
Adam and Charles Black, (1920), 2nd ed. i n 2 vols, (1925). 
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B r i e f l y , the main topics that he dealt with comprise : 
(1) Consciousness, (11) sensations and images, (111) mind, 
(IV) character and w i l l , and so f o r t h . As a phenomenalist, 
Read's discussions of such subjects were i n the mam 
speculative, metaphysical and ontological. I t i s the manner 
i n which he emphasised the topics discussed that makes his 
arguments worthwhile. 
2. Dedicated Psychologists. 
In t h i s connection, reference should be made to 
some other leading figures, who, each i n his own way, did 
contribute to the development of Psychology. The names of 
Graham Wallas (1858-1932), Charles E. Spearman (1863-1945), 
Charles S. Myers (1873-1947), James Drever (Snr), (1873-1950), 
and John Carl Flugel (1884-1955), are eminent. The reasons why 
they are mentioned here"are r (1) They had been colleagues and/ 
or students of McDougall, and were enormously influenced by 
him. The impact that McDougall's discussion l e f t upon them can 
be easily traced i n the numerous works of these psychologists. 
(2) They concentrated c h i e f l y on psychological observations and 
welcomed empirical evidence. (3) Added to McDougall's hormic 
endeavours, t h e i r e f f o r t s as a whole contributed to the 
development of Modern B r i t i s h Psychology i n 
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p a r t i c u l a r , and, i t can be s a i d , to Psychology abroad. 
(4) I t i s apparent t h a t some of McDougall's views a r e w e l l 
p r e s e r v e d and a b l y e x p l a i n e d i n the arguments contained i n 
t h e i r works to which r e f e r e n c e i s so o f t e n made throughout 
the present study. 
I n order to present a f u l l p i c t u r e of modern 
p s y c h o l o g i c a l developments, mention must a l s o be made of 
(66) 
Alexander F a u l k n e r Shand (1858-1936). His i n v e s t i g a t i o n s 
a r e of s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t , l a r g e l y because they i n c l u d e d 
c e r t a i n a s p e c t s of human psychology, namely, sentiments and 
c h a r a c t e r . 
Shand i n d i c a t e d t h r e e c o n s t i t u e n t s of human 
c h a r a c t e r , namely, " i n s t i n c t " , "emotion", and "sentiment". 
The t h r e e terms correspond to t h r e e l e v e l s of mental 
development: ( l ) of the animal, ( n ) of the c h i l d , and ( m ) of 
the human a d u l t . Such a type of d i v i s i o n could be condoned 
as f o l l o w i n g s t e p s of an e v o l u t i o n a r y s c a l e . The f i r s t of 
these stages i s r a t h e r r i g i d , because the i n t e l l e c t has but 
l i t t l e i n f l u e n c e i n i t s o r g a n i s a t i o n . The second i s 
( 66) See Shand's : The Foundations of C h a r a c t e r , (1914), 
3rd ed., (19 2 7 ) , London. 
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t r a n s x t x o n a l xn c h a r a c t e r , because i t merely lxnks two 
d i f f e r e n t phases i n developmental l i f e . I n i t s scope, the 
f i n a l s t age i s more p l a s t i c and almost complete i n 
o r g a n i s a t i o n . 
I t i s obvious t h a t Shand has been i n f l u e n c e d by 
John S t u a r t M i l l ' s arguments contained i n System of L o g i c . 
He q u o t e d ^ ^ ^ M i l l ' s f o r m u lation of " e m p i r i c a l l a w s " which 
..(68) 
depend upon experience, and c a u s a l laws which a r e not 
u n i v e r s a l l y t r u e to Shand. Yet he d i d accept M i l l ' s "laws 
of M i n d " , ^ ^ and he d i d f o l l o w , to some e x t e n t , M i l l ' s 
(70) 
"Ethology, the s c i e n c e of the Formation of C h a r a c t e r " . 
Shand's f i r s t law which he regards as a s a l i e n t f e a t u r e of 
c h a r a c t e r , p o s t u l a t e s t h a t "mental a c t i v i t y tends, a t f i r s t 
u n c o n s c i o u s l y , a fterwards c o n s c i o u s l y , to produce and to 
(71) 
s u s t a i n system and o r g a n i s a t i o n " . U n l i k e the laws of 
a s s o c i a t i o n , Shand thxnks-the—laws—of—mxnd—a-re-not—ready—a-t-^ 6 f ) The Foundation of C h a r a c t e r (1914), p.13. 
(68) J . S . M i l l , System of L o g i c , Book I I I , Chapter XVI. 
(69) xbxd, book V I , Chap.IV. (70) xbxd, book V I , Chap.V. 
(71) op.ext., p.21. 
* Shand formulated (144) laws a l t o g e t h e r . 
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(72) hand; They ought to be found. According to Shand t h e r e 
a r e i n every human being two a n t a g o n i s t i c f o r c e s or a c t i v i t i e s : 
the one making f o r o r g a n i s a t i o n , the other aiming a t 
d i s o r g a n i s a t i o n ; these two opposite a s p e c t s he c a l l e d 
" sentiments" and "emotions". D e s p i t e the t h e o r e t i c a l 
d i s t i n c t i o n between these two kinds of f o r c e , and the immense 
s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h e i r e f f e c t s on c h a r a c t e r , they a r e i n one 
r e s p e c t i d e n t i c a l ; both pursue ends, and s e l e c t the means to 
(73) 
them. Both a r e s y s t e m a t i c . "The ge n e r a l f a c t concerning 
our c o n a t i v e a c t i v i t y i s " , he wrote, " t h a t i t tends m a l l 
i t s m a n i f e s t a t i o n s to form some degree of o r g a n i s a t i o n . Form 
being d i r e c t e d to ends, n e i t h e r the stream of i d e a s , nor the 
f i e l d of pe r c e p t i o n , wholly p r e s e r v e s the chance"order which, 
a p a r t from t h i s o r g a n i s i n g a c t i v i t y , i t would e x h i b i t , but 
approximates to a s y s t e m a t i c order, as a c o n d i t i o n of 
(74) 
f u l f i l l i n g the ends pursued". The s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h i s (75) 
c i t a t i o n l i e s i n i t s a f f i n i t y w i t h McDougall's purposive 
(72) c f . M i l l ' s L o g i c "The Laws of Mind", book V I , Ch.IV. 
(73) i b i d , p.20. 
(74) i b i d , p.21. 
(75) (1) The Foundations of C h a r a c t e r , o p . c i t . , p.27. 
( n ) see a l s o Shand's a r t i c l e "The U n i t y of Consc i o u s n e s s " 
MIND, V o l . X I I , No.50, (18 8 8 ) . 
( m ) see a l s o h i s a r t i c l e "The Nature of Co n s c i o u s n e s s " 
MIND, Vol.XVI, No.62, (18 9 1 ) . 
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and hormic views. The c o n a t i v e a c t i o n i s always f u n c t i o n e d by 
the organism as a whole. The goals sought could be a t t a i n e d 
only when ( a ) t h e r e i s a f o r e s i g h t i m p l i e d i n the a c t i v i t i e s 
f u l f i l l e d , (b) the a c t s done a r e accompanied by a c e r t a i n degree 
of m o d i f i c a t i o n . ( c ) L i k e McDougall, Shand spoke of 
"s y s t e m a t i c o r d e r " of "ends pursued", of determined and 
f r e e - w i l l e d " c o n a t i o n s " . 
Concerning i n s t i n c t s , emotions, and sentiments, 
Shand had h i s own views, which sometimes l e d to much 
con t r o v e r s y w i t h McDougall. To Shand, the i n s t i n c t s of f l i g h t 
and concealment, f o r example, i n v o l v i n g so many co-ordinated 
movements f o r the f u l f i l m e n t of t h e i r end, a r e a p a r t , and a t 
f i r s t the l a r g e s t and p r i n c i p a l p a r t , of the emotional system 
of f e a r , as f u r n i s h i n g the h e r e d i t a r y methods of behaviour by 
means of which the system may ac h i e v e i t s e n d . ^ ^ "Every 
sentiment tends to i n c l u d e i n i t s system a l l those emotions 
t h a t a r e of s e r v i c e to i t s ends, and to exclude a l l those which 
(77) 
a r e u s e l e s s or a n t a g o n i s t i c " . T h i s i s one of the laws of 
the system of sentiments. For as i n the body, t h e r e a r e c e r t a i n 
(76) The Foundations of C h a r a c t e r , o p . c i t . , p.27. 
(77) i b i d , p.62. 
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" a n a b o l i c " and " k a t a b o l i c " p r o c e s s e s i n constant o p e r a t i o n , the 
one b u i l d i n g up and the other breaking down i t s o r g a n i c 
s t r u c t u r e . So too, i n the c h a r a c t e r , t h e r e a r e c e r t a i n 
tendencies working toward a higher form of o r g a n i s a t i o n , and 
others working toward a lower form of o r g a n i s a t i o n . Basing 
h i s view on such a b e l i e f , Shand formulated h i s other law of 
sentiments : " I n the growth of c h a r a c t e r , the sentiments tend 
w i t h i n c r e a s i n g s u c c e s s to c o n t r o l the emotions and impulses; 
i n the d e c l i n e of c h a r a c t e r , the emotions and impulses tend 
(78) 
w i t h i n c r e a s i n g power, to achieve t h e i r freedom". The 
sentiment, t h e r e f o r e , i s a dominant f a c t o r i n the build-up of 
the h i e r a r c h y of c h a r a c t e r ; and i t i s , a t the same time, a 
r e g u l a t o r which maintains the balance between the a n t a g o n i s t i c 
elements. T h i s then, l e a d s up to the conception of c h a r a c t e r 
i n which the f i r s t c onfusion of i t s d i v e r s e kinds of 
c o n s t i t u e n t s i s reduced to order. 
(79) 
I n an a r t i c l e on a t t e n t i o n i n MIND (1894), 
Shand r e f e r r e d to what he c a l l e d " d u a l i t y of c o n s c i o u s n e s s " . 
He d i s t i n g u i s h e d between a t t e n t i o n proper, and i t s * b j e c t . 
(78) i b i d , p.62. 
(79) " A n a l y s i s of A t t e n t i o n " MIND, N.S., V o l . I l l , No.12, p.465. 
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T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i n v o l v e s d u a l i t y of c o n s t i t u e n t s which a r e 
r e f e r r e d to as above. According to Shand, a t t e n t i o n i s 
independent of "sensory accommodation" which i s an 
(80) 
arrangement f o r i n t e n s i f y i n g and d e t a i n i n g s e n s a t i o n . , 
Throughout h i s a r t i c l e , Shand i n s i s t e d upon th r e e i d e a s : 
"The f i r s t i s , t h a t the predominant c l e a r n e s s i n which 
a t t e n t i o n c o n s i s t s cannot be found u n i v e r s a l l y i n the 
c l e a r n e s s of the ide a s or s e n s a t i o n s attended to, or i n the 
proce s s which e f f e c t s t h i s c l e a r n e s s . The second i s , t h a t 
i t can only be found i n our awareness of them, as an 
a d d i t i o n a l c o n s t i t u e n t , not i d e n t i c a l w i t h s e n s a t i o n s , nor 
capable of being r e s o l v e d i n t o or a b s t r a c t e d from them. 
The t h i r d i s , t h a t t h i s c o n s t i t u e n t i s a t any moment a t which 
i t i s r e a l and a c t u a l as much d i r e c t l y f e l t and experienced 
(81) 
as s e n s a t i o n " . Shand t h i n k s t h a t p s y c h o l o g i s t s a r e 
g e n e r a l l y agreed t h a t " f e e l i n g " , "thought" and "con a t i o n " a r e 
(82) 
i n s e p a r a b l e c o n s t i t u e n t s of a l l mental s t a t e s . Thought 
i n a broad sense i s d e f i n e d as c o n s i s t i n g i n " o b j e c t i v e 
r e f e r e n c e " . F e e l i n g i s d i s t i n g u i s h e d from i t because i t 
(80) i b i d , p.452. 
(81) i b i d , p.473. 
(82) " F e e l i n g and Thought" MIND, N.S., V o l . I l l , No.28, (1 8 9 8 ) , 
P.477. 
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i n v o l v e s no " o b j e c t i v e r e f e r e n c e " . As such they a r e , 
t h e r e f o r e , a n t i t h e t i c a l , , But t h e i r a n t i t h e s i s does not r u l e 
out t h e i r i n t i m a t e r e l a t i o n which i s i n h e r e n t i n c o n s c i o u s n e s s . 
There i s no unconscious such as seems to precede our c l e a r 
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . There i s no f e e l i n g p r e s e n t t h a t we do not 
c o n s c i o u s l y d i s c r i m i n a t e . "The moment before we d i s c r i m i n a t e d 
t h i s f e e l i n g i t was n o n ~ e x i s t e n t ; and t h a t which c o n s t r a i n e d 
our thought, so t h a t we had no c h o i c e but to d i s c r i m i n a t e 
t h i s f e e l i n g , was the brain-change which caused i t " . ^ 4 ^ 
However, Shand s e t h i m s e l f the t a s k of showing 
what a r e the components of human c h a r a c t e r , what r e l a t i o n s 
o b t a i n between them, and how they a r e m turn r e l a t e d to the 
u n i t y of the whole person. The concept of sentiments he used 
to r e f e r to an organised system of emotional tendencies c e n t r e d 
around an o b j e c t . The laws of mind a r e the laws of c h a r a c t e r . 
C h a r a c t e r i s the more s t a b l e according as i t i s based on w e l l 
organised sentiments. His d i s c u s s i o n throughout has been 
concerned mainly w i t h c h a r a c t e r which i s a sequence of i t s 
c o n s t i t u e n t s , namely, i n s t i n c t s , emotions, impulses and 
( 85 ) 
sentiments. However, he i s c r i t i c i s e d by A.A.Roback f o r 
(83) i b i d , p.479. 
(84) i b i d , p.485. 
(85) The Psychology of C h a r a c t e r , London, Kegan P a u l , (1931), p.19; 
see a l s o : Al~Bassam, A.A., A Study of C h a r a c t e r T r a i t s m 
School C h i l d r e n , Unpublished Ph.D. T h e s i s (1951), i n the 
l i b r a r y of London U n i v e r s i t y , p.15. 
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h i s r e l i a n c e on l i t e r a t u r e . T h i s c r i t i c i s m seems to be f a i r 
and j u s t i f i e d . He may a l s o be c r i t i c i s e d on other grounds, 
e.g. (1) He was not p r e c i s e as to what he meant by c e r t a i n 
words such as "Mind", " n o e t i c c o n s c i o u s n e s s " , and the l i k e . 
He d i d not c l a r i f y f u l l y the r e a l meanings i m p l i e d i n such 
terms. I t may be s a i d t h a t Shand l a c k e d the c l a r i t y t h a t 
o f t e n accompanied the d i s c u s s i o n s of w r i t e r s such a s , f o r 
example, Stout, McDougall, and o t h e r s . (11) He d i d not 
in t r o d u c e as an a l t e r n a t i v e , a d e f i n i t e l i s t of i n s t i n c t s 
which he c r i t i c i s e d . True to say, he d i d d i s c u s s some of the 
i n s t i n c t s , but he was not thorough enough. ( m ) His 
argument r e g a r d i n g the r e l a t i o n of i n s t i n c t s and emotions 
appears to be r a t h e r vague; he was not q u i t e c l e a r as to how 
he conceived of t h e i r dependence upon each o t h e r . 
- - The s e r i e s may not be complete without r e f e r r i n g 
to S i r . C y r i l Burt (b. 1883). As a student of McDougall a t 
Oxford, he d o u b t l e s s was i n f l u e n c e d by h i s t e a c h e r . I n f a c t , 
he appears to have e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y adopted and defended 
most of McDougall's views, e s p e c i a l l y the d o c t r i n e of 
i n s t i n c t s and the s t r u c t u r e of p e r s o n a l i t y . 
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(86) The i n v e s t i g a t i o n s which Burt c a r r i e d out at 
McDougall's suggestion, and w i t h the a s s i s t a n c e of J.C. F l u g e l , 
another p u p i l of McDougall's, were some ye a r s l a t e r p u b l i s h e d 
i n h i s f i r s t famous a r t i c l e "Experimental T e s t s of General 
(87) 
I n t e l l i g e n c e " . B u r t ' s own words of t h a t a r t i c l e were 
"The experimental determination of the mental c h a r a c t e r s of 
i n d i v i d u a l s i s a d m ittedly a problem of wide t h e o r e t i c a l 
(88) 
i n t e r e s t and of v a s t p r a c t i c a l importance". The mental 
c h a r a c t e r which Burt regarded as supreme i s "General 
I n t e l l i g e n c e " . He has adhered to t h i s c e n t r a l problem 
throughout h i s p r o f e s s i o n a l l i f e . The e s s e n t i a l aim of h i s 
e a r l y i n v e s t i g a t i o n s was "to determine whether h i g h e r mental 
f u n c t i o n s would not show a c l o s e r connexion w i t h g e n e r a l 
(86) ( I ) V a l e n t i n e , C.W., " C y r i l Burt : A B i o g r a p h i c a l Sketch 
and A p p r e c i a t i o n " i n : S t u d i e s i n Psychology 
Presented.to„Cyril^Burt, ed. b y B a n k s , C. and 
Broadhurst, P.L., U n i v e r s i t y of London P r e s s , ( 1 9 6 5 ) . 
( i i ) B u r t , C., "An A u t o b i o g r a p h i c a l S k e t c h " i n 
O ccupational Psych., V o l . X X I I I , (1949), pp.9-20. 
(87) B.J.Psych., V o l . I l l , p a r t s 1 and 2, (1909). 
(88) i b i d . 
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i n t e l l i g e n c e than was shown by s i m p l e r mental f u n c t i o n s , 
such as sensory d i s c r i m i n a t i o n and motor r e a c t i o n " , w i t h 
which previous i n v e s t i g a t o r s had been so l a r g e l y 
occupied. I n h i s attempt l i e s the germ of group i n t e l l i g e n c e 
t e s t s ; and h i s contentions seem to have proved worthwhile. 
The p o s i t i v e r e s u l t s he obtained encouraged him t o d e v i s e 
more t e s t s such as " a n a l o g i e s " , "sentence formation", 
"reasoning" and the l i k e . Such t e s t s were "capable of 
a p p l i c a t i o n to l a r g e numbers of c h i l d r e n a t once" and "capable 
of a p p l i c a t i o n by t e a c h e r s u n t r a i n e d to any c o n s i d e r a b l e 
degree i n a p s y c h o l o g i c a l l a b o r a t o r y " . ^ 8 9 ^ As a r e s u l t of 
f a c t o r i a l s t u d i e s , Burt came to d e f i n e i n t e l l i g e n c e as " i n n a t e " , 
"general c o g n i t i v e e f f l c i e n c y " . ^ 9 0 ^ But h i s s t r e s s e d warning 
was t h a t t h i s should not be c a r r i e d too f a r . For i t i s too 
o f t e n f o r g o t t e n t h a t every t e s t of i n t e l l i g e n c e i s a l s o a t e s t 
of emotion. "A n e g l e c t of the emotional a s p e c t of an 
examination of i n t e l l i g e n c e may send many a normal c h i l d to the 
(91) 
s p e c i a l s c h o o l as m e n t a l l y d e f i c i e n t " . 
(89) B.J.Psych., V o l . I l l , ( 1 9 0 9 ) , o p . c i t . , 
(90) Mental and S c h o l a s t i c T e s t s , London, S t a p l e s P r e s s , 2nd ed., 
(1947), 1 s t publ. 1921. 
(91) i b i d , p.16. 
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The twin p a r t s of a s p e c t s of the mind -
i n t e l l e c t u a l and emotional - Burt made the b a s i s of the 
treatment i n The Young Delinquent ( 1 9 2 5 ) . Indeed, the 
a c t u a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of many d i f f e r e n t types of 
delinquency was i n f a c t based upon McDougall's system of 
I n s t i n c t s . He a s c r i b e d delinquency i n the young to the 
emotional d i s t u r b a n c e s which may come from the environment 
(92) 
of the c h i l d . He, of course, does not r u l e out the 
r o l e of h e r e d i t y . "Heredity and environment may each do 
(93) 
t h e i r s i n i s t e r s h a r e " . They a r e both complementary . 
Dea l i n g w i t h emotional d i s t u r b a n c e s as f a c t o r s l e a d i n g to 
delinquency, Burt tended to base h i s treatment on an 
i n h e r i t e d b a s i s . T h i s he t h i n k s i s i n s t i n c t . His suggestion 
has been t h a t "the commoner d e l i n q u e n c i e s committed by the 
young a r e apparently e i t h e r the d i r e c t e x p r e s s i o n of a few 
p r i m i t i v e and u n i v e r s a l impulses which seem to have been 
handed down to us as p a r t of our i n s t i n c t i v e equipment, or 
e l s e modified r e a c t i o n s e l a b o r a t e d out of, but s t i l l 
u l t i m a t e l y s p r i n g i n g from, th e s e cruder modes of emotional 
,, (94) response . 
* 4th ed. 1944, r e p r i n t e d 1948. 
(92) The Young Delinquent, C h . I I I . 
(93) i b i d , p.63. 
(94) ( l ) i b i d , p.422. 
( n ) See a l s o h i s : How the Mind Works, ed. by C y r i l B u r t , 
"How the Mind Works i n A d u l t s " 1 s t ed. (19 3 3 ) , 2nd ed. 
1945. 
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The i m p l i c a t i o n s from the above quotation i n d i c a t e 
c l e a r l y t h a t B u r t having from the f i r s t accepted McDougall's views, 
appears to have been confirmed i n t h i s p o s i t i o n as the y e a r s went 
(95) 
by. I n the symposium " i s the Doctrine of I n s t i n c t s Dead ? " 
(1941), he e m p h a t i c a l l y r e s t a t e s the same fundamental viewpoint. I n 
h i s d i s c u s s i o n of the a b o r r a t i o n s of the young, Burt assumed a 
b i o l o g i c a l as w e l l as a p s y c h o l o g i c a l l i n e . 
Among other P s y c h o l o g i c a l t o p i c s , Burt appears to 
have been i n t e r e s t e d i n the f o l l o w i n g items: 
1. He i s always i n t e r e s t e d m the r e s u l t s of t e s t i n g , both 
t h e o r e t i c a l ^ ^ and p r a c t i c a l . 
2. His i n t e r e s t a l s o c e n t r e d round the ways and means of s e l e c t i n g 
(97) 
the e x c e p t i o n a l c h i l d f o r the award of s c h o l a r s h i p . 
3. He i s concerned w i t h f i n d i n g the s u i t a b l e l i n e s that d i v i d e 
between normal c h i l d r e n and those who need s p e c i a l s c h o o l i n g . 
(99) 
4. He intended to v e r i f y the hypothesis of the general e d u c a t i o n a l 
a b i l i t y . B u r t ' s c o n s i s t e n t view, at any r a t e , 
(95) B.J.Ed.Psych., V o l s . X I - X I I I (1941-1943). 
(96) See : Mental and S c h o l a s t i c T e s t s , London, S t a p l e s P r e s s , 2nd 
ed., ( 1 9 4 7 ) , 1 s t p u b l i s h e d i n 1921. 
(97) See : "The P r i n c i p l e s of V o c a t i o n a l Guidance", B.J.Psych., 
Vol.XIV, p a r t 4, ( 1 9 2 4 ) . 
(98) See : The Backward C h i l d , U n i v e r s i t y of London P r e s s , 2nd ed, 
and r e v i s e d ed. (1946), 1 s t p u b l i s h e d i n 1937. 
(99) See : The F a c t o r s of the Mind, U n i v e r s i t y of London P r e s s , 
( 1 9 4 0 ) . 
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i s to s e c u r e "an empxrxcally a s c e r t a i n e d s i m p l i c x t y " ^ ' " ^ xn 
Psychology. For "to choose t e s t s or t r a x t s almost a t 
random, and note the s i m p l i c x t y of the r e s u l t x n g c o r r e l a t x o n a l 
p a t t e r n , can mean l i t t l e or nothxng, except t h a t the c h o i c e 
was n e a r l y random". But, "to s e l e c t t e s t s or t r a i t s ... 
according to some d e f i n a b l e p r i n c i p l e , and then show t h a t a 
simple formula w i l l summarize the r e s u l t s , may mean something: 
i t provides a t l e a s t a presumption t h a t we have p e r c e i v e d 
what was r e l e v a n t and e l i m i n a t e d what was i r r e l e v a n t " . ^"'"^"'"^  
His aim i s to draw up i n o u t l i n e what i s c a l l e d a 
"psychographic scheme" : t h a t i s , t o d i s t i n g u i s h xn each 
xndxvidual (1) x n t e l l e c t u a l and emotional c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , 
(2) inborn and a c q u i r e d c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , and (3) g e n e r a l and 
s p e c i f i c f a c t o r s . F a c t o r a n a l y s i s and the mathematical 
and l o g i c a l foundations of f a c t o r a n a l y s i s have been h i s 
major i n t e r e s t s ; but the b a s i c m o t i v a t i o n of behaviour, be 
i t normal or de l i n q u e n t , i s f o r B u r t , e s s e n t i a l l y t h a t of 
McDougall. 
(100) i b i d , p.27. 
(101) i b i d , p.27. 
(102) The Subnormal Mind, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , ( 1 9 5 5 ) , 
p.22; 1 s t pu b l i s h e d i n 1935. 
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Along w i t h other notable p s y c h o l o g i c a l 
s t a t i s t i c i a n s such as Galton, C a r l Pearson, Spearman, 
Godfrey Thomson - to mention only a few - Burt has clorie a 
unique p a r t m e s t a b l i s h i n g the s u b j e c t on a s c i e n t i f i c b a s i s , 
both i n B r i t a i n and abroad. The impact McDougall l e f t on 
pre s e n t p s y c h o l o g i c a l thought may be e a s i l y seen through the 
w r i t i n g s and d i s c u s s i o n s of B u r t and other students of 
McDougall. I n B u r t ' s works, a t l e a s t two areas i n p a r t i c u l a r 
c l e a r l y show McDougall*s i n f l u e n c e : ( 1 ) surveys of p h y s i c a l 
and mental c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ; (11) the a p p l i c a t i o n of the 
(103) 
Mendelian g e n e t i c s to the study of mental i n h e r i t a n c e -
both of which f i e l d s were a t the focus of McDougall's a t t e n t i o n . 
(103) See f o r example, B u r t ' s f o l l o w i n g a r t i c l e s :~ 
( l ) "Heredity and I n t e l l i g e n c e " ( w i t h M. Howard), 
B . J . S t a t i s t . P s y c h . , Vol.X, (1957), pp.33-63. 
( n ) "The R e l a t i v e I n f l u e n c e of Heredity and Environment 
on Assessment of I n t e l l i g e n c e " ( w i t h M. Howard), 
idem, pp.99-104. 
( m ) "The D i s t r i b u t i o n of I n t e l l i g e n c e " B.J.Psych., 
V o l . X L V I I I , ( 1 9 5 7 ) , pp.161-175. 
(IV) "The I n h e r i t a n c e of Mental A b i l i t y " Eugen.Review. 
Vol.XLIX, (1 9 5 7 ) , pp.137-141. 
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I n a word, B u r t , to quote C.A. Mace,^ 1 0 4^ " i s a p s y c h o l o g i s t 
i n the t r a d i t i o n of F r a n c i s Galton, not only m advancing the 
development of s t a t i s t i c a l methods i n p s y c h o l o g i c a l 
e n q u i r i e s , but i n showing Galton's i n t e r e s t m answering the 
q u e s t i o n r a t h e r than i n f o r m u l a t i n g laws or methodological 
p r i n c i p l e s " . 
3. P h y s i o l o g i c a l P s y c h o l o g i s t s . 
D i s c o v e r i e s of fundamental importance to Psychology 
were made by a number of eminent p h y s i o l o g i s t s ; notable among 
them were W i l l i a m Halse R i v e r s (1864-1922), S i r Henry Head 
(1861-1940) and S i r C h a r l e s S h e r r i n g t o n (1857-1952). I t was 
R i v e r s , i n p a r t i c u l a r , who showed much i n t e r e s t i n psychology. 
Before d i s c u s s i n g h i s main views, i t may be a p p r o p r i a t e now to 
i n d i c a t e b r i e f l y S h e rrington's and Head's p h y s i o l o g i c a l 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s to Psychology. 
S h e r r i n g t o n ' s arguments a r e i n c o r p o r a t e d mainly 
i n h i s w e l l known book, The I n t e g r a t i v e A c t i o n of the Nervous 
S y s t e m ^ 1 0 5 ^ ( 1 9 Q 6 ) , of which i t i s s a i d ^ 1 0 6 ^ t h a t "no s i n g l e 
(104) "Causal E x p l a n a t i o n m Psychology" : S t u d i e s i n Psychology, 
o p . c i t . , p.27. 
(105) Another ed., ( 1 9 4 8 ) , Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s . 
(106) B oring, E.G., o p . c i t . , p.492. 
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volume had s t i m u l a t e d p h y s i o l o g i c a l psychology so much as 
t h i s one". By way of summary, S h e r r i n g t o n ' s s a l i e n t 
achievements a r e : 1. C l a r i f i c a t i o n of the nature of r e f l e x 
a c t i o n s . He was the f i r s t to provide experimental evidence 
f o r what i s c a l l e d i n modern terminology "feed-back" i n the 
nervous system. I t i s a mechanism i n muscles which p l a y s a 
l a r g e p a r t i n the r e g u l a t i o n of posture and movement. 
2. S h e r r i n g t o n c o r r e c t e d the James-Lange Theory of emotions; 
acc o r d i n g to which, emotion i s a d e r i v a t i o n of v i s c e r a l and 
v a s c u l a r changes. A f t e r e x t e n s i v e s t u d i e s , S h e r r i n g t o n came 
to the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t the v i s c e r a l e x p r e s s i o n of emotion i s 
secondary to the a c t i o n o c c u r i n g w i t h i n the p s y c h i c a l s t a t e . 
3. A d i r e c t c o n t r i b u t i o n t h a t S h e r r i n g t o n made to modern 
psychology i s apparent i n h i s p r i n c i p l e s of n e u r a l f u n c t i o n i n g 
simple r e f l e x , simple conduction, and so on. For as i s w e l l 
known, both behaviour and experience which Psychology attempts 
to e x p l a i n a r e the r e s u l t s of the a c t i o n of the nervous system 
a t l a r g e . I n s h o r t , S h errington's c h i e f c o n t r i b u t i o n to 
psychology i s b e s t r e p r e s e n t e d by h i s conception of the 
s t r u c t u r e of the nervous system as a whole. I n h i s above book 
he r e f e r r e d w i t h approval to McDougall's d i s c u s s i o n s of the 
s e a t of the p s y c h o - p h y s i c a l p r o c e s s e s , s y n o p t i c f u n c t i o n s , and 
the l i k e . 
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Head' s ^  main services to Psychology l i e 
essentially m his work on s e n s i b i l i t y . Prior to his 
investigations l i t t l e was known of the exact d i s t r i b u t i o n 
of the areas of abnormal s e n s i b i l i t y . His observations have 
proved so accurate that they have become widely known as 
"Head's areas". He devoted considerable time to the 
study of aphasia and other disorders of speech. He 
distinguished four types of aphasia, namely, (1) verbal 
aphasia, (11) syntactical form, (111) nominal type, and 
( I V ) semantic defects. These four kinds he linked with A 
mental disturbances. This i s another major contribution to 
modern psychology. He introduced the conception of 
"schemata",^ 1 0^ which has come to have a big role i n B r i t i s h 
Psychology. The doctrine was formulated to explain the 
capacity of the normal human being to appreciate bodily 
position and the d i r e c t i o n of bodily movement. This may be 
considered as complementary to the work begun by Sherrington. 
Head's researches on the effects of lesion i n peripheral 
(107) Studies i n Neurology, (1920), vol.2, pp.604-7. 
(108) Obituary Notices of Fellows of the Royal Society, (1939-1941), 
vol.3, p.668. 
(109) ( l ) i b i d , p.681. 
( n ) O l d f i e l d , C. and Zangwill, O.L., B r i t . J.Psych., 
Vol.XXXII (1942), Vol.XXXIII (1943). 
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sensory nerves l a t e r became the classical experiment which 
distinguished between "protopathic" and " e p i c r i t i c " , 
cutaneous s e n s i b i l i t y . In the course of these l a t t e r 
studies, Rivers was associated wi t h , and influenced by Head. 
I t was at Cambridge that McDougall f i r s t met 
Rivers^" L 1 <^ a s a student. I t i s i r o n i c a l enough to f i n d that 
l a t e r McDougall could influence his teacher to change and 
modify some of his views concerning the concept of i n s t i n c t . 
I n a prefatory note to River's "Psychology and 
P o l i t i c s " , G. E l l i o t Smith remarked that "Rivers approached the 
problems of p o l i t i c s and education and acquired that wider 
understanding of the range of psychology and sociology by 
way of e t h n o l o g y " . O n the psychology of p o l i t i c s , 
Rivers has t h i s to say, "The f i r s t point on which to i n s i s t 
i s that the science of psychology is s t i l l very young; i n so 
far as concerns the kind of problem with which we are now 
concerned, i t can hardly be said to be yet i n i t s teens". 
(110) Myers, C.S., "The Influence of the l a t e W.H.Rivers" 
i n : Psychology and P o l i t i c s , by W.H.R. Rivers, London, 
Kegan Paul, (1923), p.154. 
(111) G. E l l i o t Smith, Prefatory note i n Psychology and P o l i t i c s , 
by Rivers, p. v i . 
(112) Psychology and P o l i t i c s , p.3. 
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In his lectures reported xn t h i s book, ^"L"L"^  Rivers 
concerned himself with the question of i n s t i n c t i n r e l a t i o n 
to society. He t e n t a t i v e l y defined i n s t i n c t as "inherited 
disposition to behaviour". This i n i t a e l f i s a broad 
d e f i n i t i o n , because i t implies the notion of purposive 
conduct and goal-seekm g action, a theme that McDougall 
emphatically stressed. The d e f i n i t i o n also implies the 
mental make-up and the individual experience obtained i n his 
environment,. 
(115) 
In an e a r l i e r publication, Rivers 
endeavoured to explain the facts of behaviour on physiological 
and psychological bases. He pointed out that the r e l a t i o n 
between the cerebral cortex and the optic thalamus was found 
(113) Psychology and P o l i t i c s . 
(114) i b i d , p.29. 
(115) ( l ) I n s t i n c t and the Unconscious, Cambridge Press (1920), 
p.22 and p.23. 
( n ) See also Brain, Vol.XXVIII (1905), pp.99, 116. 
( m ) Brain, Vol.XXI (1908), pp.323^ 369. 
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to be sxmilar to that existing between "protopathic" and 
" e p i c r i t i c " ^ 1 1 ^ s e n s i b i l i t y . A t h i r d sort of s e n s i b i l i t y 
he indicated, as "deep" s e n s i b i l i t y : response to pressure 
and certain forms of movement. This r e f l e c t s Head's 
influence on Rivers, as indicated above. He was much 
concerned about the individual's adjustment behaviaurally: 
" i n a l l cases we have to do with the means by which behaviour, 
whether of human being or animal, i s adjusted to the needs 
with which man or animal i s c o n f r o n t e d " . j j e found that 
experience which becomes unconscious through suppression 
either "belongs d e f i n i t e l y to the a f f e c t i v e aspect of mind, or 
when i n t e l l e c t u a l i n character, has been suppressed on account 
of i t s association with a f f e c t i v e elements".^^^ In t h i s he 
tended to establish a r e l a t i o n between i n s t i n c t and a f f e c t ; 
(116) (1) I n s t i n c t and the Unconscious, op.cit., p.27 and p.25. 
( n ) Brain, Vol.XXXIV, (1911-12), p.102. 
( m ) Brain, Vol.XVII, (1893), p . l . 
(IV) Brain, Vol.XVII, (1894), p.339. 
(117) I n s t i n c t and the Unconscious, op.cit., p.21. 
(118) i b i d , pp.37-38. 
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such a r e l a t i o n would suggest that the special function of the 
unconscious i s to act as "a storehouse of i n s t i n c t i v e reactions 
and tendencies, together with the experience associated with 
them, when they are out of harmony with the prevailing 
constituents of consciousness so that , when present, they 
produce pain and d i s c o m f o r t " . ^ 1 1 ^ The d i s t i n c t i o n between the 
behaviour of man as purely i n t e l l i g e n t and that of brutes as 
merely i n s t i n c t i v e , Rivers rejected as of " l i t t l e value". 
Man's behaviour, he thinks, i s far less subject to "reason and 
int e l l i g e n c e " than i t was once supposed. The behaviour of even 
(120) 
an insect i s l i a b l e to f l e x i b i l i t y and adjustment. 
Reactions that take place m animals or man and 
happen i n t h e i r f u l l strength, Rivers called the "all-or-none"^ 1^ 1^ 
(122) 
reactions; a term he adopted from E.D. Adrian. The 
"all-or-none" p r i n c i p l e he considered as a law of wide 
implications holding good for the r e l a t i o n between stimulus and 
(119) i b i d , pp.37-38. 
(120) i b i d , pp.40-41. 
(121) ( i ) i b i d , p.45, and p.71. 
( n ) Brain, Vol.XL, (1917), p.15. 
(122) Journal of Psychology, Vol.XLV, 1912. 
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(123) sensation, or between stimulus and reaction. He rejected 
Fechner's formula that the sensation i s proportional to the 
logarithm of the stimulus. According to Rivers, any such 
exact r e l a t i o n i s "wholly absent i n the case of protopathic 
s e n s i b i l i t y " . He stressed that there i s no such exact r e l a t i o n 
between "the conditions s e t t i n g an i n s t i n c t i v e or emotional 
reaction into being and the strength of the reaction, at any 
rate i n the c h i l d , or i n the adult human being whose emotions 
have not been brought well under control by long t r a i n i n g and 
practice". ^ "^^ HQ denied the existence of the r e l a t i o n i n 
reaction i n the case of the "extensor-thrust" or the "mass 
r e f l e x " . R i v e r ' s aim i n w r i t i n g : I n s t i n c t and the 
Unconscious was, as he says, "to provide a biological theory 
for the psychoneuroses". In i t , he distinguished the 
psychological from the physiological standpoint. He held that 
an exact correspondence holds between the i n h i b i t i o n of the 
physiologist and the repression of the psychologist. 
Throughout his work on Psychology he endeavoured to define 
precisely words that had hitherto been used ambiguously. He 
(123) ( I ) I n s t i n c t and the Unconscious, op.cit., p.47. 
( n ) Brain, Vol.XIX, (1896), p.153. 
(124) i b i d , p.47. 
(125) i b i d , p.47. 
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defined "unconscious experience", for example, as that which 
is incapable of being brought i n t o the f i e l d of the 
consciousness, except under certain conditions, such as sleep 
or hypnosis. He defined "repression" as the expulsion of 
experience from consciousness. He defined "suppression" as 
the "unwitting" process by which experience becomes 
u n c o n s c i o u s . W h e t h e r a l l River's psychological views are 
s t i l l v a l i d or not i s another matter, what is essential here i s 
that his contribution to the science of modern Psychology i s 
(126) (1) i b i d . 
( I I ) C.S. Myers, "The Influence of the l a t e W.H.R.Rivers" 
i n Rivers's : Psychology and P o l i t i c s , op.cit., 
especially pp,169ff. 
( I I I ) G. E l l i o t Smith, Preface i n Rivers's Conflict and 
Dream, London, Kegan Paul, 1923. 
( I V ) W.H.R. Rivers : Conflict and Dream, op.cit., 
(v) , Medicine, Magic and Religion, London, 
(1927). 
( v i ) , Essays on the Depopulation of 
Melanesia, Cambridge (1922). 
( v n ) , History and Ethnology, London, (1922), 
See also Ch.VI. 
"The Aims of Ethnology" m Psychology and P o l i t i c s . 
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indisputable. His clear d e f i n i t i o n s of i n s t i n c t and of 
consciousness can be ascribed mainly to McDougall's impact. 
I t may be said, i n f a c t , that Rivers wrote I n s t i n c t and the 
Unconscious, largely from a McDougallian point of view. 
4, Conclusions : 
I t seems that psychological ideas were gradually 
b u i l t and completed from one thinker to another. I t is true 
that B r i t i s h Philosophy adopted evolution and eventually 
purposivism. I t i s on such a foundation that modern B r i t i s h 
psychology has been b u i l t ; but the study of Psychology 
departed from the philosophical province and followed more 
empirical l i n e s . This has been so without, of course, 
dissociating i t s e l f from the o r i g i n a l t r a d i t i o n which gave i t 
i t s impetus. When reference i s now being made to empirical 
Psychology, i t i s often called associative Psychology, largely 
because i t based the essential principles #f mental l i f e on 
the association of ideas. Such a development seems to be a 
fundamental characteristic of B r i t i s h thought. 
That certain sciences, such as Darwin's biology, 
enormously quickened the development of psychological schools 
generally, i s now acceptable and both the evolutionary and 
empirical trends are apparent i n the considerable impact of 
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modern studies of animal behaviour, p a r t i c u l a r l y those 
associated with Ethology. Again, that Psychology can now 
speak with the accent of science, i s i n no small measure 
due to Darwin who influenced Galton, In turn, Galton's 
traces were l e f t upon the works of Sully and Ward. The 
l a t t e r ' s arguments attracted and influenced Stout, whose 
impact upon McDougall was e x p l i c i t l y acknowledged; yet l a t e r 
on, McDougall influenced Stout. However, the conclusion 
that can now t e n t a t i v e l y be drawn i s that McDougall's 
purposive and hormic Psychology can be regarded as the 
natural outcome of, and b r i l l i a n t assimilation of a multitude 
of ideas deeply rooted i n a r i c h background. 
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CHAPTER IV 
ORIGINS OF THE HORMIC THEORY AND 
SOME DISTINGUISHED HORMISTS 
1. Hormic and H o l i s t i c Psychologies. 
Psychologists who maintain that the most 
important part of psychology has to be concerned with "motives", 
"purposes" and "urges" are usually described as "purposive" or 
"hormic" psychologists. The foremost representative and 
champion of th i s type of psychology was William McDougall. On 
the other hand, psychologists who i n s i s t on considering the 
individual as a whole are often termed "self-psychologists", 
"personalistic", or "organismic" psychologists. I t i s because of 
the emphasis that these psychologists place upon the person 
generally, that Woodworth has called them " h o l i s t i c " . 
2. The Fact of Purpose. 
The word "purpose" and i t s derivatives 
"purposive", purposeful", "purposivism", and the l i k e , are used m 
various contexts, "Purpose" may be used by the mechanical 
psychologists to describe even the action of a machine. On the 
(1) Contemporary Schools of Psychology, op.cit, p.213. 
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other hand, i t i s employed by the v i t a l i s t s to indicate a 
preconceived, goal-seeking behaviour, associated with awareness on 
the part o l the organism. McDougall, for instance, had continued 
using the term i n i t s l a t t e r connotation u n t i l l a t e r on he adopted 
the word "hormic". Afterwards, however, he used both words, more 
or less, synonymously. I t seems that he was aware of the 
d i f f i c u l t i e s involved i n the usage of the term "purpose", so t h i s 
was why, among other reasons, he warned against "an exclusive 
(2) 
devotion to the mechanical Psychology". 
(3) 
Unlike some other writers such as H.C.Warren, 
for example, who selects as purposive what suits his argument and 
neglects facts that do not serve his purpose, McDougall saw that 
purposive a c t i v i t y i s regulative and d i r e c t i o n a l . As he wrote, 
"purposive a c t i v i t y i s highly selective; that i s one of i t s 
fundamental p e c u l i a r i t i e s which mark i t o f f objectively from 
mechanical process. The organism, acting under the urge of a 
strong purpose, i . e . actively seeking a p a r t i c u l a r goal, not only 
selects whatever i s relevant to i t s goal and goal-seeking, but 
(4) 
neglects, i s b l i n d t o , whatever i s not relevant". This i s 
(2) "Purposive or Mechanical Psychology" Psych.Rev., Vol.30 (1923), 
pp. 273, 274. 
(3) "A Study of Purpose", J.Psych, and S c i e n t i f i c Method, V o l . X I I I , 
(1916). 
(4) ( I ) Wm.McDougall, "Purposive Experience" Pedagogical Seminary 
Vol.33, (1926), pp.354, 353. 
( n ) , "Purposive S t r i v i n g As A Fundamental Category 
of Psychology "Psychological Review, Vol.32, No.2, (1925), 
p.306; the same a r t i c l e i s published i n Rep.Brit. 
Association, (1924) pp.226-232. 
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McDougall's vxew. Whereas that of Warren i s that no s e l e c t i v i t y 
i s thought of or attended to by the s t r i v i n g organism. 
Alfr e d Sidgwick maintained that purpose has some 
(5) 
r e l a t i o n to meaning. For him " t r u t h " i s purposive. To 
Woodworth, "Purpose i s a real fact i n human l i f e , and, i f not 
purpose, at least s t r i v i n g towards a goal i s a real fact of animal 
(6) 
l i f e as w e l l " . H.Hoffding held that purpose i s conditioned by 
(7) 
the ideas, feelings and impulses occupying i t . With C y r i l Burt, 
o 
the word "purpose" can be held to connate a consciously apprehended 
purpose, which he prefers to c a l l " i n t e n t i o n " . For him the term 
makes a prediction: " i t prophesies what is l i k e l y to be the r e s u l t " . 
This r e f l e c t s exactly the notion advocated by McDougall, who was 
"the f i r s t psychologist to propose an objective meaning for the 
purposive aspect of behaviour". Konard Z. Lorenz^"*"^ upheld that 
(5) "Truth and Purpose" MIND, N.S, Vol. XXXIII, No 132, (1924), 
pp. 388, 397. 
(6) "Dynamic Psychology" Psychologies of 1925, ed. by Carl 
Murchison, op.cit, p.118. 
(7) Outlines of Psychology, p. 328. 
(8) "Is The Doctrine of I n s t i n c t Dead ?", A Symposium, B.J.Edu. 
Psychol., Vol.XI, part 3, Nov.l, 1941, p.160; 
see also; J.C. Maxwell Garnett, "General A b i l i t y , Clearness and 
Purpose" B.J.Psych. Vol. IX, pp3 & 4, (1919), 
pp. 345-366. 
V 
(9) D a l l i n Bindra, Motivation; A Systematic Remterpretation, N.Y., 
The Ronald Press Co. (1959), p.52. 
(10) The Herring Gull's World, by N. Tinbergen, London, Collins 
(1953) foreword by Lorenz, p. x i 
- 179 -
"much of the Beauty and Wonder of nature i s based on the fact that 
organic l i f e i s directed towards goals". Again, Lorenz observed 
that when "the dog wants you to open the door or turn on the tap, 
what he does has the specific and purposeful motive of influencing 
you i n a certain d i r e c t i o n " . N. Tmbergen has spoken of 
"plant sociology", of "animal sociology" and i n p a r t i c u l a r of 
(12) 
"man sociology". In animal sociology there i s always a sense 
of co-operation. "When we speak of co-operation", he wr i t e s , "we 
have always at the back of our minds an idea, clear or vague, of 
the purpose of t h i s co-operation. We assume that i t serves some ,„ (13) end . 
Though the word "purpose" i s sometimes used so 
broadly as to cover any a c t i v i t y directed to a d e f i n i t e end, i t i s 
often f e l t desirable to reserve i t f o r cases where the individual 
* 
has some "foresight" of the end. Foresight depends on memory. 
(11) King Solomon's Ring, London, Methuen (1959) 1st publ. 1952, 
P.82 
(12) Social Behaviour i n Animals, London, Methuen, (1959), pp 1-2. 
(13) i b i d , p.2 
* Woodworth distinguished between foresight, insight and 
hindsight. The f i r s t i s seeing the way to the goal before 
taking i t ; the t h i r d i s seeing that a lead i s good af t e r 
t r y i n g i t ; the second i s sometimes foresight and sometimes 
hindsight. 
See Woodworth's : Psychology ; A Study of Mental L i f e , 9th ed. 
(1948), 1st publ. 1922, p. 295. 
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(14) The view at issue i s held by writers l i k e McDougall, 
Woodworth^"1"5^ and R„ L a t t a . ^ 1 ^ The l a t t e r ' s specific view i s 
that purpose d i f f e r s from " i n t e n t i o n " m being l i m i t e d to the 
elements actually present to the mind. Taking t h i s stand, Latta 
defined purpose as "a conceived course of action directed to 
(17) 
a remote end". I n keeping with t h i s notion i s R.H. Thouless's 
statement that "We are p a r t i c u l a r l y inclined to give purposive 
explanations when what we observe i s a variety of lines of 
a c t i v i t y which have m common the fact that they lead to a single 
(18 ) 
goal". An example of t h i s i s the nest-building behaviour of 
birds. Both Latta's and Thouless's views are i n conformity with 
McDougall's. 
Views similar to those mentioned above, are every 
now and again expressed by d i f f e r e n t writers i n various ways. 
Morris A. Copeland, for example, upheld that behaviour could be 
explained t e l e o l o g i c a l l y . The implications of such an in t e r p r e t a t i o n 
(14) "Purposive Experience" Ped.Sem. Vol.33, (1926), op . c i t , 
p. 356, and elsewhere i t w i l l be shown l a t e r . 
(15) Psychology, op.cit, p. 390. 
(16) "Purpose", Proceedings of the A r i s t o t e l i a n Society, N.S, 
Vol V I I I , 1907-1908, p. 17. 
(17) i b i d , pp 17-18. 
(18) General and Social Psychology, London, Univ. T. Pr. (1958) 
1st publ. (1925), p.54. 
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appear to involve the notion that the consequent i s held to 
determine the antecedent. In Copeland's own words, "the end 
somehow selects or determines the response appropriate to 
(19) 
bringing i t about". The idea implied i n such an explanation 
seems to be that the results affect the causes or i n i t i a t e them. 
Whether such a view i s acceptable or not i s another matter; what 
r e a l l y matters i s that i t represents a natural as well as an 
evolutionary point of view. Such a developmental position was 
also assumed by L.T. Hobhouse, who maintained that, "the paradox 
of organic action i s that i t carries out apparent purposes without 
purposing to do so ... i t i s adapted to the securing of results 
which we as spectators recognize as valuable to the organism, and 
yet we do not imagine i t to be determined by any conception of 
„ (20) 
these results . Following the l i n e of natural i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
(21) 
of purposive a c t i v i t y , G.C. Grindley explained that both i n 
thought or i n behaviour both men and animals usually direct t h e i r 
(22) 
a c t i v i t i e s towards a goal or end. Grindley has clearly pointed 
out, that his views are i n l i n e with McDougall's observations 
(19) "Desire, Choice, and Purpose from a Natural-Evolutionary 
Standpoint", Psych.Rev., July, (1926), Vol.33, No.4., 
pp. 247-248. 
(20) Mind i n Evolution, (1901) op.cxt, p.126, see also by the 
same author : Development and Purpose (1913), op.cit, 
(21) "The Natural Basis of Purposive A c t i v i t y " Brit.J.Psych., 
Vol. X V I I I , part I , October, (1927), pp. 168-9. 
(22) i b i d , p. 168. 
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expressed i n An Outline of Psychology (1923). Grindley i s of the 
opinion that the simple theories of the physiological basis of 
association, the simple "chain r e f l e x " and "conditioned r e f l e x " 
theories f a i l to explain the purposive nature of animal 
(23) 
behaviour. C. Judson Herrick has t r i e d to show that some 
animal "reactions", such as the "t y p i c a l tropism", " r e f l e x " or 
(24) 
" i n s t i n c t " , have both "a backward and a forward reference". 
The forward reference i s expressed b i o l o g i c a l l y by saying that these 
a c t i v i t i e s are i n general adaptive, that i s , the a c t i v i t i e s serve 
and favour the preservation of the individual or the species. 
Herrick dwelt on explaining the function of "the forward reference 
of r e f l e x and i n s t i n c t i v e behaviour" without an adequate 
(25) 
explanation of what he r e a l l y meant by the "backward" reference, 
Herrick, however, was more cautious than Tolman who chose to give 
( 26 ) 
the name purpose to any "toward-whichness" of behaviour". But 
(23) i b i d , p. 168. 
(24) "The Natural History of Purpose" Psych.Rev. Vol. 32, No 6, 
November, (1925), p.419; see also 
Jennings, H.S., Behaviour of the Lower Animals, N.Y, 
Columbia University Press. (1931) 1st published 1906, 
pp. 265-274. 
(25) i b i d , pp. 419, 423. 
(26) Tolman, E.C. "Behaviourism and Purpose" J. of Philosophy, 
Vol 22, (1925), pp. 36-41. 
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Tolman, at the same time, urged t h a t animal behaviour and human 
l e a r n i n g should be envisaged i n terms of goal-seeking (purpose), 
a set of innate or acquired i n i t i a l explanatory impulses 
( i n i t i a l c o g n i t i v e "hunches"), and the a c q u i s i t i o n of a set of 
(27) 
f i n a l object-adjustments ( f i n a l c o g n i t i o n s ) . 
By way of summary, the term "purpose" has been 
v a r i a b l y used by p s y c h o l o g i s t s , philosophers and b i o l o g i s t s . I t 
has been sometimes used broadly and vaguely, at other times 
r e s t r i c t i v e l y but c l e a r l y . The c e n t r a l theme of i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s , 
however, i s t h a t events r a t h e r than things or a b s t r a c t s , dynamic 
tendencies r a t h e r than s t a t i c e n t i t i e s or mechanical a c t i v i t i e s , 
are t o be accounted f o r . A preconceived, d i r e c t e d behaviour 
purported t o preserve the i n d i v i d u a l , the species or both, i s i t s 
i n t r i n s i c connotation. The a d j e c t i v a l d e r i v a t i v e , " p u r p o s e f u l " 
could mean : purposive, v i t a l i s t i c , u r g i n g toward, s p u r r i n g t o 
a c t i v i t y , conative, c o n a t i o n a l , d e s i r i n g , w i l l i n g , w i s h i n g , 
v o l i t i o n a l , consciously (or unconsciously) aiming a t , e n e r g e t i c , 
pressing forward, s t r i v i n g f o r , s e l f r e g u l a t i o n , conscious 
r e g u l a t i o n , goal-seeking, goal-envisaging, aiming at an end, and so 
on. A l l such d e r i v a t i o n s i n v o l v e one and the same t h i n g - s e r v i n g 
the organism. 
(27) "Purpose and Cognition : The Determiners of animal Learning" 
Psych.Rev., V o l . 32, No.4, (1925) o p . c i t , p. 285. 
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3. The In f l u e n c e of Two Systems. 
H x s t o r x c a l l y , Psychology from Descartes and 
(28 Locke onward, r e f l e c t e d i n the main the i n f l u e n c e of two systems 
b 
- The A p o l l l n i a n and the Dionysian. The one i m p l i e s Mechanism, J 
the other represents Reason. The two types have t h e i r o r i g i n s m 
Greek Philosophy. The two systems appear t o have dominated 
European c u l t u r e a l l down the c e n t u r i e s . With the advent of the 
Renaissance the A p o l l o n i a n view became more popular. I t found A 
support i n Descartes's mechanistic physiology and i n Newton's 
mechanical i n v e s t i g a t i o n s . I n the X V I I I t h Century the A p o l l i n i a n \ 
n o t i o n was much i n vogue and Psychology tended t o be i n f l u e n c e d i n 
t h i s d i r e c t i o n . John Locke, f o r example, took up Plato's word 
"idea" and the ancient theory of perception propounded by 
Democritus, and gave them a new meaning and explanation. Locke was 
followed by David Hume w i t h the d o c t r i n e of a s s o c i a t i o n , which was 
taken over by David H a r t l e y , as already i n d i c a t e d . 
I n the XlXth Century, the mechanical p r i n c i p l e s , 
however, were s t i l l i n the a i r . They were i n c r e a s i n g l y developed 
by the M i l l s , by H. Spencer, and by Alexander Bain who,as 
(28) ( l ) McDougall, W i l l i a m , "The Present Chaos i n Psychology and 
the way out". J.Philos.Studies, Vol V, No.19, (1930), 
pp. 353-358. 
( x i ) , An I n t r o d u c t i o n t o Social Psychology, London, 
Methuen, 25th ed., (1943), pp. 488-492. 
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i n d i c a t e d above,seems t o have amalgamated i n h i s d o c t r i n e both 
v 
the A p o l l o n i a n and the Dionysian ideas, Subsequently, Psychology A 
became experimental and more s c i e n t i f i c . Even so, the A p o l l i n i a n 
or the mechanical d o c t r i n e was s t i l l dominating the climate of 
thought i n B r i t a i n , i n Germany and i n France, throughout the XlXth 
Century. Later on i t a r r i v e d at what McDougall c a l l e d "an 
(29) 
impasse", and e v e n t u a l l y ended i n " r a d i c a l behaviourism". 
Contrasting sharply w i t h the A p o l l i n i a n 
standpoint i s the Dionysian view. The n o t i o n i m p l i c i t m the 
Dionysian teachings i s t h a t man should be regarded as p a r t of 
N a t u r e . W i t h i n himself man can f e e l , though vaguely, a 
powerful nature i n the form of " s t r i v i n g s " , "cravings" or "urges" 
goading him towards c e r t a i n goals. Such a hormic explanation i s 
(31) 
s a i d t o have been given i t s s c i e n t i f i c f o r m u l a t i o n by 
A r i s t o t l e . 
(29) J.Philos.Studies, Vol V, (1930), o p . c i t . 
(30) ( l ) McDougall, Wm., J.Philos.Studies, Vol V, (1930) 
o p . c i t . , pp 354-5. 
( n ) An I n t r o d u c t i o n t o Social Psychology, o p . c i t , 
pp. 4 8 8 f f . 
(31) J.Philos.Studies, o p . c i t , p. 355. 
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Li k e the A p o l l m i a n p r i n c i p l e , the Dionysian 
creed descended down the ce n t u r i e s a f f e c t i n g the tr e n d of thought 
a t many p o i n t s . I n the XlXth Century i t s r e v i v a l found 
expression i n the romantic movement of which W i l l i a m Wordsworth 
(1770-1850), Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-1834), and other 
nature poets were the mouthpieces. About the same time i t 
f l o u r i s h e d i n the p h i l o s o p h i c a l works of authors such as Dugald 
(32) (33) Stewart (1753-1828), Francis Hutcheson (1692-1752), and 
oth e r s . Elements of the Dionysian d o c t r i n e also appeared i n 
Jeremy Bentham's psychological hedonism, according t o which n o t i o n , 
pleasure and pain are the main motives of human a c t i o n . Such an 
idea was l a t e r on decried by some w r i t e r s , e s p e c i a l l y by McDougall 
(34) 
who discarded i t as absurd. 
I n the middle of the l a s t century, a Dionysian 
(35) 
l i n e was fol l o w e d by Schopenhauer, Von Hartmann, and others. 
I n the former's w r i t i n g s , the Dionysian n o t i o n i s q u i t e e x p l i c i t 
i n the way he stressed the importance of the W i l l , i n emphasising 
(32) B i o g r a p h i c a l Memoirs of Adam Smith, W i l l i a m Robertson, and 
Thomas Reid, Edinburgh (1811). 
(33) See; B r i t i s h M o r a l i s t s , ed by Selly-Bigge, L.A., V o l . I , 
Oxford, (1897), pp. 69-177. 
(34) ( I ) An O u t l i n e of Psychology, London, Methuen, (1923), 
pp. 192, 193, 268. 
( n ) An I n t r o d u c t i o n t o So c i a l Psychology, o p . c i t , pp.14, 313. 
(35) J.Philos.Studies, o p . c i t . 
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a " v o l u n t a r i s t i c " or hormic psychology. Other t h i n k e r s l i k e Stout, 
Kiilpe, Woodworth, and o t h e r s , touched on a Dionysian, 'hormic' 
psychology proper. 
However, a question could probably be r a i s e d as 
t o how a Dionysian Psychology may d i f f e r from another which does 
not f o l l o w the same l i n e . A constant answer can be found i n 
McDougall's arguments; he was i n t e n t and almost c o n s i s t e n t i n h i s V*' 
contentions. Indeed, he appears t o have used the two words -
Dionysian and hormic - synonymously. To him the two terms are 
i n e x t r i c a b l y dependent upon each other. So t h a t , a hormic 
psychology based on a thorough Dionysian view, sees "the c r e a t i v e 
urge t o a c t i v i t y as the common foundation of human and animal 
.. (36) 
nature . S t i l l f u r t h e r , t o McDougall, hormic psychology gives 
(37) 
the name " i n s t i n c t " t o the foundations of a c t i v e nature w i t h i n 
man and the animals. I n p o i n t of f a c t , such a n o t i o n i s basic t o 
McDougall's teachings throughout. He seems t o have adopted the 
idea because i t tends t o a b o l i s h the dichotomy between man and 
the other animals. According t o t h i s view, man i s conceived of as 
having h i s r o o t s deeply plunged m Nature, and the animals are no 
longer mere machines; but i n t h e i r various grades, express the same 
powerful forces t h a t are at work w i t h i n man. 
(36) i b i d , p. 360. 
(37) ( l ) i b i d , p. 360. 
( l i ) An I n t r o d u c t i o n t o Social Psychology, o p . c i t , p.459 
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B r i e f l y , the Dionysian p r i n c i p l e seems t o have 
found itsway unto the works and arguments of many other w r i t e r s . 
Eminent among them were S. Alexander, T.P. Nunn, G.F. Stout, 
H. Bergson, J. Dewey, Morton Pr i n c e , B u r l t o n A l l e n , W i l l i a m James, 
Freud, A d l e r , Jung, the Gestalt Psychologists, J.S. Haldane, 
Jennings - t o mention only a few - besides McDougall, who was the 
most determined upholder of the hormic theory. 
4. A Consideration of Some Hormists. 
Before examining McDougall's hormic theory at 
l e n g t h , i t may be de s i r a b l e now t o consider the p o s i t i o n of some 
notable hormists, whose views d i r e c t l y a f f e c t e d McDougall's 
a t t i t u d e . 
To begin w i t h , reference must be made t o Samuel 
Alexander (1859-1938), who d i s t i n g u i s h e d between mind and i t s 
o b j e c t . I n the perception of a t r e e , f o r example, a d i s t i n c t i o n 
must be made between the act of experiencing or p e r c e i v i n g and 
what i s experienced or perceived. He sponsored "the separation of 
„ (38) 
the mental and the non-mental . He deemed i t as u s e f u l t o 
consider the u l t i m a t e characters of mind. Alexander r e j e c t e d James 
(38) J.C. F l u g e l , Studies i n F e e l i n g and Desire, London, 
Gerald Duckworth, (1955), p.51, see also pp. 19, 50. 
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* (39) Ward's "Presentation" as a t h i r d element of mind 0 The 
r e j e c t i o n has been based on the assumption t h a t t h a t f a c t o r i s 
"non-mental" and "does not form a p a r t of the psychosis". 
"Psychology i s d i r e c t l y concerned w i t h the various m s t r i n s i c 
(41) 
characters of the enjoyment i t s e l f " , he w r i t e s , "and the 
so - c a l l e d p r e s e n t a t i o n , i n any of the senses of t h a t term, does 
not belong t o i t d i r e c t l y , but only i n d i r e c t l y as an i n d i r e c t 
means of d i s c e r n i n g the i n t r i n s i c character of the enjoyment". 
He recognised only "conation" and " f e e l i n g " as a c t i v e p a r t s of 
"the nature of mental a c t s " . ^ 4 2 ^ For him the i n t r i n s i c 
characters of "the conational a c t " are c l e a r l y conceived i n what 
he c a l l e d the "content of the mental processes". This l a s t 
expression means e i t h e r of two t h i n g s , " t h a t w i t h which the process 
i s concerned" or i t may mean " t h a t of which the mental process i s 
, „ (43) made . 
* See C h . I I I above. 
(39) Alexander, S. "Foundations and Sketch-Plan of a Conational 
Psychology" B.J.Psychol., Vol IV, Parts 3 & 4, (1911) 
p. 239. 
(40) Ward, James, "Psychology" Encyclopaedia B r i t a n n i c a , 11th ed. 
Vol X X I I , p.554a(9th ed. XX, 44a). 
(41) o p . c i t , p. 242. 
(42) Alexander, S., o p . c i t , p. 242. 
(43) i b i d , p. 243. 
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I t seems t h a t S. Alexander has been consistent 
i n h i s maintenance of the c o n a t i o n a l acts presented above. I n 
(44) 
(1920) he r e i t e r a t e d the same view. He observed t h a t "Any 
experience whatever may be analysed i n t o two d i s t i n c t elements and 
t h e i r r e l a t i o n t o one another. The two elements which are the 
terms of the r e l a t i o n are, on the one hand, the act of mind or the 
awareness, and on the other, the ob j e c t of which i t i s aware; the 
r e l a t i o n between them i s t h a t they are together or compresent i n 
the world which i s thus so f a r experienced". E a r l i e r , i n 
( 1 9 0 7 - 1 9 0 8 ) ^ ^ he conceded t h a t mental a c t i v i t y i s "mental 
f u n c t i o n i n general". He pointed out the importance of the question 
of the consciousness of mental a c t i v i t y i n general. Yet he 
recognised the d i f f i c u l t y or the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of keeping t h i s 
question a l t o g e t h e r separate from "metaphysics or theory of 
knowledge". He endeavoured t o d i f f e r e n t i a t e between a c t i v e and 
(44) Space, Time, and D e i t y , London, MacMillan, The G i f f o r d 
Lectures (1916-1918), published, (1920), Vol I , p.11. 
* The d i s t i n c t n e s s of these two elements was made cl e a r i n G.E. 
Moore's paper on "The R e f u t a t i o n of I d e a l i s m " i n MIND, N.S. 
Vol X I I , 1903. 
(45) "The Nature of Mental A c t i v i t y " A Symposium i n Proc. of 
A r i s t o t l e Society, Vol V I I I , p. 215. 
(46) i b i d , p. 215 
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passive mental processes. The former he regarded as "the s e l f -
r e a l i z a t i o n of an idea, as an id e a " ; the l a t t e r he considered 
(47) 
as t h a t which "goes w i t h equivocal d i r e c t i o n " . Both, 
however, are " c u r i o u s l y mingled i n our experience". Such 
(49) 
views as those maintained above, Alexander expressed elsewhere. 
I n a symposium e n t i t l e d " i s Mind Synonymous w i t h 
Consciousness ?" ( 1 8 8 8 ) A l e x a n d e r argued t h a t "the mind i s a 
t h i n g m p r e c i s e l y the same sense as a l l other t h i n g s , and t h a t 
i t i s a p e c u l i a r and unique t h i n g i n the same way as other things 
are p e c u l i a r and unique". His c o n t e n t i o n i s t h a t mind i s a name 
which "we give t o the complex or u n i t y of what we c a l l mental 
s t a t e s , j u s t as the stone i s the complex or u n i t y of the sta t e s of 
(47) i b i d , pp 217, 218. 
(48) i b i d , p.218 
(49) ( I ) "On Relations; And i n P a r t i c u l a r the Cognitive R e l a t i o n " 
MIND, N.S, Vol XXI, No.83, (1912), pp 305-328. 
( n ) "The Method of Metaphysics; and the Categories" 
MIND, N.S. Vol XXI, No.81, 1912, pp. 1-20. 
( m ) "Some Explanations" MIND, N.S, Vol. XXX, No.120, 
(1921), pp.409-428. 
(50) P r o c . A r i s t o t e l i a n Society, Vol I , No,I, 
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(51) the stone". He emphatically stressed t h i s view, namely, t h a t 
"mind" i s the u n i t y of i t s s t a t e s . For him, "consciousness" 
inv o l v e s the element of a t t e n t i o n . He agreed w i t h Bosanquet, 
another c o n t r i b u t o r t o the same symposium, t h a t "consciousness" i s 
f o r the most p a r t , a s c i e n t i f i c term. The phrase "states of 
(52) 
consciousness" would hardly be i n t e l l i g i b l e t o ordinary usage. 
Knowledge, Alexander described as "a r e l a t i o n between two 
e n t i t i e s , a subject and an o b j e c t " or a "consciousness" and a 
" t h i n g " . Consciousness i s always "consciousness of something, of .. (53) 
an obj e c t . What he c a l l e d mental a c t i v i t y i s i n the usual 
language of psychology, "conation". His t h e s i s i s t h a t 
"consciousness i s conation" and nothing e l s e . I t f o l l o w s t h a t 
" a l l consciousness i s s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s " . ^ ^ 
Alexander i n d i c a t e d two kinds of "imagination", 
( 55 ) * 
"r e p r o d u c t i v e " and " c o n s t r u c t i v e " . With both these 
(51) i b i d , p.18 
(52) i b i d , p.20 
(53) Space, Time, and D e i t y , o p . c i t , Vol.11 pp.125,22,92,105. 
(54) "The Nature of Mental A c t i v i t y " , A Symposium, Proc.Arist.Soc. 
V o l . V I I I , (1907-1908) o p . c i t , pp.222-223. 
(55) "On Sensations and Images" Proc.Arist.Soc., Vol.X, 
(1909-1910), p.13. 
* This t o p i c i s suggested by G.F. Stout i n a paper on "Are 
Presentations Mental or Physical ?". Proc.Arist.Soc., 
Vol.IX, (1908)-(1909), pp. 2 2 6 f f . 
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c o n s t i t u e n t s e n t e r i n g i n t o i t s form, imagination has c e r t a i n 
features which d i s t i n g u i s h i t from the corresponding process 
of perception. I t remains f o r Psychology t o expound the 
(56) 
features at issue. Here, as elsewhere, Alexander touched 
upon the d i s t i n c t n e s s between memory and per c e p t i o n . The 
former d i f f e r s from the l a t t e r , as he t h i n k s , m i t s r e l a t i v e 
incompleteness and inaccuracy. Moreover, memory d i f f e r s from 
perception m the possible i n t r o d u c t i o n of new fea t u r e s not 
present i n the o r i g i n a l . He ascribes t o p e r c e p t i o n , o b j e c t i v i t y 
(57) 
and accuracy which the memory lac k s . Imagining an object i s 
comparable t o the p h y s i c a l act of "Turning round t o see something 
.. (58) 
behind our backs . But he warned against t a k i n g the d i f f i c u l t 
cases as a guide, l e s t we should e r r . Thus he declared t h a t our 
(59) 
objects a l i k e i n " i m a g i n a t i o n " and "sensation" are "mental". 
(56) ( 1 ) Space, Time and D e i t y , Vol.11, o p . c i t , p.83. 
( n ) "Science and A r t " J.of Philo.Studies, Vol.V, No.20 (1930), 
pp.517ff. 
(57) ( l ) Proc.Arist.Soc., Vol.X, 1909-1910, o p . c i t , p.13 
( n ) Space, Time and D e i t y , Vol.11, o p . c i t , pp.83ff, see also 
( m ) by the same author, "Space-Time" A r i s t . S o c , V o l , XVTIT, 
1917-1918, pp.410ff. 
(58) Space, Time and D e i t y , Vol.11, o p . c i t , p.85. 
(59) ( l ) i b i d , p.86 see also 
( n ) G.F. Stout, "The Philosophy of Samuel Alexander" MIND, N.S. 
Vol.XLIX, No.193, 1940, pp.6,2,138,141. 
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I n Alexander's view, science i s a form of A r t . 
Nevertheless, he d i d not mean t h a t i t i s a s o r t of " f i n e a r t " 
i n the s t r i c t meaning of the word. He meant t h a t i t i s "one 
example of a process of which f i n e a r t i s the most obvious 
example, the process of making out of c e r t a i n m a t e r i a l s a r e s u l t 
i n t o which the mind i t s e l f enters". i n t h i s a r t i c l e t o o , he 
pointed out again t h a t the mind establishes coherence amongst 
the f a c t s of perception by means of laws obtained through 
s e l e c t i o n and r e f l e c t i o n . He contends t h a t the mere laws of the 
science do not themselves c o n s t i t u t e a s e l f - c o n t a i n e d and 
harmonious whole. "The raw m a t e r i a l , whether presented i n 
p erception or i n thought ... i s c a r r i e d i n t o the product, only 
(61) 
organized and rearranged". The o b j e c t which Alexander sought 
i n t h i s a r t i c l e was t o p o i n t out the a r t i s t r y of science and t o 
(62 
i n d i c a t e t h a t science d i f f e r s from f i n e a r t . I n another paper, 
Alexander asserted t h a t "the a r t i s t can help the philosopher more 
than the philosopher can help the a r t i s t " . Yet the l i n k between 
(60) ( I ) "Science and A r t " J.Philos.Studies, Vol V, Part I , No.19, 
(1930), p.331. 
( n ) "Art and Science" J.Philos.Studies, V o l . 1 , No.I, 1926, 
pp. 5-19. 
(61) "Science and A r t I " J.Philos.Studies, Vol.V, o p . c i t , p.352. 
(62) "Philosophy and A r t " J.Philos.Studies, Vol.IV, No.14, 
1929, p.157. 
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them i s "the c r i t i c " or " h i s t o r i a n " of a r t . But the s p e c i f i c 
question which philosophy asks about a r t i s , "What i s beauty, 
or what i t i s which makes an o b j e c t , whether of a r t or of 
,.(63) 
nature, b e a u t i f u l *? . For he believed the study of beauty 
i s ... the best or the easiest way t o approach the study of 
value m g e n e r a l " . T o w a r d t h i s purpose he dedicated h i s 
whole : Beauty and other Forms of Value (1933) as a main essay i n 
A e s t h e t i c s . The realm of values comes d i r e c t l y from the province 
of^mental sphere. Values, according t o Alexander, among a l l / 
(65) 
emergent q u a l i t i e s are the only ones which are not o b j e c t i f i e d . 
C 66 ) 
I n h i s Moral Order and Progress (1891), Alexander intended t o 
show t h a t Ethics i s but the study of moral judgements which imply 
(63) ( I ) i b i d , p.160. 
( n ) See also by the same author " i s There Evidence of 
Design i n Nature ?" A Symposium A r i s t . S o c . , V o l . 1 , 
Part 3, (1890), p.65. 
(64) Alexander, S., Beauty and other Forms of Value, London, 
MacMillan, (1933) preface, p.VI. 
c f . The Author's : P h i l o s o p h i c a l and L i t e r a r y Pieces, ed. 
post humously, John L a i r d , London, MacMillan (1939). 
(65) Beauty and other Forms of Value, o p . c i t . 
(66) 2nd ed. London, Kegan Paul, Ch.l. 
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c e r t a i n working conceptions. Ever since he wrote t h i s work, he 
c o n s i s t e n t l y pointed out the r e l a t i o n between m o r a l i t y and 
consciousness. He i n d i c a t e d t h a t moral a c t i o n i s conscious of 
(67) 
i t s o b j e c t . 
Alexander's views are wide i n scope and much X 
d e t a i l e d i n d i s c u s s i o n . I n h i s t h e o r i s a t i o n , he covered 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l issues as w e l l as psychological t o p i c s . His 
philosophy i s based mainly upon the theory of knowledge and 
metaphysics, the c e n t r a l element of which i s i m p l i e d i n h i s w e l l 
known d o c t r i n e of Space-Time, which underlies a l l h i s system. 
Like many other p h i l o s o p h i c a l p s y c h o l o g i s t s , Alexander endeavoured 
t o discuss and understand Psychology i n the l i g h t of Philosophy. 
The essence of h i s Psychological arguments i s t h a t the e n t i t y of 
mind should be emphasised. Such an e n t i t y i s apparent m the form 
of conation and f e e l i n g , which are the r e a l elements of mental 
process. The o d d i t y about h i s argument is h i s exclusion of 
c o g n i t i o n from mental f u n c t i o n s ; he believed t h a t i t i s not a p a r t 
of the contents of the mind and has no r o l e at a l l . I n so t h i n k i n g , 
(67) ( I ) Moral Order and Progress, o p . c i t , Book I , Ch.I, pp.31ff. 
( n ) Alexander, S. "The Basis of Realism" Proceedings of 
The B r i t i s h Academy, V o l . V I , 1914, pp.279-314, see 
e s p e c i a l l y pp.281, 296, 313 ; f o r S. Alexander "MIND" i s 
"always a world; i t s objects always fragments". Further 
"Mind as t h i n g and as character". 
See also ( I ) Obituary n o t i c e by T.H.Pear i n B.J.Psychol. Vol.XXIX, 
p a r t 4, (1939) e n t i t l e d "Professor Samuel Alexander"; and 
( n ) "Memoir" by John L a i r d i n S. Alexander's 
P h i l o s o p h i c a l and L i t e r a r y Pieces, o p . c i t , pp. 1-96. 
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he seems t o have parted company wxth the more orthodox t h i n k e r s 
such as, f o r instance, Ward, Stout, McDougall, and others. 
However, another f e a t u r e of Alexander's psychology, 
i s t h a t mind should be d i f f e r e n t i a t e d from i t s o b j e c t , which i s 
r e a l i s e d only through mental a c t i v i t y . His hormicism i s best 
r e f l e c t e d i n the stress he placed upon the a c t i v e elements of mind. 
His main i n t e r e s t centred c h i e f l y round the conational process of 
the mind i t s e l f . He f r e q u e n t l y i n d i c a t e d t h a t a completely 
conational psychology i s q u i t e p o s s i b l e . Perception can be 
resolved i n t o act and e x t e r n a l t h i n g s . Such arguments Alexander 
presented w i t h s i m p l i c i t y and i n h i s day, w i t h notable s k i l l . 
I t i s s a i d ^ ^ ^ t h a t the f i r s t , i n England, t o 
formulate the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c d o c t r i n e s of the New Realism was 
Thomas Percy Nunn (1870-1944). Best known as an e d u c a t i o n a l i s t , 
Nunn wrote l i t t l e on philosophy. Yet t h a t l i t t l e had an 
i n f l u e n c e t h a t perpetuated h i s name. I n p a r t i c u l a r , h i s 
c o n t r i b u t i o n t o a symposium on "Are Secondary Q u a l i t i e s Independent 
of Perception ? " ^ ^ was widely studied both i n Great B r i t a i n and 
i n America. He there sustained two theses : (1) t h a t both the 
(68) Passmore, John, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, o p . c i t , 
p.259 
(69) Proc.Arist.Soc. Vol.X, 1909-1910. pp.191-218; the other 
symposiast was F.C.S. S c h i l l e r , pp.218-231. 
(70) Passmore, John, o p . c i t , p. 259. 
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primary and the secondary q u a l i t i e s of bodies are r e a l l y i n them, 
whether they are perceived or not; (2) t h a t q u a l i t i e s e x i s t as 
they are perceived. Much of h i s argument, however, i s 
(71) 
c o n t r o v e r s i a l i n form, compared w i t h Stout's e a r l i e r a r t i c l e s . 
Stout had thought he could begin by presuming t h a t there are at 
l e a s t some elements i n our experience which e x i s t only m being 
perceived. As an example, Stout mentioned "pain". Nunn opposed 
t h a t p a i n presents any d i f f i c u l t i e s t o us, or creates obstacles 
i n our path. "Pain" he concluded, " i s something outside my mind, 
(72) 
w i t h which my mind may come i n t o various r e l a t i o n s " . 
Stout also had contended t h a t the secondary 
q u a l i t i e s e x i s t only as objectSof experience. I f we look at 
a buttercup i n a v a r i e t y of l i g h t s we see d i f f e r e n t shades of 
c o l o u r , w i t h o u t having any reason t o b e l i e v e t h a t the buttercup 
has a l t e r e d . I f a number of observers plunge t h e i r hands i n t o a 
bowl of water, they w i l l r e p o r t very d i f f e r e n t degrees of warmth, 
even although nothing has happened which could a f f e c t the water's 
temperature. Such phenomena, according t o Stout, demonstrate t h a t 
secondary q u a l i t i e s e x i s t only as objects of our perception; they 
(71) Stout's papers are "Primary and Secondary Q u a l i t i e s " (1903), 
and "Are Presentations Mental or Physical?"(1908) both i n 
Proc.Aristot.Soc. Vols, V and IX r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
(72) P r o c . A r i s t . S o c i e t y , Vol.X, 1909-10, o p . c i t , pp.191-218. 
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( 7 3 ) a r e n o t a c t u a l p r o p e r t i e s o f p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s . 
Nunn's argument i s q u i t e d i f f e r e n t . The c o n t r a s t 
between t h e o b j e c t o f p e r c e p t i o n and t h e a c t u a l p r o p e r t i e s i s , 
he t h i n k s , an u n t e n a b l e one. A l l t h e shades o f c o l o u r w h i c h t h e 
b u t t e r c u p p r e s e n t s t o an o b s e r v e r a r e a c t u a l p r o p e r t i e s o f t h e 
b u t t e r c u p ; and a l l t h e " h o t n e s s e s " o f t h e w a t e r a r e p r o p e r t i e s o f 
t h e w a t e r . The f a c t i s , Nunn t h i n k s , t h a t a t h i n g has n o t one 
" h o t n e s s " , f o r example, b u t many, and t h a t t h e s e " h o t n e s s e s " a r e 
n o t i n a l i m i t e d r e g i o n o f space b u t i n v a r i o u s p l a c e s around 
about t h e s t a n d a r d o b j e c t . A t h i n g i s h o t t e r an i n c h away t h a n a 
( 7 4 ) 
f o o t away and h o t t e r on a c o l d hand t h a n on a warm hand. Nunn's 
p o s i t i o n , however i s a c c e p t e d by S. A l e x a n d e r w i t h much 
( 7 5 ) 
r e s e r v a t i o n . 
Throughout a p e r i o d extended f r o m 1906 t o about 
1916, Nunn m a i n t a i n e d t h e same and one theme, namely, t h a t 
(76 
" N a t u r a l s c i e n c e i s an i n t e l l e c t u a l p r o c e s s d i r e c t e d towards n a t u r e " . 
( 7 3 ) S t o u t ' s two papers (1903) and (1908) o p . c i t . 
( 7 4 ) ( l ) Nunn, o p . c i t , pp.191-218. 
( n ) See a l s o Nunn's "The P l a c e o f Hypotheses i n Science 
T e a c h i n g " xn Broad L i n e s i n S c i ence T e a c h i n g , ed. by 
F.Hodson, London, C h r x s t o p h e r s 2nd ed, ( 1 9 1 1 ) , 1 s t 
p u b l . 1909. pp.64-79. see e s p e c i a l l y , p.78. 
(7 5 ) A l e x a n d e r , S., Space, Time and D e i t y , V o l . I I , o p . c i t , 
pp. 187-188. 
( 7 6 ) (1) Nunn, T.P. " S c i e n t i f i c o b j e c t s and Common-Sense T h i n g s " 
P r o c . A r i s t o t . S o c . Vol.XXIV, 1923-24, p.2. 
( n ) "Sense-Data and P h y s i c a l O b j e c t s " P r o c . A r i s t o t . S o c . , 
V o l X V I , 1916, pp.156-178. 
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(77) H i s views were f i r s t f o r m u l a t e d i n a paper w h e r e i n he 
i n d i c a t e d t h a t h i s aim was a t w o - f o l d one: f i r s t t o make an 
i n v e n t o r y o f t h e o b s e r v a b l e t h i n g s and e v e n t s t h a t c o n s t i t u t e 
t h e t i s s u e o f n a t u r e ; and s e c o n d l y t o make t h e emergence o f 
t h o s e t h i n g s and e v e n t s i n t e l l i g i b l e . I n o t h e r words, he 
endeavoured t o show t h a t man ought t o have an i n t e l l e c t u a l 
c o n t r o l over n a t u r e w h i c h must be subdued t o h i s r e a s o n , t h e s e 
views w h i c h he f i r s t i n i t i a t e d he c o n t i n u e d t o e l a b o r a t e and 
(78) 
d e f e n d . The d o c t r i n e w h i c h he a c c e p t e d d e c l a r e s t h a t a t h i n g 
i s "a s t r u c t u r e embracing and a c t u a l l y c o n s i s t i n g o f a l l t h e 
s e n s e - d a t a , s e n s i b i l i a , sensa, o r s e n s e - o b j e c t s w h i c h common-
sense r e g a r d s as appearances o r q u a l i t i e s o f t h e t h i n g and w h i c h 
(7 9 ) 
a r e p r e s e n t e d t o any p e r c i p i e n t a t any t i m e o r p l a c e " . T h i s 
view he based on two f a c t s : ( 1 ) t h a t s e n s e - e x p e r i e n c e c o n t a i n s as 
an i n t e g r a l element a d i r e c t announcement t h a t i t s o b j e c t s a r e 
o u t s i d e and i n d e p e n d e n t o f t h e m e n t a l a c t ; ( 2 ) t h a t a n a l y s i s can 
d i s c o v e r i n t h i n g s n o t h i n g except "sensa" and t h e i r forms o f 
c o n n e c t i o n . ^ 8 0 ^ A b r i e f q u o t a t i o n , however, w i l l be t h e b e s t means 
(77) ( l ) P r o c . A r i s t o t . S o c . 1905-1906, V o l . V I , pp.141-182. 
( n ) Nunn, T.P. "Anthropomorhism and P h y s i c s " Proc.Brit.Academy, 
( 1 9 2 7 ) , V o l . X I I I , pp.13-45, e s p e c i a l l y , p . 2 0 f f . 
(78) Nunn, T.P., The Aim and Achievements o f S c i e n t i f i c Method 
London, The M a c M i l l a n Co., ( 1 9 0 7 ) . 
( 7 9 ) P r o c . A r i s t o t . S o c . Vol.XXIV, 1923-24, o p . c i t , p.7 
(80) i b i d , pp.7-8 
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o f summarising t h e whole t h e s i s he p u t f o r w a r d ; " t h e r e a l 
achievement o f s c i e n c e i s n o t t o have d i s c l o s e d any r e a l i t y 
behind t h e v e i l o f s e n s i b l e t h i n g s , b u t t o have g r e a t l y extended 
and deepened and r a t i o n a l i s e d t h e scheme o± t h e w o r l d r e v e a l e d 
..(81) 
i n p e r c e p t i o n . 
I t i s t i m e now t o c o n s i d e r b r i e f l y Nunn t h e 
e d u c a t i o n a l i s t . F o r him " t h e e d u c a t i o n t h a t aims a t f o s t e r i n g 
i n d i v i d u a l i t y i s t h e o n l y e d u c a t i o n ' a c c o r d i n g t o n a t u r e ' . " He 
made i t h i s theme t o a l l o w i n d i v i d u a l i t y t o grow w i t h i n s o c i e t y . 
He was aware a t t h e same t i m e t h a t n e i t h e r s h o u l d encroach upon 
each o t h e r . " I n d i v i d u a l i t y i s an a f f a i r o f t h e whole organism o r /go") ( 8 3 ) 'body-mind' ." I n a c h a p t e r e n t i t l e d "The Aim o f E d u c a t i o n " , 
Nunn reckoned t o f i n d a s o l u t i o n i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h e o r i e s , 
e s p e c i a l l y , i t may be presumed i n new r e a l i s m . He defended 
i n d i v i d u a l i t y as a supreme aim o f an e d u c a t i o n a l p r o c e s s . 
" E d u c a t i o n a l e f f o r t s must", he u p h e l d , "... be l i m i t e d t o s e c u r i n g 
f o r e v e r y one, t h e c o n d i t i o n s under w h i c h i n d i v i d u a l i t y i s most 
c o m p l e t e l y d e v e l o p e d " . Only so a l l o w e d and encouraged, t h e 
i n d i v i d u a l can c o n t r i b u t e h i s o r her m i t e t o t h e " v a r i e g a t e d whole 
\ 
o f human l i f e " as f u l l y and as t r u l l y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c as " h i s n a t u r e 
i 
( 8 1 ) ( i ) i b i d , p.18. see a l s o : 
( n ) P r o c . A r i s t . S o c . V o l X, 1909-1910, o p . c i t , p. 205. 
( 8 2 ) Nunn, T.P. E d u c a t i o n ; I t s Data and F i r s t P r i n c i p l e s , London, 
Edward A r n o l d , 2nd ed. ( 1 9 3 4 ) , 1 s t p u b l . 1 9 2 0 , p.20, See a l s o 
pp. 2, 3, and 4. 
( 8 3 ) The f i r s t c h a p t e r i n h i s book above. 
( 8 4 ) i b i d , pp.5-6. 
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i t (85) 
permxts . N o n e t h e l e s s , t h e s o r t o f c o n t r i b u t i o n i s i n no 
way b e i n g imposed on t h e i n d i v i d u a l . I t i s l e f t up t o him o r 
her t o f o r g e o u t f o r h i m s e l f o r h e r s e l f . 
( 8 6 ) 
S i m i l a r views Nunn d i s c u s s e d e l s e w h e r e . He 
r a i s e d t h e f o l l o w i n g q u e s t i o n : "What i s i t ... t h a t d e t e r m i n e s 
t h e g e n e r a l c h a r a c t e r o f t h e e d u c a t i o n process a t a g i v e n p o i n t 
i n t h e h i s t o r y o f a human s o c i e t y ?". His answer t o t h i s 
q u e s t i o n may b r i e f l y be r e p r e s e n t e d by a c o n c i s e c i t a t i o n t h a t 
" t h e same e l a n v i t a l w h i c h b r o u g h t t h e s o c i e t y " t o a c e r t a i n 
p o i n t o f development "urges i t t o t r a m i t s young t h a t t h e y may 
( 87 ) 
m a i n t a i n i t s t r a d i t i o n and ways o f l i f e " , and as a c o r o l l a r y 
t o t h i s , t h a t " t h e e d u c a t i o n a n a t i o n g i v e s i t s c h i l d r e n i s , 
p e r h a ps, t h e c l e a r e s t e x p r e s s i o n o f i t s ethos and t h e b e s t 
.. ( 8 8 ) 
epitome o f i t s scheme o f l i f e . 
P s y c h o l o g i c a l e x c u r s i o n s have had p r o m i n e n t p l a c e 
i n Nunn's arguments a l m o s t t h r o u g h o u t . He d i s c u s s e d t h e 
i n d i v i d u a l ' s awareness o f t h e c o n s c i o u s a c t i v i t i e s . Such 
a c t i v i t i e s a r e r e g a r d e d as an element o f " d r i v e " , " u r g e " o r f e l t ( 8 5 ) i b i d , p.6 
( 8 6 ) "The E d u c a t i o n o f t h e P e o p l e " R e p . B r i t . A s s o c . ( 1 9 2 3 ) , p p . 2 6 1 f f . 
( 8 7 ) i b i d , pp.261-262. 
(8 8 ) ( l ) i b i d , p.262; see a l s o p.321. "On General T e a c h i n g " , 
( n ) see a l s o by him on E d u c a t i o n ; i n Rep. Br i t . Assoc, 1926. 
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tendency towards an e n d . ^ 8 ^ To t h i s element o f d r i v e o r u r g e , 
w h i c h p s y c h o l o g i s t s c a l l c o n a t i o n , Nunn proposed t o g i v e a s i n g l e 
name - "horme". F o l l o w i n g t h i s p r o p o s a l , a l l t h e p u r p o s i v e 
processes o f t h e or g a n i s m a r e h o r m i c p r o c e s s e s , " c o n a t i v e 
processes b e i n g t h e s u b - c l a s s whose members have t h e s p e c i a l 
( 9 1 ) ( 9 2 ) mark o f b e i n g c o n s c i o u s " . I n a f o o t n o t e , Nunn p o i n t e d o u t 
t h a t t h i s Greek t e r m "horme" was s u g g e s t e d , b u t n o t ado p t e d , by 
(93) 
C.G. Jung, who used i t t o mean an e n e r g e t i c e x p r e s s i o n f o r 
p s y c h o l o g i c a l v a l u e s " . Nunn used i t i n an extended manner t o 
i n v e i g l e t h e c o n c e p t i o n s o f " p u r p o s i v e energy as m a n i f e s t e d b o t h 
(94 ) / i n c o n s c i o u s and m unconscious b e h a v i o u r " . The t e r m "horme" 
was used by Nunn t o embrace a l l c o n s c i o u s l i f e o f men and t h e 
h i g h e r a n i m a l s , as w e l l as t h e unconscious b e h a v i o u r o f l o w e r 
a n i m a l s and t h e un c o n s c i o u s a c t i v i t i e s o f t h e b o d i e s o f men and 
(8 9 ) E d u c a t i o n : I t s Data and F i r s t P r i n c i p l e s , o p . c i t , p.21 
(90 ) i b i d , p.23 
(91) i b i d , p.23 
(92) i b i d , p.23 
(93) G.C.Jung, A n a l y t i c P s y c h o l o g y , (1916) E n g l i s h T r a n s , 
o p . c i t , p.348 
(94) i b i d , p.23 
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h i g h e r a n i m a l s . Nunn spoke o f memory as "co n s c i o u s mneme" j u s t 
/ ( 9 5 ) 
as he spoke o f c o n a t i o n , as "co n s c i o u s horme". Two p o i n t s 
i n p a r t i c u l a r s t r e s s e d by Nunn were : ( 1 ) t h a t as ho r m i c 
processes become o r g a n i s e d i n t o systems, t h e a c t i v i t i e s t h a t 
s p r i n g f r o m them become more "complex" and more " e x p r e s s i v e " 
s t i l l ; ( 2 ) i n v e s t i g a t i o n s c a r r i e d o u t by t h e method o f psycho-
a n a l y s i s have shown t h a t a l a r g e p a r t i s p l a y e d i n t h e human b e i n g ' s 
c o n s c i o u s b e h a v i o u r by hor m i c f a c t o r s o f w h i c h t h e i n d i v i d u a l may 
be a t t h e t i m e u t t e r l y u n c o n s c i o u s . Moreover, such i n v e s t i g a t i o n s 
have a l s o shown t h a t " t h e a d u l t mind i s ... b u t t h e v i s i b l e 
s u r f a c e o f a l i v i n g s t r u c t u r e whose deeper l a y e r s a r e hor m i c 
elements d a t i n g f r o m i n f a n c y even beyond". 
As so f a r s t a t e d , Nunn's p o s i t i o n may be 
summarised; as a r e a l i s t he a s c r i b e d t o t h e "sensa" a p h y s i c a l 
c h a r a c t e r i n s t e a d o f a p s y c h i c one. T h i s i s i n a c c o r d w i t h h i s new 
r e a l i s m , and may be r e g a r d e d as a c o r r e c t i o n as w e l l . To him i f 
t h i n g s a r e a n a l y s e d , n o t h i n g can be d i s c o v e r e d b u t sen s o r y d a t a . 
* The t e r m "mneme" Nunn adopted f r o m t h e German b i o l o g i s t ^ R i c h a r d 
Semon, who w r o t e two books oft t h e same t i t l e : The Mneme ( 1 9 0 4 ) , 
E n g l i s h t r a n s . , London, George A l l e n ( 1 9 2 1 ) , and Mnemic 
Psychology ( 1 9 0 9 ) , E n g l i s h t r a n s . , London, George A l l e n ( 1 9 2 3 ) . 
( 9 5 ) o p . c i t , p.23, see a l s o Chapter I V , "The L i v i n g P a s t " . 
( 9 6 ) E d u c a t i o n ; I t s Data and F i r s t P r i n c i p l e s , o p . c i t , 
pp.36-37. 
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The sense-data a r e t h e p r i m a r y f a c t o r s o f r e a l i t y ; i t i s f u t i l e 
t o l o o k b e h i n d them. The s c i e n t i f i c o b j e c t s he r e g a r d e d as o f 
q u i t e secondary c h a r a c t e r . The aim o f f o r m i n g s c i e n t i f i c 
c o n c e pts i s t o make t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d o f s e n s e - p e r c e p t i o n 
i n t e l l i g i b l e by m e t h o d i c a l a i d s . N a t u r e , he t h i n k s , must be 
mastered by t h e human mind. As an e d u c a t i o n a l i s t , Nunn f e r v e n t l y 
a d vocated i n d i v i d u a l i t y as an u l t i m a t e end o f e d u c a t i o n . S o c i e t y 
he defended as t h e b e s t environment w h e r e i n i n d i v i d u a l i t y can 
grow and d e v e l o p . Nunn's e d u c a t i o n a l arguments a r e a l m o s t always 
based upon h o r m i c p s y c h o l o g i c a l f o u n d a t i o n s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , an 
i s s u e may now be r a i s e d as t o where Nunn's h o r m i c i s m r e a l l y comes. 
An answer t o t h e above q u e r y can be f o u n d , 
i n d e e d c l e a r l y shown, i n Nunn's arguments e s p e c i a l l y , ( 1 ) i n h i s 
emphasis o f t h e d o c t r i n e o f e l a n v i t a l , as i n d i c a t e d above. > 
( 2 ) The s t r e s s he l a i d upon c o n a t i v e p r o c e s s e s , b o t h c o n s c i o u s 
and u n c o n s c i o u s ; t h e s e c o n a t i o n a l a c t i v i t i e s a r e m a n i f e s t e d by man 
and t h e o t h e r a n i m a l s a l i k e , and t h e a c t i v i t i e s a r e g o a l - s e e k i n g 
a c t i o n s . ( 3 ) Nunn's m e r i t , as a t r u e h o r m i s t , l i e s i n h i s 
s u g g e s t i o n o f t h e concepx o f horme'', w h i c h he defended as a l e s s 
c o n t r o v e r s i a l t e r m ; i t i s a w i d e , d e n o t a b l e word and i n d i c a t e s a 
p o s i t i o n on t h e d e b a t a b l e r e l a t i o n between o r g a n i c and i n o r g a n i c 
m a t t e r , t h e c o n s c i o u s l y p u r p o s i v e and m e c h a n i s t i c a c t i v i t y . He 
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m a i n t a i n e d t h a t w hatever e x p l a n a t i o n t h a t m i g h t be g i v e n o f t h e 
br o a d f a c t s o f l i f e must a p p l y , i n p r i n c i p l e , e q u a l l y t o body 
(9 7 ) 
and mind. Hence t h e q u e s t i o n , "Are we, s i n c e our b o d i e s a r e 
' m a t t e r ' , t o seek i n p h y s i c a l laws an e x p l a n a t i o n f o r t h e whole 
o f l i f e ; o r a r e we, s i n c e our b o d i e s a r e a l i v e , t o i n t e r p r e t 
t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s by what we know o f l i f e where i t s c h a r a c t e r 
appears i n t h e h i g h e s t and c l e a r e s t f o r m - namely, i n t h e 
..(98) 
c o n s c i o u s l i f e o f t h e mind ? . The answer i s s u p p l i e d i n a 
l e n g t h y way. The c h i e f p a r a g r a p h s o f w h i c h may be c i t e d so t h a t 
a b e t t e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f Nunn's own ho r m i c c o n t r i b u t i o n c o u l d 
be g a i n e d . 
"The urgency o f t h e q u e s t i o n l i e s i n t h e f a c t 
t h a t men o f s c i e n c e " , w r o t e Nunn, "and p a r t i c u l a r l y p h y s i o l o g i s t s , 
g e n e r a l l y seek t o i n t e r p r e t t h e l i f e o f t h e body e n t i r e l y i n 
(99 
terms o f f a c t s and n o t i o n s d e r i v e d f r o m p h y s i c s and c h e m i s t r y " . 
Nunn expressed no wonder a t such a view w h i c h he r e g a r d e d as 
e s s e n t i a l l y t h a t o f D e s c a r t e s , namely, t h a t man m i g h t be r e g a r d e d 
as o n l y a v e r y " c u n n i n g l y f a s h i o n e d a u t o m a t i o n i f we d i d n o t know 
f r o m i n n e r e x p e r i e n c e t h a t he has a s o u l " . ^"^^ "The a n i m a l ' s 
( 9 7 ) E d u c a t i o n : I t s Data and F i r s t P r i n c i p l e s , o p . c i t , p.13 
(98 ) i b i d , pp.13-14. 
(99) i b i d , p. 14 
(100) i b i d , p. 14 
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l x f e i s , o f c o u r s e , permeated (as human p s y c h o l o g y i s ) by 
c h e m i c a l and p h y s i c a l f a c t o r s ; b u t j u s t as a poem, though 
permeated by grammar, i s more t h a n a sum o f g r a m m a t i c a l 
e x p r e s s i o n s , so t h e b e h a v i o u r , even o f a p r o t o z o a n , escapes 
beyond t h e c o n c e p t i o n o f a p h y s i c o - c h e m i c a l machine. I n s h o r t , 
t h e humblest c r e a t u r e i s autonomous". ^**'< '^1"^  "Stupendous as t h e 
d i s t a n c e i s between t h e l i v e s o f t h e p r o t o z o a n and t h e c r e a t u r e 
who has been made a l i t t l e l o w e r t h a n t h e a n g e l s , i t c o n s i s t s 
... n o t i n any r a d i c a l u n l i k e n e s s o f t h e e s s e n t i a l f e a t u r e s , b u t 
r a t h e r i n t h e d i f f e r i n g r i c h n e s s , v a r i e t y , and s u b t e " l t y o f t h e 
d e t a i l s i n w h i c h a s i n g l e scheme has been worked o u t a t d i f f e r e n t 
e v o l u t i o n a r y l e v e l s " . ^ "^^ 
From t h e above passages, i t becomes c l e a r t h a t 
(103) 
Nunn viewed t h e h i s t o r y o f l i f e as a c o n t i n u o u s s t r i v i n g 
t owards i n d i v i d u a l i t y . T h i s i n d i v i d u a l i t y i s r i c h l y expressed 
i n "man's co n s c i o u s n a t u r e " . So t h a t , b o r n w i t h t h e w i l l t o l i v e 
and t o seek g o a l s , man i s always a c t i v a t e d by d e e p l y i n g r a i n e d 
u r g e s t o a t t a i n t h e h i g h e s t s e l f - e x p r e s s i o n . I n d e e d , h e r e i n l i e s 
( 1 01) i b i d , pp.17-18. 
(1 0 2 ) i b i d , p.18 
(103) i b i d , p.20, see a l s o : Hamley, H.R., " S i r Percy Nunn" 
B.J.Ed.Psych. V o l , XV, p a r t 1 , ( 1 9 4 5 ) , pp.1-4. 
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Nunn's h o r m i c i s m i n i t s w i d e s t c o n n o t a t i o n s , much o f w h i c h came 
t o be used by McDougall i n ( 1 9 3 0 ) / 1 0 4 ^ who a c t u a l l y i n ( 1 9 3 1 ) ^ 1 0 5 ^ 
expressed r e g r e t t h a t he had n o t used t h e e x p r e s s i o n "Hormic 
P s y c h o l o g y " a t t h e f i r s t p u b l i c a t i o n o f I n t r o d u c t i o n t o S o c i a l 
Psychology ( 1 9 0 8 ) . 
I n a p r e f a c e t o h i s A n a l y t i c P s y c hology ( 1 8 9 6 ) , 
George F r e d e r i c k S t o u t (1860-1944) s t a t e s t h a t " t h e s u b j e c t may 
be approached f r o m t h e p o i n t o f v i e w o f P h y s i o l o g y , o f M e n t a l 
P a t h o l o g y , o f E t h n o l o g y , and o f P s y c h o - p h y s i c a l E x p e r i m e n t " . ^ 1 <~'^ 
By so s t a t i n g , S t o u t wanted t o show t h a t t h e d i s c i p l i n e s 
enumerated, a l l c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e s t u d y o f p s y c h o l o g y . Yet he 
has n o t me n t i o n e d p h i l o s o p h y w h i c h forms t h e groundwork o f h i s 
arguments. But t o c l a s s i f y h i s works under t h e headings o f 
p s y c h o l o g y and p h i l o s o p h y would be r a t h e r a r t i f i c i a l i f n o t 
a r b i t r a r y . A l l h i s p s y c h o l o g i c a l w r i t i n g s a r e permeated w i t h 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l r e f l e x i o n s , and c e r t a i n p a r t s o f h i s p h i l o s o p h y a r e 
based upon p s y c h o l o g i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . P h i l o s o p h i c a l l y s p e a k i n g , 
he was s y m p a t h e t i c a l l y i n c l i n e d towards " i d e a l i s m " . The 
(104) P s y c h o l o g i e s o f 1930, C l a r k U n i v . P r e s s , Mass; ed. by 
C a r l M u r c h i s o n . 
(105) P r e f a c e t o t h e 22nd ed. o f An I n t r o d u c t i o n t o S o c i a l 
P s y c h o l o g y , o p . c i t , pp. XIX-XX. 
(106) V o l I , p. I X . 
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p h i l o s o p h e r s t o whom he acknowledged h i s i n d e b t e d n e s s and by 
whom he had been most i n f l u e n c e d , were P l a t o , Hobbes, Locke, 
B e r k e l e y , Hume, B r a d l e y , B a i n , S p i n o z a , and Kant. S t o u t a l s o 
admired James Ward under whom he worked as an u n d e r g r a d u a t e 
+ n ^ * ( 1 0 7 ) 
a t Cambridge. 
I n t h e f i r s t volume o f The A n a l y t i c P s y c h o l o g y , 
S t o u t c o n s i d e r e d i n some d e t a i l t h e concept o f m e n t a l a c t i v i t y . 
"The s t r e a m o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s " , he o b s e r v e d , "though i t s c o u r se 
i s p e r p e t u a l l y c o n t r o l l e d and r e s t r i c t e d by e x t r a n e o u s 
c o n d i t i o n s , has n e v e r t h e l e s s a c u r r e n t o f i t s own. The i n c e s s a n t 
change w h i c h i s e s s e n t i a l t o t h e v e r y e x i s t e n c e o f c o n s c i o u s 
l i f e always possesses some degree o f momentum. I t i s always i n 
some degree s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g . T h i s i s an i n d i s p e n s a b l e p a r t o f 
t h e c o n n o t a t i o n o f a l l such words as a c t i v i t y , endeavour, c o n a t i o n , 
„ (108) 
s t r i v i n g , e f f o r t , w i l l , a t t e n t i o n . As S t o u t c o n c e i v e d r , ' 
t h e s e terms a r e t h e warp and woof o f t h e end towards i t t h e y a r e 
d i r e c t e d . W i t h o u t any such end, t h e terms i n t hemselves have no 
meaning n o r can t h e y have any e x i s t e n c e . 
(107) ( l ) P r e f a c e t o A n a l y t i c P s y c h o l o g y , o p . c i t , pp. IX and X I . 
( n ) Broad, C.D., " O b i t u a r y N o t i c e " i n MIND, N.S. V o l L I V , 
No.215, ( 1 9 4 5 ) , p.286. 
( i n ) Passmore, John, A Hundred Years o f P h i l o s o p h y , o p . c i t , 
P.197. 
(108) S t o u t , G.F., A n a l y t i c P s y c h o l o g y , 2 v o l s . , V o l . 1 , o p . c i t , 
p. 147. 
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S t o u t ' s p e r s i s t e n c e t o d e f e n d i n g "The N a t u r e $ 
,,(109) 
o f M e n t a l A c t i v i t y remained u n w a v e r i n g t h r o u g h o u t h i s 
arguments. He contends t h a t t h e c o n a t i v e p r o c e s s i s always 
t h e r e , p r o v i d e d t h e r e i s an aim i n v i e w , and we a r e " a c t i v e i n 
making an a t t e m p t , whether t h e a t t e m p t i s s u c c e s s f u l o r n o t " . ^ 1 1 ^ 
I n t h i s he was opposed t o b o t h S. A l e x a n d e r ' s and C a r v e t h Read's 
versions/ 1'''' 1'^ Yet S t o u t was n o t s a t i s f i e d t o l e a v e t h e m a t t e r 
v a g u e l y worded. "A c o n a t i v e p r o c e s s w h i c h i s u n s u c c e s s f u l i s 
i n e f f i c i e n t i n p r o d u c i n g t h a t p a r t i c u l a r r e s u l t w h i c h we c a l l 
i t s f u l f i l m e n t . But i t i s n o t a b s o l u t e l y i n e f f i c i e n t ; i t c o u n t s 
i n some way as a f a c t o r d e t e r m i n i n g t h e course o f e v e n t s " . 
I t i s c a l l e d a c o n a t i v e process on i t s own m e r i t , and i t i s 
g i v e n t h e name "mental a c t i v i t y " m e r e l y because i t i s a pro c e s s 
a t a l l . He ten d e d t o show t h a t i t i s t h e i n t e n s i t y o f c o n a t i o n 
w h i c h b e l o n g s t o "immediate e x p e r i e n c e " . I t may be i n f e r r e d , 
c o n s e q u e n t l y , t h a t i t i s t h i s immediate e x p e r i e n c e w h i c h c o l o u r s 
(109) A Symposium xn Proceedxngs o f t h e A r i s t o t e l i a n S o c i e t y , 
V o l . V I I I , 1907-8. 
(110) i b i d , p.248 
(111) B o t h were c o n t r i b u t o r s t o t h e same symposium. 
(112) "The N a t u r e o f C o n a t i o n and M e n t a l A c t i v i t y " B.J.Psych. 
V o l . I I , p a r t 1 , ( 1 9 0 6 ) , pp.2-3. 
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t h e c h a r a c t e r o f " t h e c o n a t i v e complex" and g i v e s i t i t s 
d i s t i n c t i v e n a t u r e . ^ "'"'^ Then S t o u t proceeds t o show where 
t h e d i f f e r e n c e l i e s between h i s view and t h a t o f B r a d l e y i n 
r e s p e c t o f c o n a t i o n . B r a d l e y equated an " i d e a " w i t h " t h e 
s e l f " . Such a n o t i o n S t o u t j u d g e d as " h i g h l y ambiguous". 
I n s t e a d , he suggested t h a t t h e " f e l t t e n d e n c y " c o u l d be r e g a r d e d 
as an immediate u n a n a l y s a b l e e x p e r i e n c e . S t i l l f u r t h e r , he spoke 
o f t h e s e l f m t h e l i m i t e d sense and c a l l e d i t t h e " o r g a n i s e d 
s e l f " . A s a c o r o l l a r y o f t h i s t h a t o t h e r "mental c o n t e n t s 
a r e r e l a t i v e l y a l i e n t o t h e o r g a n i s e d s e l f " , s , A l e x a n d e r , 
who borrowed f r o m S t o u t t h e f o u n d a t i o n s o f h i s own c o n a t i v e 
t h e o r y o f knowledge, conceded t h a t S t o u t ' s t r e a t m e n t o f p e r c e p t i o n 
was "one o f t h e g r e a t e s t c o n t r i b u t i o n s t h a t have been made t o 
P s y c h o l o g y " . A l t h o u g h t h i s b r i e f s t a t e m e n t i s r e l e g a t e d t o 
a f o o t n o t e , i t n e v e r t h e l e s s g i v e s A l e x a n d e r ' s e v a l u a t i o n p r e c i s e l y . 
For t h o u g h some o f S t o u t ' s terms w h i c h he n e o l o g i s e d o r borr o w e d , 
(1 1 3 ) B.J.Psychol., V o l . I I , P a r t 1 , 1906, o p . c i t , p.6 
(114) i b i d , pp.7-8 
(11 5 ) ( l ) i b i d , pp.7-8; 
( n ) see a l s o by S t o u t " i s Mind Synonymous w i t h Consciousness'?" 
A Symposium: A r i s t . S o c . , V o l . 1 , N o . l , 1888, p.12. 
(11 6 ) Space, Time and D e i t y , o p . c i t , f o o t n o t e , p.119. 
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such as " n o e t i c s y n t h e s i s " , " r e l a t i v e s u g g e s t i o n " , 
" a p p e r c e p t i o n " ^ 1 1 ^ may be c o n s i d e r e d as o l d - f a s h i o n e d , t h e y can 
be c o n f i d e n t a l l y r e g a r d e d as o f permanent r e l e v a n c e t o * 
p s y c h o l o g i c a l t e r m i n o l o g y . They a r e a l l c o g n i t i v e f o r m u l a t i o n s 
w h i c h loom l a r g e i n what may be c a l l e d " a c t " p s y c h o l o g y . The 
c o n c e p t s j u s t a l l u d e d t o a n t i c i p a t e d t h e work o f 
t h e G e s t a l t s c h o o l . Thus i n 1896 S t o u t was w r i t i n g t h a t " t h e 
p e r c e p t o f t h e whole i s n o t t h e sum o f t h e p e r c e p t s o f t h e 
p a r t s " , t h a t what we p e r c e i v e i s " t h e whole o b j e c t " b e f o r e we 
r e s o l v e i t i n t o i t s p a r t s , t h a t " t h e a p p r e h e n s i o n o f t h e whole 
d e t e r m i n e s t h e o r d e r and c o n n e c t i o n o f t h e a p p r e h e n s i o n o f t h e 
p a r t s " . I t i s now o v e r h a l f a c e n t u r y s i n c e he f i r s t a t t a c k e d 
" t h e f u n d a m e n t a l f a l l a c y o f t h e a s s o c i a t i o n i s t s " f o r t h e i r 
" p s y c h o l o g i c a l a t o m i s n " , t h e i r " e x c l u s i v e emphasis on mere 
c o m b i n a t i o n ... t h e i r f a i l u r e t o r e c o g n i s e t h e a p p r e h e n s i o n o f 
t h e f o r m " , and t h e i r d i s p o s i t i o n t o r e g a r d "mental elements as 
e n t e r i n g i n t o new c o m b i n a t i o n s w i t h o u t themselves u n d e r g o i n g 
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n i n t h e p r o c e s s " . 
(117) A n a l y t i c P s y c h o l o g y , o p . c i t , V o l . 1 1 , Chapters : 
V, V I , and V I I I . 
( 1 18) A n a l y t i c P s y c h o l o g y , V o l . 1 1 , o p . c i t , pp.47-48, 249-235, 
26, 1 1 . 
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The work A n a l y t i c Psychology has i n f a c t t h r e e 
d i v i s i o n s , and n o t two as J o s i a h Royce^'''^ has i n d i c a t e d . The 
t h r e e p a r t s a r e : (1) a g e n e r a l a n a l y s i s o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s 
whereby S t o u t i n t e n d e d t o " a s c e r t a i n t h e number and n a t u r e and 
m u t u a l c o n n e c t i o n o f t h o s e u l t i m a t e c o n t e n t s o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s " . 
T h i s department o f p s y c h o l o g y , anyway, i s p u r e l y a n a l y t i c a l 
and l a r g e l y i n t r o s p e c t i v e . I t aims t o d i s c o v e r t h e 
i r r e d u c i b l e c o n s t i t u e n t s o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s . G e n e r a l l y , t h e 
p o i n t o f view p r o p e r t o i t i s s t a t i s t i c a l , n o t dynamic. 
(11) I n t h e second d i v i s i o n S t o u t meant " t o i n v e s t i g a t e t h e 
g e n e r a l laws and c o n d i t i o n s a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h change t a k e s 
p l a c e i n c o n s c i o u s n e s s " . The method p r o p e r t o t h i s s t a g e i s 
b o t h " a n a l y t i c " and " s y n t h e t i c " . (111) The p u r p o r t o f t h e 
,. .. ( 1 2 0 ) f i n a l p a r t i s an e x p o s i t i o n i n g e n e r i c o r d e r . However, 
S t o u t ' s view seems t o be t h a t consciousness i s s u b j e c t t o t h e 
g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e t h a t i t s f a c t s n o r m a l l y mean som e t h i n g ; i n 
(119) A C r i t i c a l N o t i c e i n 
( 1 8 9 7 ) , pp. 379-399. 
(120) A n a l y t i c P s y c h o l o g y , 
Mind, N.S., V o l . V I , No.23 
o p . c i t , pp. 35-37. 
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o t h e r words, x t t e n d s towards what Royce termed t h e " e v o l u t i o n 
11 (121) o f meanxngs . 
One o f t h e o t h e r i m p o r t a n t f e a t u r e s o f S t o u t ' s 
p s y c h o l o g y xs x t s emphasxs on development. S t r x c t l y t h i s i s t h e 
theme o f t h e Manual o f Psychology (1898) . I n p a r t i c u l a r S t o u t 
h e l d i n t h i s book t h a t we m a i n l y have t o l e a r n by a g r a d u a l 
(121) ( l ) M i nd, N.S. V o l . V I , o p . c i t , p.394. 
( n ) See a l s o : Rex K n i g h t , "George F r e d e r i c S t o u t " 
O b i t u a r y N o t i c e i n B.J.Ed.Psych, V o l . X V I , 
P a r t 2, 1946. 
( i n ) S t o u t , G.F. " i s t h e D i s t i n c t i o n o f F e e l i n g , 
C o g n i t i o n , and C o n a t i o n V a l i d as t h e U l t i m a t e 
D i s t i n c t i o n o f t h e M e n t a l F u n c t i o n s ?" A 
Symposium, A r i s t o t . S o c . V o l . 1 , No.3, 1890. 
(IV) , "A General A n a l y s i s o f P r e s e n t a t i o n s 
as A P r e p a r a t o r y t o t h e Theory o f t h e x r 
I n t e r a c t x o n " A r x s t o t . S o c . V o l . 1 1 , N o . l , 
1892. 
( v ) , "The Scope and Method o f P s y c h o l o g y " 
A r x s t o t . S o c . V o l I , 1888. 
( v x ) , " I n What Sense, x f any, xs i t t r u e 
t h a t P s y c h x c a l S t a t e s a r e extended ?" A symposxum, 
A r x s t o t . S o c . Vol I I I , No.2 f 1896, 
* 4 t h ed. London, U n x v e r s x t y T u t o r x a l P r e s s , ( 1 9 3 2 ) . 
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process to discern the shape, situatxon and distance of objects. 
He maintained that the perceptual processes generally were the 
result of a complex process of development i n which experiences 
of movement played an essential r o l e . "Our power of freely 
c o n t r o l l i n g , detaining, modifying and repeating mental images 
depends i n a large measure on our power of c o n t r o l l i n g t h e i r 
(122) (123) motor constituents or accompaniments". Here, once again, ' 
Stout pointed out the significance of mental a c t i v i t y . The 
emphasis th i s time i s l a i d mainly on perception. In the 
Introduction, chapter I , Stout objected to the saying that 
"Psychology i s not the science of mind, but only of mental 
processes or states". He held that "the only possible point of 
departure l i e s i n the d e f i n i t i o n of a mind as a conscious 
i n d i v i d u a l " , and no one "can deal with mental processes or states 
without reference to t h e i r being the processes or states of some 
(124). 
conscious i n d i v i d u a l , some " I " or " s e l f " . 
(122) Manual, p.483. 
(123) See, f o r example, McDougall's preface to h i s : Introduction 
To Social Psychology. 
(124) See, f o r example : 
( l ) T. Loveday, A C r i t i c a l Notice i n MIND, N.S, Vol.XXIII, 
No.92, (1914), pp.570-587. 
( n ) E.G. Boring, A History of Exp.Psychol, op.cit, p.464. 
( i n ) CD. Broad, "Professor G.F. Stout" Obituary Notice, i n 
MIND, N.S., Vol LIV, No.215, 1945, pp.285-288. 
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In the Groundwork of Psychology (1903) , Stout 
draws the attention to a twofold d i v i s i o n of conscious } ( 
processes instead of a threefold one as i n Analytic Psychology. 
This new adoption of div i s i o n i s perhaps the most important 
change i n Stout's a t t i t u d e with regard to Psychology. He divided 
the "modes of being conscious of an object" i n t o "Cognition" and 
"intere s t " ; and of these two, again in t o "Simple Apprehension 
and Judgement" on the one hand, and "Conation and Feeling-
..(125) 
Atti t u d e on the other. The author here was not interested 
i n chasing ideas and feelings about m his own mind; he was 
rather engaged i n exhibiting the broad outline and structure and 
l i f e of the mental island. Here, as elsewhere, Stout showed an 
orthodoxity and consistency i n pointing out that what should be l\ 
investigated i s "the unity and continuity of the individual 
consciousness i n i t s various forms, phases, and stages of + ( 1 2 6 ) development . 
* 2nd ed., London, University T u t o r i a l Press, (1927). 
(125) The Groundwork of Psychology, p.17. 
(126) The Groundwork of Psychology, p.53. 
op.cit, p.6. See also a c r i t i c a l notice of the book by 
H. Bosanquet i n MIND, N.S., V o l . X I I I , No.51, 1904, 
pp. 422-424. 
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Stout wrote many important a r t i c l e s on 
psychological and philosophical topics. Most, and perhaps the 
best, of the a r t i c l e s he wrote between 1888 and 1927. They were 
published i n 1930 under the t i t l e Studies i n Philosophy and 
(127) 
Psychology. Four of the essays are predominantly 
psychological, v i z . , "The Herbatian Psychology" (1888), 
"Voluntary Action" (1896), "Perception of Change and Duration" 
(1899), and "The Nature of Conation" (1906). 
In v o l i t i o n , Stout agreed that there i s an 
element which does not exist m desire. I n holding t h i s view, 
he i s opposed to Shand's argument. The l a t t e r held that the 
difference between v o l i t i o n and desire cannot be analysed i n the 
last resort. In Stout's view, the element present i n v o l i t i o n 
., (128) 
consists i n a certain kind of judgement or beli e f . Stout 
also strongly opposed Shand's phrase of v o l i t i o n a l " i d e n t i f i c a t i o n 
with s e l f " . This i s deemed as "vague" as i t has no specific 
(129) 
l i m i t s and no i d e n t i f i e d denotation. 
(127) Published by MacMillan and Co4 London. 
(128) Studies i n Philosophy and Psychology, p.53. 
(129) i b i d , pp.56-57, 166-181, see also : a c r i t i c a l notice by 
CD. Broad i n MIND, N.S., Vol. XL, No.158, 1931. 
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In MIND AND MATTER (1931)^13°^Stout*s purport 
was to show that philosophy has two parts, namely, (1) an 
analysis of ordinary experience i n order to f i n d a coherent 
account of the principles involved i n i t , and (2) an enquiry as 
to whether the universe i s a self-complete unity, or an endless 
series, or an aggregate. O r i g i n a l l y , Stout accepted the 
t r a d i t i o n a l post-Cartesian view that a representation i s a 
"modification of consciousness". The d i f f i c u l t i e s lurking behind 
such an assumption, Stout thought he could overcome by adopting 
from Leibniz, Lotz^ and James Ward, the doctrine that there is no 
hard l i n e between mind and matter, since what i s called "material 
objects" are minds i n disguise. But he came to re j e c t t h i s idea 
and held that representations (rechristened ' sensa') are material, 
although not physical. By t h i s he meant that although they are 
not mental, they are equally not "physical objects" i n the sense 
i n which such objects form the subject-matter of physics. Only 
on t h i s view, according to Stout, can we understand the way i n 
which our 'sensa' point to the existence of physical objects 
without being physical objects themselves. To make "practical 
(130) Being the f i r s t of twovolumes based on the Gifford 
Lectures delivered i n the University of Edinburgh 
i n 1919 and 1921. 
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adjustments" to our experience, we have to regard "sensa" as 
pointing to "things". That means we cannot manage our lives 
with sensa alone. ^ •^'"^  i n connection with these philosophical 
views, the question remains whether or not the "sensum" i s "by 
nature" fragmentary and incomplete. This position i s most f u l l y 
(132) 
worked out i n God and Nature (posthumous 1952). 
Stout held that psychology deals with 
psychical processes that are i n themselves subjective and that 
have mental objects l i k e sensations. Mind is conative, but i t 
i s cognitive, too. Cognition and conation are not merely added 
to one another but mingle i n the same process. The psychical 
process he divided i n t o cognition and in t e r e s t , the l a t t e r i s 
subdivided i n t o conation and fe e l i n g - a t t i t u d e . Conation i s 
described by him as the equivalent of craving, desire, or w i l l . 
Stout's views, p a r t i c u l a r l y his doctrine of conation, i s of 
special interest because they are founded on hormic bases and they 
(131) ( l ) Mind and Matter, op.cit. pp.15, 167-168, 171-2, 
211-212, 230-231, 236-7, 268-9, see also a c r i t i c a l 
notice by CD. Broad i n Mind. N.S., Vol.XLI. No.163, 
1932, pp.351-370. 
(132) ed. by A.K. Stout, being the second volume based on The 
Gifford Lectures delivered i n the University of 
Edinburgh, i n 1919 and 1921. 
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form the flanks of the hormic theory. They mxght as well be 
considered as the doorway to McDougall's systematic position. 
Stout's philosophy might well be summarised 
i (133) „ i n Passmore s own words. Everything i n i t leads to the 
conception of a t o t a l Universe containing whatever i s f i n i t e , 
which yet, j u s t because i t i s f i n i t e , demands a ground. The 
presentation looks towards the object of which i t i s a 
fragmentary revelation, the object looks towards the Universe 
which completes i t ; every experience i s a phase i n the history 
of a s e l f , but a self finds i t s unity only through the 
(134) 
conception of a single object of thought". The description 
f i t s Stout's d e f i n i t e and systematic philosophy. This b r i e f 
survey of some of Stout's mam psychological and philosophical 
, (135) 
views perhaps provides some evidence to support Passmore s 
verdict that "far from being antiquated Stout i s much more 
revolutionary than exponents of such modern doctrines as the 
conditioned r e f l e x " . 
(133) Passmore, J.A., Memoire, m Stout's God and Nature, op.cit, 
pp. XXVff. 
(134) i b i d , p.XLIX 
(135) i b i d , p.XLIX 
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I f nobody thinks of Stout as the founder of 
a school, i t i s "because he was very much more than that", as 
(136) 
i&A. Mace has observed. The advance that psychology has 
made is i n no small measure due to Stout himself. That he must 
be regarded primarily as a philosopher i s an unquestionable 
fac t ; nevertheless, i t i s not paradoxical to say that he made a 
great contribution to Psychology, so that "the central body of 
psychological doctrine has assumed a form i n which i t can 
(137 ) 
assimilate so much". Appreciating Stout's position i n 
( l 38 ) 
modern psychology, Mace has recently stated that, "His 
influence was not that of a founder of a school. He was one who 
influenced the founders of schools ... other psychologists 
learned most from him m th e i r maturity. I t was i n t h i s way 
McDougall ... derived and developed from Stout what Stout had 
derived and developed from Spinoza". 
(136) Obituary Notice, B.J.Psychol, Vol.XXXVI, part 2, 
(1946), p.54. 
(137) i b i d , p.54. 
(138) "The Permanent Contribution to Psychology of George 
Frederick Stout" B.J.Psych., Vol.XXIV, part 2, 
(1954), p.75. 
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5. Retrospective Conclusions. 
Thus far consideration has been given only to 
three of the most o r i g i n a l and stimulating exponents of the 
hormic doctrine. They can be credited with the capability of 
elucidating clearly how mental contents co-operate, and how 
mental processes function. I t i s true that t h e i r arguments 
extend over the long span of time which l i e s between them and 
many other notable authors such as Locke, Hume, Berkeley, Bain, 
Lewes, Ward, as already indicated. Yet m t h i s respect, i n 
the discussions of Alexander, Nunn and Stout, the contents of 
mind as well as the relations obtaining between them are well 
stressed. I t could be said, however, that t h e i r attitudes seem 
to have been monadic i n character. To the three w r i t e r s , ju s t 
mentioned, the mind i s the active factor i n d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g 
between the inner and the outer sides of human nature, between 
the subject and the object, as such. Perhaps another 
meritorious aspect of t h e i r endeavours l i e s i n the fact that they 
tended to point out that Psychology holds a unique position i n 
the hierarchy of the sciences. 
Their contentions, at any rate, seem to have 
certain characteristics: (1) the three 'hormic' thinkers appear 
to have concerned themselves with the task of reconciling 
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psychologxcal with s c i e n t i f i c judgements. Such a case i s at 
least true of Nunn and Stout. (2) Their method of enquiry was to 
examine as c a r e f u l l y as possible the data of experience i n the 
expectation that they would be capable of educing the principles 
which could hold the data obtained together. (3) Conational 
issues were the central theme of t h e i r arguments. (4) They were 
consistent and thorough. (5) Above a l l , i t seems that i t was 
t h e i r ideas, more than any others, that inspired McDougall, who 
re-shaped the hormic principle on fresh ground; so that he 
emerged as an eminent Psychologist with whose name hornucism is 
now intimately associated. "Of a l l hormic Psychologists", to 
quote Flugel, "McDougall i s by f a r the most thorough and 
(139) 
consistent". I t i s to his hormic views, therefore, that the 
next chapters w i l l be devoted. 
(139) Studies i n Feeling and Desire, op.cit, p.60. 
PART I I 
INSTINCT AS A BASIC CONCEPT 
OF THE HORMIC THEORY 
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CHAPTER V 
THE CONCEPT OF INSTINCT ; HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 
The basxc ideas underlying the concept of 
i n s t i n c t are older than recorded his t o r y . The orientation of 
the problems of i n s t i n c t at the present time has a long history 
behind i t . I t i s also the outcome of a gradual process of 
development m philosophical and psychological thought; so that 
"the s p e c i f i c i t y of the various problems ... has long gradually 
emerged",^^ as James Drever (Snr.) said. 
1. Origins In Philosophy And Theology. 
There have been p r i n c i p a l periods i n the history 
of the theories of i n s t i n c t . A l l attempts made m th i s respect 
are meant to trace the h i s t o r i c a l development of the theories 
pertaining to the word " i n s t i n c t " and i t s concept. The term 
(2) 
"Instinctus", for example, was the term used by the Romans 
(1) A C r i t i c a l Notice about E.C. Wilm's : The Theories of 
I n s t i n c t , m J. of Philosophical Studies, v o l . 1 , 
No.2 (1926), p. 259. 
(2) Drever, James (Snr.), "The Nature of Emotions", j . Abn. 
and Social psycho., v o l . XXVII, No.3, (1932), p.299. 
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(3) to translate the Greek "horme". The root idea of the Greek 
word i s "drive", "urge", "impulsion". The word "horme" was 
employed by the Stoics, for instance, i n the sense i n which 
i n s t i n c t was r i g h t l y used i n modern times from the XVIIth 
(4) 
Century onwards. However, i n the h i s t o r i c a l background of 
(5) 
i n s t i n c t there are main periods which Wilm grouped in t o 
four : 
1. The ancient (Greek and Roman) period; 
2. Scholasticism; 
3. The period of the Enlightenment; 
4. The modern or s c i e n t i f i c period; 
Despite the obvious objections that might be 
raised i n respect of the terminology, there have been , 
coincident with the h i s t o r i c a l stages,various tendencies. They 
are called the " n a t u r a l i s t i c " , the "monistic" or the 
" m a t e r i a l i s t i c " and the "animistic", the " d u a l i s t i c " or the 
(3) i b i d , p.299 
(4) i b i d , p.299 
( l i ) Herzberg, Alexander, The Psychology of Philosophers, 
London, Kegan Paul, (1929), pp.13, 39ff; 
( i n ) Durant, W i l l , The Story of Philosophy, London, 
Ernest Benn, (1926), pp.l08ff. 
(5) The Theories of I n s t i n c t ; A Study i n the History of 
Psychology, London, Humphrey Mil f o r d ; Oxford Univ.Press, 
(1925), Preface, p. x n . 
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"xde a l i s t i c " . The d i f f e r e n t problems of i n s t i n c t begin to 
take on a modern form af t e r Descartes. Nevertheless, the 
controversy between, for example, the mechanistic and the 
animistic conceptions of nature i n the f i r s t instance, and 
thereafter of the organism, are care f u l l y traced and clearl y 
discussed. The r e l a t i o n of present day problems of i n s t i n c t 
to age-old and fundamental questions i s to some extent 
emphasised. 
Among representatives of the n a t u r a l i s t i c 
tendency the following names are mentioned: Hcraclitus, the 
Greek atomists, Leucippus and Democritus, The Epicureans, 
Plutarch, Porphry, Montaigne, Gassendi, Condillac, Leroy, 
Rorarius, Thomasius, Jenkin, Leibnitz, La Metrie, Vogt, Buchner, / 
and many others of the XlXth and the XXth Centuries, notably, 
(7) 
Bethe, and Loeb. 
(6) ( I ) i b i d , p. X I I I ; 
( n ) A r i s t o t l e ' s Psychology ; A Treatise on the Principle of L i f e , 
Translated by W.A. Hammond, London, Sonnenheim (1902), 
Books I and I I . 
( m ) Erdmann, J.E., A History of Philosophy, 3 vols., v o l s I j 
London, Sonnenheim, (1890). 
(7) ( i ) Hamilton, Sir William, Lecture, 4 v o l , Edinburgh, 
William Blackwood, (18 ); 
( n ) A r i s t o t l e ' s Moral Philosophy, London, John Murray, (1879); 
( i n ) Wilm, E.G, op.cit, p . X I I I . 
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Heraclitus, for example, declared during the 
fourth century B.C., that there had been two types of creation. 
Men and gods were the products of r a t i o n a l creation, whereas 
i r r a t i o n a l brutes comprised a separate category of l i v i n g 
creatures. Only gods and men possess souls as Heraclitus 
thought. I t cannot be said that he advanced the concept of 
i n s t i n c t , but i t may be said that he l a i d the ground work for 
i t s development. 
The mam feature of the atomistic system i s , of 
course, the mechanistic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of nature, the 
elimination of any purposive category, l i k e i n t e l l i g e n c e , soul 
or the l i k e . I t substitutes instead, natural law and necessity. 
The mechanistic interpretations of nature inaugurated by 
Leucippus and Democritus, as well as beginnings of animal 
psychology, are continued i n Epicurus and Lucretius, and i n 
P l u t a r c h . ^ 
In t h i s connection mention of Socrates (469-399) must 
be made. His position had always been supposed to be that of a 
moralist, and there i s no need to elaborate on t h i s here. Yex 
(8) I n s t i n c t , an Insight ed., ed. by R.C. Birney and 
R.C. Teevan (1961), pp.165-166. 
(9) ( l ) Wilm, E.C., op.cit. pp.14-15. 
( i i ) Herzberg, Alexander, op.cit, chapters I-IV inclusive. 
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s u f f i c e i t may be to quote a passage by A r i s t o t l e ^ ^ a s 
decisive on Socrates's viewpoint: "The speculations of Socrates 
were only concerning Ethics, and not at a l l concerning Nature 
i n general". This seems to be appositely true of Soorates, 
whose philosophising i s not a complete system; i t i s only "seed 
and germ of l o g i c a l analysis". His views, however, were 
best objectivised by Plato, who explored and analysed the 
notion of the world of ideas. 
I t was, then, a l l l e f t to Plato (427-347) who 
f i r s t c l e a r l y elaborated the conceptual discussions of the 
bodily and of the mental causation and i n t e l l i g e n c e . These terms 
have come to be incorporated so thoroughly i n subsequent 
philosophy, and are today a part of the working vocabulary of 
(12) 
biology and psychology. The dualism of soul and body i n man, 
however, i s complicated by the further d i v i s i o n of the soul in t o 
two parts or functions, the r a t i o n a l and the i r r a t i o n a l . The 
(10) Cited by G.H. Lewes : History of Philosophy, 3 vols., 
v o l . 1 , op.cit, p.163. 
(11) Schwegler, A., Handbook of the History of Philosophy, 
Edinburgh, (1868), pp. 85ff. 
(12) ( l ) Plato, The Dialogues of Plato, Translated by B.Jowett, 
2nd ed., Oxford, (1875); 
( n ) Durant, W i l l , op.cit, pp.7-59; 
( i n ) Wilm, E.C., op.cit, p.16. 
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i r r a t i o n a l soul, i n turn, comprises two parts, the s p i r i t e d 
part, manifesting i t s e l f i n energy and courage, and located i n 
(13) 
the breast and the n u t r i t i v e and appetitive or "orectic" 
part as i t i s called i n modern terminology; t h i s l a t t e r part i s 
located i n the abdomen. There has been thus a t r i p a r t i t e 
d i v i s i o n of the soul into the deliberative or r a t i o n a l soul, 
the emotional or s p i r i t e d soul or w i l l , and the appetitive, which 
stretches a f t e r desires connected with the organic needs. This 
threefold d i v i s i o n corresponds to the three levels of organic 
l i f e , plant, animal, and man. Plants possess the n u t r i t i v e 
or appetitive soul, animals the s p i r i t e d or courageous soul, 
while man has i n addition to these two, the facult y of 
(14) 
reason. 
(13) ( I ) Aveling, Francis, Psychology: The Changing Outlook, 
London, Watts and Comp. (1937), p.144, 
See also: 
(n)Psychologies of 1930, ed by C.Murchison, p.359, 
( i n ) P l a t o , The Republic. 
(14) ( l ) Herzberg, A., op.cit, pp. 140-1; 
( n ) Wilm, E.C., op.cit, pp.16-17. 
( l i i ) Durant, W i l l , op.cit, Chapter I , 
- 230 -
Nowhere xn P l a t o ' s t r i p a r t i t e d i v i s i o n does the 
term " i n s t i n c t " appear as a c l e a r - c u t concept. I t i s r a t h e r an 
i n f e r e n t i a l matter t h a t what i s nowadays c a l l e d i n s t i n c t was 
l o c a t e d by P l a t o w i t h i n the s e a t s of the emotions and o r g a n i c 
cravingso As to the r e l a t i o n between the r a t i o n a l and i r r a t i o n a l , 
or "reason" and " i n s t i n c t " , as i t i s now c a l l e d , P l a t o 
regarded i t as a r e l a t i o n of mutual i n t e r a c t i o n . 
The d i s c u s s i o n s and a n a l o g i e s enunciated by P l a t o 
were c a r r i e d out m more d e t a i l by A r i s t o t l e (385-322). 
A r i s t o t l e ' s n a t u r a l Philosophy shows a fundamental r e l a t i o n to 
the system of P l a t o i n i t s t e l e o l o g i c a l and d u a l i s t i c concept 
of n a t u r e . A l l t h i n g s , A r i s t o t l e thought, are a combination of 
matter and form, and can be arranged m an ascending s c a l e , from 
the i n o r g a n i c to the l i v i n g . The v a r i o u s f u n c t i o n s or forms of 
animation a r e c a l l e d s o u l s . The d i f f e r e n c e between the o r g a n i c 
and i n o r g a n i c was c o n d i t i o n a l upon the presence or absence of 
s o u l . The P l a t o n i c p a r t i t i o n of the s o u l i n t o d i s t i n c t e n t i t i e s 
or p a r t s , g i v e s p l a c e m A r i s t o t l e ' s system to a g e n e t i c s e r i e s 
of f u n c t i o n s m which the lower form i s i n c l u d e d m the h i g h e r . 
According to t h i s view, the lower can e x i s t without the higher; 
but the higher always presupposes and operates i n connection 
w i t h the lower. The g e n e t i c treatment of mental l i f e i s a p a r t 
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of A r i s t o t l e ' s g e n e r a l view of organ i c nature; t h i s view alone 
may e n t i t l e him to be i n c l u d e d among the most important 
f o r e - r u n n e r s i n a n t i q u i t y of the modern d o c t r i n e of or g a n i c 
i . (15) e v o l u t i o n . 
From memory, A r i s t o t l e d i s t i n g u i s h e d v o l u n t a r y 
r e c o l l e c t i o n which i s found only m man. From s e n s a t i o n and 
imagination a r i s e p l e a s u r e and p a i n , d e s i r e and a v e r s i o n , and 
locomotion. Locomotion being due to a p p e t i t i o n ; the l a t t e r , i n 
t u r n , i s depending upon c o g n i t i v e p r o c e s s e s , l i k e s e n s a t i o n s or 
i d e a s . D e s i r e , to A r i s t o t l e , depends upon a c o g n i t i v e p r o c e s s , 
and i s i m p o s s i b l e without i t . T h i s m t e l l e c t u a l i s t i c view shows 
h i s psychology as a whole as e s s e n t i a l l y p r e - e v o l u t i o n a r y ; i t 
a l s o i n d i c a t e s t h a t A r i s t o t l e ' s psychology was l a r g e l y dominated 
by conceptions taken from i n t r o s p e c t i v e treatment of the higher 
(16) 
processes i n human beings. I n the higher reaches of human 
a c t i v i t y , d e s i r e becomes " w i l l " through the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the 
r a t i o n a l s o u l , which i s the p r e r o g a t i v e of man. 
(15) ( I ) A r i s t o t l e ' s Psychology, o p . c i t , Books I , I I and I I I . 
( n ) A r i s t o t l e ' s Moral Philosophy, o p . c i t ; 
( i n ) Wilm, E.C., o p . c i t , pp.22-23. 
(16) ( I ) A r i s t o t l e ' s Psychology, o p . c i t , books: I , I I , I I I . 
( n ) Herzberg, A. o p . c i t , pp,16ff. 
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I n A r i s t o t l e ' s scheme, as i n P l a t o ' s , t h e r e xs 
no e x p l i c i t mention of i n s t i n c t . Yet he made the f i r s t s t e p s 
towards a t r u l y g e n e t i c conception of mental l i f e . I t was 
A r i s t o t l e who f i r s t named the gradations t h a t s e p a r a t e the lower 
from the higher m a n i f e s t a t i o n s of i n t e l l i g e n c e i n l i v i n g 
organisms. 
2. P a s t A r i s t o t e l i a n Schools: S t o i c i s m and the E p i c u r e a n s . 
The a n i m i s t i c or i d e a l i s t i c t r a d i t i o n begun by 
such w r i t e r s as Anxagoras, P l a t o and A r i s t o t l e , was c a r r i e d 
f u r t h e r by the S t o i c s , the S c h o l a s t i c P h i l o s o p h e r s , both 
mediaeval and modern, the V i t a l i s t s and the r e c e n t n e o - v i t a l i s t s 
(17) 
l i k e H.Driesch, H. Bergson, and W i l l i a m McDougall. 
I n t h e i r t e a c h i n g s , the S t o i c s e x p r e s s l y 
demanded a c t i v e work i n the sphere a l l o t t e d to every 
i n d i v i d u a l . Man i s considered as an image of the u n i v e r s e - a 
"microcosm". The microcosm has to obey immutable laws and i s 
(17) ( l ) Wilm, E.C., o p . c i t , p. X I I I . See a l s o 
( n ) Durant, W i l l , o p . c i t . 
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governed by rea s o n . I n d i s c u s s i n g the "horme" which they used 
i n the sense of i n s t i n c t , the S t o i c s employed a l t e r n a t e l y the 
(18) 
idioms of metaphysics and of theology. The s i g n i f i c a n t 
t h i n g about t h e i r p o s i t i o n i s t h a t they were followed 
throughout the Middle Ages and r i g h t i n t o modern tim e s . 
On the S t o i c s * theory, men and gods only were 
c h a r a c t e r i s e d as r a t i o n a l and t h e r e f o r e they belong to one 
p a r t i c u l a r community. A l l animals were c a t e g o r i s e d as 
i r r a t i o n a l and a c c o r d i n g l y they form a d i f f e r e n t category; 
even the most complex behaviour of the brutes was thought to 
(19) 
t a k e p l a c e without any reason or r e f l e c t i o n . The n a t u r a l 
promptings, now c a l l e d i n s t i n c t s , the S t o i c s regarded as 
purposive a c t i v i t i e s implanted i n the animal by nature or by 
(18) ( l ) Herzberg, A., o p . c i t , pp. 3 9 f f . 
( n ) Erdmann, J . E . , o p . c i t , v o l . 1 . 
( m ) Wilm, E.C., o p . c i t , p. 40. 
( I V ) Durant, W i l l , o p . c i t , pp. 1 0 8 f f . 
(19) I n s t i n c x , I n s i g h t ed, o p . c i t . , 
p. 166. 
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"the world reason or c r e a t o r " ^ ^ f o r the guidance of the c r e a t u r e 
to a t t a i n an end, and to p r e s e r v e i t s own s p e c i e s . 
Two i n t e r e s t i n g p o i n t s must be d i s c u s s e d here : 
( 1 ) The purposiveness which i s d e f i n i t e l y i m p l i e d i n the S t o i c s ' 
d o c t r i n e , has been e m p i r i c a l l y v a l i d a t e d i n modern d i s c u s s i o n s . 
McDougall, f o r i n s t a n c e , based h i s t e l e o l o g i c a l and hormic 
d o c t r i n e on the foundation of p u r p o s i v i t y both i n man and i n the 
b r u t e s . He endeavoured, of course, to e l a b o r a t e h i s d o c t r i n e so 
as to cover a wider range w i t h an up-to-date terminology; t h i s 
w i l l be d i s c u s s e d l a t e r . ( 2 ) The a s c r i p t i o n of the c r e a t i o n 
of i n s t i n c t to "nature" or to a s p e c i f i c " c r e a t o r " i s now t o t a l l y 
r e j e c t e d by the adherents of the d o c t r i n e of i n s t i n c t . Some 
w r i t e r s , l i k e H. Fabre, f o r example, s t i l l adhere to t h i s notion; 
but i t i s , however, dying hard. 
According to Wilm's o b s e r v a t i o n s , the S t o i c s 
noted the f o l l o w i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of i n s t i n c t : (1) I t s 
c o n g e n i t a l c h a r a c t e r , i t s independence of experience; ( 2 ) i t s 
a daptive f u n c t i o n or a b i l i t y , and ( 3 ) i t s u n i f o r m i t y as opposed 
(20) ( I ) A r i s t o t l e ' s Moral Philosophy, London, John Murray, 
(1879). 
( n ) Erdmann, J . E . , o p . c i t , V o l . I . 
( i n ) Drever, James ( S n r . ) , "The Nature of Emotions" 
J.Abn. and S o c i a l Psych., V o l . X X V I I I , ( 1 9 3 2 ) , 
pp. 2 9 7 f f . 
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(21) to the v a r i a b l e nature of the le a r n e d a c t i v i t i e s . These 
and some more c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s have been i n d i c a t e d i n present 
day i n v e s t i g a t i o n s i n t o the nature of i n s t i n c t . 
I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t the s t o i c a l taxonomy 
was not completely convincing. T h e i r premises and c o n c l u s i o n s 
were not based upon o b j e c t i v e evidence. T h e i r hypotheses 
concerning the psychology of animals were not d e r i v e d from 
e m p i r i c a l o b s e r v a t i o n s . They were demanded by the assumption 
of the p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o s i t i o n t h a t animals l a c k a r a t i o n a l 
(22) 
s o u l . The S t o i c s , however, were not l i k e A r i s t o t l e who 
was i n t h i s sphere more of an observer than a ph i l o s o p h e r . Y e t , 
A r i s t o t l e and S t o i c i s m , mechanism and t e l e o l o g y , as Henderson 
has a p t l y s a i d , "are complementary a s p e c t s of nature, which a re 
(23) 
always a s s o c i a t e d i n i t s m a n i f e s t a t i o n s " . 
3. P s y c h o l o g i s m g Tendencies. 
As was i n d i c a t e d above, A r i s t o t l e denied reason 
and moral c a p a c i t y to animals. I n t h i s a t t i t u d e he was followed 
by the S t o i c s . Then came the Epicureans who d i d much to m i t i g a t e 
the a l l e g e d d i f f e r e n c e between man and the animals i n the matter 
(21) o p . c i t , pp. 40-41. 
(22) I n s t i n c t , o p . c i t , p.166. 
(23) Henderson, L . J . , The Order of Nature, Cambridge, Mass, 
(1925), p.17. 
- 236 -
of mental endowment. N e v e r t h e l e s s , they never taught t h a t t h e r e 
was a s o r t of descent of higher from lower form of animal l i f e ; 
by doing so,they a r e departing from the Darwinian type of e v o l u t i o n a r y 
conception which a l r e a d y had e x i s t e d i n A r i s t o t l e ' s t e a c h i n g . 
There a r e o b s e r v a t i o n s on the a n a l o g i e s e x i s t i n g between the 
e x p r e s s i v e a c t i v i t i e s of animals and human speech. These 
tendencies were c a r r i e d forward by P l u t a r c h and Porphyry. Such 
a t t i t u d e s were emphasised i n the Age of Enlightenment, and 
g r e a t l y developed by Darwin, Romanes, and the e a r l y e v o l u t i o n i s t s . 
The mental powers Porphyry f i n d s i n animals are 
(1) sense p e r c e p t i o n , ( 2 ) memory, (3 ) i m i t a t i o n , as m crows, 
magpies, the r o b i n r e d b r e a s t , and the p a r r o t , (4) speech, which 
i s o f t e n understood even by man, ( 5 ) l o g i c a l i n f e r e n c e , as i n 
dogs, and ( 6 ) an a e s t h e t i c sense, as m c r a b s , f i s h e s , s t a g s , 
and h o r s e s . 
No c l e a r - c u t r e f e r e n c e to i n s t i n c t has ever 
appeared m the E p i c u r e a n s ' s t e a c h i n g s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , the 
c a t e g o r i e s they mentioned of mental powers m animals a r e s t i l l 
v a l i d t o p i c s i n modern psychology. 
(24) ( l ) Wilm, o p . c i t , pp. 43-49; 
( n ) Herzberg, A., o p . c i t , pp. 4 5 f f . 
* c f . f o r example C o l . E.H. Richardson "Homing I n s t i n c t i n Dogs" 
Psyche, N.S., Vol.11, No.l, 1921-22. 
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4. S c h o l a s t i c i s m . 
I n s t i n c t had a l i m i t e d p l a c e i n the s c h o l a s t i c 
(25) 
philosophy. I t was r e s t r i c t e d to animals as i r r a t i o n a l 
c r e a t u r e s . Animal behaviour was supposed to be d i c t a t e d by 
i n s t i n c t i v e c o n t r o l . I n other words, only w i t h i n the frame of 
the t h e o l o g i c a l system was i n s t i n c t a t o p i c f o r d i s c u s s i o n . 
The s c h o l a s t i c conception of animal a c t i v i t y i s 
to r e p r e s e n t a mean p o s i t i o n between two a t t i t u d e s : the 
p s y c h o l o g i s i n g tendency which a s c r i b e s r a t i o n a l i t y to animals 
and the modern m e c h a n i s t i c tendency which e x p l a i n s animal 
behaviour on a p u r e l y p h y s i o l o g i c a l b a s i s . According to the 
l a t t e r view, p r o c e s s e s of animal behaviour are unaccompanied by 
(26) 
c o n s c i o u s n e s s . 
G e n e r a l l y , mediaeval psychology was l i t t l e more 
than "a d o c t r i n e of reason". Reason was supposed to be a f a c u l t y 
(25) ( I ) Herzberg, o p . c i t . 
( n ) Durant, W i l l , o p . c i t . 
(26) ( 1 ) Erdmann, J . E . , o p . c i t . , V o l . I ; 
( n ) Durant, W i l l , o p . c i t . 
( i n ) Herzberg, A., o p . c i t . 
c f . Hartmann, Eduard Von, Philosophy of the 
Unconscious, London, Kegan P a u l , Book I I , 
pp. 47-154. 
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super-added to s e n s a t i o n and p e r c e p t i o n , and p r e r o g a t i v e to man 
only. Animals being endowed w i t h sense p e r c e p t i o n and sense 
impulse, were thought to be devoid of reason. Impulse i n man i s 
a d a p t i v e . I t i s not i n b r u t e s . T h i s p o s i t i o n was g r a d u a l l y 
e l a b o r a t e d through the w r i t i n g s of S t . Augustine ( d . 430), 
A l c u m ( d . 804), Rhabanus Maurus ( d . 856), John Scotus Eriugena 
( d . 8 7 7 ) , Hugh of S t . V i c t o r ( d . 1141). The development came to 
i t s climax m the arguments of the well-known philosophers of 
the X l l l t h Century, l i k e Alexander of Hales (d.1245), A l b e r t 
(27) 
the Great (d.1280), and Thomas Aquinas (d.1274). 
The Rennaissance could h a r d l y be d e s c r i b e d as 
c o n t r i b u t i n g to i n s t i n c t u a l study. The eminent w r i t e r who 
d i s c u s s e d questions r e l e v a n t to the t o p i c of psychology was 
Montaigne ( 1 5 3 3 - 1 6 9 2 ) / 2 8 ) 
(27) ( l ) Wilm, E.C., o p . c i t . pp. 67, 61-62 ; 
( n ) Hamilton, S i r W i l l i a m , o p . c i t . 
( m ) Cofer, C.N. and Appley, M.H., Motivation : 
Theory and Research, N.Y., John Wiley and 
Sons, (1965), Ch.2. 
(28) ( I ) Durant, W i l l , o p . c i t . 
( n ) Hamilton, S i r W i l l i a m . 
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5. D e s c a r t e s and Anxmal Automatism. 
I t was Thomas Aquinas (d.1274) who wrote : 
(29) 
" I n animals t h e r e a r e only i n s t i n c t s , but not i n man". 
As i t s t a n ds, t h i s statement tends to emphasise a s o r t of 
dichotomy between man and the other animals. Anyway, Aquinas's 
p o s i t i o n r e p r e s e n t s an e x t e n s i o n of views a l r e a d y upheld by the 
s c h o l a s t i c p h i l o s o p h e r s . A f t e r about four c e n t u r i e s , Aquinas's 
notion was reviewed by Rene De s c a r t e s (1596-19650) who 
intended to r e s t a t e an a l l e g e d e x i s t e n c e of man-brute d i v i s i o n . 
The c e n t r a l i d e a i n D e s c a r t e s was the primacy of c o n s c i o u s n e s s . 
His apparently obvious p r o p o s i t i o n was t h a t the mind knows 
i t s e l f more d i r e c t l y than i t can ever know anything e l s e ; i t 
knows the e x t e r n a l world only through the impression the world 
makes upon the mind i n s e n s a t i o n and p e r c e p t i o n . His viewpoint wa 
that the study of man must m consequence begin w i t h the 
i n d i v i d u a l ' s mind and s e l f . His whole argument i s summarised 
(29) ( i ) I n s t i n c t , I n s i g h t ed., o p . c i t , pp. 167-168 ; 
( n ) Wilm, E.C., o p . c i t , p. 78 
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i n " ( C o g i t o , ergo sum), I t h i n k , t h e r e f o r e I am"/^^ Such a 
way of r e asoning seems to have l e d D e s c a r t e s to s t a t e t h a t , 
"there i s nothing t h a t leads weak minds f u r t h e r a s t r a y from the 
paths of v i r t u e than the i d e a t h a t the minds of other animals 
resemble our own, and t h a t t h e r e f o r e we have no g r e a t e r r i g h t to 
(31) 
f u t u r e l i f e than have gnats and a n t s " , 
D e s c a r t e s ' s p o s i t i o n was opposed by Gassendi 
(1592-1655) and Hobbes (1588-1679) who sought to develop a p u r e l y 
m a t e r i a l i s t i c conception of n a t u r e . I n the X V I I I t h century h i s 
views were a l s o o b j e c t e d to by men l i k e C o n d i l l a c (1715-1780) who, 
f o l l o w i n g P l u t a r c h and Montaigne, tended to minimize the a l l e g e d 
d i f f e r e n c e s between man and the a nimals. C o n d i l l a c , f o r example, 
a s c r i b e d to the i n t e l l i g e n c e of animals sundry a c t i v i t i e s which 
were regarded by D e s c a r t e s and h i s s u pporters as having a p u r e l y 
(32) 
r e f l e x and i n s t i n c t i v e q u a l i t y . 
(30) ( l ) D e s c a r t e s ' s P h i l o s o p h i c a l Works, E n g l i s h ed m 2 v o l s . , by 
E l i z a b e t h S. Haldane, Cambridge, ( 1 9 4 2 ) . 
( n ) Durant, W i l l , o p . c i t . p.166. 
(31) ( l ) D e s c a r t e s ' s P h i l o s o p h i c a l Works, E n g l i s h ed by E l i z a b e t h 
Anscomb and P.Y.Geach, London, Thomas Nelson & Sons (1964); 
1 s t p u b l i s h e d ( 1 9 5 4 ) . 
( n ) Hamilton, S i r W i l l i a m , o p . c i t . 
( i n ) B r e t t ' s H i s t o r y of Psychology, abridged and ed by R.S.Peters, 
London, George A l l e n , ( 1 9 5 3 ) , pp.344ff. 
(32) ( l ) Erdmann, J . E . o p . c i t . Vol.1, 
( n ) Wilm, E.C., o p . c i t . pp.78-88 ; 
( i n ) Durant, W i l l , o p . c i t . 
( I V ) C o f e r , C.N. and Appley, M.H. o p . c i t . Ch.2. 
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6. E m p i r i c i s t and N a t i v i s t C o n t r o v e r s i e s of the X V I I I t h 
Century. 
C o n d i l l a c ' s views above c l e a r l y r e f l e c t an 
i d e a l i s t i c and popular t e l e o l o g i c a l philosophy u s u a l l y r e f e r r e d 
(33) 
to as the "Enlightenment". He d e s c r i b e d , f o r example, how 
the animal tends to repeat i t s p r evious movements. T h i s i s a 
somewhat ge n e r a l statement which has i t s a f f i n i t y i n what i s 
today c a l l e d t r i a l and e r r o r l e a r n i n g . On C o n d i l l a c ' s view, the 
i n i t i a l equipment of r e f l e x and i n s t i n c t i v e apparatus i s 
(34) 
reduced to a minimum of organic needs. Some of h i s views 
were opposed by Hermann Samuel Reimarus (1694-1768) of Jena 
U n i v e r s i t y . I n h i s observations, Reimarus tended to show t h a t 
t h e r e i s a gradual advance from the lowest animals to man. I n 
sense p e r c e p t i o n and i n t e l l i g e n c e the h i g h e s t animals are not f a r 
(35) 
removed from man. I n other words, he t r i e d to b e l i t t l e the 
(33) Durant, W i l l , o p . c i t , pp. 2 1 8 — 2 7 5 
(34) Reeves, Joan Wynn, Body and Mind i n Western Thought, 
P e l i c a n ed., (1958), pp.140-1, 352-62. 
(35) ( l ) Erdmann, J . E . , o p . c i t , v o l . I I . 
( n ) Wilm, E.C., o p . c i t . , 
( m ) S i r W i l l i a m Hamilton's L e c t u r e s 4 v o l s , o p . c i t . 
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sharp d i s t i n c t i o n imposed by some phil o s o p h e r s between man and 
the animals. Although Reimarus d i d deny reason to animals, yet 
t h e s e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s can be t r a c e d i n h i s contentions 
throughout: (1) sense p e r c e p t i o n and i n t e l l i g e n c e a re a s c r i b e d to 
animals; (2) inborn n a t u r a l impulses a r e possessed by the 
animals; (3) animals can b e n e f i t from experience or p r a c t i c e . 
A l l the tendencies are d i v i d e d i n t o t h r e e c l a s s e s 
i n Reimarus's system; (1) automatic tendencies; ( 2 ) a c t i v i t i e s 
of consciousness; (3) overt b o d i l y a c t i v i t i e s or conations aimed 
a t the a p p r o p r i a t i o n of the p l e a s a n t and avoidance of the 
u n p l e a s a n t . I n s t i n c t s a re v a r i a t i o n s of the fundamental impulse 
of s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n ; t h i s i n c l u d e s the c a r e of o f f s p r i n g , an 
e x t e n s i o n of the s e l f - r e g a r d i n g impulse. He enumerated f o r t y -
seven d i f f e r e n t i n s t i n c t s i n c l u d i n g the f o l l o w i n g . " ( 1 ) To move 
the body as a whole, or s p e c i a l organs of the body; (2) to f i n d 
i t s proper environment; ( 3 ) to seek f o r and to d i s c r i m i n a t e 
between d i f f e r e n t substances s u i t a b l e f o r food; (4) to avoid 
dangerous o b j e c t s and deep p l a c e s ; (5) to r e c o g n i s e and avoid 
i t s n a t u r a l enemies; (6) to r e c o g n i s e i t s mates; ( 7 ) i n the 
c a r e and n u t r i t i o n of the young, to l a y , p r o t e c t , and hatch eggs; 
(8) on the p a r t of the young to s u c k l e the mother; ( 9 ) to 
a s s o c i a t e w i t h t h e i r kind; (10) to modify or r e d i r e c t the 
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•• (36) 
impulses under e x t r a o r d i n a r y circumstances . 
However, the terms "impulse" and " i n s t i n c t " seem 
to have been used by Reimarus synonymously. T h e i r c u r r e n t usage 
may be taken as i n d i c a t i v e of a b e t t e r understanding of what 
they meant at the time. T h i s could be considered as a f u r t h e r 
s t e p towards the development of psychology. The two words i n 
q u e s t i o n were afterwards t r e a t e d by the most p r o f e s s e d l y 
s c i e n t i f i c w r i t e r s , l i k e Darwin, Romanes, McDougall and o t h e r s , 
i n almost the same way as they had been employed i n the X V I I l t h 
Century. One b i g d i f f e r e n c e , however, must be accounted f o r 
here; t h a t the authors j u s t mentioned being h i g h l y advanced 
t h i n k e r s and b e t t e r equiped w i t h knowledge, were a b l e to c a r r y 
the arguments to even higher l e v e l s , so t h a t they could l e a v e 
t h e i r marks on v a r i o u s p s y c h o l o g i c a l t o p i c s . 
7. P h i l o s o p h i c a l D i s c u s s i o n s of I n s t i n c t i n the X l X t h Century. 
I n the X l X t h Century, advanced t h e o r i e s were 
formulated concerning i n s t i n c t . E a r l y i n the X V I I I t h Century 
L e i b n i z (1646-1716) put forward h i s theory of monads. I t i s 
(36) C i t e d by Wilm, o p . c i t , pp,116-?117; see a l s o , 
pp.97-109. 
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(37) s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t the theory was adopted i n t h i s century (1930) 
by McDougall who used i t as a b a s i s f o r some of h i s hormic 
d i s c u s s i o n s . McDougall h e l d t h a t the hormic a c t i v i t y can be 
e x h i b i t e d only by organisms or n a t u r a l e n t i t i e s which he c a l l e d 
"monads". Long before McDougall, however, i n the 17th and 18th 
(38) 
C e n t u r i e s , B r i t i s h E t h i c i s t s and M o r a l i s t s such as A.Shaftesbury 
(1671-1713), F. Hutcheson^ 3 9^(1692-1752) and Adam S m i t h ^ 4 0 ^ 
( a l r e a d y mentioned), re c o g n i s e d the e x i s t e n c e of i n s t i n c t m 
human behaviour and r e a l i s e d i t s r o l e i n s o c i a l Philosophy. Words 
l i k e "conscience", "sympathy", "benevolence" and " p a s s i o n s " were 
g r a d u a l l y r e p l a c e d by the term " i n s t i n c t " . 
(37) P s y chologies of 1930, ed. by C a r l Murchison, Worcester, Mass; 
C l a r k U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , See a l s o ; Cofer, C.N. and 
Appley, M.H., o p . c i t , Chapter 2. 
(38) I n q u i r y Concerning V i r t u e or M e r i t , i n B r i t i s h M o r a l i s t s , ed. 
by L.A. Selby-Bigge, Vol.1, Oxford, (1897). 
(39) ( l ) An I n q u i r y Concerning the o r i g i n a l of our Id e a s of 
v i r t u e s or Moral Conduct, i n : B r i t i s h M o r a l i s t s , o p . c i t , 
( n ) An Es s a y on the Nature and Conduct of the P a s s i o n s and 
A f f e c t i o n s , B r i t i s h M o r a l i s t s , o p . c i t . 
( n i ) A System of Moral Philosophy, B r i t i s h M o r a l i s t s , o p . c i t . 
(40) The Theory of Moral Sentiments, B r i t i s h M o r a l i s t s , 
o p . c i t . 
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(41) L e i b n i z ' s theory, however, i m p l i e d c e r t a i n 
suggestions which could be d e s c r i b e d as " t e l e o l o g i c a l " . Notable 
among h i s arguments a r e these: ( 1 ) the c o n t i n u i t y of nature 
from the i n o r g a n i c realms to man; ( 2 ) an e x p l a n a t i o n of 
spontaneous change t h a t takes p l a c e w i t h i n the organism; (3) he 
maintained t h a t d e f i n i t i o n of r e a l i t y could be b e t t e r e x p l a i n e d 
m terms of " a c t i v i t y " . Supposedly, by a c t i v i t y L e i b n i z meant 
the f u n c t i o n s which the organism f u l f i l l s i n c e r t a i n s i t u a t i o n s , 
f u n c t i o n s which are now c a l l e d s e l f - r e g u l a t i n g a c t i v i t i e s and 
which loom l a r g e i n i n s t i n c t u a l d i s c u s s i o n s . 
Anyway, i t i s s a i d t h a t i t was A r t h u r 
Schopenhauer (1788-1860), who r a i s e d i n s t i n c t to the d i g n i t y of 
(42) 
"a cosmic p r i n c i p l e " . He devoted an e n t i r e chapter to an 
a n a l y s i s of i n s t i n c t and mechanical tendency. 
(41) ( l ) T h i l l y , Frank, A H i s t o r y of Philosophy, New York, 
Henry Holt and Co., (1914), r e p r i n t e d (1931). pp. 364ff. 
( n ) Wilm, o p . c i t , p. 125 ; 
( m ) Herzberg, A. o p . c i t , pp. 45, 50, 6 1 f f , 
( i v ) Burant, W i l l , o p . c i t , pp. 296. 385. 
(42) Wilm, o p . c i t , p. 126. 
(43) Schopenhauer, A r t h u r , The World as W i l l and I d e a , 
E n g l i s h t r a n s l a t i o n , 3 v o l s . , (1884), London, (19 4 8 ) , 
V o l . I l l , Chapter XXVII. 
- 246 -
Connected with the understanding of i n s t i n c t i s 
the question of purposive direction aimed at a goal. I t i s 
often thought that purposivity exists only where there i s 
consciousness. A discussion of the pros and cons of t h i s matter 
w i l l be coming before long. I t may suf f i c e to say now that 
i n s t i n c t i s i n the main regarded as purposive a c t i v i t y without 
consciousness. The animal does not know i t s ends as ends; and 
t h i s a c t i v i t y which unconsciously realises ends i s what A r i s t o t l e 
(44) 
called "teleology", which i s the eternal conformity of things 
to t h e i r idea or nature. Perhaps, Hartmann (1842-1906) had t h i s 
i n mind when he defined i n s t i n c t as "purposive action without 
(45) 
consciousness of the purpose". After a somewhat detailed 
discussion of i n s t i n c t , Hartmann reached the following 
conclusion: " I n s t i n c t i s not the resu l t of conscious r e f l e c t i o n -
not a consequence of bodily organisation - not mere resul t of 
a mechanism founded i n the organisation of the brain - not the 
effect of a dead, and essentially foreign mechanism, externally 
adheremg to the mind - but the individual *s own a c t i v i t y , ^ 
(44) ( l ) A r i s t o t l e ' s Psychology, op.cit. 
( n ) Wilm, E.C., op.cit, p.122. 
(45) Hartmann, E. Von, Philosophy of the Unconscious, London, 
Kegan Paul, English trans. (1931), f i r s t publ. 1869, 
book I , C h . I I I , p.79. 
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springing from his inmost nature and character. The end, to 
which a d e f i n i t e kind of i n s t i n c t i v e action i s subservient, i s 
not conceived once fo r a l l by a mind standing outside the 
individual l i k e a providence, and the necessity to act 
conformably thereto externally thrust upon the individual as 
something foreign to him; but the end of the i n s t i n c t i s i n each 
single case unconsciously w i l l e d and imagined by the i n d i v i d u a l , 
and the choice of means suitable to each special case 
unconsciously made. Frequently the knowledge of the purpose of 
the unconscious cognition i s not at a l l ascertainable by sense 
.. (46) - perception , 
The conception worked out here renders i t 
possible to comprehend i n s t i n c t as the inmost core of every 
being. Unobjective though the basis of the argument i s , i t shows 
nevertheless the concept of i n s t i n c t as well - formulated af t e r 
i t had been somewhat hazily conceived. The reason why Hartmann 
has been mentioned before Darwin or Spencer, for instance, i s 
simply because the former's treatment of the subject f a l l s more 
wi t h i n the region of philosophy than i n the f i e l d of what may be 
called evolutionary science, which i s closely linked with the 
name of Darwin. 
(46) i b i d , book I , p. 113. 
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In summary, i t appears that dxscussxons about 
the concept of instxnct can be traced back i n early 
philosophical speculations. I t was argued that man's conduct 
was ascribed to reason alone, whereas the behaviour of animals 
was thought to be purely i n s t i n c t i v e . Support f o r such a 
dichotomous c l a s s i f i c a t i o n came from the theological teachings 
during the Mediaeval Era. The i n s t i n c t u a l concepts were 
brought about prim a r i l y by metaphysical conceptions of nature, 
rather than by first-hand observations. 
8. Early Evolutionary And S c i e n t i f i c Usage. 
Before the s c i e n t i f i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of i n s t i n c t 
was adopted, the general tendency was to explain a l l behaviour 
as a product of experience alone. Later on such a notion seems 
to have been repudiated, largely because of Darwin's novel 
explanation of biological evolution and the e x p l i c i t emphasis he l a i d 
upon the i n s t i n c t u a l factor. From then onwards the at t i t u d e 
appears to have changed tremendously, and the argument, 
generally, has been that i t cannot be assumed at a l l that learning 
or experience plays any part i n the creation or execution of 
i n s t i n c t which i s i n t e l l i g e n t , highly adaptive and useful to the 
creature. The dogma of immutable i n s t i n c t s m the animal species 
was renounced by biologists sometime ago. Douglas A. Spalding, 
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for instance, could prove suppressions and transformations of 
(47) 
i n s t i n c t s i n chickens (1872, 1873, 1875). I t i s reasonable 
therefore to think of i n s t i n c t as both natural and inherited. 
Credit, doubtless, goes to Jean Baptiste Lamarck, Charles 
Darwm^^and, more recently, to William McDougall. McDougall's 
(49) 
e f f o r t s which are described as "exceedingly valuable" w i l l 
be elaborated l a t e r . I t may s u f f i c e to say here that he 
endeavoured to distinguish and describe the elemental unitary 
i n s t i n c t s which are together supposed to form the entire basis of 
(50) 
the human mind. 
(47) (1) see chapter I above, 
( n ) I n s t i n c t , op.cit, p.168 
(48) ( l ) "On I n s t i n c t " Paper read before Brit.Assoc., August 19th, 
1872, published m Nature, vol V I , (1872). 
( n ) "Flight of Birds not Acquired" Nature, vol V I I I (1873); 
( i n ) " I n s t i n c t with o r i g i n a l observations on Young Animals" 
i n : MacMillan's Magazine, (1873) Vol 27, 282-293, 
reprinted i n B.J, of Animal Behaviour, (1954), vol 2, 2-11. 
(IV) " I n s t i n c t and Acquisition" Nature, v o l . X I I (1875). See 
also; 
Charles Baudoum, "The Evolution of I n s t i n c t from the 
Standpoint of Psycho-Analysis", Psyche, vol 3, 1922. 
(49) See chapter I I above. 
(50) Tansley, A.G., The New Psychology and I t s Relation to L i f e , 
London, George Allen (1921), p.181. 
See also by the same author : Mind and L i f e , London, George 
Allen, (1952) pp. 41ff, 53ff. 
See also: (1) Tansley, A.G., The New Psychology, op.cit, pp.41ff. 
( n ) Cofer, C.N. and Appley, M.H., op.cit, Ch,2 
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The two pr i n c i p a l suggestions of the o r i g i n of 
i n s t i n c t offered by the evolutionary theory are those of 
inheritance of acquired s k i l l s and natural selection. The f i r s t 
theory i s mainly associated with Lamarck, the second with 
(51) 
Darwin . Lamarck's theory of the inheritance of acquired 
characteristics applies to both structures and functions; the 
functions precede and give r i s e to the structures. The theory of 
the o r i g i n of i n s t i n c t implied i n Lamarck's contentions has come 
to be widely known as "The lapsed intelligence theory", by 
which i t i s meant that i t i s derived from e a r l i e r i n t e l l i g e n t 
and adaptive a c t i v i t i e s . This phrase i n i t s e l f was apparently 
(52) (53) invented by G»H. Lewes. Lamarck's "unfortunate term" 
(54) (55) and "unlucky venture" was opposed by S.J. Holmes and 
C.O. Whitman.^56^ 
(51) ( I ) Durant, W i l l , op.cit, pp.385,405,498,384,428; 
( l i ) Wilm, E.C., op.cit, pp„144-149. 
(52) (1) Durant, W i l l , op.cit., 
( n ) Wilm, E.C., op.cit. 
(53 & 54) Wilm, E.C., pp.154, 161. 
(55) The Evolution of Animal Intelligence, (1911). New York, Holt. 
(56) Animal Behaviour, Biological Lectures for 1898, Woods H a l l , 
published i n (1899). 
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Lamarck's general position was f i r s t widely 
accepted by biologists and students of developmental psychology. 
Afterwards the d r i f t of opinion was strongly against i t . 
Nevertheless, as prominent among Lamarckians, these names are 
(57) 
mentioned; Spencer, Lewes, Sully, Cunningham and Henslow 
i n Great B r i t a i n , Hyatt and Cope i n America, Preyer, Haeckel, 
Schneider, Eimer, Wilser, Herdwig and Wundt i n Germany, Ribot 
and Foveau de Courmelles i n France, and Canastrini and Cattaneo 
m I t a l y . 
Charles Darwin (1809-1882) showed much concern 
about the concept of i n s t i n c t which was one of the central issues 
i n his w r i t i n g s . He made i n s t i n c t one cornerstone of his theory 
of evolution by means of natural selection. To bridge the gap 
between man and the brutes, and thus to establish the evolution of 
mind as well as structure, Darwin amassed two types of evidence. 
One type purported to prove the existence of human i n s t i n c t s , the 
other pertained to r a t i o n a l behaviour i n sub-human species. He 
C 58) 
observed that " i t w i l l be universally admitted that i n s t i n c t s 
(57) ( I ) Durant, W i l l , op.cit. 
( n ) Wilm, E.C., op.cit. 
(58) The Origin of Species, (1859), 6th impression, (1950), 
London, Watts and Co., p.180. 
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are as important as corporeal structure f o r the welfare of each 
species, under i t s present conditions of l i f e . Under changed 
conditions of l i f e , i t i s at least possible that s l i g h t 
modifications of i n s t i n c t might be p r o f i t a b l e to a species; and 
i f i t can be shown that i n s t i n c t s do vary ever so l i t t l e , then 
I can see no d i f f i c u l t y i n natural selection preserving and 
continually accumulating variations of i n s t i n c t to any extent 
that may be p r o f i t a b l e " . In Darwin's statement two points are 
worth emphasising. (1) he indicated the possible m o d i f l a b i l i t y 
of i n s t i n c t according to the required conditions; such a view 
conforms with his evolutionary arguments. (2) the coherence he 
expressed i n the connection between i n s t i n c t and natural 
selection as two coincident factors i n the l i f e of any being^ 
Yet Darwin conceded that i n s t i n c t cannot be expected to be 
perfect as such. He could w r i t e "Wonderful and admirable as most 
in s t i n c t s are, yet they cannot be considered as absolutely 
perfect. There i s a constant struggle going on throughout nature 
between the i n s t i n c t of the one to escape i t s enemy and of the 
.. (59) 
other to secure i t s prey . 
(59) A posthumous essay on I n s t i n c t appended to Mental Evolution 
i n Animals by George John Romanes, London, Kegan Paul, 
(1883), the f u l l text of a part of Darwin's chapter on 
I n s t i n c t w r i t t e n f o r The Origin of Species, afterwards 
suppressed for the sake of condensation, pp. 379-380. 
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Darwin's description of i n s t i n c t included some 
main points that have nowadays been confirmed by w r i t e r s , l i k e , 
(60) 
fo r example, R.W.G. Hmgston. Among the characteristics of 
i n s t i n c t that Darwin pointed out and,supported by Hingston are f 
these : i t s independence of experience, i t s uniformity w i t h i n 
given species, the absence of prevision or conscious purpose. The 
l a t t e r point has often been disputed, especially by McDougall, as 
i t w i l l be shown l a t e r . 
However, Darwin adopted a dual o r i g i n of i n s t i n c t . 
He distinguished between what he called "domesticated i n s t i n c t s " 
and "natural i n s t i n c t s " . The former "are certainly far less fixed 
or invariable" than the l a t t e r ; but the former "have been acted on 
by far less rigorous selection, and have been transmitted for an 
f r-
incomparably shorter period under less fixed conditions of l i f e " . 
How strongly these "domestic i n s t i n c t s " , "habits" and 
"dispositions" are inherited, and how curiously they become 
mingled, i s well shown when d i f f e r e n t breeds of one species are 
(62) 
crossed. He believed that natural i n s t i n c t s are l o s t under 
domestication". I l l u s t r a t i n g t h i s , Darwin referred to those breeds 
(60) Problems of I n s t i n c t and I n t e l l i g e n c e , London, 1928 
(61) The Origin of Species, op . c i t , p, 183. 
(62) i b i d , pp. 183-4. 
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of fowls which very rarely or never become "broody". The effects 
of habit are of quite subordinate importance to the effects 
of natural selection of what he called "accidental variations of 
i n s t i n c t " ; by t h i s phrase Darwin meant "variations produced by 
the same unknown causes which produce s l i g h t deviations of bodily 
structure". Even so, Darwin tended to show that although 
"there i s a s t r i k i n g and close parallelism between habits and 
i n s t i n c t s , and although habitual actions and states of mind do 
become hereditary, and may then ... most probably be called 
i n s t i n c t i v e , yet i t would be ... the greatest error to look at the 
great majority of i n s t i n c t s as acquired through habit and become 
hereditary". His b e l i e f was that "most i n s t i n c t s are the 
accumulated r e s u l t , through natural selection of s l i g h t and 
pr o f i t a b l e modifications of other i n s t i n c t s " ; such modifications 
Darwin looked at as due to "the same causes which produce 
,. (65) 
variations i n corporeal structure . 
At any rate, Darwin did declare that i t i s "almost 
certain that many of the most wonderful i n s t i n c t s have been 
acquired independently of habit, through the preservation of 
(63) i b i d , p. 185 
(64) i b i d , p. 180 
(65) From Darwin's MSS, p.264, appended to Romanes's 
Mental Evolution i n Animals. 
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„ (66) useful variations of pre-existing i n s t i n c t . He thought 
that other i n s t i n c t s may have arisen suddenly i n an individual 
and then been transmitted to i t s o f f s p r i n g , independently both 
of rigorous selection and severe tests of usefulness. 
(67) 
Subsequently, they may be strengthened by habit. He 
conceded that i t would be "the most serious error to suppose that 
the greater number of i n s t i n c t s have been acquired by habit i n 
one generation, and then transmitted by inheritance to a 
succeeding generation. I t can be clear l y shown that the most 
wonderful i n s t i n c t s with which we are acquainted, namely, those 
of the hive-bee and of many ants, could not possibly have been 
,. (68) 
acquired by habit . This statement could be nas an i m p l i c i t 
r e j e c t i o n of Lamarck's pr i n c i p l e of acquired t r a i t s , a p r i n c i p l e 
which seems to have been adopted by McDougall, who subsequently 
conducted experiments to prove i t s u t i l i t y . The experiments and 
t h e i r methodology, however, w i l l be discussed i n the appropriate 
place. Unlike Lamarck, Darwin placed the emphasis upon natural 
selection operating upon congenital variations. The Lamarckian 
theory was consistent with the view that i n s t i n c t s are " r a c i a l 
habits". 
(66) Darwin, C., "Inherited I n s t i n c t s " , Nature, Vol V I I , (1873) 
p.281 
(67) ( l ) i b i d , p.281, see also, pp. 417-18. 
( n ) The Descent of Man, op.cit, pp.149-151. 
(68) The Origin of Species, op.cit, p. 201 
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To Darwin, both i n s t i n c t and habit are 
unconscious performances. They are often constant throughout 
l i f e . Both are composed of smaller, more specific a r t s . Habits, 
l i k e i n s t i n c t s , are "associated with other habits, with certain 
periods of time, and states of the body". I n s t i n c t s , however, 
vary i n a l l directions. 
I n his Descent of Man (1871), Darwin adduced 
proofs that "there i s no fundamental difference m mental 
characteristics between man and the higher mammals". He started 
his review of the evidence procured by indicating how most of the 
in s t i n c t s to be observed i n animals - sex, pugnacity, f l i g h t , 
parental care, s o c i a b i l i t y - are also traceable i n human beings. 
To v e r i f y such a notion he carried out d a i l y observations on his 
own children, as formerly pointed out. Inheritance, of course, was 
the central core i n Darwin's argument. When any tendency i s 
inherited, i t i s l i k e l y to be inherited by d i f f e r e n t individuals 
(69) 
i n d i f f e r e n t degrees. Inheritance as C y r i l Burt has put i t 
" i s a crucial part of the Mendelian Theory that the transmission, 
the combination and the recombination of genes are largely 
determined by the laws of chance." This means that there would 
(69) " I n s t i n c t i n Man" Medical World, vol LXXXVII (87), No.4, 
(1957), p. 308. 
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be genetic differences quite as often as genetic resemblances. 
Since i n s t i n c t s are dependent on neural structures, they are 
very much l i a b l e to individual v a r i a t i o n . This view, doubtless, 
was i n Darwin's mind. 
Darwin was al i v e to the fact that i n s t i n c t s , as 
behavioural impulses, could c o n f l i c t with each other even w i t h i n 
the self-same i n d i v i d u a l . Indeed, his own oft-used word "struggle" 
may well be interpreted as to mean c o n f l i c t . I t seems for t h i s 
reason that Darwin recorded, "a struggle may often be observed 
between d i f f e r e n t i n s t i n c t s , or between an i n s t i n c t and some 
habitual disposition". Struggle, as used by Darwin, or c o n f l i c t 
can be considered as a sort of behaviour; the ensuing behaviour i s 
based upon or motivated by s t r u c t u r a l units - by i n s t i n c t s . I t i s 
by these i n s t i n c t s , then, that we and the other animals are 
(71) 
"jerked and pulled", as Burt has remarked. 
Evidently, i t was Darwin, more than anyone else, 
who realised the importance of i n s t i n c t and i t s essential part 
i n behaviour. I t was he and Spencer who substituted innate 
reflexes f o r innate ideas which the scholastic writers used for 
the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of behaviour. Darwin's theory of natural 
(70) i b i d . 
(71) i b i d , p. 306. 
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selection as applied to the o r i g i n of i n s t i n c t s has, largely 
(72) 
owing to August Weismann's (1834-1914) influence, found i t s 
way to many writers i n B r i t a i n and abroad, notably F. Galton, 
(73) 
G.J. Romanes, Lloyd Morgan, A.L. Baldwin, Wm.James, and 
others. The impact Darwin l e f t may easily be seen i n 
S.J. Holmes's own observation that "In the evolution of i n s t i n c t 
the factor of organic selection would appear to be especially 
p a t e n t " . ( 7 4 ) 
However, the evolutionary movement and the idea 
of an i n s t i n c t i v e basis f o r human psychology became rapidly 
popular. This i s due c h i e f l y to McDougall's e f f o r t s who 
formulated the i n s t i n c t u a l theory neatly and advanced i t 
considerably. Among recent investigators of i n s t i n c t i v e 
behvaiour are K. Lorenz and N. Tmbergen. The conclusions ^ 
(72) Essays upon Heredity and Kindred Biological Problems 2 vols, 
English Translation, Oxford, (1891). 
(73) See: Charles S. Minot : A C r i t i c a l Notice about Morgan's : 
In s t i n c t and Habit, Psych.Rev., v o l . IV, No.3, (1897), 
pp. 312ff., where Morgan i s described as a disciple of 
Darwin, a pupil of Huxley, and a follower of Romanes. 
(74) The Evolution of Animal Intelligence, (1911), op.cit, p.137. 
(75) ( l ) King Solomon's Ring, London, Methuen, (1952). 
( n ) On Aggression, London, Methuen, (1966), 1st published (1963). 
(76) ( I ) The Study of I n s t i n c t , London, Oxford University Press, 
(1951). 
( i i ) Social Behaviour i n Animals, London, Methuen, (1953). 
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reached by these two authors closely resemble those advanced 
by McDougall. One s t r i k i n g s i m i l a r i t y i s the doctrine of a 
"hierarchy of neurophysiological levels and centres", which 
constituted the basic feature of McDougall*s general theory of 
mental a c t i v i t y . An elaboration of t h i s w i l l come. 
Discussing i n s t i n c t , Herbert Spencer defined i t 
(77) 
as "compound r e f l e x action". He thought that no demarcation 
can be drawn between i t and simple r e f l e x action, out of which 
i t arises by successive complications. The two are distinguished 
as "sensori-motor" and "excito-motor". The d i s t i n c t i o n seemed 
to him i n d e f i n i t e . 
In Spencer's view, i n s t i n c t i s much further 
removed from the purely physical l i f e , than i s simple r e f l e x 
action. "While simple re f l e x action i s common to the i n t e r n a l " 
(78) 
l i f e , i n s t i n c t , properly so called, i s not. He could not 
think of i n s t i n c t s "displayed by the kidneys, the lungs, the 
Xiver". I n s t i n c t s i n his view are confined actions of "the 
(77) The Principles of Psychology. London, Longmans, (1855), 
part IV, Ch.V, p. 539. 
See also; Burt, C y r i l , Medical World, vol 87, No.4, 
(1957), o p . c i t , p. 308. 
(78) i b i d , p. 542. 
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nervo-muscular apparatus, which i s the special agent of the 
(79) 
physical l i f e " , i n that i n s t i n c t s answer to external 
phenomena that are more complex. While the simple r e f l e x actions 
respond to some of the most general relations common to the 
individual objects, "the compound r e f l e x actions" ( i . e . i n s t i n c t s 
i n his view) respond to those more involved relations by which 
certain orders of objects and actions are discriminated from 
others. In the phenomena of i n s t i n c t , a greater d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n 
of the psychical from the physical l i f e i s seen. In i t s higher 
forms, i n s t i n c t i s accompanied by some approach to consciousness, 
a point which indicates the main difference between Darwin's and 
Spencer's outlook concerning the consciousness of i n s t i n c t . The 
evolution of i n s t i n c t s , as res u l t i n g from experience, i s quite 
comprehensible to Spencer. Regarding t h i s point, his notion seems 
to have been quite i n agreement with that of Darwin. The only 
difference between the two approaches seems to be that Darwin 
emphasised the hereditary o r i g i n , whereas Spencer, without 
neglecting inheritance, gave the p r i o r i t y to experience. Both of 
them, however, were of the opinion that i n s t i n c t i n the end 
imperceptibly passes into an order of psychical action. 
(79) ( l ) Spencer, H.I. "Comparative Psychology" MIND, Vol i, No.l. (187C 
( n ) Principles of Psychology, op.cit, pp. 542,553. 
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Apparently Spencer's argument i s that i n s t i n c t i v e 
actions grow out of r e f l e x . These actions, i n t u r n , pass int o 
i n t e l l i g e n t acts, so that m his own terminology, an i n s t i n c t i v e 
act need never have been i n t e l l i g e n t , and an i n t e l l i g e n t act need 
never become i n s t i n c t i v e . This p a r t i c u l a r view, which may be 
described as "Bergsonian", i s i n sharp contrast with the 
orthodox exposition of i n s t i n c t l a t e r presented by eminent 
psychologists, such as Stout, McDougall, and even by less 
(80) 
professional writers on i n s t i n c t such as E.H. Richardson , 
for example. 
Perhaps the main defect of Spencer's theory i s 
that i t does not recognise the pr i n c i p l e of natural selection, 
though he himself i n an essay on "The Development Hypothesis" 
(1852), and i n his Principles of Psychology (1855), anticipated 
the Darwinian evolution and supported i t afterwards. I t could be 
said, then, that Spencer's i n s t i n c t s are not true i n s t i n c t s but 
elaborate "neuro-muscular" adjustments. However, i t was Spencer's 
c l a r i t y of mind which "suggested the application of the 
(81) 
evolutionary idea to every f i e l d of study". 
(80) See; "Homing I n s t i n c t i n Dogs" Psyche NS, vol.11, No.I, 
(1921). 
(81) Durant, W i l l op.cit, p. 385. 
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Traces of Darwin's influence can be found in 
G.J.Romanes's (1848-1894) writings. Like Darwin, Romanes t r i e d 
to popularise the issue of i n s t i n c t i v e duality. He 
differentiated between primary and secondary i n s t i n c t s . The 
f i r s t mode of origin "consists in natural se l e c t i o n , or 
su r v i v a l of the f i t t e s t , continuously preserving actions which, 
although never i n t e l l i g e n t , yet happen to have been of benefit 
.1 (82) 
to the animals which f i r s t chanced to perform them . As 
support for his observation, cited here, Romanes mentioned the 
i n s t i n c t of incubation. In his view, i t i s quite impossible 
that any animal can ever have kept i t s eggs warm with "the 
i n t e l l i g e n t purpose of hatching out t h e i r contents" ; so i t could 
be supposed that the incubating i n s t i n c t began by "warm-blooded 
animals showing that kind of attention to t h e i r eggs which we 
( 83) 
find to be frequently shown by cold-blooded animals". On 
t h i s view, the incubating i n s t i n c t would be developed with the 
absence of intelligence and purpose. Scrutinised in the l i g h t 
of modern l i t e r a t u r e on i n s t i n c t , such a notion would prove 
untenable. 
(82) Romanes, G.J., Mental Evolution i n Animals (1883), also by 
the same author : 
"Animal Int e l l i g e n c e " , A lecture delivered 
March 12, (1879), published i n a pamphlet, p. 155. 
(83) M.E.A., op.cit, p. 177 
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The second possxble mode of the orxgxn of 
instxnct xs as follows: "By the effects of habxt xn successxve 
generatxons, or actxons whxch were orxgxnally xntellxgent become, > 
as xt were, stereotyped xnto permanent xnstxncts". Romanes 
thought that xn the l i f e time of the xndxvxdual, adaptxve 
actxons whxch were orxgxnally xntellxgent mxght by frequent 
repetitxon become automatxc and leave thexr effects on "the 
nervous system". In other words, the xntellxgent actxons xn one 
generatxon became automatxc xn a succeedxng one. Thxs poxnt of 
vxew Romanes desxgnated as the "lapsing of xntellxgence" whxch 
f 85 ) 
he borrowed, wxth approval, from G.H. Lewes. Thxs standpoxnt 
too, may be regarded as xndefensible sxnce xt takes as xts maxn 
basxs the xdea of lapsed xntellxgence, the notxon that makes 
xnstxnct as' a consequence of xntellxgence xnstead of the other / 
way round, 
Romanes's argument succxnctly stated xs as 
follows: (1) Many xnstxnctxve acts are performed by anxmals which 
are low xn the scale of development, and consequently xt xs 
dxffxcult to suppose that thexr present xnstxnctxve adjustments 
can ever have been xntellxgent. (2) Among the higher anxmals, 
(84) xbxd, pp. 177-178. 
(85) xbxd, p.257 and pp. 177-178. 
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instxnctive actxons are performed at an age before int e l l i g e n c e 
has begun to assert i t s e l f ; however, i n s t i n c t i v e actions begin 
even before any power of learning i s possible. (3) Considering 
the great importance of i n s t i n c t s to species, Romanes was 
prepared to expect that they are subject to the influence of 
natural s e l e c t i o n . 
From Romanes's viewpoint, however, there i s a 
great difference between the two kinds of i n s t i n c t s - Primary 
and Secondary - i f regarded psychologically; but no difference, 
i f considered physiologically. Regarded physiologically, both 
kinds of i n s t i n c t s are merely expressions of the fact that 
p a r t i c u l a r "nerve-cells" and " f i b r e s " have been set apart to 
form t h e i r reflexes automatically, i . e . without being 
(87) 
accompanied by i n t e l l i g e n c e . 
..(88) 
To Romanes, i n s t i n c t i s both p l a s t i c and 
..(89) 
generic . P l a s t i c i n being adaptive to changed conditions 
that may happen i n the l i f e of the individual. In the case of 
(86) i b i d , p. 178 
(87) "Animal Intelligence", A lecture delivered before the 
B r i t i s h Association at Dublin, August 16 (1878), 
published m: The XlXth Century, vol. IV, No.XX, pp.653-
672. 
(88) "Animal I n t e l l i g e n c e " A lecture (1879), op.cit, p. 159. 
(89) Mental Evolution m Man, London, Kegan Paul, (1888), p.7 
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adaptability mstxnct conforms to the princ i p l e of lapsing 
intelligence or of natural se l e c t i o n , or to both. In being 
generic, i t comprises a l l the f a c u l t i e s of mind which are 
concerned i n conscious and adaptive action, antecedent to 
individual experience, without necessary knowledge of the 
r e l a t i o n between means employed and ends attained e 
Two interesting points may here be alluded to : 
F i r s t , Romanes used the terms " d i s p o s i t i o n " ^ ^ and 
(91) 
"propensity" i n quite a different way from that i n which 
McDougall l a t e r used them. Romanes, i t seems, used them i n a 
r e s t r i c t e d sense; by "disposition" he meant i n s t i n c t i n i t s 
limited sense, by "propensity" he intended to mean habit, 
McDougall, however,employed both of the two terms as synonymous 
with i n s t i n c t i n i t s wider connotation. Secondly, Romanes was 
one of the f i r s t to propose names for s p e c i f i c i n s t i n c t s , an 
effort which may be regarded as a tentative attempt towards a 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of i n s t i n c t s . 
The i n s t i n c t s that Romanes enumerated are : 
(92) 
self-preservation, reproduction, rearing of progeny, the 
migratory i n s t i n c t , homing i n s t i n c t , "a mysterious i n s t i n c t " 
(90) M.E.A., op.cit, p. 186 
(91) i b i d , p. 200 
(92) Mental Evolution i n Man, o p 0 c i t , pp. 7«»8 
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manifested by several species of wasp=like insects; the 
(93) 
incubating i n s t i n c t , the sucking i n s t i n c t , i n s t i n c t s of 
(94) 
play, affection, c u r i o s i t y . Romanes appears to have taken 
i t for granted that the i n s t i n c t s of man are i d e n t i c a l with 
those which are observed i n the lower animals. He was of the 
opinion that i n s t i n c t s are found to give r i s e to the existence 
of habits, and once the habits are inculcated, i n s t i n c t s 
themselves fade away. He thought that i t i s habits, and not 
i n s t i n c t s , which are inherited. On his theory, the 
"palaentology" of i n s t i n c t s i s something different from that 
of habits. "Unlike structures" i n s t i n c t s do not "occur i n a 
f o s s i l s t a t e " , and therefore i n the course of t h e i r 
"modification they do not leave behind them any permanent record, 
(95) 
or tangible evidence, of th e i r transformation". 
Anyway, despite the c o n f l i c t that Romanes 
sometimes showed i n his arguments, he undoubtedly was an advocate 
of i n s t i n c t . Apparently, he was rather confused as to which i s 
more l a s t i n g : i n s t i n c t or habit. Nevertheless, his assiduous 
e f f o r t s , i n addition to those of Darwin and Spencer, enabled 
(93) "Animal I n t e l l i g e n c e " (1879), op.cit, pp. 153-157. 
(94) M.E.A., op.cit, p. 275 
(95) i b i d , p. 250 
- 267 -
i n s t i n c t to have a foot at the threshold of the door of 
existence, a step which was further supported and emphasised by 
McDougall. Generally, the XlXth Century l i t e r a t u r e on evolution 
shows p l a i n l y to have adopted the concept of i n s t i n c t which 
f i l l e d a need i n the theoretical system. 
9. C l a s s i f i c a t i o n s Attempted. 
The rapidly increasing need for explaining 
behaviour i n terms of i n s t i n c t s led to controversy as to the 
number of i n s t i n c t s involved. The differences i n attitudes 
resulted i n describing i n s t i n c t s variably, so that some writ e r s , 
l i k e R.C. B o l l e s ^ 9 6 ^ ( 1 9 6 7 ) , could t a l k of "The Great I n s t i n c t 
(97) 
Controversy" ; others, l i k e K. Lorenz (1967), could speak of 
"The Great Parliament of I n s t i n c t s " . Yet, both writers are 
advocates of i n s t i n c t s as natural forces i n a l l behavioural 
s i t u a t i o n s . The discrepancy inevitably led to a demand of 
i n s t i n c t u a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n which i s rather d i f f i c u l t . The 
d i f f i c u l t y a r i s e s especially i f an evolutionary or phylogenetic 
(96) Theory of Motivation, A Harper International Edition, 
N.Y. and London, p. 90. 
(97) On Aggression, London, Methuen, t i t l e of Ch. VI 
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c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i s essayed, and even more, when no two i d e n t i c a l 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s can be found i n the current l i t e r a t u r e . 
The problem of c l a s s i f y i n g i n s t i n c t s i s no new 
one. I t was f a m i l i a r enough to the older psychologists from 
(98) 
Descartes up to the modern days. In reviewing the older 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s at the present time, two mam groups may be 
pointed out; the one group comprises the facts revealed by the 
various methods of modern psychology, esp e c i a l l y the methods of 
(99) 
Sigmund Freud and h i s school; The other group i s related to 
the development of b i o l o g i c a l research, and the r e s u l t s 
achieved.^^"^ Just for the sake of brevity i t may be 
appropriate to s t a r t from the more recent times. 
" I f we t r y to work out a rough c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of 
i n s t i n c t s " wrote E.B.Titchener (1911),^ 1 0 1^"we find at the lower 
(98) Drever, James (Snr), "The C l a s s i f i c a t i o n of I n s t i n c t s " 
B.J.Psych, vol.XIV, part 3, (1924). p. 248 
(99) ( l ) See: Freud, Sigmund, (1915), " i n s t i n c t s and t h e i r 
V i c i s s i t u d e s " : In : Collected Papers, London, 
Hogarth, vol IV, Ch.4, (1925), another ed. Basic 
Books (1959). 
( n ) Drever, James, op.cit, pp. 248ff. 
(100) Drever James, op.cit, pp. 248-249. 
(101) A Text Book of Psychology, New York, MacMillan, (1924), 
(1924), pp. 463-464. 
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end of the scale a number of movements that grade off into the 
re f l e x - such things as coughing, smiling, sneezing, 
swallowing, threading our way on the s t r e e t , beating time to 
music ... there are definite responses to p a r t i c u l a r s t i m u l i . 
At the upper end of the sc a l e , we find large general tendencies; 
the tendency that makes us take the world of perception as a 
world of r e a l things; the emphatic tendency, that makes us 
humanise our surroundings, animate and inanimate a l i k e ; the 
s o c i a l tendency, that makes us imitative and credulous ... the 
tendency to dual d i v i s i o n , closely connected with the polar 
opposition of pleasantness—unpleasantness, which makes us 
c l a s s i f y the world by pa i r s , good—bad, active - passive etc". 
Between these two extremes, Titchener counted fear, love, 
jealousy, r i v a l r y , c u r i o s i t y , pugnacity, repulsion, s e l f -
--
assertion, self-abasement. These l a s t nine i n s t i n c t s he termed 
" i n s t i n c t s proper". Two points may emerge from Titchener*s 
calculated l i s t . ( i ) Taking his point of view as i t i s , i t 
would mean that there i s quite a wide range of i n s t i n c t i v e 
tendencies i n the broader sense; the tendencies range from 
sneezing or coughing to c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i n contrasted p a i r s . In 
the narrower sense, these tendencies extend from fear and 
pugnacity, through jealousy and r i v a l r y , to self-abasement. 
(2) Titchener ss enumeration of i n s t i n c t s seems to have been 
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influenced by William James ( 1 8 9 0 ) , A t h i r d point may be 
mentioned here; To some extent, Titchener*s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n 
conforms with that of E.Thorndike ( 1 9 1 3 ) . ^ 1 0 3 ^ The "large 
general tendencies" of the former writer can be correlated with 
the "inborn c a p a c i t i e s " of the l a t t e r . Both distinguished 
between " i n s t i n c t s proper" and hereditary p o s s i b i l i t i e s of mental 
l i f e . 
William James (1842-1910), for example, i n s i s t e d 
that man has more i n s t i n c t s than any other mammal. He could 
enumerate f o r t y - s i x such i n s t i n c t s ranging from the i n s t i n c t of 
sucking to that of parental love. Included i n his long l i s t are 
some of the r e f l e x movements or a c t s , l i k e sneezing, snuffing, 
coughing, sighing, and so f o r t h . ( 1 0 ^ He used both "propensity" 
and "tendency" as synonymous with i n s t i n c t . Yet, i t i s 
peculiar enough to find him r e s t r i c t i n g the term "propensity" to 
two i n s t i n c t s only, namely, the i n s t i n c t of "secretiveness" and 
that of " l o v e " . ^ 1 ^ ^ Two points may be indicated h e r e : f i r s t , 
( 1 0 2 ) P r i n c i p l e s of Psychology, 2 vols., London, MacMillan, vol I I , 
( 1 0 3) Educational Psychology, vol I , the o r i g i n a l Nature of Man, 
New York. 
(104) P r i n c i p l e s of Psychology, op.cit, vol I , Chap XXIV, 
pp. 383-441. 
(105) i b i d , pp. 433, 437. 
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i t seems that James was not d e f i n i t e l y sure of the i n s t i n c t s he ^ 
nominated; for example, he referred to what he ca l l e d the 
i n s t i n c t of " c l e a n l i n e s s " and "modesty" as being "open to doubt"^ 1^^, 
In his confusion, James seems to have been l i k e F. Galton (1883) ^ "^^ 
before him, who described somewhat vaguely c e r t a i n tendencies 
such as " s l a v i s h i n s t i n c t s " , "incapacity of relying on oneself 
and a f a i t h i n others"; of these he thought that "they have been 
ingrained into our breed" and "are a bar to our enjoying the 
freedom which the forms of modern c i v i l i s a t i o n are otherwise 
capable of giving us". Galton's i n s t i n c t s and capacities seem 
to be certain aspects of the gregarious i n s t i n c t which McDougall 
emphasised l a t e r . 
Secondly, James's defined i n s t i n c t s are vague and 
not so neatly designated as those given by McDougall. However, 
the essential thing i n t h i s connection i s that he recognised the 
existence of i n s t i n c t s which he regarded as "the most prominent 
of the tendencies which are worthy of being c a l l e d i n s t i n c t i v e 
i n the human species. I t w i l l be observed that no other mammal, 
„ (108) 
not even the monkey, shows so large an array . 
(106) i b i d , pp. 434-435. 
(107) Enquiries into Human Faculty, op.cit, pp. 47-57 
(108) Prin c i p l e s of Psychology, op.cit, p. 441, 
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John B. Watson, xn his c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , mentions 
about twelve i n s t i n c t s , ^ " ^ ^ However, i t must be noted that 
Watson's attitude towards i n s t i n c t i s a wavering one, i f not 
antagonistic; for he did not know "What the Nursery has to say 
about I n s t i n c t s " . T h e group of reactions i n man he cal l e d 
"unlearned b e h a v i o u r " . I t may be said that he i m p l i c i t l y 
uses the notion of i n s t i n c t , but he declared that the terms he 
used have no connection "corresponding to what i s c a l l e d an 
' i n s t i n c t 9 ^ 1 1 ^ " > Terms l i k e "capacity", "talent", "temperament", 
"mental constitution and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c " have no inherited 
origin; they depend, from his own point of view, on learning and 
(113) 
tra i n i n g . I t i s habit, not i n s t i n c t , which has the 
fundamental role i n his scheme.^^^^ "Such McDougallian i n s t i n c t s 
(109) Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviourist, 
London, J.B. Lippincott Co., (1919), pp.254-261. 
(110) The t i t l e of an a r t i c l e i n : Psychologies of 1925, 
ed by C. Murchison, Clark University, Mass: 
Worcester. 
( I l l ) i b i d , p. 1 
(112) i b i d , P. 1 
(113) i b i d , P. 2 
(114) i b i d , p. 6 
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do not exist "^ ''"'^  and accordingly, he thought, they are t o t a l l y 
ruled out. 
I t i s to be noted, however, that a famous 
controversy developed between McDougall as the champion of 
human i n s t i n c t s and Watson and his supporters as advocates of 
the Pavlovian theory of "conditioning". Later on, the 
purposive behaviourists, under the lead of Tolman, showed how 
impossible i t i s to dispense altogether with i n s t i n c t as a 
hereditary concept. So i n s t i n c t i s now used i n America 
synonymously and alternately with "drives", "urges", "goals", 
and the l i k e . 
A more detailed c l a s s i f i c a t i o n founded on a 
behaviouristic basis i s the one that Thorndike prepared. His 
long l i s t (over 42) comprises i n s t i n c t s of attention,submissive as 
well as "the i n s t i n c t of multiform mental a c t i v i t y " and "the 
i n s t i n c t of multiform physical a c t i v i t y " , through to the s o c i a l 
i n s t i n c t s . The words "response" and "disposition" occur 
(115) Behaviourism, London, Kegan Paul, 2nd e d 0 J (1931) 
P. 143 
(116) Psychologies of 1925, p. 17 
(117) Educational Psychology, vol. I , op.cit, chapters vi*»xi. 
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xn his terminology as synonymous with i n s t i n c t . The long l i s t 
of i n s t i n c t s may be regarded on his part as recognising i n s t i n c t 
as being the basis of human nature. To him,"What or i g i n a l human 
nature shows i s not a general tendency to s e l f - r e v e l a t i o n , but 
a multitude of sp e c i a l responses by f a c i a l movements, gestures, 
c r i e s and gross bodily movements which act as potent situations 
to evoke attention and various adaptive responses from others 
of the species". ^ •'"^ Recognising both i n s t i n c t s and the 
consequent individual differences, Thorndike observed thus; 
"Since these differences m i n s t i n c t i v e equipment are true 
causes i t seems wise not to invoke other l e s s probable t r a i t s to 
account for any fact which these seem f a i r l y adequate to 
e x p l a i n " . ^ 1 1 9 ^ Thorndike, however, l i s t e d four methods of 
c l a s s i f y i n g the o r i g i n a l nature of man : (1) "By the functions 
which the tendencies perform". (2) By the responses which are 
their end-terms". (3) "By the situations which are th e i r 
f i r s t - t e r m s " . (4) "By t h e i r origin or a f f i n i t i e s i n 
.„ (120) development . 
(118) i b i d , p. 159 
(119) i b i d , p. 203, vol I I 
(120) i b i d , p. 205, vol I . 
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Thorndike maintained that the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n 
by functions a'r^ e the commonest. He thought that they have the 
advantage that i t i s easy to describe the i n s t i n c t in an e a s i l y 
recognizable manner i n t h i s way. In support of t h i s method, 
(122) 
Thorndike referred to E.A. Kirkpatrick's (1903) c l a s s i f i c a t i o n 
of i n s t i n c t s . Kirkpatrick's grouping of i n s t i n c t s runs l i k e 
t h i s : 
I . I n d i v i d u a l i s t i c or Self-Preservative I n s t i n c t s j 
Feeding, Fearing, Fighting. 
I I . Parental I n s t i n c t s . 
Sex and courtship i n s t i n c t s , singing, s e l f - e x h i b i t i o n , 
fighting for mates, nest-building. 
I I I . Group or Social I n s t i n c t s . 
To arrange themselves i n groups, to co-operate for the common 
good xn attack and defence, seeking companionship, desiring 
the approval of group which one j o i n s , pride, ambition, 
r i v a l r y , j*ealousy f embarrassment, shame. 
IV. Adaptive I n s t i n c t s . 
Tendency to spontaneous movement, tendency for nervous energy 
to take the same course that has j u s t been taken, tendency to 
imitation, tendency to play, tendency to c u r i o s i t y . 
(121) i b i d , pp. 205ff. 
(122) Fundamentals of Child Psychology, pp. 51-63. 
V. Regulative I n s t i n c t s . 
The moral tendency to conform to law, the re l i g i o u s tendency 
to regard a higher power. 
VI. Resultant and Miscellaneous I n s t i n c t s and Peelings: 
The tendency to c o l l e c t objects of various kinds and to 
enjoy t h e i r ownership, the tendency to construct or destroy 
and the pleasure of being a power or a cause , the tendency 
to express mental states to others of the species and to take 
pleasure i n such expression, the tendency to adornment, and 
the making of beautiful things, and the aesthetic pleasure of 
contemplating such objects. 
The d i f f i c u l t y of c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s by functions i s 
that i t may be impossible to distinguish one i n s t i n c t or set of 
(123) 
i n s t i n c t s from another. 
C l a s s i f i c a t i o n s by responses, Thorndike thought, 
have the advantage of "economy". This could be acceptable as the 
acts of, say, sneezing or smiling, can be observed. 
(123) See also; 
Bernard, L.L., I n s t i n c t : A Study i n Social Psychology, 
London, George Allen, (1924), pp. 150ff. 
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C l a s s i f i c a t i o n s by the situations are not c l e a r l y 
defined. The psycho-physical mechanism involved may not be 
ea s i l y inferred. 
As to c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s by affinities,Thorndike had 
th i s to say: "Such a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n would be a ' s c i e n t i f i c * or 
'natural* one because i t would arrange man's i n s t i n c t s and 
capacities for purposes of study i n an order corresponding to 
their genesis i n the r e a l world, and so i n c i t e students to note 
the elements i n which heredity c a r r i e s along man's equipment and 
(124) 
the possD b i l i t i e s for i t s future evolution". IT: may be said 
that t h i s can be considered as the most s c i e n t i f i c way of 
grouping the o r i g i n a l tendencies i n man. I t shows that behaviour 
as well as structure has i t s ancestral roots. 
I t appears that Thorndike's ordering and grouping 
of i n s t i n c t s i s to some extent s i m i l a r to the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n 
given by HoRutgers Marshall ( 1 8 9 6 ) . ^ ^ ^ Marshall divided what he 
call e d "the great mass of i n s t i n c t s " into three mam cl a s s e s , 
determined by three diverse types of biological ends; the three 
(124) Vol.1, op.cit, p. 208 
(125) "Consciousness and Biological Evolution" MIND, 
Vol. V, No.20, p. 524. 
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groups are : 
I . The i n s t i n c t s which tend to render p e r s i s t e n t the l i f e of 
the i n d i v i d u a l . 
I I . The i n s t i n c t s which tend to render p e r s i s t e n t the s p e c i e s 
to which the i n d i v i d u a l belongs. 
I I I . The i n s t i n c t s which tend to render p e r s i s t e n t the s o c i a l 
aggregates formed by i n d i v i d u a l s i n the higher process of 
development. 
M a r s h a l l seems to have been followed by 
Th.Ribot ( 1 8 9 7 ) , ^ ' ^who intended to d i v i d e i n s t i n c t s i n t o 
t h r e e groups: 
Group I comprises those t h a t belong to the l i f e 
which b i o l o g i s t s c a l l " o r g a n i c " or " v e g e t a t i v e " . T h i s group 
i s the e a r l i e s t i n date and i t i s e s s e n t i a l l y p h y s i o l o g i c a l . 
The f u n c t i o n of t h i s group i s n u t r i t i v e mainly. Three sub-
d i v i s i o n s come under t h i s head; ( a ) " r e c e p t i o n " , showing i t s e l f 
i n c onsciousness by hunger and t h i r s t ; (b) " t r a n s f o r m a t i o n " 
which i s p u r e l y p h y s i o l o g i c a l ; and ( c ) " r e s t i t u t i o n " which 
d i s p l a y s i t s e l f i n i n s t i n c t i v e movements. 
(126) The Psychology of the Emotions, 
London, Walter S c o t t , pp. 193-197. 
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I n Group I I , Ribot spoke of i n s t i n c t s of wh:eh he 
saxd t h a t they belong to " r e l a t i v e l i f e " . They are c h i e f l y 
p s y c h o — p h y s i o l o g i c a l and correspond to r e c e p t i o n and r e s t i t u t i o n . 
Group I I I , which i s e s s e n t i a l l y p s y c h o l o g i c a l , 
has the end of c o n v e r s a t i o n and development of the i n d i v i d u a l 
a s a conscious being,, Emotions stem from t h i s group. 
The odd t h i n g about M a r s h a l l ' s and R i b o t * s 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s i s t h a t they worded t h e i r views i n g e n e r a l 
terms. The i n s t i n c t s they d i s c u s s e d a r e not a l t o g e t h e r c l e a r l y 
d e s i g n a t e d . They t a l k e d of g e n e r a l c l a s s e s r a t h e r than 
s p e c i f i c i n d i v i d u a l i n s t i n c t s . Yet Ribot d i d point out t h a t 
i n s t i n c t s are c h a r a c t e r i s e d by i n n a t e n e s s , s p e c i f i c i t y and 
r e l a t i v e f i x a t i o n . 
(127) 
W.B. P i l l s b u r y ' s (1911) c l a s s i f i c a t i o n 
appears to be c l o s e l y r e l a t e d to those given by M a r s h a l l and 
R i b o t . He, too, spoke of i n s t i n c t s which a r e mere undefined 
movements. He thought t h a t i n s t i n c t s may be c o n v e n i e n t l y 
grouped as " i n d i v i d u a l " , " r a c i a l " and " s o c i a l " . I n t h i s 
connection, P i l l s b u r y ' s attempt seems to be s i m i l a r t o 
(127) The E s s e n t i a l s of Psychology, New York, 
MacMillan and Co., another i m p r e s s i o n (1922), 
Ch.X, pp. 267-287. 
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W. T r o t t e r ' s (1919) move; T r o t t e r was xnclxned to t a l k of 
four i n s t i n c t s only, namely, s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n , g r e g a r i o u s , sex, 
n u t r i t i o n . I n d i s c u s s i n g i n s t i n c t , T r o t t e r was concerned 
c h i e f l y about the s t r u c t u r e of s o c i e t y . P i l l s b u r y * s purpose, 
on the other hand, seems to be mainly p s y c h o l o g i c a l . He 
emphasised the i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c i n s t i n c t s which c a r e f o r "the 
e s s e n t i a l movements of the c h i l d " ; i n c l u d e d i n t h i s phrase are 
the f e a r s and d i s c omforts t h a t the c h i l d may show. 
However, an i n c r e a s i n g emphasis i n the d i r e c t i o n 
of i n s t i n c t u a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n has been shown by one 
p s y c h o l o g i s t a f t e r another. I n t h e i r grouping of i n s t i n c t s two 
f a c t o r s or s c h o o l s appear to have emerged; the one, such as the 
F r e u d i a n s , f o r example, u s i n g a few wide c l a s s e s , the o ther, 
such as Wm.James and Thorndike, g i v i n g long l i s t s of s e p a r a t e 
i n s t i n c t s . Between these two extremes i s a l i s t l i k e t h a t of 
Wm. McDougall, which, as i t w i l l f o l l o w below, c o n t a i n s about a 
dozen d i s t i n c t i n s t i n c t s , to each of which i s l i n k e d a primary 
emotion. 
McDougall es i n f l u e n c e of c l a s s i f i c a t i o n shows 
(129) 
i t s e l f c l e a r l y i n A.G. T a n s l e y * s (1921) work. T a n s l e y 
(128) I n s t i n c t s of the Herd i n Peace and War, another ed ( 3 r d ) , 
(1949), London, E r n e s t Benn, Ch.2 
(129) The New Psychology and i t s R e l a t i o n to Life, London, 
George A l l e n , o p . c i t . 
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attempted to r e c o n c i l e h i s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n w i t h McDougall's. He 
t r i e d to subsume McDougall's twelve headings under th r e e main 
items of h i s own : 
1. Ego-complexes i n v o l v e ; s e l f - a s s e r t i o n , pugnacity, c u r i o s i t y , 
f e eding, a c q u i s i t i o n , c o n s t r u c t i o n , submission, f l i g h t , 
r e p u l s i o n . 
2. Sex i n s t i n c t s : under t h i s head he p l a c e d , p a r e n t a l i n s t i n c t s and 
r e p r o d u c t i v e i n s t i n c t s ; 
3. Herd i n s t i n c t : comprises the g r e g a r i o u s one. Such i s T a n s l e y ' s 
view s u c c i n c t l y . The t h r e e headings (1,2, and 3) a l l correspond 
to s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n , t r i b a l - p r e s e r v a t i o n , and r a c i a l - p r e s e r v a t i o n , 
r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
L i k e T a n s l e y , t h e r e have been other w r i t e r s who 
i n t h e i r groupings of i n s t i n c t s showed t r a c e s of McDougall's 
impact, namely, L l o y d Morgan ( 1 9 2 1 ) ^ 1 3 0 ' ) , E r n e s t Jones (1924) ^ 1 3 1 \ 
(132 ) 
A.H.Burlton A l l e n (1930). Morgan d i s t i n g u i s h e d i n s t i n c t s of 
t h r e e l e v e l s : ( l ) simple motor t e n d e n c i e s ; (2) m i d - l e v e l i n s t i n c t s ; 
w i t h t h i s l e v e l he thought many w r i t e r s , i n c l u d i n g McDougall, 
(130) " I n s t i n c t i v e D i s p o s i t i o n " i n S c i e n t i a , October (1 9 2 0 ) . 
(131) "The C l a s s i f i c a t i o n of I n s t i n c t " B.J.Psychology, 
v o l . XIV, p a r t 3, ( 1 9 2 4 ) . 
(132) P l e a s u r e and I n s t i n c t ; A Study i n the Psychology of 
Human A c t i o n , London, Kegan P a u l . 
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d e a l ; (3) two comprehensive i n s t i n c t s comprising ( a ) " a l l the 
behaviour which f a l l s under s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n " ; and (b) " a l l 
the behaviour which f a l l s under race-maintenance". I t i s to 
be noted here, however, t h a t swimming, pecking and s c r a t c h i n g , 
which L l o y d Morgan c a l l e d " l o w - l e v e l i n s t i n c t s " a r e not i n s t i n c t s 
i n the proper s e n s e . They a r e mere motor mechanisms which subserve 
t e l e o l o g i c a l purposes. 
(133) 
To E r n e s t Jones^ i t seemed u s e f u l to group 
a l l i n d i v i d u a l m a n i f e s t i o n s i n t o two: ( a ) " a t t r a c t i o n " or " l i k e " ; 
t h i s would comprise hunger and s e x u a l i t y , w i t h two subordinate 
members of c u r i o s i t y and p o s s e s s i v e n e s s . (b) " r e p u l s i o n " or 
" d i s l i k e " . T h i s accounts f o r the ego i n s t i n c t s which are made 
up of a v e r s i o n , d i s g u s t and f l i g h t . 
As to B u r l t o n A l l e n ' s n o t i o n , he seemed to have 
been of the opinion t h a t the o r i g i n a l i n s t i n c t i v e equipment of man 
i s , more or l e s s , made up as f o l l o w s : 
1. The s e l f •-maintaining p r o c e s s ; i t i n c l u d e s growth and 
i . < -
propogation, together w i t h a number of a c t i v i t i e s which are 
s u b s i d i a r y and are c r e a t e d m the cause of e v o l u t i o n . 
2. I n the second p l a c e come two impulses i n which th e r e expresses 
i t s e l f the n a ture of the s p i r i t u a l element l y i n g behind the 
(133) B.J.Psychology, v o l . XIV, p a r t 3, (1924), o p . c i t . 
(134) Bernard, L.L., o p . c i t , pp. 154-162. 
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f a c t s of l i f e . 
3. L a s t l y t h e r e a re f e a r and anger, which a c t as r e a c t i o n s 
p r o t e c t i n g the other impulses. 
Other v a r i o u s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s of i n s t i n c t have 
been c a r r i e d out by d i f f e r e n t American w r i t e r s , ^ " ^ ^ l i k e 
S.S.Colvm (31 i n s t i n c t s ) , M.F.Meyer (8 i n s t i n c t s ) , W.C.Bagley 
(5 c a t e g o r i e s ) , Howard C.Warren^"1"^^^(31 i n s t i n c t s ) , and above 
(136) 
a l l R.S.Woodworth, who named over (110) i n s t i n c t s . The 
l a t t e r w r i t e r , l i k e Watson, was i n c l i n e d to speak of i n s t i n c t s 
as "unlearned t r e n d s " . He t h i n k s d i s p u t e s a r i s e i f the word 
" i n s t i n c t " i s r e s t r i c t e d l y used. I t might be c o n t r a s t e d w i t h 
h a b i t . For him t h e r e i s no sharp l i n e which can be drawn between 
i n s t i n c t and h a b i t , t h i s i s so because every a c t i v i t y , from 
Woodworth*s point of view, has an unlearned aspect and a l e a r n e d 
(137) 
s i d e . B e s i d e s , he p r e f e r r e d to speak of "motives" and 
" d r i v e s " i n s t e a d of i n s t i n c t . He used to speak of "maternal 
motive", f o r example, i n s t e a d of maternal i n s t i n c t ; " d r i v e f o r 
(134) Bernard, L.L., o p . c i t , pp. 154-162. 
(135) Human Psychology, Boston, (1922), p.106; see a l s o 
Bernard, L.L. "The Misuse of the concept of I n s t i n c t " 
I n s t i n c t , I n s i g h t ed., o p . c i t , p.15. 
(136) Psychology ; A Study of Mental L i f e , ( 1948), 1 s t p u b l i s h e d 
i n B r i t a i n ( 1 9 2 2 ) , pp. 138-169. 
(137) i b i d , p.371. 
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e x p l o r a t i o n " , " f i g h t i n g d r i v e " and "anger d r i v e " a r e "S-Q oft e n / 
(138 ) 
used r a t h e r than i n s t i n c t . The motive he d e f i n e d as "a 
s t a t e or s e t of the i n d i v i d u a l which d i s p o s e s him f o r c e r t a i n 
(139) 
behaviour and f o r seeking c e r t a i n g o a l s " . T h i s d e f i n i t i o n 
i s more or l e s s congruous w i t h McDougall's notion of i n s t i n c t 
as s e t out i n h i s d e f i n i t i o n , as w i l l be seen l a t e r . F or 
Woodworth, a motive, or d r i v e , r e l e a s e s some of the organism's 
s t o r e of energy and d i r e c t s i t i n t o c e r t a i n c h a n n e l s . The 
words "motive" and " d r i v e " a r e employed by Woodworth to mean 
one and the same t h i n g ; to r e l e a s e energy and to seek c e r t a i n 
ends or g o a l s . Tolman mentioned the " t e l e o l o g i c a l " and " r e f l e x " 
type of t h e o r i e s . ^"^^ The former type d e f i n e s and i d e n t i f i e s 
i n s t i n c t s i n terms of ends. These ends themselves may be d e f i n e d 
i n v a r i o u s ways; " b i o l o g i c a l l y " , " m e n t a l i s t i c a l l y " or 
" b e h a v i o u r i s t i c a l l y " . ^ 1 4 1 ^ The term " t e l e o l o g i c a l " Tolman used 
i n a p u r e l y d e s c r i p t i v e , "non-metaphysical" sense. A 
(138) i b i d , pp. 376-377, 374-382. 
(139) i b i d , p. 363 
(140) Tolman, E.C., "The Nature of I n s t i n c t " The P s y c h o l o g i c a l 
B u l l e t i n , v o l.20, No.4, (192 3 ) , p.200. 
(141) i b i d , p. 200. 
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t e l e o l o g i c a l theory, from Tolman's s t a n d p o i n t , may be u l t i m a t e l y 
" m e c h a n i s t i c " , provided merely t h a t i t s immediate d e s c r i p t i o n s 
are i n terms of ends. These ends, themselves, may be f i n a l l y 
(142) 
r e d u c i b l e to p u r e l y n a t u r a l i s t i c phenomena. T h i s 
e v i d e n t l y shows the d i f f e r e n c e between the new general t r e n d i n 
the b e h a v i o u r i s t i c purposive theory l e d by Tolman, H u l l and 
S k i n n e r , on the one hand, and on the other, McDougall's purposive 
or hormic theory which w i l l be d e s c r i b e d l a t e r . 
Tolman f u r t h e r grouped the t e l e o l o g i c a l t h e o r i e s 
(143) 
i n t o t h r e e s u b - v a r i e t i e s : 
( a ) The b i o l o g i c a l , (b) The m e n t a l i s t i c , ( c ) The b e h a v i o u r i s t i c . 
With regard to ( a ) , Tolman observed t h a t "a 
s o l e l y b i o l o g i c a l type of theory has probably been advanced by 
no one. But a b i o l o g i c a l f l a v o u r has been given to the other 
types by the tendency of r e s o r t i n g to b i o l o g i c a l c a t e g o r i e s i n 
h e l p i n g to make up one's ' l i s t s ' of i n s t i n c t s or of fundamental 
(144) 
behaviours ..." Considering Tolman's statement, one f i n d s 
t h a t i t i s not a l t o g e t h e r w e l l - f o u n d e d . F o r McDougall's theory of 
(142) i b i d , p. 200 
(143) (1) i b i d , p. 208, see a l s o : 
( n ) Warren, H.C., "Mechanism and Teleology m Psychology" 
P s y c h o l g i c a l Review, v o l . 3 2 , No.4, 1925, pp. 266, 
271-272. 
(144) "The Nature of I n s t i n c t " o p . c i t , p. 208 
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i n s t i n c t s xs based mainly on b i o l o g i c a l grounds; and Drever, i n 
h i s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of i n s t i n c t s , attempted not only a 
p s y c h o l o g i c a l one, but a c l e a r b i o l o g i c a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n as w e l l , 
as i t w i l l be shown soon i n t h i s c h apter, Tolman's argument, 
t h e r e f o r e , cannot be accepted prima f a c i e . 
Regarding ( c ) Tolman mentioned what he c a l l e d 
"the c o n f e s s e d l y b e h a v i o u r i s t i c " ^ 1 ^ ^ ^ a t t i t u d e of the t e l e o l o g i c a l 
t h e o r i e s . I n t h i s category he c l a s s e d Woodworth, C r a i g and 
(146) 
Dunlap. Here a point i s t o be made c l e a r , t h a t i s , i t 
would be a misjudgement on Tolman's p a r t to regard Woodworth as 
an avowed b e h a v i o u r i s t . F o r , i f the word "dynamist" would not 
s u i t Woodworth w e l l , the term " e c l e c t i c " p s y c h o l o g i s t may 
d e s c r i b e him j u s t l y . Concerning C r a i g and Dunlap, t h e r e w i l l be 
more about them i n another p l a c e . 
J u s t before d i s c u s s i n g the category (b) which 
comprises McDougall and Drever as the c h i e f exponents of the 
m e n t a l i s t i c v a r i e t y of the t e l e o l o g i c a l theory, t h e r e should be a 
(145) i b i d , pp. 209-210. 
(146) i b i d , pp. 210-211. 
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* 
word about the r e f l e x theory. 
The r e f l e x theory i d e n t i f i e s and d e f i n e s i n s t i n c t s 
p r i m a r i l y i n terms of the d i r e c t sensori-motor mechanisms 
( r e f l e x e s ) which they i n v o l v e , i n s t e a d of i n terms of the ends 
which they subserve. I t has two sub-types, Tolman cateifgorised / 
them a s : "(A) the type which conceives the i n s t i n c t s i n terms of 
r e l a t i v e l y simple sensori-motor c o n n e c t i o n s " ; and "(B) the 
type which conceives them i n terms of complex sensori-motor 
(147) 
p a t t e r n s " . The f i r s t of these two types ( t h e simple r e f l e x 
theory) i s to be found m i t s p u r e s t form i n J , Loeb's Forced 
Movements, Tropism and Animal Conduct ( 1 9 1 8 ) , T h e main 
examples of (B) can be t r a c e d throughout J.B. Watson's works. ^ " ^ ^ 
Thorndike i s grouped w i t h the (A) type. ^ ^ " ^ 
* The term " r e f l e x o l o g " appeared f o r the f i r s t time i n 1912. See 
Psychologies of 1930, ed. by C a r l Murchison, o p . c i t , p,224, an 
a r t i c l e by Alexander Schneider, 
(147) "The Nature of I n s t i n c t " , o p . c i t , pp. 200-201. 
(148) p. 209 
(149) e s p e c i a l l y h i s : Behaviour; An I n t r o d u c t i o n to 
Comparative Psychology ( 1 9 1 4 ) . 
(150) "The Nature of I n s t i n c t " o p . c i t , p. 201, see a l s o : 
Thorndike's E d u c a t i o n a l Psychology, v o l I , o p . c i t , 
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Tolman seems to have mis judged, ^ ' '^ to some 
exte n t , McDougall's p o s i t i o n . He thought t h a t McDougall's 
c l a s s i c a l d o c t r i n e contained i n , An I n t r o d u c t i o n to S o c i a l 
Psychology (1 9 0 8 ) , r e p r e s e n t s an admixture of a l l types of 
theory. He m i s t a k e n l y thought t h a t i t combines a m e n t a l i s t i c 
v a r i e t y of the t e l e o l o g i c a l theory w i t h c e r t a i n i n d i c a t i o n s 
of a r e f l e x theory. I n point of f a c t , McDougall t o t a l l y r e j e c t e d 
"The mechanical r e f l e x theory" which, i n o r i g i n , descends 
from D e s c a r t e s * s philosophy. He d i d not accept the argument t h a t 
behaviour i s to be i n t e r p r e t e d as merely the i s s u e of the p l a y of 
the nervous c u r r e n t s , s t a r t e d i n the sense-organs by s t i m u l a t i o n s 
from the p h y s i c a l world. McDougall made i t c l e a r ^ 1 ^ 3 ^ t h a t the 
r e f l e x a c t i o n may be i n h i b i t e d by the i n t e r f e r e n c e of s t i m u l i 
other than the one t h a t i n i t i a t e s the a c t i o n . The i n s t i n c t i v e 
a c t i o n must not be regarded s o l e l y as simple or compound r e f l e x 
a c t i o n . I t profoundly d i f f e r s from p u r e l y r e f l e x a c t i v i t y i n 
being a p e r s i s t e n t s t r i v i n g towards an end. I n McDougall's own 
words, the d i f f e r e n c e i s t h i s , " I n simple s i t u a t i o n s i n which the 
organism (man or animal) e a s i l y and immediately a t t a i n s i t s 
(151) "The Nature of I n s t i n c t " o p . c i t , p 201. 
(152) An o u t l i n e of Psychology ( 1 9 2 3 ) , London, Methuen, pp 2 1 f f . 
(153) An I n t r o d u c t i o n to S o c i a l Psychology, London, Methuen, 
25th ed. ( 1 9 4 3 ) , pp. 413, see a l s o p.25. 
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n a t u r a l g o a l , i n s t i n c t i v e a c t i o n o f t e n proceeds i n a r o u t i n e 
f a s h i o n , r e p e a t i n g i t s e l f without obvious v a r i a t i o n on 
r e p e t i t i o n of the e x c i t i n g impression or s i t u a t i o n . I t i s when 
the i n s t i n c t i v e a c t i o n cannot a t t a i n i t s goal i n the s i m p l e s t 
most d i r e c t f a s h i o n t h a t i t s p e c u l i a r nature and i t s profound 
d i f f e r e n c e from mechanical r e f l e x a c t i o n c l e a r l y appear". 
McDougall's theory i s t e l e o l o g i c a l i n d e f i n i n g i n s t i n c t s i n terms 
of emotions many of which have d i r e c t i o n a l and co n a t i v e 
i m p l i c a t i o n s . I n h i s treatment an emotion becomes almost the 
(155) 
i n s i d e of an i n s t i n c t . As "a t r u e v i t a l i s t " , as K. Lorenz 
has d e s c r i b e d him, McDougall repudi a t e d every c a u s a l p h y s i o l o g i c a l 
e x p l a n a t i o n of animal behaviour. The notion i m p l i e d i n An 
I n t r o d u c t i o n to S o c i a l Psychology (1908) and An O u t l i n e of 
Psychology ( 1 9 2 3 ) , i s t h a t purposive ( l a t e r c a l l e d hormic) 
c a u s a t i o n i s the r e a l reason of motivating an animal to a c t i n a 
given way. The only exception he made m An O u t l i n e of Psychology, 
however, i s t h a t he explained what Lorenz has c a l l e d "the 
(156) 
m i s f u n c t i o n m g of the l i g h t c ompass—orientation, which causes 
f - i c rj \ 
i n s e c t s to f l y a t nigh t i n t o flames, by "tropism". 
(154) i b i d , p. 413; see a l s o : An O u t l i n e of Psychology, o p . c i t , 
pp.53-54. 
(155) On Aggression, (1967), o p . c i t , p. 42 
(156) i b i d , p. 199 
(157) An o u t l i n e of Psychology, o p . c i t , pp.59-64. 
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However, concerning McDougall*s own 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of i n s t i n c t s , i t may be s a i d t h a t i t i s more c l e a r l y 
s t a t e d . Three d i f f e r e n t but a l l i e d c l a s s e s of i n s t i n c t s are 
(158) 
i n d i c a t e d . These a r e pl a c e d under the f o l l o w i n g c a t e g o r i e s : 
( a ) P r i n c i p a l i n s t i n c t s : under t h i s heading come these i n s t i n c t s ; 
1, The i n s t i n c t of f l i g h t (emotion of f e a r ) ; 
2, The i n s t i n c t of r e p u l s i o n (emotion of d i s g u s t ) ; 
3. The i n s t i n c t of c u r i o s i t y (emotion of wonder); 
4, The i n s t i n c t of pugnacity (emotion of a n g e r ) ; 
5. The i n s t i n c t of s e l f - a s s e r t i o n or s e l f - d i s p l a y (emotion 
of e l a t i o n , or p o s i t i v e s e l f - f e e l i n g ) ; 
6. The i n s t i n c t of self-abasement (emotion s u b j e c t i o n , or 
negative s e l f - f e e l m g ) ; 
7, The p a r e n t a l i n s t i n c t (tender emotion); 
8. The sex i n s t i n c t (no s p e c i f i c emotion i s i n d i c a t e d ) . 
The l a s t i n s t i n c t i n t h i s group i l l u s t r a t e s very c l e a r l y a much 
neglec t e d f a c t on which McDougall i n s i s t e d , namely, t h a t "an 
i n s t i n c t i s not only an i n n a t e d i s p o s i t i o n to a c t and to f e e l i n a 
more or l e s s s p e c i f i c manner, but i s a l s o an i n n a t e d i s p o s i t i o n to 
p e r c e i v e or p e r c e p t u a l l y d i s c r i m i n a t e those t h i n g s towards which 
(158) (1) An I n t r o d u c t i o n to S o c i a l Psychology, o p . c i t , 
pp.43-56, 228-239, 240-254, 331-363; 
( n ) An o u t l i n e of Psychology, o p . c i t , pp. 7 1 f f , 110,118,133, 
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(159) such r e a c t i o n s a r e demanded by the w e l f a r e of the s p e c i e s " . 
(b) I n s t i n c t s of l e s s - w e l l d e f i n e d c h a r a c t e r ; t h i s category 
comprises: 
1. I n s t i n c t of reproduction (no s p e c i f i c emotion i s a ttached 
to t h i s i n s t i n c t , which i s u n u s u a l ) . 
2. The gregarious i n s t i n c t ( a g a i n , no emotion i s g i v e n ) ; 
3. The i n s t i n c t of a c q u i s i t i o n (no emotion i s mentioned); 
4. The i n s t i n c t of c o n s t r u c t i o n ^ * ' ^ ( n o emotion i s mentioned); 
( c ) Minor I n s t i n c t s , t h i s p a r t c o n s i s t s of ; 
1. The i n s t i n c t of sucking (no emotion); 
2. The i n s t i n c t of w a i l i n g (no emotion); 
3. The i n s t i n c t of c r a w l i n g (no emotion); 
4. The i n s t i n c t of walking (no emotion); 
5. The i n s t i n c t of winking (no emotion); 
f 1 a 1 \ 
6. The i n s t i n c t of s h r i n k i n g before a blow (no emotion); 
7. An i n s t i n c t to r e l a x a t i o n , r e s t and s l e e p ; 
8. An i n s t i n c t (tendency) to s c r a t c h an i t c h i n g spot; 
(159) An I n t r o d u c t i o n to S o c i a l Psychology, o p . c i t , p.334 
(160) i b i d , pp.69-75, see a l s o ; pp.255-259, 277-279. 
(161) i b i d , pp. 35, 397-399. 
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9. An i n s t x n c t (tendency) to coughing; 
10. An i n s t i n c t (tendency) to sneezing; 
11. An i n s t i n c t (tendency) to yawning; 
12. An i n s t i n c t (tendency) to u r i n a t i o n ; 
13. An i n s t i n c t (tendency) to d e f e c t i o n ; 
The reason why McDougall c o n s i d e r e d the (13) 
simple i n s t i n c t s above as "minor" and he sometimes d e s c r i b e d 
them as "obscure", was mainly because they do not "conform i n 
a l l ways to the type of i n s t i n c t i v e a c t i o n " . ^ " ^ ^ Yet he 
regarded them as "minor i n s t i n c t s " r a t h e r than r e f l e x e s , because 
of what he c a l l e d t h e i r " i m p u l s i v e " and "compulsive nature". 
They r e f l e c t the e x p r e s s i o n of i n s t i n c t s , although they do not 
seek goa l s e x t e r n a l to the organism. I n naming these i n s t i n c t s , 
McDougall seems to have been f o l l o w i n g Wm. James. The only 
d i f f e r e n c e between them, which i s a b i g one, i s t h a t w h i l e James 
counted them among the mam i n s t i n c t s , McDougall plac e d them m a 
minor p o s i t i o n which i s c l o s e to " s e n s a t i o n - r e f l e x e s " . 
At any r a t e , i n the human being only a few of 
these s i m p l e r i n s t i n c t s mature soon a f t e r b i r t h ; they a r e 
(162) i b i d , p. 398 
(163) i b i d , p. 397; the e x p r e s s i o n above was o r i g i n a l l y quoted 
by McDougall who seems to have found i t a p p r o p r i a t e l y s u i t s 
the "obscure" i n s t i n c t s . 
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d i s p l a y e d i n movements determined purely by the i n n a t e d i s p o s i t i o n s . 
Taken together, i n s t i n c t s i n c a t e g o r i e s ( a ) and (b) could form a 
l i s t of twelve c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e d i n s t i n c t s . These i n s t i n c t s a r e 
w e l l presented i n a diagrammatical manner prepared by F.V. 
Smith^" 1"^^(see Appendix I ) . The l i s t i s l a t e r enlarged by 
McDougall under the heading " p r o p e n s i t i e s ' ^ ^ ^ a s a new proposed 
t i t l e . S p e c i f i c a l l y , eighteen p r o p e n s i t i e s are enumerated. They 
a r e : 
1. To seek food (food-seeking p r o p e n s i t y ) . 
2. To r e j e c t and avoid c e r t a i n noxious substances ( d i s g u s t 
p r o p e n s i t y ) . 
3. To court and mate (sex p r o p e n s i t y ) . 
4. To f l e e to cover i n response to v i o l e n t impressions t h a t 
i n f l i c t or t h r e a t e n p a i n or i n j u r y ( f e a r p r o p e n s i t y ) . 
5. To explore strange p l a c e s and t h i n g s ( c u r i o s i t y p r o p e n s i t y ) . 
6. To feed, p r o t e c t and s h e l t e r the young ( p r o t e c t i v e or p a r e n t a l 
p r o p e n s i t y ) , 
7. To remain m company w i t h f e l l o w s and, i f i s o l a t e d , to seek t h a t 
company (g r e g a r i o u s p r o p e n s i t y ) . 
(164) E x p l a n a t i o n of Human Behaviour, 2nd ed., o p . c i t , 
pp. 182-183. 
(165) The E n e r g i e s of Men ; A Study of the Fundamentals of 
Dynamic Psychology, London, Methuen, (1939) 4t h ed., 
1st p u b l i s h e d (1932), chapter V I I , " i n n a t e P r o p e n s i t i e s 
and A b i l i t i e s of Man", 
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8. To domineer, to l e a d , to a s s e r t o n e s e l f over, or d i s p l a y 
o n e s e l f before, one's f e l l o w s ( s e l f - a s s e r t i v e p r o p e n s i t y ) . 
9. To d e f e r , to obey, to f o l l o w , to submit i n the presence of 
other s who d i s p l a y s u p e r i o r powers (submissive p r o p e n s i t y ) . 
10. To r e s e n t and f o r c i b l y to break down any thwarting or 
r e s i s t a n c e o f f e r e d to the f r e e e x e r c i s e of any other tendency 
(anger p r o p e n s i t y ) . 
11. To c r y aloud f o r a s s i s t a n c e when our e f f o r t s a r e u t t e r l y 
b a f f l e d (appeal p r o p e n s i t y ) . 
12. To c o n s t r u c t s h e l t e r s and implements ( c o n s t r u c t i v e p r o p e n s i t y ) . 
13. To a c q u i r e , p o s s e s s , and defend whatever i s found u s e f u l or 
otherwise a t t r a c t i v e ( a c q u i s i t i v e p r o p e n s i t y ) . 
14. To laugh a t the d e f e c t s and f a i l u r e s of our f e l l o w c r e a t u r e s 
( l a u g h t e r p r o p e n s i t y ) . 
15. To remove, or to remove o n e s e l f from, whatever produces 
discomfort, as by s c r a t c h i n g or by change of p o s i t i o n and 
l o c a t i o n (comfort p r o p e n s i t y ) . 
16. To l i e down, r e s t and s l e e p when t i r e d ( r e s t or s l e e p 
p r o p e n s i t y ) . 
17. To wander to new scenes (migratory p r o p e n s i t y ) . 
18. A group of very simple p r o p e n s i t i e s subserving b o d i l y needs, 
(166) 
such as coughing, sn e e z i n g , b r e a t h i n g , evacuation. 
(166) i b i d , pp. 97-98. 
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I n connection wxth the l i s t of the above 
p r o p e n s i t i e s two p o i n t s are to be i n d i c a t e d : ( 1 ) I t i s to be 
noted t h a t p r o p e n s i t i e s 11,14,15,16 and 17 have been mentioned 
f o r the f i r s t time; they do not appear i n the l i s t given i n 
An I n t r o d u c t i o n to S o c i a l Psychology. ( 2 ) The u n s p e c i f i e d 
p r o p e n s i t i e s , namely, coughing, sneezing e t c , , added to the 
minor i n s t i n c t s given before, may form a long l i s t of such 
i n n a t e d i s p o s i t i o n s t h a t subserve the u n l i m i t e d a c t i v i t i e s of the 
i n d i v i d u a l . 
As a c o r o l l a r y to the l i s t of n a t i v e 
(167) 
p r o p e n s i t i e s , McDougall d e c l a r e d t h a t i t i s not put forward 
as f i n a l and c o r r e c t i n a l l r e s p e c t s . Under No ( 1 3 ) , f o r 
example, i n the l i s t i t may be t h a t two or more p r o p e n s i t i e s are 
subsumed: one to take p o s s e s s i o n , one to s t o r e or hoard; i t may 
be t h a t under item ( 5 ) s e v e r a l d i s t i n c t p r o p e n s i t i e s can be 
brought together. Regarding n o , ( 1 7 ) , McDougall was not q u i t e 
c e r t a i n whether or not i t i s r e a l l y a p r o p e n s i t y i n h e r e n t i n the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n of the organism. However, d e s p i t e a l l the 
u n c e r t a i n t i e s , ''there i s no room f o r doubt t h a t such inborn 
p r o p e n s i t i e s a r e the very foundation of a l l our mental l i f e , t h a t 
they provide the d r i v i n g f o r c e s , the hormic e n e r g i e s , manifested 
(167) i b i d , p. 98 
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.. (168) 
i n a l l our a c t x v i t x e s from the s i m p l e s t to the most complex . 
Prom t h i s c o n c i s e c i t a t i o n i t seems apparent now t h a t although 
i n s t i n c t i s r e p l a c e d by p r o p e n s i t y , t h i s replacement does not 
a c t u a l l y a f f e c t McDougall's a t t i t u d e . The common f a c t o r i s s t i l l 
maintained, namely, the innateness of p r o p e n s i t i e s and the f a c t 
t h a t i t i s , l i k e i n s t i n c t , a prime mover of our mental l i f e . The 
burning q u e s t i o n now i s why, then, has p r o p e n s i t y been 
s u b s t i t u t e d f o r i n s t i n c t ? The answer to t h i s q u e s t i o n w i l l be 
d e a l t w i t h m a f o l l o w i n g chapter. 
McDougall pointed out some ge n e r a l or "non-
s p e c i f i c " i n n a t e tendencies which he c a l l e d " p s e u d o - ' i n s t i n c t s " . 
C h i e f among these a r e "sympathy", "sugge s t i o n " and " i m i t a t i o n " . ^ " ^ ^ 
These t h r e e a r e c l o s e l y a l l i e d as regards t h e i r e f f o r t s , " f o r i n 
each case the proc e s s i n which the tendency m a n i f e s t s i t s e l f 
i n v o l v e s an i n t e r a c t i o n between a t l e a s t two i n d i v i d u a l s , one of 
whom i s the agent, w h i l e the other i s the person a c t e d upon"^"1"^0^ 
and i n each case the r e s u l t of the process i s some degree of 
a s s i m i l a t i o n of the a c t i o n s and "mental s t a t e of the p a t i e n t to 
those of the a g e n t " . M c D o u g a l l regarded sympathy, suggestion 
(168) E n e r g i e s of Men, p. 99 
(169) I n t r o d u c t i o n to S o c i a l Psychology, o p . c i t , p. 77 
(170) i b i d , p. 77 
(171) i b i d , p. 77 
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and m u t a t i o n as t h r e e forms of mental i n t e r a c t i o n of 
fundamental importance f o r a l l s o c i a l l i f e , both of men and 
(172) 
animals. As c h i e f a s p e c t s of s o c i a l l i f e they w i l l be 
d e a l t w i t h more f u l l y i n another chapter. An a l l u s i o n has been 
made to them here as " p s e u d o - i n s t i n c t s " c l a s s e d w i t h r e a l ones. 
At the moment i t must be added t h a t McDougall's l i s t of i n s t i n c t s 
i s s h o r t and c l e a r compared w i t h , say, James's, Thorndike's, 
or Woodworth's l i s t s . One i s not disposed, t h e r e f o r e , to accept 
MacCurdy's c r i t i c i s m of McDougall's i n s t i n c t s as "long and 
(173) 
d i f f u s e catalogues of i n s t i n c t s ... unfocussed f o r m a l i t i e s " . 
I t i s worthwhile comparing McDougall's i n s t i n c t s 
(174) 
w i t h Drever's c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . I n h i s : I n s t i n c t i n Man (1917), 
Drever d i s t i n g u i s h e d two groups of i n s t i n c t i v e t e n d e n c i e s i n man : 
(1) the group c h a r a c t e r i s e d by s p e c i f i c responses to c e r t a i n 
s i t u a t i o n s . Of t h i s group he names " s u c k i n g " and " b i t i n g " an 
o b j e c t p l a c e d i n the mouth. (2 ) The other group c o n s i s t i n g of 
tendencies s p e c i f i c i n v a r i o u s degrees, accompanying emotions, 
when these a r e aroused. No example of t h i s second group has been 
gi v e n . ( 3 ) A t h i r d group, which he d i d not c l a s s so, of i n n a t e 
tendencies l i k e p l a y and i m i t a t i o n ; these a r e n o n - s p e c i f i c , nor 
(172) i b i d , pp.77-78. 
(173) MacCurdy, Problems of Dynamic Psychology, Cambridge Univ. 
P r e s s , ( 1 9 2 3 ) , C h . X V I I I . 
(174) Cambridge Univ. P r e s s , 2nd ed. (1 9 2 1 ) , pp. 166-167. 
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a r e they l i n k e d w i t h s i t u a t i o n or response. I n regarding p l a y and 
i m i t a t i o n as n o n - s p e c i f i c t e n d e n c i e s , Drever, one may say, i s 
f o l l o w i n g McDougall who t r e a t e d them so. Drever*s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n 
of i n s t i n c t i s s c h e m a t i c a l l y t h i s : 
I n n a te Tendencies 
"Appetite"Tendencies 
General 
seeking of 
p l e a s u r e 
avoidance 
of p a i n 
S p e c i f i c 
Hunger 
T h i r s t 
Sleep 
Sex 
Nausea 
" i n s t i n c t " Tendencies 
S p e c i f i c 
1 
General 
p l a y 
experimentation 
i m i t a t i o n 
sympathy 
s u g g e s t i b i l i t y 
"Pure" "Emotional" 
Probably numerous though d i f f i c u l t 
to d i s t i n g u i s h from r e f l e x e s and 
may perhaps be c l a s s i f i e d as : 
Re a c t i o n s of Adjustment and A t t e n t i o n 
" " Prehension 
" " Locomotion 
" " V o c a l i s a t i o n 
F e a r 
Anger 
Hunting 
A c q u i s i t i v e 
C u r i o s i t y 
Gregarious 
C o u r t s h i p 
S e l f - d i s p l a y 
S e l f - a b a s ement 
P a r e n t a l 
(175) I n s t i n c t m Man, p. 169 
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The c l a s s i f i c a t i o n shown above i s on the same 
general l i n e as t h a t of McDougall. Drever h i m s e l f admitted t h i s . 
The c h i e f d i f f e r e n c e i n Drever*s own words i s : " ( a ) the 
c l a s s i f y i n g of both sex impulse and p r i m i t i v e d i s g u s t w i t h the 
" A p p e t i t e " t e n d e n c i e s , r a t h e r than w i t h the " i n s t i n c t " t e n d e n c i e s ; 
(b) the a d d i t i o n of experimentation to the g e n e r a l ' i n s t i n c t * 
t e n d e n c i e s " , which he regards as e q u i v a l e n t to the t r a n s f e r r i n g 
of " c o n s t r u c t i v e n e s s " from the s p e c i f i c to the g e n e r a l " , s i n c e 
t h a t i s one way i n which t h i s g e n e r a l tendency m a n i f e s t s i t s e l f ; 
( c ) the d e f i n i t e adding of the gregarious i n s t i n c t , and the 
c o u r t s h i p tendency, the hunting i n s t i n c t , and the a c q u i s i t i v e 
tendency to the s p e c i f i c ' i n s t i n c t * t e n d e n c i e s , and t h e r e f o r e to 
the group of t e n d e n c i e s , ... which ... develops i n t o a s p e c i f i c 
„(176) primary emotion. 
Another p s y c h o l o g i c a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n which Drever 
attempted i s contained i n : An I n t r o d u c t i o n to the Psychology of 
(177) 
Education ( 1 9 3 1 ) . A minor a d d i t i o n has been made, t h a t i s 
" E x e r c i s e " i s now i n c l u d e d i n the a p p e t i t i v e s p e c i f i c t e n d e n c i e s . 
" F l i g h t " , "Pugnacity" and "Repulsion" are added to the s p e c i f i c 
emotional t e n d e n c i e s . A point i s to be i n d i c a t e d now, "©rg-. t h a t 
(176) I n s t i n c t i n Man, o p . c i t , pp. 168-9. 
(177) London, Edward Arnold, p.57 
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Drever has now used, the word " R e a c t i v e " as a sub-heading i n s t e a d 
of " I n s t i n c t t e n d e n c i e s " as used i n the schematic diagram i n 
I n s t i n c t m Man. Whether or not the term " r e a c t i v e " and i t s noun 
" r e a c t i o n " can be s u b s t i t u t e d f o r i n s t i n c t and i n s t i n c t i v e n e s s , 
i s h i g h l y q u e s t i o n a b l e . T h i s i s s o , because an i n s t i n c t , m i t s 
proper sense, i s not s o l e l y a r e a c t i o n ; i t i s an urge, a mover, a 
d i r e c t i n g power. I n a word i t i s a cause l e a d i n g to an end, 
w h i l e r e a c t i o n i s both , l i m i t e d i n scope and more a b s t r a c t i n 
n a t ure. 
Before any comment xs to be made on D r e v e r J s 
p s y c h o l o g i c a l schematic c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , i t i s important to note 
h i s b i o l o g i c a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . Three groups of b i o l o g i c a l 
(178) 
ends are being, Drever t h i n k s , subserved by i n s t i n c t i v e 
t e n d e n c i e s , they a re : 
1. Tendencies whose end i s the p r e s e r v a t i o n of the l i f e of the 
i n d i v i d u a l . 
2. Tendencies whose end i s the p r e s e r v a t i o n of the s p e c i e s , 
3. Tendencies whose end i s the maintenance of the s o c i a l groups, 
to which the i n d i v i d u a l belongs. For s h o r t these t h r e e groups 
Drever designated "ego", "sex" and "herd" i n s t i n c t s . 
(178) B.J. Psych., v o l . XIV, p a r t 3, (1924) o p . c i t , 
pp. 249-250. 
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(179) 
The bxologxcal c l a s s i f i c a t i o n would run 
somewhat as f o l l o w s : 
S e l f 
Simple Adaptive 
r e a c t i o n s 
F ear 
Anger 
A c q u i s i t i o n (see 
Herd). 
Hunger 
Nausea 
P l a y ? 
Sex Herd 
Sexual A p p e t i t e Gregarious I n s t i n c t 
C o u r t s h i p 
P a r e n t a l I n s t i n c t 
Sympathy 
I m i t a t i o n 
S u g g e s t i b i l i t y ? 
P l a y ( s e e s e l f ) A c q u i s i t i o n ( s e e s e l f ) 
S e l f - D i s p l a y 
Comparing the p s y c h o l o g i c a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n w i t h the 
b i o l o g i c a l one above, one can see t h a t human i n s t i n c t s c l a s s i f i e d 
on a p s y c h o l o g i c a l b a s i s i s s i m p l e r and more s a t i s f a c t o r y . ( 1 ) Two 
groups can be d i n s t i n g u i s h e d which appear to d i f f e r fundamentally / 
from one another p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y : ( a ) the " a p p e t i t i v e " t e n d e n c i e s ; 
the a v e r s i v e i s i n c l u d e d as w e l l . (b) The i n s t i n c t i v e , or what 
Drever p r e f e r s to c a l l " r e a c t i v e " as opposed to a p p e t i t i v e . 
( 2 ) Among both a p p e t i t i v e and r e a c t i v e tendencies a d i s t i n c t i o n 
could be made between tendencies which a r e r e l a t i v e l y s p e c i f i c and 
tendencies which a r e r e l a t i v e l y not so. (3) A d i s c r i m i n a t i o n 
(179) An I n t r o d u c t i o n to the psychology of Education, e p y c i t , 
p. 49 
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could be e a s i l y observed between what he c a l l s " s i m p l e " tendencies 
such as "play", "prehension" and the l i k e , and "emotional" r e a c t i v e 
t e n d e n c i e s , such as " f l i g h t " , "pugnacity" and so f o r t h . S t i l l 
f u r t h e r , "suggestion", "sympathy", and " i m i t a t i o n " , which 
McDougall c a l l s " p s e u d o - i n s t i n c t s " , Drever has c a l l e d " g e n e r a l " 
i n s t i n c t s . Under t h i s l a s t category, Drever a l s o i n c l u d e d 
" p l a y " and "experimentation". The g e n e r a l i m p r e s s i o n t h a t can 
be deduced from such a nomination i s t h a t t h e r e a r e i n s t i n c t s 
of wider connotation. Such a n o t i o n may not prove t e n a b l e 
as i t r e s t s mainly upon p e r s o n a l judgement r a t h e r than on 
enough evidence adduced m i t s support. B e s i d e s , no p a r t i c u ] a r 
emotions have been named as accompanying the " g e n e r a l " i n s t i n c t s . 
Under the heading " s p e c i f i c i n s t i n c t s " i n the d i a g r a m , t w o 
c a t e g o r i e s are g i v e n ; "pure" and "emotional". Under pure, Drever 
p l a c e d "prehension", "locomotion" and " v o c a l i s a t i o n " . I t may be 
s a i d t h a t i t i s h i g h l y debatable i f t h e r e a r e any i n s t i n c t s of 
such names. I t could be s a i d , however, t h a t "locomotion" may 
correspond to McDougall's minor i n s t i n c t s of c r a w l i n g and walking; 
and " v o c a l i s a t i o n " may be i d e n t i f i e d w i t h McDougall's simple 
i n s t i n c t of w a i l i n g ; y e t the q u e s t i o n remains where "prehension" 
i s to be p l a c e d . The usage of the a d j e c t i v e "emotional" may mean 
t h a t i n s t i n c t s a r e known by t h e i r accompanying emotions, i n s t e a d 
(180) I n s t i n c t m Man, o p . c i t . p.169. 
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of the other way round whxch xs both l o g x c a l and more orthodox. 
To accept Drever's s t a n d p o i n t , xt would r e q u i r e one to say, f o r 
example, "the emotxonal xnstxnct of f e a r " or "the emotxonal 
xnstxnct of anger" whxch can mean nothing a t a l l . To descrxbe an 
xnstxnct by x t s emotxon i s quxte unfamxlxar. Drever's usage, 
however, shows t h a t he s t r e s s e d the emotion r a t h e r than the i n s t i n c t s 
which c o n t a i n s i t . Probably t h i s i s one of the e s s e n t i a l 
d i f f e r e n c e s between h i s view and t h a t of McDougall. 
As to the b i o l o g i c a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , Drever 
h i m s e l f was i n some doubt of c l a s s i n g some i n s t i n c t s i n c e r t a i n 
p l a c e s . " P l a y " , f o r i n s t a n c e , f o r no obvious reason, he c l a s s e d 
w i t h simple adaptive r e a c t i o n and w i t h s e x u a l a p p e t i t e . 
Concerning t h i s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , however, i t can h a r d l y be s a i d 
on what b a s i s i t has been done. Anyway, i n s t i n c t s could be 
d i v i d e d , on Drever's view, on p s y c h o l o g i c a l bases i n t o : (1) 
general and s p e c i f i c , ( 2 ) under each head i n t o a p p e t i t i v e and 
. , (181) r e a c t i v e , and (3) under the l a s t head i n t o simple and emotional. 
The b i o l o g i c a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i s more con f u s i n g , and l e s s c l e a r i n 
c h a r a c t e r ^ 
(181) ( i ) B.J.Psych, v o l . XIV, (1924), o p . c i t , p. 250. 
(xx) An Introductxon to the Psychology of Education, o p . c i t , 
pp. 50-51. 
( m ) ( a ) see a l s o ; Drever, J . ( w i t h Mary C o l l i n s ) , Psychology 
and P r a c t i c a l L i f e , London, ( 1 9 3 6 ) . 
(b) , Experimental Psychology, London, Methuen 
6th ed, (1941). 
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A word must be s a i d i n connection w i t h the term 
" a p p e t i t e " and i t s a d j e c t i v e " a p p e t i t i v e " . The word " a p p e t i t e " 
McDougall used as synonymous w i t h purpose. He accepted the 
a p p e t i t i v e p o i n t of view so long as i t i m p l i e s no d i f f i c u l t y i n 
e x p l a i n i n g behaviour. So the p s y c h o l o g i s t could "study 
a p p e t i t i v e p r o c e s s e s " , i n order "to a s c e r t a i n the most general 
l a w s " of b e h a v i o u r a l p r o c e s s e s . I n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r case t h e r e 
would be no d i f f e r e n c e between the p s y c h o l o g i s t and the p h y s i c i s t 
who s t u d i e s and e x p l a i n s h i s f a c t s i n terms of the conception of 
mechanical p r o c e s s . He seems to have used a p p e t i t e i n the same 
sense of " c u r i o s i t y " or "wonder", only invoked i n t o a c t i o n by 
c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s . H i s c h i e f aim appears t o have been to 
formulate general laws based on a p p e t i t i o n , a c c o r d i n g to which 
could be e x p l a i n e d "the a c t s of human beings, a l l our v o l i t i o n s , 
• i (182) 
our e f f o r t s , our r e s o l u t i o n s , c h o i c e s and d e c i s i o n s . 
Drever, on the other hand, used " a p p e t i t e " more or l e s s m a 
/ T O O \ 
s t r i c t p h y s i o l o g i c a l s e n s e . L i k e David K a t z , he employed i t 
i n the sense of "need". To be employed i n t h i s manner, i t may not 
(182) ( i ) An I n t r o d u c t i o n to S o c i a l Psychology, o p . c i t , pp.311, 
312-313. 
( l i ) An o u t l i n e of Psychology, o p . c i t . pp.100-103. 
(183) ( l ) Animals and Men, London, Longmans, ( 1 9 3 7 ) . 
( n ) " P s y c h o l o g i c a l Needs" i n : Human A f f a i r s , ed by 
R . B . C a t t e l l , London, MacMillan, (1 9 3 7 ) , pp.36ff. 
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i n v o l v e the i m p l i c a t i o n of a c o n a t i v e a s p e c t , which McDougall 
emphasised m h i s treatment of a p p e t i t e . To maintain w i t h 
Drever t h a t a p p e t i t e i s a need l i k e hunger and t h i r s t , 
determined by the organ i c c o n s t i t u t i o n of the i n d i v i d u a l , may 
e n t a i l the n o t i o n t h a t a g g r e s s i o n i s a need, too. Such an 
argument can h a r d l y be adopted a t a l l . Drever's c o n t e n t i o n , 
however, i s d e s c n b e d ^ 1 * * ^ as "a more gloomy view". So i n order 
t h a t a conf u s i o n r e g a r d i n g the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of i n s t i n c t s and 
a p p e t i t e could be avoided, one may t e n t a t i v e l y suggest two 
broad headings under which i n s t i n c t s would be c a t e g o r i s e d : 
" s p e c i a l i s e d " and " s e m i - s p e c i a l i s e d " . Under the one come i n s t i n c t s 
w i t h s p e c i f i c p e c u l i a r i t y such as p a r e n t a l i n s t i n c t , s e l f -
d i s p l a y i n s t i n c t , i n s t i n c t of c u r i o s i t y , the grega r i o u s i n s t i n c t , 
and so f o r t h . Under the other category c o u l d be p l a c e d i n s t i n c t s 
which a r e u n s p e c i f i c a l l y c h a r a c t e r i s e d , v i z , McDougall's 
"pseudo" and "minor" i n s t i n c t s , as w e l l as Drever's " a p p e t i t e " 
and the b i o l o g i c a l l y g e n e r a l ones. By doing so, a v a r i a b l e and 
mi s l e a d i n g c a t e g o r i s a t i o n could be avoided. 
I n summary, the concept of i n s t i n c t seems to have 
o r i g i n a t e d i n connection w i t h c e r t a i n e f f o r t s to d e l i n e a t e 
c l e a r - c u t d i f f e r e n c e s between man and ani m a l s . Human conduct was 
(184) F l u g e l , J.C., Man, Morals and S o c i e t y , London, Duckworth, 
(194 5 ) , p.249. 
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a t t r i b u t e d to reason e s s e n t i a l l y , whereas animal behaviour was 
thought to be depending mainly on i n s t i n c t s . At any r a t e , the 
concept came i n t o the focus of s c i e n t i f i c t h i n k i n g as a r e s u l t 
of Darwin's i n v e s t i g a t i o n s . T h i s does not mean, however, t h a t 
the dichotomy between the behaviour of man and th a t of animals 
was e n t i r e l y e l i m i n a t e d . Y e t , i n s p i t e of some o b j e c t i o n s r a i s e d , 
a need f o r e x p l a i n i n g behaviour (of man and animals) i n terms of 
i n s t i n c t s became popular. The i n c r e a s i n g p o p u l a r i t y of i n s t i n c t 
r e s u l t e d i n attempts at i t s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . T h i s i n e v i t a b l y l e d 
to a s i t u a t i o n where v a r i o u s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s have been attempted; 
none of which could be regarded as s a t i s f a c t o r y as each of them 
viewed the p o s i t i o n d i f f e r e n t l y . The idea must have been 
" s c i e n t i f i c t r a v e l i s not a home-coming", as W. Grey Walter has 
suggested r e c e n t l y ( 1 9 6 5 ) . ^ ^ ^ I t so o f t e n occurs t h a t 
s c i e n t i s t s r e a c h an agreement only to diverge; and a t o p i c l i k e 
i n s t i n c t has many more d i v e r g i n g p o i n t s than converging ones. 
However, the e s s e n t i a l t h i n g i s t h a t the o r i g i n a l meaning of the 
word and i t s concept a r e no longer i n doubt any more; and a 
remedy could be found i n McDougall's advocacy of i n s t i n c t . By 
both d e f i n i t i o n and c l a s s i f i c a t i o n he r e d r e s s e d the l o n g -
st a n d i n g c o n f u s i o n connected w i t h i t . 
(185) The L i v i n g B r a i n , P e l i c a n ed., p. 139 
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CHAPTER V I . 
INSTINCT IN SUBSEQUENT PSYCHOLOGICAL 
DISCUSSIONS. 
1. The Concept of I n s t i n c t m E t h o l o g i c a l O b s e r v a t i o n s . 
The e t h o l o g i c a l and n e u r o l o g i c a l f i e l d i s too v a s t 
to cover w i t h i n the scope of t h i s study/ b e s i d e s , i t would be 
out of p l a c e to concentrate upon i t s innumerable d e t a i l s . Y e t 
a b r i e f account of some of i t s h i s t o r i c a l and o b s e r v a t i o n a l 
i s s u e s i s i n e v i t a b l e , so long as such r e s u l t s may c a s t some 
l i g h t on the i n n a t e bases of animal behaviour. 
The word "ethology" i s i n no way an i n n o v a t i o n . 
(2) 
Some w r i t e r s , however, such as R. F l e t c h e r (1957), 
(3 ) 
V.G. D e t h i e r and E l i o t S t e l l a r (1965), b e s i d e s o t h e r s , tend 
(4 ) 
to a s s o c i a t e i t w i t h K. Lorenz and N. Tmbergen. E.H. Hess 
( 1 ) Thorpe, W.H., "Ethology as a new Branch of Bi o l o g y " , Reading 
m Animal Behaviour, ed. by M c G i l l , Thomas E., New York, Holt 
(1965), pp.34-35. 
(2) I n s t i n c t i n Man ; I n the L i g h t of Recent Work i n Comparative 
Psychology, London, George A l l e n and Unwm. 
(3) Animal Behaviour ; I t s E v o l u t i o n a r y and N e u r o l o g i c a l B a s i s , 
2nd ed, P r e n t i c e H a l l , Foundations of Modern Biology S e r i e s . 
( 4 ) "Ethology : An Approach toward the Complete A n a l y s i s of 
Behaviour", New D i r e c t i o n s m Psychology, New York, Holt, 
pp.162-163; the same paper i s p u b l i s h e d i n a condensed form I: 
Readings i n Animal Behaviour, ed. by M c G i l l , Thomas E., New 
York, Holt, (1965). 
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(1963), on the other hand, t r a c e s i t s h i s t o r y back to the 
e a r l y e ighteenth century (1702, 1716, 1740) when o b s e r v a t i o n s 
of c e r t a i n s p e c i e s of b i r d s were then made by some z o o l o g i s t s , 
and d i n s t i n c t i o n s between i n n a t e and a c q u i r e d a c t i v i t i e s were X 
(5) 
i n d i c a t e d . Yet F.V. Smith (1960a, 1968a), who seems to be 
more thorough, goes even f a r t h e r than Hess d i d , and r e l a t e s 
i t s o r i g i n to A r i s t o t l e . Along w i t h A r i s t o t l e , Smith has 
l i s t e d J.H. Fabre, H.S. Jennings, E.G. and G.W. Peckham, 
G.J. Romanes, R.M. Ye r k e s , R.W.G, Hmgston, E.L. Thorndike, 
and other names. " i t would be q u i t e u n f a i r " , w r i t e s Smith, 
"to suggest t h a t experimental study of animal behaviour began 
w i t h the p u b l i c a t i o n s of Lorenz and Tinbergen and o t h e r s of 
t h i s s c h o o l " . T h i s statement preceded the many names 
enumerated, and some of which have j u s t been mentioned. The 
quotation c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e s t h a t Smith i s r a t h e r emphatic i n 
h i s p o s i t i o n , namely, ethology as a d i s c i p l i n e and the b a s i c 
i d e a s u n d e r l y i n g i t s background, a r e e a r l i e r than some w r i t e r s 
tend to t h i n k . 
Ethology, however, r e f l e c t s a c e r t a i n way of X 
study concerning animal behaviour. Along w i t h the n a t u r a l i s t i c 
( 5 ) ( I ) E x p l a n a t i o n of Human Behaviour, o p . c i t . , p.158. 
( n ) I m p r i n t i n g , MSS. 
(6) E x p l a n a t i o n of Human Behaviour, o p . c i t . , p.158. 
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(7) method and the p s y c h o l o g i c a l techniques, i t r e p r e s e n t s a 
t h i r d s c i e n t i f i c approach which aims to i n t e r p r e t the animal 
performances. There seems to be a g e n e r a l agreement among 
w r i t e r s such as E.H. Hess (1963, 1965), W.H. Thorpe (1965), 
F.V. Smith (1960a, 1968a) and o t h e r s , t h a t i t i s C h a r l e s 
Darwin who i s to be c r e d i t e d as "an e a r l y f o r e r u n n e r " of the 
e t h o l o g i c a l study. I n The E x p r e s s i o n of Emotiong'in Man and 
Animals (1872), Darwin i n d i c a t e d numerous complicated and 
c o n s i s t e n t p a t t e r n s of behaviour, which he a s c r i b e d to i n n a t e 
f a c t o r s . I t i s p o s s i b l e i n Darwin's w r i t i n g s to d i s c e r n the 
beginnings of the modern e t h o l o g i c a l approach which p l a c e s 
g r e a t s t r e s s on the p a t t e r n of behaviour. "There a r e behaviour 
(8 ) 
p a t t e r n s " , wrote Lorenz (1955), "whose g e o l o g i c a l age i s 
o b v i ously as g r e a t as t h a t of the most c o n s e r v a t i v e b o d i l y 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s " and again, "the comparative method to which we 
owe a l l or most of our knowledge concerning the e v o l u t i o n a r y 
h i s t o r y of l i v i n g c r e a t u r e s i s j u s t as a p p l i c a b l e to those 
behaviour p a t t e r n s as to any organs". Darwin was i n f a c t 
(7) Thorpe, W.H., "Ethology as a new Branch of Biology", Readings 
i n Animal Behaviour, o p . c i t . , p.35; see a l s o : 
Hinde, R.A., "Some Recent Trends i n Ethology", Psychology: 
A Study of S c i e n c e , v o l . 2 , (1959), ed. by : Koch, S., New 
York, McGraw-Hill, pp.561-610. 
(8) Lorenz, K.Z., "Morphology and Behaviour P a t t e r n s i n C l o sely 
A l l i e d A p e c i e s " , i n S c h a f f n e r , 3. ( e d ) , T r a n s a c t i o n s of the 
f i r s t conference on Group P r o c e s s e s , New York, J o s i a h Macy, 
J r . Foundation, pp.168-220. 
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i n v e s t i g a t i n g the a p p l i c a t i o n of h i s e v o l u t i o n a r y p r i n c i p l e s 
to a c t u a l behaviour i n animals. 
Darwin's s p e c i f i c o b s e r v a t i o n s i n s p i r e d many other 
i n v e s t i g a t o r s , ^ notably, C O . Whitman (1898), D. S p a l d i n g ^ 1 0 ^ 
(12) 
(1873), C. L l o y d Morgan v (1894), and P.A. Chadbourne (1872) 
could be i n c l u d e d . The l a t t e r , f o r example, wondered what 
s e t s c e r t a i n c r e a t u r e s to perform v a r i o u s a c t i v i t i e s . "Has 
(13) 
the b i r d a gland f o r the s e c r e t i o n of o i l asked he; h i s 
answer was, "She knows i n s t i n c t i v e l y how to p r e s s the o i l from 
the gland, and apply i t to the f e a t h e r . Has the r a t t l e s n a k e 
the grooved tooth and gland of poison *? He knows without 
i n s t r u c t i o n how to make both s t r u c t u r e and f u n c t i o n most 
(9) ( l ) Hess, E.H., "Ethology: An Approach toward the complete 
A n a l y s i s of Behaviour", Readings i n Animal Behaviour, 
(1965), pp.16-17. 
( n ) Smith, F.V., E x p l a n a t i o n of Human Behaviour, o p . c i t . , 
pp. 1 5 8 f f . 
(10) Ci) " I n s t i n c t w i t h o r i g i n a l o b s e r v a t i o n s on Young Animals", 
MacMillan Magazine, vol . 2 7 , (1873), pp.282-293, 
r e p u b l i s h e d i n B.J.Animal Beh., v o l . 2 , ( 1 9 5 4 ) , pp.2-11. 
( n ) " F l i g h t of B i r d s not Acquired", Nature, v o l . V I I I , (1873), 
p.289. 
(11) An I n t r o d u c t i o n to Comparative Psychology, London, Walter 
S c o t t . 
(12) L o w e l l L e c t u r e s on I n s t i n c t s i n Animals and Men, New York. 
(13) o p . c i t . , p.28. 
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e f f e c t i v e a g a i n s t h i s enemies. Has the silk-worm the f u n c t i o n 
of s e c r e t i n g the f l u i d s i l k f At the proper time, she winds 
the cocoon such as she has never seen, as thousands before 
have done; and thus without i n s t r u c t i o n , p a t t e r n , or 
experience, forms a s a f e abode f o r h e r s e l f i n the p e r i o d of 
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n . Has the hawk t a l o n s ? She knows by i n s t i n c t 
how to w i e l d them e f f e c t i v e l y a g a i n s t the h e l p l e s s quarry". 
These e a r l y and i n t e r e s t i n g o b s e r v a t i o n s can r e f l e c t : ( 1 ) 
the d i r e c t or i n d i r e c t i n f l u e n c e of Darwin's notion r e g a r d i n g 
the m o d i f l a b i l i t y of i n s t i n c t to d i f f e r e n t c o n d i t i o n s ; (2) 
l i k e many other w r i t e r s of the time, Chadborne expressed deep 
i n t e r e s t i n nature by observing and r e c o r d i n g the a c t i v i t i e s 
performed by v a r i o u s c r e a t u r e s ; (3) apparently, m Darwin's 
(14) 
and i n Chadborne's i m p r e s s i v e o b s e r v a t i o n s , W i l l i a m James 
(1890) found a c l u e to a v a r i e g a t e d number of i n s t i n c t s both 
i n animals and i n man who was h e l d to r e v e a l a l a r g e a r r a y of 
them. 
Spalding's e a r l y r e c o r d s of chickens and unlearned 
f l i g h t s of b i r d s c l e a r l y show th a t e t h o l o g i c a l s t u d i e s a r e no 
(15) 
new a c t i v i t i e s as Smith (1960a, 1968a) has e x p l a i n e d . 
(14) P r i n c i p l e s of Psychology, 2 v o l s , New York, H o l t . 
(15) ( a ) E x p l a n a t i o n of Human Behaviour, o p . c i t . , p.158. 
(b) I m p r i n t i n g , MSS, o p . c i t . , pp.4-5. 
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Spalding's hooded chickens a t b i r t h could f o l l o w , when 
uncovered a f t e r t h r e e days, the i n s e c t s w i t h i n a very l i m i t e d 
time (about 15 m i n u t e s ) , and were a b l e to a d j u s t themselves 
(16 ) 
when placed upon an uneven plane. L l o y d Morgan's 
experiments w i t h dogs, and how they t r y to open the gate of 
a c o n f i n i n g p l a c e , l e d him to conclude t h a t animals a r e 
capable of forming c e r t a i n a s s o c i a t i o n s . The s i g n i f i c a n c e of 
the experiment r e v e a l s an i n t e r e s t i n e t h o l o g i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n s . 
Among other e a r l y w r i t e r s who, l i k e Darwin, a s c r i b e d i n n a t e 
powers to animal behaviour, was C O . Whitman. He i s r e f e r r e d to 
(17} (18} by Smith ' (1960a, 1968a) and quoted by E.H. Hess (1965) as 
s a y i n g , " I n s t i n c t s and organs a r e to be s t u d i e d from the common 
viewpoint of p h y l e t i c descent". Whitman was of the opinion 
t h a t "as the ge n e s i s of organs takes i t s departure from the 
elementary s t r u c t u r e of protoplasm, so does the ge n e s i s of 
i n s t i n c t proceed from the fundamental p r o p e r t i e s of protoplasm". 
(16) See a l s o : Smith, F.V., o p . c i t . , p.152. 
X/17) ( i ) E x p l a n a t i o n of Human Behaviour, o p . c i t . , pp.158, 159. 
( n ) I m p r i n t i n g , MS. 
(18) I n : Readings i n Animal Behaviour, o p . c i t . , p.15. 
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To hxm both "prxmodxal organs and xn s t x n c t s a r e a l i k e , few 
\ 
(19) 
i n number and g e n e r a l l y p e r s i s t e n t " . Whitman's e a r l y views 
as w e l l as other o b s e r v a t i o n s made l a t e r l y by r e s e a r c h e r s such 
as Gerald M c C l e a r n ^ 2 0 ^ ( 1 9 6 5 ) , V.G. D e t h i e r and E l x o t S t e l l a r ^ 2 1 ^ 
(22) 
(1965), Smxth (1968a), add support to McDougall's notion 
of i n s t i n c t , namely, ( 1 ) i t i s i n h e r i t e d , (2) i t i s 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the s p e c i e s , ( 3 ) i n s t i n c t s a r e prime 
movers of behaviour, ( 4 ) i n s t i n c t i s not r i g i d ; i t i s f l e x i b l e 
and c h a r a c t e r i s e d by a d a p t a b i l i t y to changing c o n d i t i o n s . 
Consequently, t h i s would imply t h a t ( a ) behaviour i s g e n e t i c a l l y 
i n h e r i t e d ; (b) i t i s i n t e r n a l l y motivated; ( c ) i t i s 
i n t e r n a l l y co-ordinated. 
(23) (24) Both Smith v (1960a, 1968a) and Hess (1965) have 
r e p o r t e d t h a t s i m i l a r e t h o l o g i c a l s t u d i e s to those mentioned 
(19) i b i d , p.15. 
(20) "The I n h e r i t a n c e of Behaviour", Readings i n Animal Behaviour, 
o p . c i t . , pp.73-95. 
(21) Animal Behaviour ; I t s E v o l u t i o n a r y and N e u r o l o g i c a l B a s i s , 
2nd ed. P r e n t i c e - H a l l , Modern Biology S e r i e s , p.69. 
(22) I m p r i n t i n g . , MS., o p . c i t . 
(23) ( I ) E x p l a n a t i o n of Human Behaviour, o p . c i t . , pp. 159, 170. 
( n ) I m p r i n t i n g , MS., o p . c i t . 
(24) I n : Readings i n Animal Behaviour, o p . c i t . , p.16. 
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above, were c a r r x e d out by Oskar Heinroth (1910) who, through 
ob s e r v a t i o n s and experimentation on geese, could i n t r o d u c e 
e m p i r i c a l evidence to the e f f e c t t h a t "the concept of homology" 
was a p p l i c a b l e as much to movements as to "morphological" 
p a t t e r n s . Such s t u d i e s c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e one important f a c t , 
t h a t the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of i n s t i n c t i v e behaviour i s now 
s e r i o u s l y c onsidered by e t h o l o g i s t s as w e l l as p s y c h o l o g i s t s . 
I t may w e l l be thought t h a t e t h o l o g i s t s concentrate on 
observable performances of behaviour without g i v i n g enough 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n to the p r o c e s s e s of l e a r n i n g ; i t may as w e l l be 
b e l i e v e d t h a t p s y c h o l o g i s t s tend to delve f o r the r e a l motives 
of l e a r n i n g to the n e g l e c t of o b j e c t i v e f a c t s . Such a 
dichotomy does not e x i s t i n r e a l i t y ; both areas of r e s e a r c h 
a r e complementary. The whole i s s u e , however, i s a matter of 
emphasis and a q u e s t i o n of major i n t e r e s t . Both e t h o l o g i s t s 
and p s y c h o l o g i s t s a r e i n t e r e s t e d to know t h a t l e a r n i n g 
a b i l i t i e s i n animals a r e i n t i m a t e l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the 
"general c u r i o s i t y " t h a t those animals show about t h e i r 
environment; and c u r i o s i t y i s one of the main i n s t i n c t s i n 
McDougall's scheme. Le a r n i n g t h e r e f o r e , which i s of paramount 
importance, i s not d i s c a r d e d xn the e t h o l o g i s t s ' i n v e s t i g a t i o n s , 
but t h e i r primary aim i s to c o n s i d e r "behaviours t h a t a r e 
normally performed by anxmals", as Hess (1963) has s t a t e d , 
"because xt xs t h e i r phxlosophy t h a t the basxc materxal a l r e a d y 
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p r e s e n t xn an animal must be p e r f e c t l y known before changes i n 
( 25) 
t h i s substratum as a r e s u l t of l e a r n i n g can be s t u d i e d " . 
Answering a q u e s t i o n , "How does an animal's 
behaviour become so w e l l f i t t e d to i t s normal environment ?", 
( 26 ) 
Aubrey Manning (1967) has suggested t h a t t h i s can be done 
( a ) by means of i n s t i n c t i v e response which i s i n h e r i t e d 
s t r u c t u r e as a p a r t of the nervous system, (b) through the 
animal's a b i l i t y of u t i l i z i n g e x p e r i e n c e so t h a t i t can modify 
i t s performances. I n Manning's s p e c i f i c words, " i n s t i n c t i v e 
behaviour evolves g r a d u a l l y as do s t r u c t u r a l f e a t u r e s , and 
n a t u r a l s e l e c t i o n modifies i t to f i t the environment m the 
b e s t way". Such an evolvement r e f l e c t s what Manning has 
c a l l e d " s p e c i e s memory" which descends from one generation to 
another. T h e r e f o r e i n s t i n c t and l e a r n i n g can "ensure adaptive 
behaviour" by means of i n h e r i t a n c e and e x p e r i e n c e , or to use 
Manning's own statement : "The former by s e l e c t i o n o p e r a t i n g 
during the h i s t o r y of a s p e c i e s , the l a t t e r during the h i s t o r y 
(27) 
of an i n d i v i d u a l " . Manning's views a r e a c l e a r r e f l e c t i o n 
(25) "Ethology: An Approach toward the complete A n a l y s i s of 
Behaviour", New D i r e c t i o n s i n Psychology, New York, H o l t , 
P. 160. 
(26) An I n t r o d u c t i o n to Animal Behaviour, London, Edward Arnold, 
Chapter 2, " i n s t i n c t and L e a r n i n g " ; see a l s o : 
Hmde, R.A., "Some Recent Trends i n Ethology", Psychology; 
A Study of S c i e n c e , v o l . 2 , ( 1 9 5 9 ) , ed. by S. Koch., o p . c i t . , 
P.564. 
(27) An I n t r o d u c t i o n to Animal Behaviour, o p . c i t . , pp. 16-17. 
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( 1 ) of Darwin's p r i n c i p l e of n a t u r a l s e l e c t i o n , (2) of McDougall's 
notion about i n s t i n c t as a concrete u n i t of mental s t r u c t u r e , 
( 3 ) of an emphasis on the i n h e r i t a n c e of i n s t i n c t m the 
Mendelian sense. 
Y e t i t i s q u i t e obvious t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l ' s 
e v o l u t i o n a r y h i s t o r y i s a c t u a l l y i n s e p a r a b l e from that of the 
s p e c i e s as a whole; and any intended dichotomy such as t h a t 
attempted above by Manning, must be considered as s u p e r f i c i a l 
which m r e a l i t y has nothing to do w i t h the fundamentality of the 
s u b j e c t . Apparently Manning has r e a l i s e d t h i s , so he admitted 
.. (28) 
t h a t i t i s u n r e a l i s t i c . The g e n e r a l p o s i t i o n i s meant to 
emphasise i n s t i n c t which provides both man and the animals w i t h 
(29) 
"a s e r i e s of a d a p t i v e responses"; t h i s can be regarded of 
c o n s i d e r a b l e advantage f o r the i n d i v i d u a l , both human and b r u t e s . 
I t can be s a i d t h a t McDougall's approach of m o t i v a t i o n a t t r a c t e d 
i n f a c t many notable p s y c h o l o g i s t s such as E.G.Tolman, G.W.Allport, 
K.Lewin and o t h e r s . T h e s e people c l e a r l y acknowledged 
McDougall's e f f e c t on the trend of Psychology today. The s t r e s s 
McDougall p l a c e d upon the g o a l - d i r e c t e d n e s s of behaviour aroused, 
(28) i b i d , p.17. 
(29) i b i d , p.17. 
(30) Such a s , f o r example, G.Murphy, H.A.Murray. 
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(31) f o r example, Tolman's (1932, 1948) i n t e r e s t i n the process i n 
(32) 
which a c t i v e motives govern performance. Woodworth's (1937) 
(33 ) 
i n t e r e s t i n " S i t u a t i o n - a n d - g o a l S e t " , and i t a t t r a c t e d Lewin's 
(1951) a t t e n t i o n to c o n f l i c t s i t u a t i o n s and other m o t i v a t i o n a l 
problems. 
I t i s of utmost importance to note t h a t most of the X 
/ i 
a c t i v i t i e s performed by i n s e c t s and other c r e a t u r e s ought to be 
(34) 
understood as goal-oriented^governed by p e r c e p t u a l p r o c e s s e s 
which a r e , i n p oint of f a c t , c l e a r l y emphasised by McDougall 
throughout, and i n d i c a t e d i n h i s c l a s s i c a l d e f i n i t i o n of i n s t i n c t . (31) ( I ) (1932) Purposive Behaviour i n Men and Animals, o p . c i t . 
( n ) (1948) " C o g n i t i v e Maps i n Rats and Men" Psych. Re v., 
v o l . 5 5 , pp.189-208. 
(32) Amer. J . Psychology, vol.50, pp.130-140. 
(33) F i e l d Theory m S o c i a l S c i e n c e , New York, Harper. 
(34) See: 
( l ) H i l g a r d , E r n e s t , R., "Motivation i n L e a r n i n g Theory" 
Psychology; A Study of S c i e n c e , v o l . 5 , ( 1 9 6 3 ) , ed. 
by S.Koch, New York, McGraw-Hill, pp.253-283. 
( n ) Leeper, R.W., "Learning and the F i e l d s of P e r c e p t i o n , 
Motivation and P e r s o n a l i t y " , Psychology: A Study of 
S c i e n c e , v o l . 5 , (1963), o p . c i t . , pp.365-487. 
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(35) I t i s both e x p e r i m e n t a l l y shown by R.W.G. Hingston, (1926-7), 
f of? \ 
K.D. and W.McDougall (1931), and pointed out by Manning 
(1967) on d i r e c t o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t i n s e c t s such as Mason Wasps, 
Mason Bees, and female digger-wasps, can achieve remarkable 
performances which are i n d i c a t i v e of i n s i g h t i n l e a r n i n g . I t 
was noted t h a t no t n a l - a n d - e r r o r attempts were manifested by 
the i n s e c t s , and new and adaptive responses to the new s i t u a t i o n s 
were d i s p l a y e d . These p o i n t s can b e s t be c l a r i f i e d by one or two 
(37) 
examples. Hmgston (1926-7) c l o s e l y observed t h a t a mason-
wasp b u i l d s c l a y c e l l s i n which i t a f t e rwards d e p o s i t s an egg, 
f i l l s i t w i t h c a t e r p i l l a r s and c l o s e s i t . The whole c l u s t e r i s 
covered w i t h a t h i n l a y e r of c l a y . When a hole i s made i n the 
s i d e of the whole pot, the wasp n o t i c e s i t and h u r r i e s up to 
amend i t so no one of the c a t e r p i l l a r s would be allowed to f a l l 
out; every time the c a t e r p i l l a r i s put back, the l a r v a e i s a l s o 
s t u f f e d back i n t o the c e l l and a p e l l e t of c l a y i s i n s e r t e d i n t o 
the hole so t h a t the pot should be kept i n t a c t and e v e n t u a l l y 
e v e r y t h i n g i n s i d e i t i s safeguarded. The s i g n i f i c a n c e of the 
e n t i r e o b s e r v a t i o n s i s t h a t the wasp broke o f f the r o u t i n e of 
(35) "The Mason Wasp (Eumenes Comica)", J.Bombay Nat.Hist.Soc., 
vol.31, pp.241-57, 754-61, 890-6. 
(36) " I n s i g h t and F o r e s i g h t i n v a r i o u s Animals - Monkey, Raccoon, 
Rat and Wasp", J.Comp.Psych., v o l . X I , pp. 237-273. 
(37) J.Bombay Nat.Hist.Soc., v o l . 3 1 , (1926-7), o p . c i t . , 
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making i t s mud n e s t . Every time a new movement was done and 
s u c c e s s f u l l y performed. S i m i l a r to Hingston's own experiment, i s 
/ (38) 
W-M. and K.McDougall's ' one (1931) whereby the wasp showed 
much i n s i g h t i n r e p a i r i n g the h o l e s made i n the s i d e or bottom 
of the n e s t . The emphasis i s t h a t the r e p a i r methods are 
f u n c t i o n i n g q u i t e d i f f e r e n t l y from those of b u i l d i n g the house 
f o r the f i r s t time. 
A more r e c e n t example which a l s o p recludes 
s t e r e o t y p e d movements from the performance of i n s e c t s , and s t r o n g l y 
(39) 
suggests i n s i g h t f u l l e a r n i n g i s g i v e n by Manning (1967) about 
a female digging-wasp which "emerges from her underground pupa 
i n s p r i n g . Her parents d i e d the previous summer. She has to 
mate w i t h a male wasp and then perform a whole s e r i e s of complex 
p a t t e r n s connected w i t h digging out a n e s t h o l e , c o n s t r u c t i n g 
c e l l s w i t h i n i t , hunting and k i l l i n g prey such as c a t e r p i l l a r s , 
p r o v i s i o n i n g c e l l s w i t h the prey, l a y i n g eggs and f i n a l l y s e a l i n g 
up the c e l l s . A l l t h i s must be completed w i t h i n a few weeks, 
a f t e r which the wasp d i e s " . These c r e a t u r e s , which a r e f a r lower 
i n the z o o l o g i c a l s c a l e than, say, b i r d s , r a t s , c a t s or dogs, 
have shown what Thorpe (1963) has c a l l e d an " i d e a l r e l e a s e r " . 
(38) J . Comp. Psych., v o l . X I , (1931), o p . c i t . 
(39) o p . c i t . , 17. 
(40) L e a r n i n g and I n s t i n c t i n Animals, London, Methuen, p.42. 
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A l l the i n s e c t s d i s c u s s e d d i s p l a y e d tremendously i n s t i n c t i v e 
development w i t h i n a very l i m i t e d time. For example, i n the 
case of the female digging-wasp, " I t i s q u i t e i n c o n c e i v a b l e 
t h a t she could a c h i e v e t h i s t i g h t schedule i f she had to l e a r n 
(41) 
e v e r y t h i n g from s c r a t c h and by t r i a l - a n d - e r r o r " . There i s 
no doubt t h a t i t performed the remarkable a c t i v i t i e s mentioned 
above l a r g e l y because i t i s f u l l y equipped w i t h i n s t i n c t i v e 
endowment which i s ready-made by i n h e r i t a n c e . The inhered 
i n s t i n c t i v e power i s , of course, always being modified and 
improved by l e a r n i n g and experience; t h i s a t l e a s t i s the c a s e 
w i t h animals which a r e higher m the e v o l u t i o n a r y s c a l e than 
the i n s e c t s . 
E t h o l o g i c a l l y conceived, i n s t i n c t i v e behaviour i s 
c o n s i dered as a complex outcome of a combination of i n f l u e n c e s , 
both i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l , which a r e "organised i n a h i e r a r c h y 
of n e u r a l mechanisms w i t h each l e v e l of the nervous system 
c o n t r o l l i n g s p e c i f i c i n s t i n c t i v e a c t s " . T h i s view, which i s 
expressed by D e t h i e r and S t e l l a r ^ 4 2 ^ ( 1 9 6 5 ) , i s a l s o a pparently 
(43) 
shared by Joseph Altman (1966). The t h r e e w r i t e r s appear to 
(41) Manning, A., (1967), o p . c i t . , p.17. 
(42) Animal Behaviour ; I t s E v o l u t i o n a r y and N e u r o l o g i c a l B a s i s , 
o p . c i t . , p.71. 
(43) Organic Foundations of Animal Behaviour, New York, Holt, Ch.3, 
pp. 2 7 0 f f , and Ch.15, pp. 3 9 9 f f . 
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agree t h a t t h e r e xs a n e u r a l mechanism operating w i t h i n the 
nervous system and i n f l u e n c i n g i n s t i n c t i v e a c t i v i t i e s , but 
t h e i r e x p l a n a t i o n s have been s e t i n g e neral terms. For example, 
they d i d not s p e c i f y which i n s t i n c t i v e performances a r e being 
c o n t r o l l e d by p a r t i c u l a r n e u r a l mechanisms w i t h i n the system. 
Nor have they i n d i c a t e d which i n s t i n c t i v e a c t i o n s a r e being 
c o n t r o l l e d more than o t h e r s . Common sense t e l l s ,»-1 t h a t not 
a l l i n s t i n c t i v e a c t s occur on one and the same l e v e l of urgency 
or power. N e v e r t h e l e s s , i n t h e i r treatment, an i n h e r i t e d 
b a s i s of behaviour i s claimed and i n s t i n c t i s taken as an 
explanatory concept. The p o s i t i o n as a whole, at any r a t e , 
seems to be t h a t what McClearn (1965) has c a l l e d "animal 
(44) 
b e h a v i o u r a l g e n e t i c s " has now become an e s t a b l i s h e d d i s c i p l i n e 
w i t h a broad base so t h a t i t can account f o r "a wide v a r i e t y of 
(45) 
behaviours and m d i v e r s e animals s p e c i e s " . The g e n e r a l 
tendency, however, as r e p r e s e n t e d by the work of many w r i t e r s 
and experimenters such as W.H.Thorpe and O.L.Zanguill ( 1 9 6 3 ) , ^ 4 6 ^ 
(47) (48) R.A.Hxnde and N.Tmbergen (1965), W i l l i a m Exkm (19 6 4 ) , 
(44) o p . c i t . , p.89. (45) o p . c i t . , p.89. 
(46) Current Problems i n Animal Behaviour, Cambridge U n i v . P r e s s , pp.91ff 
(47) "The Comparative Study of S p e c i e s - S p e c i f i c Behaviour", 
Readings i n Animal Behaviour, o p . c i t . , pp.58-67. 
(48) "The E t h o l o g i c a l Concept of I n s t i n c t " i n S o c i a l Behaviour and 
O r g a n i s a t i o n Among V e r t e b r a t e s , ed. by W i l l i a m E t k i n , Univ.of 
Chicago P r e s s , pp.170-205. 
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(49) F.V.Smith (1960a, 1968a) and o t h e r s , appears to support 
McClearn's judgement t h a t , "the foundation of b e h a v i o u r a l 
g e n e t i c s i s now s u f f i c i e n t l y s t a b l e Lo permit The f u t u r e course 
of r e s e a r c h to be more d e t a i l e d and r e f i n e d i n e x p l o r a t i o n s of 
the dynamics of g e n e t i c determination of b e h a v i o u r " . ^ 5 < ^ The 
c r u c i a l q u e s t i o n i s now, how much supporting evidence can be 
found i n such s t u d i e s f o r McDougall's v e r s i o n of i n s t i n c t . 
2. I n s t i n c t Defined. 
W i l l i a m McDougall d e f i n e d i n s t i n c t as "an i n h e r i t e d 
or i n n a t e p s y c h o - p h y s i c a l d i s p o s i t i o n which determines i t s 
p o s s e s s o r to p e r c e i v e , and to pay a t t e n t i o n to o b j e c t s of a 
c e r t a i n c l a s s , to experience an emotional excitement of a 
p a r t i c u l a r q u a l i t y upon p e r c e i v i n g such an o b j e c t and to a c t i n 
r e gard to i t i n a p a r t i c u l a r manner, or, a t l e a s t , to experience 
(49) ( I ) E x p l a n a t i o n of Human Behaviour, o p . c i t . , pp.158-178. 
( n ) I m p r i n t i n g , MS, o p . c i t . 
(50) "The I n h e r i t a n c e of Behaviour", i n : Readings i n Animal 
Behaviour, o p . c i t . , p.89. 
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(51) 
an impulse to such a c t i o n s " . T h i s d e f i n i t i o n , which i s 
comprehensive, i m p l i e s two main, y e t i n s e p a r a b l e a s p e c t s ; ( a ) a 
b i o l o g i c a l a s p e c t , and (b) a p s y c h o l o g i c a l one. P h y s i o l o g i c a l l y 
regarded, an i n s t i n c t , which i s conducive to the p r e s e r v a t i o n of 
the s p e c i e s , i s an inborn o r g a n i s a t i o n of the nervous system 
determining the behaviour of the l i v i n g organism. So, b i o l o g i c a l l y 
speaking, an i n s t i n c t may be considered as "a product of 
..(52) 
e v o l u t i o n which s e c u r e s u s e f u l ends b e n e f i c i a l to the 
i n d i v i d u a l as w e l l as to the s p e c i e s . As a f a c t o r determining the 
p s y c h i c a l l i f e of the organism, i n s t i n c t , i n f a c t , i s a p e r c e p t u a l 
power or s k i l l whose nature can be i n f e r r e d from the kind of 
behaviour which i s o f t e n accompanied by an emotional experience. I t 
(53) 
i s now almost e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t l e a r n i n g a b i l i t i e s i n animals a r e 
c l o s e l y r e l a t e d to the p e r c e p t u a l endowments, e s p e c i a l l y the v i s u a l 
ones. McDougall t h e r e f o r e seemed to have been a l i v e to the f a c t of 
(51) An I n t r o d u c t i o n to S o c i a l Psychology, London, Methuen, 25th ed., 
(19 4 3 ) , p.25 ; 1 s t pu b l i s h e d i n 1908. 
(52) ( I ) Hobhouse, L.T., Mind i n E v o l u t i o n , London, MacMillan, (1 9 0 1 ) . 
P.47. 
See a l s o ; 
( n ) P i l l s b u r y , W.B., The E s s e n t i a l s of Psychology, r e v i s e d . e d . , 
New York, MacMillan, (1 9 2 2 ) , pp.270-272. 
( i n ) Drever, James ( S n r ) , I n s t i n c t m Man, (1922), o p . c i t . , p.81. 
(IV) C o g h i l l , G.E., "The Genetic I n t e r r e l a t i o n of I n s t i n c t i v e 
Behaviour and R e f l e x e s " , Psych.Rev., v o l . 3 7 , (1930), 
pp.264=266. 
(v ) Wheeler, R. Holder, The Laws of Human Nature, London, Nisbet 
and Comp., (1931), pp. 14 4 f f . 
( v i ) B u r t , C y r i l . , " I s the D o c t r i n e of I n s t i n c t s Dead ?" Symp., 
B.J.Ed.Psych., v o l . X I , p a r t 3, (1 9 4 1 ) , p.157. 
(53) Thorpe, W.H., "Ethology as a New Branch of Bi o l o g y " , Readings i n 
Animal Behaviour, o p . c i t . , pp. 45-46. 
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d e f i n i n g psychology i n terms of m s t i p t i v e behaviour, yet he was 
/» 
"more i n c l u s i v e than what i s meant by the American School", as 
( 54) 
K. K o f f k a v (1935) judged. Koffka made i t abundantly c l e a r t h a t 
he was " i n f u l l agreement w i t h McDougall" concerning the ope r a t i o n 
of an i n s t i n c t u a l system which was a p p r o p r i a t e l y c a r r i e d out and 
(55) 
d e s c r i b e d by Tolman i n b e h a v i o u r i s t i c terms. S t i l l f u r t h e r , 
Koffka admitted t h a t McDougall's theory of the conceptual power of 
i n s t i n c t was p u b l i s h e d long before " G e s t a l t Psychology e x i s t e d " . 
The G e s t a l t i s t s ' p o s i t i o n as a whole appears to be based on the 
outlook t h a t i n the p e r c e p t u a l process t h e r e i s an i n n a t e tendency 
to v i s u a l i s e t h i n g s as u n i t s ( S m i t h ^ 5 7 ^ : 1941,1960a). W.Kohler's^ 5 8^ 
(1921) Chimpanzee, f o r i n s t a n c e , r e a l i z e d , both p e r c e p t u a l l y and 
g e o g r a p h i c a l l y , the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the s t i c k s and the banana 
which he e a r n e s t l y d e s i r e d to r e a c h . S t u d i e s conducted by 
(54) P r i n c i p l e s of G e s t a l t Psychology, London, Kegan P a u l , p.25. 
(55) i b i d , pp. 401-403. 
(56) i b i d , pp. 403, 404-6. 
(57) ( i ) (1941) "The I n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the Theory of G e s t a l t " , The 
A u s t r a l i a n J . of Psychology and Philosophy, vol.XIX, No.3, 
pp. 193-215. 
( n ) E x p l a n a t i o n of Human Behaviour, o p . c i t . , Ch.IX, "The 
G e s t a l t Approach". 
(58) The M e n t a l i t y of Apes, London. 
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p s y c h o l o g i s t s , such a s , f o r example, H e b t / 5 9 ^ (1937, 1949), S m i t h ^ 6 0 
(1960b, 1968a) and o t h e r s , show t h a t t h e r e e x i s t s i n animals and 
men an i n h e r i t e d tendency t o or g a n i s e p e r c e p t i o n i n t o wholes. I n 
Smith's experiments, f o r example, the c h i c k s a r e i n h e r e n t l y endowed 
to d i s c r i m i n a t e between up and down and to p e r c e i v e s p a t i a l a s p e c t s 
such as angles and h e i g h t s . I n t h i s , t h e r e i s a c l e a r i n d i c a t i o n of 
the e x i s t e n c e of an i n n a t e p r e f e r e n c e f o r p a t t e r n s ; t a k i n g i n t o 
account the v a r y i n g degrees of complexity, i t can be s a i d t h a t 
animals and man a r e i n n a t e l y equipped w i t h p e r c e p t u a l powers 
i m p l i c a t e d i n i n s t i n c t s as worked out by McDougall on hormic bases. 
I n h i s d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between the c o g n i t i v e and the 
c o n a t i v e a s p e c t s , McDougall was t r y i n g to s t r e s s the p e r c e p t u a l 
a s p e c t s of i n s t i n c t s ; so t h a t I . T . Diamond and K.L. Chow (1962) 
could w r i t e t h a t "the p e r c e p t u a l problem m i n s t i n c t i v e behaviour 
(59) ( l ) (1937) ( a ) "The In n a t e O r g a n i s a t i o n of v i s u a l a c t i v i t y . 
I . P e r c e p t i o n of f i g u r e s by r a t s r e a r e d i n 
Darkness", J.Genet.Psych., v o l . 5 1 , pp. 101-
126. 
(b) "The In n a t e O r g a n i s a t i o n of v i s u a l a c t i v i t y . 
I I . T r a n s f e r of response i n the d i s c r i m i n a t i o n 
of b r i g h t n e s s and s i z e by r a t s r e a r e d i n 
t o t a l darkness", J . Comp. Psych., v o l . 24, 
pp. 277-99. 
( n ) (1949) The O r g a n i s a t i o n of Behaviour, o p . c i t . , 
(60) ( l ) "Towards D e f i n i t i o n of the Stimulus S i t u a t i o n f o r the Approach 
Response m the Domestic Chick", Anim.Beh., v o l . 8 , o p . c i t . , 
pp. 197-200. 
( n ) I m p r i n t i n g , MS., o p . c i t . , 
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was emphasised by McDougall's d i s t i n c t i o n between c o g n i t i v e and 
( 61) 
c o n a t i v e d i s p o s i t i o n s " . However, "the h e u r i s t i c v a l u e " of 
t h i s s e p a r a t i o n was emphasised by an example t h a t McDougall gave, 
(62) 
and r e p o r t e d by Diamond and Chow, of how baby lambs may f o l l o w 
any moving o b j e c t , a process which has now i t s e x t e n s i o n and 
i n f l u e n c e on the t o p i c of i m p r i n t i n g . The word " i m p r i n t i n g " , 
( 63 ) 
w i t h which Smith (1968a) has much concerned h i m s e l f both 
h i s t o r i c a l l y i n t r a c i n g i t back to A r i s t o t l e upward to Heinroth 
and Konrad Lorenz, and e x p e r i m e n t a l l y m h i s own demonstrations 
w i t h lambs and c h i c k s , i s c o n s idered p a r t i c u l a r l y a process of 
l e a r n i n g . McDougall appears to have been aware of i t s importance 
f o r the l e a r n i n g tendency. I n f a c t , McDougall was mostly concerned 
to b r i n g home the o v e r - r i d i n g f a c t o r of i n s t i n c t or the i n n a t e 
endowment which underpins the whole concept of i m p r i n t i n g e s p e c i a l l y 
and l e a r n i n g g e n e r a l l y . S m i t h ' s ^ 6 4 ^ (1965, 1968a), which a r e 
(61) "The P l a c e of L e a r n i n g m Comparative Psychology", i n : 
Psychology : A Study of S c i e n c e . , ed. by Koch, S., v o l . 4 , 
New York, McGraw-Hill, p.162, see a l s o , pp. 164, 170. 
(62) i b i d , pp. 164, 170. 
(63) I m p r i n t i n g , MS, o p . c i t . , pp. 3-4, 7-9, 10-13, 24, 29. 
(64) ( I ) ( 1 9 6 5 ) , " I n s t i n c t and L e a r n i n g i n the Attachment of Lamb 
and Ewe", Animal Beh., vol.13, pp. 8 4 f f . 
( n ) (1968a), I m p r i n t i n g , MS., o p . o i t . 
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dxscussed h e r e a f t e r , and others experxments tend to support 
what McDougall was t r y i n g to prove. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g , however, 
to point out here t h a t the data r e s u l t i n g from such s t u d i e s 
i n d i c a t e t h a t ( 1 ) t h e r e i s a common mechanism, an i n s t i n c t i v e 
a s s o c i a t i o n of i n t e r n a l s e n s o r i a l p r o c e s s e s which permeates the 
whole process of p e r c e p t i o n i n i m p r i n t i n g , ( 2 ) There i s a gradual 
Y 
development oi, maturation of an i n s t i n c t d uring the i n d i v i d u a l ' s 
l i f e . ( 3 ) I m p r i n t i n g i s regarded as a tendency to l e a r n and 
l e a r n i n g i s an i n e x t r i c a b l e p a r t of behaviour. (4) The process of 
i m p r i n t i n g , which i s a very r a p i d form of l e a r n i n g , adds to the 
proof of e v o l u t i o n a r y c o n t i n u i t y . 
I n an i n t e r e s t i n g paper based upon c l o s e o b s e r v a t i o n s 
about p e r c e p t u a l powers of i n s t i n c t i n young lambs and i n ewes, 
( R& \ 
Smith (1965) has formulated the f o l l o w i n g h y p o t h e s i s : 
1. "The ewe, u n l e s s d i s t u r b e d , tends to remain i n t h a t a r e a of 
ground upon which f l u i d has been di s c h a r g e d from the vagina. 
The c h i e f cues appear to be o l f a c t o r y . T h i s r e s t r i c t i o n of 
movement enhances the p r o b a b i l i t y of the ewe f i n d i n g the 
lambs when they a r e dropped". 
(65) See; Thorpe, W.H., 
( l ) "Ethology as a new Branch of Biology", Readings i n 
Animal Behaviour, o p . c i t . , pp. 31-49. 
( n ) L e a r n i n g and I n s t i n c t i n Animals, o p . c i t . , pp. 239. 
(66) " I n s t i n c t and L e a r n i n g m the Attachment of Lamb and Ewe", 
Animal Behaviour, v o l . 1 3 , pp. 84-86. 
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2. "The l i c k i n g of the lamb w i t h accompanying low-pitched 'maa-mg' 
by the ewe would appear to be i n s t i n c t i v e . The consequences 
a r e t h a t the ewe l e a r n s the odour of the lamb and t h a t the lamb 
has an opportunity of l e a r n i n g the b a s i c v o c a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s 
of the ewe. Whether or not both p r o c e s s e s should be c l a s s i f i e d 
as ' i m p r i n t i n g ' i n the sense of an i r r e v o c a b l e attachment to 
a s t i m u l u s experienced during an e s p e c i a l l y s e n s i t i v e p e r i o d , 
i s a f e a t u r e which could be f u r t h e r i n v e s t i g a t e d and so too, 
the ewe's attachment to the f e e b l e b l e a t m g s of her lambs which, 
on the evidence advanced, she can d i s t i n g u i s h from those of 
other lambs. 
The chemical a n a l y s i s of the amniotic f l u i d s 
a s s o c i a t e d w i t h d i f f e r e n t lambs to determine i f and i n what 
way they d i f f e r would appear t o be c r u c i a l " . 
3. "The p l a c i n g of the head under any convenient p r o j e c t i n g s u r f a c e 
would appear to be an i n s t i n c t i v e a c t by the lamb. The 
e v e n t u a l f i n d i n g of the t e a t i s sometimes aided by the ewe and 
i s probably a s s i s t e d by o l f a c t o r y cues f o r the lamb. Once the 
lamb has been s u c k l e d , repeated approaches to the t e a t could 
be e x p l a i n e d by r e f e r e n c e to r e i n f o r c e d l e a r n i n g . An element 
of reinforcement i n the process of attachment could a r i s e from 
the f a c t t h a t the. process of s u c k l i n g i s s a t i s f y i n g to the 
„ (67) ewe . 
(67) Animal Behaviour, vol.13, ( 1 9 6 5 ) , o p . c i t . , pp. 85-86. 
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Smith's h y p o t h e s i s a u t h e n t i c a t e s the t r i p a r t i t e 
d i v i s i o n of i n s t i n c t i n t o knowing, emotion and purposive a c t i o n , 
being e x e r c i s e d by the ewe and the lamb. I n the whole paper, 
however, the i n n a t e a b i l i t y of p e r c e p t i o n i s s t r e s s e d . The broad 
b a s i s i s provided by i n s t i n c t which i s i n h e r e n t i n the d i s c u s s e d 
a n i m a l s ' c o n s t i t u t i o n ; y e t the environmental c o n d i t i o n s have not 
been excluded or minimised m the whole p r o c e s s . For example, 
the "maa-ing" of the i n d i v i d u a l lamb was l e a r n t by the ewe; when 
the lamb was taken away, the mother responded even to the lamb's 
recorded "maa—ing", a f t e r she r e c o g n i s e d t h a t i t was the "maa-mg" 
of her baby lamb. 
The s i g n i f i c a n c e of Smith's above paper i s t h a t i t 
adds support to McDougall's n o t i o n of i n s t i n c t as "a mental 
d i s p o s i t i o n " ^ * ^ and, "a f a c t of mental s t r u c t u r e " ^ ^ r e l a t i n g to 
mental l i f e . To McDougall, mental l i f e or experience c o n s i s t e d 
always m an a c t i v i t y of a s u b j e c t p e r c e i v i n g an o b j e c t of c e r t a i n 
c l a s s . On the s u b j e c t i v e s i d e , the a c t i v i t y c o n s t a n t l y changes; 
t h i s change or m o d i f i c a t i o n s e c u r e s an attainment of an end sought 
a f t e r . I t i s worthy of note t h a t McDougall's d e f i n i t i o n of 
i n s t i n c t m no sense i m p l i e s t h a t the i n s t i n c t i v e a c t i o n i s performed 
without awareness of the goal towards which i t tends. Yet t h e 
(68) An o u t l i n e of Psychology, London, Methuen, (19.23), p. 106. 
(69) i b i d , p.105. 
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a n t i c i p a t i o n of the end may be conceived of i n d i f f e r e n t degrees of 
c l a r i t y and i t may be r e a l i s e d a t d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s of mental l i f e . 
The behaviour of the lower animals appears to be almost completely 
determined throughout t h e i r l i v e s by i n s t i n c t s modified but l i t t l e 
by e x p e rience. The lower animals a r e capable of p e r c e i v i n g and 
f e e l i n g so th a t they " a c t i n a p e r f e c t l y d e f i n i t e and i n v a r i a b l y 
manner whenever a given i n s t i n c t i s e x c i t e d " . According to 
McDougall's view, an i n s t i n c t i v e a c t i o n may continue t o be 
i n s t i n c t i v e even a f t e r much experience of i t s o b j e c t . The 
n e s t - b u i l d i n g , f o r i n s t a n c e , or the migratory f l i g h t of b i r d s , "does 
(71) 
not cease to be i n s t i n c t i v e ' a f t e r these a c t i v i t i e s a r e 
performed r e p e a t e d l y . Experience may improve the i n s t i n c t i v e 
a c t i o n , but i t does not r e p l a c e i n s t i n c t i t s e l f . "The l i f e - h i s t o r y " 
of an i n s t i n c t can be g r a d u a l l y t r a c e d i n the organism's l i f e . 
An i n s t i n c t develops and may express i t s e l f b efore i t i s p e r f e c t e d . 
Yet t h i s h a r d l y occurs i n the i n s e c t s , merely because they emerge 
from "the C h r y s a l i s " almost f u l l y developed. McDougall, 
n e v e r t h e l e s s , d i d admit t h a t i n some c a s e s , which he never 
s p e c i f i e d , i n s t i n c t fades away, or becomes i n o p e r a t i v e . Such would 
be the c a s e , i f i n s t i n c t i s not allowed to f u l f i l i t s r o l e 
(72) 
immediately a f t e r the time a t which i t u s u a l l y matures. Such a 
(70) I n t r o d u c t i o n to S o c i a l Psychology, o p . c i t . , p.27. 
(71) i b i d , p.26. 
(72) An o u t l i n e of Psychology, o p . c i t . , p.111. 
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few i n s t a n c e s appear to have prompted W i l l i a m James (1842-1910) to 
formulate h i s "Law of t r a n s i t o r m e s s " , whereby i t i s s t a t e d t h a t , 
(73) 
"Many i n s t i n c t s r i p e n a t a c e r t a i n age and then fade away". 
James too, l i k e McDougall, d i d not i n d i c a t e which i n s t i n c t s a r e 
meant to v a n i s h a f t e r reaching a p a r t i c u l a r phase. 
McDougall's extended use of i n s t i n c t was perhaps the 
main cause of c r i t i c i s m s launched by v a r i o u s w r i t e r s such as 
Watson (1878-1958), Z.Y. Kuo and o t h e r s . His a s c r i p t i o n of 
experience and f e e l i n g even to the lowest animals made h i s whole 
scheme an obvious t a r g e t f o r a t t a c k and s e t many people to be 
s c e p t i c a l about h i s e n t i r e p o s i t i o n . His treatment of the s u b j e c t , 
however, allows f o r and takes i n t o account the v a r i o u s degrees of 
advance i n the organismic e v o l u t i o n ; but only i n p r i n c i p l e and i n 
broad o u t l i n e , not m any s p e c i f i c d e t a i l . Furthermore, h i s 
v 
t h e o r e t i c a l d i v i s i o n of mental f u n c t i o n s i n t o t h r e e main powers can 
be regarded as an innov a t i o n of h i s own, which i n s p i r e d 
m o t i v a t i o n a l psychology to con c e n t r a t e on mental s t r u c t u r e s alone; 
motivating f a c t o r s must always be looked f o r w i t h i n the behaving 
i n d i v i d u a l . I n f a c t , i t i s i n s t i n c t , which i s a co n c r e t e f a c t of 
mental s t r u c t u r e , t h a t c o n s i s t s of t h r e e r e l a t e d p a r t s , namely, 
an " a f f e r e n t " , a " c e n t r a l " and a motor or " e f f e r e n t " p a r t . The 
r e s u l t a n t a c t i v i t i e s of these d i v i s i o n s a r e the c o g n i t i v e , the 
(73) P r i n c i p l e s of Psychology, o p . c i t . , v o l . 2 , p.398. 
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a f f e c t x v e and the c o n a t i v e f e a t u r e s . Y e t McDougall h i m s e l f 
(74) 
r e c t i f i e d an e r r o r he made i n drawing a l i n e of s e p a r a t i o n 
between the second and the t h i r d p a r t s . He r e a l i s e d t h a t t h e r e 
was no s u f f i c i e n t reason f o r reg a r d i n g the c o n a t i v e p a r t as 
d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from the emotional a s p e c t . As to the e f f e r e n t 
p a r t , he regarded as "a p u r e l y n e u r a l apparatus, or motor mechanism, 
(75) 
through which the i n s t i n c t i v e excitement d i s c h a r g e s i t s e l f " . 
The i n t e r l o c k e d r e l a t i o n of the t h r e e p a r t s to the main i n s t i n c t s 
can be b e t t e r understood from examining Smith's i l l u s t r a t i v e 
d i a g r a m ^ ^ contained i n h i s lengthy chapter on McDougall's system, 
and i t i s appended to t h i s study (Appendix I ) . 
S i m i l a r d e f i n i t i o n s of i n s t i n c t have been attempted 
(r7r7\ (TR") 
by d i f f e r e n t w r i t e r s such as Burt ( 1 9 4 1 ) , N.Tinbergen (1 9 5 1 ) , 
and many o t h e r s . Burt conceived of an i n s t i n c t as a "complex" 
(74) An I n t r o d u c t i o n to S o c i a l Psychology, o p . c i t . , Chapter V I I I , p.495. 
(75) i b i d , pp. 495-6. ' 
(76) E x p l a n a t i o n of Human Behaviour, o p . c i t , , pp, 182-183. 
(77) " I s the D o c t r i n e of I n s t i n c t Dead ?", Symposium, B.J.Ed, 
Psychology, v o l . X I , ( 1 9 4 1 ) , p.157. 
(78) The Study of I n s t i n c t , London, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 
p. 112. 
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d i s p o s i t i o n inherent i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n of any members of the 
s p e c i e s . The i n h e r i t e d d i s p o s i t i o n i m p e l l s the s p e c i e s to A 
p e r c e i v e , to become e x c i t e d , to a c t i n a way p r e s e r v a t o r y to the 
i n d i v i d u a l and e v e n t u a l l y to the s p e c i e s . B urt h i m s e l f d e c l a r e d 
t h a t h i s d e f i n i t i o n i s based on t h a t of McDougall, s i n c e 
McDougall's use of the word " i n s t i n c t " , "has l e d to the most 
p r o l i f i c and s u g g e s t i v e a p p l i c a t i o n s of the notion to human 
(79) 
a f f a i r s " , i n B u r t ' s s p e c i f i c words. 
Co n s i d e r i n g i n s t i n c t i n i t s h i e r a r c h i c a l l e v e l s and 
d i f f e r e n t phases, Tinbergen has d e f i n e d i t as "a h i e r a r c h i c a l l y 
o rganised nervous mechanism which i s s u s c e p t i b l e to c e r t a i n 
priming, r e l e a s i n g and d i r e c t i n g impulses, of i n t e r n a l as w e l l as 
of e x t e r n a l o r i g i n , and which responds to these impulses by 
co-ordinated movements t h a t c o n t r i b u t e to the maintenance of the 
i n d i v i d u a l and the s p e c i e s " . T h i s d e f i n i t i o n , too, i s not d i f f e r e n t 
from t h a t of McDougall. I n i t , the emphasis i s l a i d upon 
p h y s i o l o g i c a l elements, purposive c o n d i t i o n s , a d i s t i n c t i o n between 
an i n s t i n c t which i s an energy or urge and i n s t i n c t i v e behaviour 
which i s d e s c r i p t i v e of and a c r i t e r i o n to the nature of i n s t i n c t . 
Yet c e n t r a l to McDougall's d e f i n i t i o n , which Stout d e s c r i b e d as 
.. (80) 
the most complete and thoroughgoing , a r e these c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s : 
(79) B.J.Ed.Psych., v o l . X I , (1941), p.158. 
(80) Manual Psychology, o p . c i t . , p. 348. 
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( 1 ) xt embraces the c o g n i t i v e , the a f f e c t i v e , and the c o n a t i v e phases 
of mental p r o c e s s e s . ( 2 ) I t r e f e r r e d t o s p e c i f i c movements. 
(3) The i n n a t e t e n d e n c i e s , both p s y c h i c a l and b i o l o g i c a l a r e 
i n c l u d e d . (4) Purposive a s p e c t s a r e i n d i c a t e d . ( 5 ) A c l e a r 
r e f e r e n c e i s a l s o made to the a d a p t a b i l i t y of i n s t i n c t and i t s 
m o d i f i c a t i o n by e x p e r i e n c e . The d e f i n i t i o n , however, may be 
designated both as s u f f i c i e n t and comprehensive. I n McDougall*s 
(81) 
scheme, t o quote Smith (1960), " I n s t i n c t i s conceived as i n v o l v i n g 
both a mechanism which i s capable of f u n c t i o n i n g a p p r o p r i a t e l y once 
i t has been s e t i n motion by the a p p r o p r i a t e key, and as having 
the n e c e s s a r y motive power to s u s t a i n t h i s a c t i v i t y " . T h i s i s an 
adequate d e s c r i p t i o n of i n s t i n c t , and i t adds much support to 
McDougall's n o t i o n , whose dictum i s " i n s t i n c t i s everywhere shot 
through w i t h i n t e l l i g e n c e " , but the q u e s t i o n i s whether i n s t i n c t i s 
p e r f e c t from the o u t s e t and i s without i t s " f o l l i e s " , to use a 
(an) 
term from R.W.G. Hmgston (19 2 8 ) . 
(81) E x p l a n a t i o n of Human Behaviour, o p . o i t . , p.124. 
(82) ( I ) " i n s t i n c t and I n t e l l i g e n c e " , Symposium, B.J.Psych., 
v o l . I l l , ( 1 9 1 0 ) . 
( l i ) An I n t r o d u c t i o n to S o c i a l Psychology, o p . c i t . , p.421. 
( m ) "Notes on I n s t i n c t and I n t e l l i g e n c e i n Rats and C a t s " , 
J.Comp.Psych., v o l . V I I , (1927), pp. 145-175. 
(83) Problems of I n s t i n c t and I n t e l l i g e n c e , London, Edward Arnold, 
p. 280, see a l s o ; p. 282. 
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I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o t h i n k t h a t i n s t i n c t i s o f t e n not 
i n f a l l i b l e and without i t s own shortcomings; but o b s e r v a t i o n s made 
at d i f f e r e n t times by v a r i o u s w r i t e r s such as G.W. and E eG» 
Peckham^ 8 4^ (19 0 5 ) , J.H. F a b r e ^ 8 5 ) (1912,1914,1916,1918,1929), 
H m g s t o n ^ 8 6 ) (1920,1928), W.M.Wheeler^ 8 ? )(1928) , A.D.Imms^ 8 8 )(1947), 
W.H. T h o r p e ^ 8 9 ^ (1943, 1965), and o t h e r s , seem to be i n favour of 
McDougall's p o s i t i o n . These w r i t e r s ' views, which a r e s c a t t e r e d 
throughout t h e i r works, tend to agree t h a t the c r e a t u r e s observed 
(84) Wasps; S o c i a l and S o l i t a r y , Westminster, A r c h i b a l d Constable 
and Co. 
(85) ( l ) (1912) The L i f e of the S p i d e r , E n g l i s h t r a n s . , London, 
Hodder and Stoughton. 
( n ) (1914) The Mason Bees, E n g l i s h t r a n s . , London, Hodder 
and Stoughton. 
( m ) (1916) The Hunting Wasps, E n g l i s h t r a n s . , London, 
Hodder and Stoughton. 
( I V ) (1918) The Wonders of I n s t i n c t , E n g l i s h t r a n s . , London, 
Hodder and Stoughton. 
( v ) (1929) Animal L i f e i n F i e l d and Garden, E n g l i s h t r a n s . , 
London, Thornton, Butterworth. 
(86) ( I ) (1920) A N a t u r a l i s t i n Himalaya, London, H.F. and Co. 
Witherby. 
( n ) (1928) Problems of I n s t i n c t and I n t e l l i g e n c e , o p . c i t . , 
(87) The S o c i a l I n s e c t s , London, Kegan P a u l . 
(88) S o c i a l Behaviour i n I n s e c t s , London, Methuen. 
(89) ( l ) (1943) "Types of L e a r n i n g i n I n s e c t s and other Arthropods" 
papers I - I I I , B.J.Psych., v o l s . X X X I I I and XXXIV, 
(1943-1944). 
( n ) (1965) "Ethology as a Branch of Biology", Readings i n 
Animal Behaviour, o p . c i t . 
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show f l e x i b i l i t y and u t i l i z e rudimentary i n t e l l i g e n c e . They can : 
(1) adapt means to ends; ( 2 ) given adequate time, do something 
no v e l ; ( 3 ) i n g e n e r a l , l e a r n from experience. 
The q u e s t i o n now i s whether the concept of i n s t i n c t and 
i t s proponents were saved the t r o u b l e of being c r i t i c i s e d . 
P o l e m i c a l s t r i c t u r e s , which a r e sometimes unfounded and 
un s u b s t a n t i a t e d , a r e every now and again being made a g a i n s t the 
concept as a whole. Undoubtedly, behind the a n t a g o n i s t i c a t t i t u d e s , 
t h e r e a r e oft e n r e a l f a c t s hidden or v i t i a t e d . G e n e r a l l y , the 
tendency assumed by the c r i t i c s i s mostly c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of denying 
the e x i s t e n c e of i n s t i n c t en t o t o . Among the w r i t e r s , to whom 
i n s t i n c t seemed to be an anathema and perhaps wanted to see i t s 
d i s c u s s i o n " s t r i c t l y b a r r e d " , ( 9 0 ) were J.B.Watson < 9 1 ) (1919, 1925, 1928), 
(90) McDougall, W i l l i a m . , "The Use and Abuse of I n s t i n c t m 
S o c i a l Psychology", J . Abn. and S o c i a l Psych., v o l . X V I , 
Nos. 5 and 6, (192 2 ) , p.285. 
(91) ( I ) (1919) Psychology from the Standpoint of a B e h a v i o u r i s t , 
P h i l a d e l p h i a , L i p p m c o t t and Co., 3rd ed., 1929. 
( n ) ( 1 9 2 5 ) Behaviourism, New York, Norton and Co. 
( i n ) (1928) The B a t t l e of Behaviourism, London, Kegan 
P a u l , another ed., New York, Norton, ( 1 9 2 9 ) . 
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(Q2) (93} 
F.H. A l l p o r t v ' ( 1 9 2 4 ) , Knight Dunlap v ' (1920, 1925a, 1925b), 
(94) 
Z.Y. Kuo v ' (1921,1922,1924,1928,1929,1930), and o t h e r s . The 
essence of these w r i t e r s * views, which are shared by some othe r s 
(92) S o c i a l Psychology, Boston : Houghton M i f f l i n and Co., another ed. 
Cambridge, Mass. 
(93) ( i ) (1920) "Are There Any Instincts ?" J.Abn.Psych., v o l . XIV, 
pp. 35-50. 
( n ) (1925a) " I n s t i n c t s and D e s i r e s " , J.Abn. and Soc. Psych., 
v o l . XX, pp. 1 7 0 f f . 
( i n ) (1925b) S o c i a l Psychology, B a l t i m o r e , Wiliam and W i l k i n s ; 
see a l s o ; Dunlap's other t h r e e a r t i c l e s m : 
Psychologies of 1925, ed. by C. Murchison. 
(94) ( I ) (1921) "Giving up I n s t i n c t s i n Psychology", J . P h i l o s . , 
v o l . X V I I I , pp. 6 4 3 f f . 
( i i ) (1922) "How Are Our I n s t i n c t s Acquired ?" Psych.Rev., 
v o l . XXIX, pp. 3 4 4 f f . 
( l i i ) (1924) "A Psychology Without Heredity", Psych. Rev., 
v o l . XXXI, pp. 4 2 7 f f . 
( I V ) (1928) "The Fundamental E r r o r of the Concept of Purpose 
and the T r i a l and E r r o r F a l l a c y " , Psych. Rev., 
v o l . XXXV, pp. 4 1 4 f f . 
( v ) (1929) "The Net R e s u l t of the A n t i - H e r e d i t y Movement i n 
Psychology", Psych. Rev., v o l . XXXVI, pp. 1 8 1 f f . 
( v i ) (1930) "The Genesis of the Cat*s Response to the Rat", 
J . Comp. Psych., v o l . X I , pp. 3 0 f f . 
(95) See f o r example: 
( i ) Vernon, P.E. " I s the D o c t r i n e of I n s t i n c t s Dead ? " 
Symposium, B.J.Ed. Psych., v o l . X I I , ( 1 9 4 2 ) . 
( n ) P e a r , T.H., " I s the D o c t r i n e of I n s t i n c t s Dead ? " 
Symposium, B.J.Ed. Psych., v o l . X I I , ( 1 9 4 2 ) . 
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i n B r i t a i n , i s t h a t much behaviour, and p a r t i c u l a r l y a d u l t human 
behaviour, i s a c q u i r e d by l e a r n i n g , so t h a t t h e r e i s no need f o r 
concocting long l i s t s of i n s t i n c t s , and f o r F.H. A l l p o r t i n 
p a r t i c u l a r , t h a t even b a s i c i n s t i n c t s or " d r i v e s " p l a y a v a n i s h l y 
s m a l l p a r t i n the behaviour of a d u l t human beings. 
I r o n i c a l l y enough, however, i t appears t h a t c a r e f u l l y 
designed experiments and r i g o r o u s o b s e r v a t i o n s were c a r r i e d out 
by other American i n v e s t i g a t o r s , notably, R.M. Yerkes and 
(96) (97) (98) D. Bloomfield^ ' (1910), K.S. L a s h l e y ( 1 9 3 8 ) , C.P. Sto n e v 
(1951), and o t h e r s . They supported the e x i s t e n c e of i n s t i n c t . 
Among a l l American authors, E.C. Tolman, perhaps the most 
c o n s i s t e n t defender of i n s t i n c t , t r e a t e d the concept mainly i n 
connection w i t h b e h a v i o u r a l s t r u c t u r e which w i l l be examined i n 
Chapter V I I . 
(96) "Do K i t t e n s I n s t i n c t i v e l y K i l l Mice ?" Psych. B u l l . , 
v o l . V I I . 
(97) ( I ) "The Thalamus and Emotion" Psych. Rev., v o l . 4 5 , 
pp. 42±f. 
( n ) "Experimental A n a l y s i s of I n s t i n c t i v e Behaviour" 
Psych. Rev., v o l . 45, pp. 4 4 5 f f . 
(98) "Maturation and I n s t i n c t i v e F u n c t i o n s " i n : Comparative 
Psychology, ed. by Stone, C P . , 3rd ed., New York, 
P r e n t i c e - H a l l , pp. 3 0 f f . 
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The essence of i n s t i n c t i v e a c t i v i t y i s the l i b e r a t i o n and 
d i r e c t i o n of a p s y c h o - p h y s i c a l energy which McDougall c a l l e d 
(99) 
"neurokyme"; he spoke of i t as " v i c a r i o u s usage of nervous 
„ (100) 
energy . His i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the c a s e i s t h a t the energy, 
which i s converted from the p o t e n t i a l chemical form t o some a c t i v e 
form w i t h i n each neurone, must be regarded as not confined to the 
neurone w i t h i n which i t has been l i b e r a t e d , but as capable of flowing 
on, p a s s i n g i n t o and through other neurones, so t h a t each neurone 
s e r v e s , not only as an i r r i t a b l e conductor of e x c i t a t i o n imparted 
to i t , but a l s o a s a channel through which the s p e c i f i c energy 
l i b e r a t e d w i t h i n i t , may flow from p l a c e to p l a c e w i t h i n the nervous 
system. T h i s h y p o t h e t i c a l d e s c r i p t i o n was supplemented by two other 
hypotheses ^ " ^^ i m p l i e d by i t , namely, the "common r e s e r v o i r " of f r e e d 
energy and " i n h i b i t i o n by drainage". On t h i s view, each i n s t i n c t 
t h e r e f o r e i s regarded as c o n t a i n i n g a s t o r e of p o t e n t i a l energy, a 
source from which, when i t i s tapped, p s y c h o - p h y s i c a l power w e l l s up i n 
"a g r e a t gush to r e - e n f o r c e and s u s t a i n mental and b o d i l y a c t i v i t y " . 
(99) "The Sources and D i r e c t i o n s of P s y c h o - P h y s i c a l Energy", Amer. J . 
of I n s a n i t y , v o l . 69, ( 1 9 1 3 ) , p. 863. 
(100) i b i d , p. 863. 
(101) "The Hypothesis of I n h i b i t i o n by Drainage" Psych. Rev., v o l . 33, 
No. 5, ( 1 9 2 6 ) . 
(102) Amer. J . of I n s a n i t y , v o l . 69, o p . c i t . , p. 866. 
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B a s i c a l l y , then, McDougall envisaged i n s t i n c t ( 1 9 1 3 ) ^ 1 0 3 ^ 
as an energy w i t h i n the nervous system; but i t i s h e l d back by 
" s l u i c e g a t e s " . An i n s t i n c t would r e l e a s e the energy dammed when 
i t i s s t i m u l a t e d a t the a p p r o p r i a t e time. A more complex analogy 
McDougall u s e d ^ 1 0 4 ^ (1923), when he l i k e n e d i n s t i n c t t o a locked 
chamber w i t h d i f f e r e n t l o c k s t h a t a r e only opened by s u i t a b l e keys, 
i . e . s t i m u l i , when need a r i s e s . The quest i o n s t i l l i s whether or 
not t h e r e i s a uniform key s u i t i n g a l l the d i f f e r e n t s p e c i e s or t h a t 
i t i s r a t h e r v a r i a b l e according to every p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n . The 
c o n s i d e r a b l e and growing l i t e r a t u r e , both experimental and 
o b s e r v a t i o n a l , i n d i c a t e s the v a r i a b i l i t y of the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of 
the e s s e n t i a l s t i m u l u s o b j e c t and the i n s t i n c t i v e behaviour i s 
a c c o r d i n g l y v a r i e g a t e d and f l e x i b l e . I t cannot be g a i n s a i d t h a t what 
has been c a l l e d "the n a t i v i s t - e m p i r i c i s t c o n t r o v e r s y " ^ ' " ^ always 
e x i s t s i n any d i s c u s s i o n on any d i s c i p l i n e i n v o l v i n g behaviour. 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , s t u d i e s made, f o r example, by H.C. Bingham^ 1 0 6^ (19 1 3 ) , 
(103) i b i d . 
(104) An O u t l i n e of Psychology, o p . c i t . , pp. 98, 106, 109. 
(105) Smith, F.V., E x p l a n a t i o n of Human Behaviour, o p . c i t . , p.152. 
(106) " S i z e and Form P e r c e p t i o n i n the G a l l u s Domesticus" 
J . Anim. Beh., v o l . 3, pp. 260-273. 
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M. H e r z ^ 1 0 7 \ l 9 3 8 ) , K.S.Lashley and J . T . R u s s e l l ^ 1 0 8 \ l 9 3 4 ) , L a s h l e y ^ 1 0 9 ^ 
( 1 9 3 8 ) , W . K o h l e r ( 1 1 0 ) (1950), Smith et a l ( 1 1 1 ) ( 1 9 6 1 ) , S m i t h ^ 1 1 2 ) ( 1 9 6 0 , 
1968a), point to a p r i n c i p a l f a c t , namely, t h a t t h e r e i s an i n n a t e 
f e a t u r e of a g e n e r a l nature u n d e r l y i n g the o r g a n i s a t i o n of the 
p e r c e p t u a l system. I n S m i t h ' s ^ 1 1 " ^ (1960a) own words, "The f a c t t h a t 
the animal r e a c t s to the l a r g e r or s m a l l e r of the two s t i m u l u s o b j e c t s 
and not to the one to which i t has been t r a i n e d to r e a c t , could 
suggest t h a t the animal apprehends r e l a t i o n s h i p s between o b j e c t s m 
w 
the a c t of p e r c e p t i o n . 
(107) See; E l l i s , W.D., "A Source Book of G e s t a l t Psychology", London, 
Routledge and Kegan P a u l , pp. 253-263. 
(108) "The Mechanism of V i s i o n . XI : A P r e l i m i n a r y T e s t of I n n a t e 
O r g a n i s a t i o n " , J.Genet.Psychol., v o l . 45, pp«, 136-143. 
(109) "The Experimental A n a l y s i s of I n s t i n c t i v e Behaviour", Psych.Rev., 
v o l . 45, pp. 445-471. 
(110) See; E l l i s , W.D., "A Source Book of G e s t a l t Psychology", London, 
Routledge and Kegan P a u l , pp. 217-227. 
(111) " P r o p e r t i e s of the V i s u a l Stimulus f o r the Approach Response i n 
the Domestic Chick", Anim.Beh., v o l . 9 , o p . c i t . , pp.159-165. 
(112) ( I ) (1960) "Towards D e f i n i t i o n of the Stimulus S i t u a t i o n f o r 
the Approach Response i n the Domestic Chick", 
Anim. Beh., v o l . 8 , o p . c i t . , pp.197-199. 
( n ) (1968a) I m p r i n t i n g , MSS, o p . c i t . , 
(113) E x p l a n a t i o n of Human Behaviour, o p . c i t . , pp. 151-2. 
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The unplicatxons of McDougall*s analogy mentioned above, 
appear t o have been a t t r a c t i v e t o L o r e n z ^ 1 1 ^ ( 1 9 5 0 ) and T m b e r g e n ^ 1 1 ^ 
(1950,1951). Both w r i t e r s discussed the mechanisms underpinning 
i n s t i n c t i v e r e a c t i o n s , and t a l k e d of "the damming up" of c e r t a i n inborn 
a c t i v i t y . "The damming up" assumes t h a t t h e re i s a p h y s i o l o g i c a l 
mechanism which stops the discharge of any a c t i v i t y unless the 
organism faces the appropriate s i t u a t i o n and s t i m u l a t i o n t o release 
t h i s stoppage. This e n t a i l s t h a t t h e re i s a r e q u i s i t e "innate 
r e l e a s i n g mechanism", or (I.R.M.), f o r b r e v i t y , which i s attuned t o 
the r i g h t s t i m u l u s , and which i s unlocked by a p a r t i c u l a r r e l e a s e r 
( k e y ) , so t h a t behaviour i s allowed t o f l o w t o the next lowest l e v e l . -
These lowest l e v e l s may i n t u r n form blocks which prevent a c t i v i t y . 
Even so, t h e r e i s no wastage of energy a t a l l . This i s so, f o r the 
simple f a c t t h a t a c t i o n w i l l be d i v e r t e d t o a c t i v a t e " a p p e t i t i v e 
behaviour" which i s both d i r e c t i v e and purposive. A c t u a l l y , i n 
McDougall's w r i t i n g s , the words " a p p e t i t e " and " a p p e t i t i v e " are o f t e n 
encountered (Chapter V above). The essence of h i s v e r s i o n i s t h a t 
a p p e t i t e i s not t o be thought of as d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from i n s t i n c t . 
Such a n o t i o n has apparently, d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y , i n f l u e n c e d 
(114) "The Comparative Method i n Studying i n n a t e Behaviour P a t t e r n s " , 
Symposia of the Society f o r Experimental B i o l o g y , v o l . 4, 
pp. 221-268. 
(115) ( I ) (1950) "The H i e r a r c h i c a l Organisation of nervous 
mechanisms Underlying I n s t i n c t i v e Behaviour", Symposia of 
the Society f o r Experimental Biology, v o l . 4 , o p . c i t . , 
pp. 305-312. 
( l i ) The Study of I n s t i n c t , Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 
o p . c i t . 
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w r i t e r s such as, f o r i n s t a n c e , Wallace C r a i g ^ 1 ^ (1918) and 
L o renz^ 1 1^(1950,1968). Both wrote of " a p p e t i t i v e behaviour" and 
"aversive behaviour" as two types of purposive searching. The 
former k i n d c o n s i s t s of changeable searching a c t i v i t i e s which 
g r a d u a l l y become s p e c i f i c . The l a t t e r type i s s i m i l a r t o the former, 
but i t goes on u n t i l a s t a t e of e q u i l i b r i u m i s reached. The 
fundamental d i f f e r e n c e between Craig's and Lorenz's treatment of 
a p p e t i t i v e behaviour i s t h i s : the former considered a p p e t i t e or 
"appetence", as he sometimes c a l l e d i t , a s o r t of c o n d i t i o n or a 
s t a t e of a g i t a t i o n t h a t shows i t s e l f e x t e r n a l l y ; whereas Lorenz 
regarded the a p p e t i t i v e behaviour as t r u l y purposive, s e l f -
s t i m u l a t i n g and consummatory, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n i t s pursuance of a 
proper g o a l . I t i s f l e x i b l e and represents the v a r i a b l e phase of 
an i n s t i n c t i v e behavioural sequence; and here, once again, i s one 
o f , t o quote Thorpe (1963), the "challenging s i t u a t i o n s which makes 
the subject of i n s t i n c t a t present so a t t r a c t i v e and so s t i m u l a t i n g " , 
(116) "Appetites and Aversions as Constituents of I n s t i n c t s " , 
B i o l . B u l l . , v o l . 34, pp. 91-107. 
(117) ( l ) (1950) Symp.Soc.Exp.Biol., v o l . 4 . , o p . c i t . , pp. 221-268. 
( i i ) On Aggression, Methuen, paperback ed„, pp. 43, 74. 
(118) Learning and I n s t i n c t i n Animals, o p . c i t . , p. 34. 
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not only t o p s y c h o l o g i s t s , but also t o ethologxsts and physxologxsts. 
w (119) What Thorpe and ZangXiill (1963) simply c a l l " innate mechanism" 
of behaviour, Lorenz and Tinbergen name as "innat e r e l e a s i n g 
mechanisms" or (I.R.M.). The i n v e s t i g a t i o n s made by Lorenz and 
Tinbergen are b u i l t on behavioural r e p e r t o r y and p h y s i o l o g i c a l 
evidence. Both w r i t e r s use such phrases as " c e n t r a l nervous impulse 
f l o w " and " r e a c t i o n s p e c i f i c energy". Such expressions are 
reminiscent of McDougall's hypothesis of l i b e r a t e d energy discussed 
above. I t could be sai d t h e r e f o r e t h a t t h e i r studies are much i n 
l i n e w i t h , and tend t o confirm McDougall's view t h a t "the evoking 
of the i n s t i n c t i v e a c t i o n , the opening of the door of the i n s t i n c t 
on perception of i t s s p e c i f i c o b j e c t increases the urgency of the 
a p p e t i t e " . ^ ^ " ^ This means t h a t energy, which i s released when 
necessary, i s always l a t e n t xn i n s t i n c t . Therefore i t i s hard t o 
t h i n k w i t h R.A. H x n d e ^ 1 2 1 \ l 9 6 0 ) t h a t the i n s t i n c t u a l power ceases 
once the goal i s achieved. I f t h i s i s so, the x n d i v i d u a l "would be 
(122) 
incapable t o a c t " , as McDougall f i r m l y b e l i e v e d . I n s t i n c t s , 
(119) Current Problems xn Anxmal Behavxour, op.ext., p.91. 
(120) An outlxne of Psychology, op.ext., p.98; see a l s o ; pp.96, 
97, 9 9 f f . 
(121) "Energy Models of Motxvation", Symp.Soc.Exp.Biol., vol.14, 
pp.199-213. 
(122) An I n t r o d u c t i o n t o Social Psychology, op.ext., p.38. 
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(123 ) as W.E. Sargent (1965) has put i t , "are the stream of man's l i f e 
energy". Sargent has l i k e n e d them t o "w a t e r - j e t s forcxng ( t h e i r ) 
(124) 
way through the c r u s t of the e a r t h " , an analogy which, m i t s 
essence, i s s i m i l a r t o McDougall's analogy of the " l o c k " and the 
"key" and the explanation of the "neurokyme". (123) 
The p o s i t i o n , however, appears t o be as Smith has 
observed t h a t "There are many features emphasised by the e t h o l o g i s t s 
which are reminiscent of McDougall's e a r l i e r w r i t i n g s " . Smith 
seems t o have i n mind the advanced st u d i e s made by Lorenz, 
(126 ^  (127 ^  f l 2 8 ^ Tmbergen, Hmde, Hmde and Tmbergen (1965) , W. E t k i n , 
and many others. Indeed, Lorenz and Txnbergen could demonstrate t h a t 
behavxoural events xn higher organisms and lower organisms have much 
i n common. They, of course, allowed f o r the complexity of the acts 
f u l f i l l e d . Comparative study of behaviour can adduce r e s u l t s which 
are h i g h l y s a t i s f a c t o r y . Elements whxch are of a common e v o l u t i o n a r y 
(129) 
o r i g i n are always accounted f o r i n e t h o l o g i c a l s t u d i e s . 
(123) Psychology, Teach Yourself ed., p.55. 
(124) i b i d , p.55. 
(125) Explanation of Human Behaviour, o p . c i t . , p.160. 
(126) op.ext., 
(127) "The Comparative Study of Species - S p e c i f i c Behaviour", 
Readings i n Animal Behavxour, o p . o i t . , pp.58-67. 
(128) o p . c i t . , 
(129) Hinde, R.A. and Tmbergen, N., "The Comparative Study of Species 
- S p e c i f i c Behaviour", Readings i n Animal Behaviour, o p . c i t . , 
P.67. 
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Comparative methods, when combined w i t h studies of " f u n c t i o n and 
causation" can allow f o r an enormous progress i n t h i s way. So, 
EoH, Hess^ 1 3 0^(1965) has s t a t e d t h a t ethology, being i n s p i r e d by 
Lorenz's and Tinbergen's i n v e s t i g a t i o n s "began t o expand i n t o the 
n e u r o p h y s i o l o g i c a l bases of behaviour". 
I n s t i n c t i v e behaviour, at any r a t e , i s complicated, 
and there are various elements which c o n s t i t u t e i t s general 
s t r u c t u r e . Lorenz and Tinbergen, f o r example, have mentioned 
several such f a c t o r s as " r e f l e x e s " , "taxes", " f i x e d a c t i o n p a t t e r n s " 
or i n s t i n c t i v e movements, "consummatory a c t s " as w e l l as 
a p p e t i t i v e and aversive behaviour. I n e t h o l o g y ^ 1 3 1 ^ t h e i n s t i n c t i v e 
behaviour i s d i s t i n g u i s h e d from r e f l e x e s at l e a s t m two ways: 
(1) The i n s t i n c t i v e behaviour o f t e n depends upon s p e c i a l c o n d i t i o n s 
r e l a t e d t o the organism's i n t e r n a l s t a t e . (2) I n s t i n c t i v e behaviour 
(130) "Ethology : An Approach toward the complete Analysis of 
Behaviour", Readings i n Animal Behaviour, o p . c i t . , 
P.17. 
* Taxes are d i r e c t e d locomotory r e a c t i o n s of m o t i l e 
organisms. 
** The consummatory act i s made i n response t o one or more 
r e l e a s e r s . I t s components are the t a x i s and the f i x e d 
a c t i o n p a t t e r n s . 
(131) ( I ) D e t h i e r , V.G. and E l i o t S t e l l a r , Animal Behaviour ; I t s 
E v o l u t i o n a r y and Neurological Basis, (1965), o p . c i t . , 
P.71. 
( n ) Hebb, D.O., A Textbook of Psychology, P h i l a d e l p h i a , Saunders 
Co., 2nd ed., (1966), p.140. 
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i s always regarded as a means-end o r i e n t e d a c t i v i t y ; t h i s , anyway, 
does not r u l e out e x t e r n a l i n f l u e n c e s by which i t i s sometimes 
(132) 
t r i g g e r e d . The re p r o d u c t i v e behaviour of the male s t i c l e b a c k 
f i s h , f o r example, i s a combination of various i n s t i n c t i v e 
a c t i v i t i e s such as m i g r a t i o n , f i g h t i n g , n e s t i n g , mating and 
pa r e n t a l a c t s , many demonstrably i n s t i g a t e d by s p e c i f i c s t i m u l i . 
Nor have e t h o l o g i s t s escaped c r i t i c i s m . 
(133) 
D.S. Lehrman (1953) c r i t i c i s e d the e t h o l o g i c a l movement, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y Lorenz's approach. Lehrman admitted t h a t Lorenz's 
theory of i n n a t e l y i n s t i n c t i v e behaviour has been extensive m i t s 
impact l a r g e l y because : (a) of i t s "diagrammatical s i m p l i c i t y " , 
(b) of i t s use of "neurophysiological concepts", ( c ) of i t s d e a l i n g 
w i t h the "behaviour p a t t e r n s drawn from the l i f e c ycle of animals 
discussed". Lorenz's view i s t h a t energy s p e c i f i c f o r the 
i n s t i n c t i v e a c t i v i t y can accumulate continuously i n the neural 
centre s p e c i f i c f o r t h a t a c t i v i t y . This means t h a t the organism 
does not remain passive, and t h a t purposive behaviour i s being 
d i r e c t e d toward the performance of the i n s t i n c t i v e f u n c t i o n s . Yet 
(132) Tinbergen, N., The Study of I n s t i n c t , o p . c i t . , pp.173, 192; 
c f . Thorpe, W.H., "Ethology as a New Branch of B i o l o g y " i n 
Readings i n Animal Behaviour, (1965), o p . c i t . , 
p.48. 
(133) "A C r i t i q u e of Konrad Lorenz's Theory of I n s t i n c t i v e Behaviour", 
Quart. Rev, of B i o l . , vol.28, pp.337-363. 
(134) i b i d , fl. 337. 
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Lehrman xndicated t h a t he was not h o s p i t a b l e t o Lorenz's p o s i t i o n . 
Without s p e c i f y i n g how, he thought t h a t Lorenz's theory i s 
" r i g i d l y c a n a l i z e d " and has "serious f l a w s " . ^ ^ ' ^ A f t e r t h i s , he 
attacked the theory of i n s t i n c t i n general. "Any i n s t i n c t theory", 
he wrote, "which regards ' i n s t i n c t * as immanent, performed, V 
i n h e r i t e d , or based on s p e c i f i c neural s t r u c t u r e s , i s bound to d i v e r t 
the i n v e s t i g a t i o n of behaviour development from fundamental a n a l y s i s 
and the study of developmental problems". 
(137) 
J.S. Kennedy (1954), a B r i t i s h Z o o l o g i s t , l i k e 
Lehrman, has attacked ethology and i t s e n t h u s i a s t i c proponents, 
e s p e c i a l l y Lorenz and Tinbergen. He c r i t i c i s e d Lorenz's d i s t i n c t i o n 
between "endogenous" and " r e f l e x i v e n e u r o p h y s i o l o g i c a l " processes, 
and described such a d i s t i n c t i o n as s u b j e c t i v e and i n d e f e n s i b l e . He 
t h i n k s the e t h o l o g i s t s are harming t h e i r p o s i t i o n "because of t h e i r 
tendency t o f o r c e i n t o the portmanteau of i n s t i n c t as much of the 
(138) 
v a r i a t i o n of behaviour as they p o s s i b l y can". Kennedy then 
attacked Tmbergen's n o t i o n i m p l i e d i n the Study of I n s t i n c t (1951), 
namely, t h a t the e t h o l o g i s t must study i n s t i n c t m the f i r s t place, 
and l e a r n i n g must be considered l a t e r . 
(135) i b i d , p. 358. 
(136) i b i d , p. 359. 
(137) " I s Modern Ethology Objective ?", B.J.Animal Beh., v o l . 2 , 
pp. 12-19. 
(138) i b i d , p. 15. 
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Despite such s t r i c t u r e s , which can be expected i n any 
d i s c i p l i n e , the e t h o l o g i c a l studies have undoubtedly d i s s i p a t e d much 
confusion which was associated w i t h the perceptual phase of i n s t i n c t . 
The close observations and the systematic experimentations have 
shown t h a t animal behaviour i s expressive of the discharge of 
i n t e r n a l energy which i s serviceable t o the i n d i v i d u a l and i t s 
species. The general p i c t u r e presented by such i n v e s t i g a t i o n s i s 
t h a t i n s t i n c t i v e a c t i v i t i e s f u n c t i o n i n accordance w i t h f i e l d f a c t o r s 
t y p i f i e d by n a t u r a l needs, both p h y s i o l o g i c a l and p s y c h i c a l . I t 
would be d i f f i c u l t t o circumscribe a l l "the excesses of the 
(139) 
purposive i n t e r p r e t a t i o n connected w i t h i n s t i n c t , t o quote Smith 
(1960a); t h i s i s so because "the l i t e r a t u r e i s v a s t , heterogeneous 
and growing a t such a r a p i d r a t e t h a t a t any one p o i n t of time i t 
would be impossible t o give an adequate account unless an e n t i r e 
volume were devoted^14°^to i t " (Smith, 1960a). 
However, McDougall's p o s i t i o n may be summed up i n 
Smith's own statement t h a t , " i t i s c l e a r from most of McDougall's 
w r i t i n g s t h a t he had conceived of each i n s t i n c t as associated w i t h 
a s p e c i f i c ' neurological c o r r e l a t e ' and the i m p l i e d image i s one 
of s p e c i f i c connection between s p e c i f i c neural o r g a n i s a t i o n s " . ^ 1 4 1 ^ 
(139) Explanation of Human Behaviour, o p . c i t . , p.159. 
(140) i b i d . , p.159. 
(141) i b i d . , p.133. 
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This may mean t h a t from the beginning, McDougall discerned t h a t 
t h e r e were a number of r e l a t i v e l y d i s t i n c t i n s t i n c t s , each one 
mediated by a separate " n e u r o l o g i c a l c o r r e l a t e " . Yet i t i s of 
paramount importance t o r e a l i z e t h a t the various i n s t i n c t s are 
i n no way independent of one another; and McDougall i n no sense 
meant t h i s d e spite the f a c t t h a t he discussed them separately. 
He apparently d i d so t o c l a r i f y the nature of the f u n c t i o n of each 
one. I n s t i n c t i v e behaviour i s a c t u a l l y rhythmic, so i t cannot be 
ascribed t o any p a r t i c u l a r i n s t i n c t , and i t i s very much erroenous 
t o t h i n k t h a t i n s t i n c t s f u n c t i o n independently of each other. The 
question, however, i s the nature of an i n s t i n c t i v e a c t . The 
(142) 
combined e f f o r t s of e t h o l o g i s t s and neurophysiologists have 
r e s u l t e d i n p o i n t i n g out c e r t a i n l e v e l s of i n s t i n c t i v e behaviour, 
so t h a t the hypothesis of the mechanism of such an i n s t i n c t i v e 
behaviour now embraces "the r e a l i t y b e t t e r than any theory thus f a r 
advanced"^ 1 4^^ (Tmbergen, 1951). The various l e v e l s enumerated 
are : (1) The l e v e l of the i n d i v i d u a l motor u n i t ; (2) a l l the motor 
u n i t s belonging t o one muscle; (3) co-ordinated f u n c t i o n s of 
muscular complexes r e l a t i n g t o a s i n g l e j o i n t ; (4) co-ordinated 
(142) ( l ) Smith, F.V., Explanation of Human Behaviour, o p . c i t . , 
pp. 132-147. 
( n ) , I m p r i n t i n g , MSS., o p . c i t . , pp. 3-4,7-9, 
12-13, 24, 29. 
(143) The Study of I n s t i n c t , o p . c i t . , p. 107; Cf. Tmbergen's paper: 
"The S h e l l Menace" i n Readings i n Animal Behaviour, (1965), 
o p . c i t . , pp. 532-540. 
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movements of a lxmb as a whole; (5) co-ordinated movements of a 
number of locomotor organs r e s u l t i n g i n locomotion; (6) the highest 
l e v e l common t o a l l animals, the movements of the animals as a 
(144) 
whole. Such a h i e r a r c h i c a l o r g a n i s a t i o n , i n t e r e s t i n g though 
i t i s , would r a i s e a question t h a t i n s t i n c t i v e a c t i v i t y i s r a t h e r 
v a r i a b l e i n connection w i t h the goal sought a f t e r . I n p o i n t of 
f a c t , i n s t i n c t i v e behaviour i s so adaptive and purposive m 
character where the methods and movements of the i n d i v i d u a l are 
d i r e c t i v e and they change according t o circumstances, w h i l e the goal 
i s constant. The v a r i a b i l i t y m i n s t i n c t i v e f u n c t i o n s i s e n t i r e l y 
dependent on the l e v e l concerned. The lower l e v e l s , f o r instance, 
a c t i v a t e the simple and motor movements, whereas the higher l e v e l s 
g i v e r i s e t o purposive a c t i v i t i e s which are h i g h l y adaptive and 
d i r e c t i v e i n seeking the end d e s i r e d . 
As a psycho-physical d i s p o s i t i o n , i n s t i n c t seems t o 
imply what H.W. Nissen (1953) c a l l s "the s e n s i t i z i n g e f f e c t s of 
neural s t i m u l a t i o n " , ^ " ^ ^ a phrase which c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e s the 
l o c a l i z a t i o n of i n s t i n c t i v e f u n c t i o n w i t h i n the nervous system. 
(144) ( I ) Weiss, P., " S e l f - d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of the Basic p a t t e r n s of 
Co-ordination", Comp.Psych., Mongr., vol.17, 
(1941), pp. 1-96. p. 23. 
( n ) Tinbergen, N., The Study of I n s t i n c t , o p . c i t . , p.122. 
( m ) T h o r p e , W.H., Learning and I n s t i n c t i n Animals, o p . c i t . , 
pp. 30-32. 
(145) " I n s t i n c t as seen by a Psychologist" i n : W.C.Allec, W.H.Nissen, 
and M.F.Nimkoff, "A Re-Examination of the concept of I n s t i n c t " , 
Psych.Rev., vol.60, pp. 287-297. 
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Consequently t h i s would e n t a i l t h a t , (1) the behaviour displayed by 
the i n d i v i d u a l i s h i e r a r c h i c a l i n n ature, i . e . , i t t r a n s i t s from 
higher l e v e l s downward t o the lower ones. (2) Each ongof the 
h i e r a r c h i c a l l e v e l s , w i t h i n the nervous system, has c e r t a i n 
i n t e g r a t i v e f u n c t i o n s . (3) The h i e r a r c h i c a l centres of the system 
of these l e v e l s are neurophysiological i n character. (4) The 
neu r p h y s i o l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p underpinning i n s t i n c t s would 
ne c e s s i t a t e t h a t they are mediated by "ne u r o l o g i c a l c o r r e l a t e s " , 
which would e v e n t u a l l y mean t h a t the i n s t i n c t i v e l y purposive 
a c t i v i t y i s i n t i m a t e l y r e l a t e d t o "a common neurophysiological 
m e c h a n i s m " , " a common t a x i s m e c h a n i s m " . T h e question now 
i s whether or not there i s such a system of centres, and i f i t 
e x i s t s , where i t i s t o be l o c a t e d . This i s t o be now considered. 
McDougall already^ 1^^^(1932) l o c a l i z e d i n s t i n c t s or 
" p r o p e n s i t i e s " i n the " o p t i c thalamus", the mid-brain. So i n t e r e s t 
i n l o c a l i s i n g the source of energy appears t o have been considered 
f o r q u i t e a long time now, and, t o c i t e Smith, "the systematic 
experimental study of innate p a t t e r n s of behaviour has s t e a d i l y 
(146) Tinbergen, N., The Study of I n s t i n c t . , o p . c i t . , p.112. 
(147) Thorpe, H.W., Learning and I n s t i n c t i n Animals, o p . c i t . , p.282. 
(148) The Energies of Men, London, Methuen, p.321. 
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(149) (150) 
increased". According t o Smith v '(1960a, 1968a), 
E.H. Hess^ 1 5 1^ (1965,1967), Von Hoist and Von Saint Paul ( 1 9 6 7 ) / 1 5 2 ^ 
t h i s increase s t a r t e d about 1930; from t h i s time onwards, E. Von 
Hoist and W.R. Hess ( 1 9 3 0 * s ) , ^ 1 5 3 ^ w.R. Hess and M. Brugger (1943, 
1 9 4 4 ) , ^ 1 5 4 ) M. Brugger ( 1 9 4 3 ) , ^ 1 5 5 ^ could demonstrate existence of 
ne u r o l o g i c a l o r g a n i s a t i o n embodied m d i f f e r e n t behavioural p a t t e r n s . 
This was achieved by s t i m u l a t i n g a p a r t i c u l a r b r a i n r e g i o n , the 
hypothalamus of b i r d s and cats w i t h very f i n e e l e c t r o d e s . E l i c i t a t i o n 
of the cat's behaviour, f o r example, showed t h a t not only d i d i t 
(149) Explanation of Human Behaviour, o p . c i t . , p.159, see al s o ; by 
the same author: I m p r i n t i n g , MSS, o p . c i t . 
(150) ( l ) Explanation of Human Behaviour, o p . c i t . , p.159. 
( n ) I m p r i n t i n g , MSS, o p . c i t . , pp. 10, 12-15. 
(151) ( I ) Readings i n Animal Behaviour, o p . c i t . , p.17. 
( n ) " i m p r i n t i n g i n Animals" i n : Psychobiology, o p . c i t . , 
pp. 107-112. 
(152) " E l e c t r i c a l l y C o n t r o l l e d Behaviour" i n Psychobiology, o p . c i t . , 
pp. 5 6 f f , 5 7 f f . 
(153) ( l ) Smith, F.V., I m p r i n t i n g , MSS, o p . c i t . 
( n ) V. Hoist and V.S. Paul, o p . c i t . 
(154) Smith, F.V., I m p r i n t i n g , o p . c i t . , p.10. 
(155) ( I ) Smith, F.V., Explanation of Human Behaviour, o p . c i t . , p.135. 
( n ) Smith, F.V., I m p r i n t i n g , MSS, o p . c i t . 
( i n ) Tinbergen, N., The Study of I n s t i n c t , o p . c i t . , p.108. 
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sleep, but also x t looked f o r a certaxn place t o sleep. "The 
behavxour", wrxtes Smxth^ 1^^(1968a), "appeared t o be normal xn 
the sense t h a t x t was co-ordxnated and apparently p u r p o s e f u l " . 
Now f u r t h e r support f o r the exxstence of the 
hxerarchxcal centres of behavxoural p a t t e r n s comes from varxous 
sources of whxch Smxth (1950a,1968a) has made an extensxve study. 
He r e p o r t s , f o r example, t h a t B. Anderson and S.M. McCann (1955) 
could show t h a t x f the hypothalamus of goats xs stxmulated 
e l e c t r x c a l l y or by applying " s a l i n e s o l u t i o n " , the goats could "be 
induced t o d r i n k " excessive water, though they were already 
" s a t i a t e d " . Another example, which may w e l l add support t o 
McDougall's p o s i t i o n , can be found i n A . E . F i s h e r , s ^ 1 ^ \ l 9 6 4 ) 
s t u d i e s . Experimenting on r a t s , Fisher's purport was t o examine 
t h e i r " t h i r s t - d r i v e " by chemically s t i m u l a t i n g the hypothalamus 
and a d j o i n i n g regions of the b r a i n . The conclusion reached was t h a t 
the chemical s o l u t i o n a p p l i e d t o any of the explored areas of 
the b r a i n would s t i m u l a t e the e n t i r e t h i r s t - d r i v e system. Apparently, 
Fisher was w e l l on the way t o i s o l a t e a p a r t i c u l a r c i r c u i t which, 
when a c t i v a t e d , could suppress other d r i v e s and thus ensure t h a t the 
(156) I m p r i n t i n g , o p . c i t . , p.10. 
(157) "Chemical S t i m u l a t i o n of the B r a i n " , Psychobiology, 
op.ext., p.73. 
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animal's needs f o r water were met. The s i g n i f i c a n c e of these and 
other e a r l i e r studies such as those done by W.B.Cannon and S.W. 
B r i t t o n ( 1 9 2 5 ) / 1 5 8 ) P. Bard (3934 / 1 5 9 ^ 1 9 4 0 ) , P.Bard and 
V.B. Mountcastle ( 1 9 4 7 ) , ^ ^ ^ i n d i c a t e c e r t a i n p o i n t s of p a r t i c u l a r 
importance. 
(1) The d e s c r i p t i o n s o f f e r e d p o i n t t o the f a c t t h a t there are 
various l e v e l s , i . e . , besides the hypothalamus, there are the 
c o r t e x , which fu n c t i o n s both as e x c i t a t o r y and i n h i b i t o r y , and the 
thalamus proper. 
(2) Systems, which are subordinate t o the hypothalamic c e n t r e , m 
t u r n c o n t r o l other centres lower i n the h i e r a r c h y . 
(3) By s y s t e m a t i c a l l y s t i m u l a t i n g the hypothalamic areas c e r t a i n 
behavioural p a t t e r n s , such as sleep, e a t i n g or f i g h t i n g , can be 
e l i c i t e d . 
(158) "Studies on the Conditions of A c t i v i t y i n Ductless Glands", 
XV, Pseudaffective Medulliadrenal Secretions", Amer.J.Phys10I., 
v o l . 72, pp. 283-294. 
(159) "On Emotional Expression a f t e r D e c o r t i c a t i o n w i t h some Remarks 
on C e r t a i n T h e o r e t i c a l Views", Psych.Rev., v o l . 4 1 , I , pp.309-
329, I I , pp. 424-449. 
(160) "Some Forebram Mechanisms i n v o l v e d i n the Expression of Rage 
w i t h Special Reference t o Suppression of Angry Behaviour", 
Res. Publ. Ass. Nerv. Ment. P i s . , vol.27, pp. 362-404. 
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(4) The behaviour i n s t i g a t e d was mostly co-ordinated. 
(5) These studies have discovered the anatomical basis of the centres 
which c o n t r o l the i n s t i n c t i v e a c t i v i t i e s g e n e r a l l y . So, t o quote 
Smith^ 1^ 1^(1960a), " I t i s thus p o s s i b l e , t o conceive of the several 
sources of s t i m u l a t i o n operating j o i n t l y , and of a degree of mutual 
assistance or even of compensation". The whole tendency, however, 
has been t o s t r e s s the great advantage of sub-thalamic centres, 
and s t i l l i t i s of g r e a t e s t importance t o r e a l i s e t h a t , t o c i t e 
S m i t h ^ ^ 2 ^ (1960a), "The hypothalamus has a wealth of p o s s i b l e forms 
of discharge t o other p a r t s of the b r a i n and being a r i c h l y 
v a s cularised area can q u i c k l y r e f l e c t any changes i n the chemical 
and p h y s i c a l p r o p e r t i e s of the blood". 
The ^ f o r e - g o i n g s t u d i e s , however, can serve various x 
purposes, s i g n i f i c a n t among which can be enumerated: (a) they tend 
t o r e p l i c a t e McDougall's v e r s i o n of i n s t i n c t as a psycho-physical 
f a c t o r determining the behaviour of the l i v i n g organism, (b) They 
serve t o r e v i v e i n t e r e s t i n the concept of i n s t i n c t as a 
b i o l o g i c a l u n i t i n the Mendelian sense, (c) They o f f e r f u r t h e r 
e t h o l o g i c a l evidence which i s congruent w i t h the e v o l u t i o n a r y 
c o n t i n u i t y ; the e t h o l o g i c a l evidence i n t u r n adds support t o the 
(161) Explanation of Human Behaviour, o p . c i t . , p.141. 
(162) i b i d , p. 140. 
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existence of i n s t i n c t as a key f a c t o r m any purposive a c t i v i t y , 
(d) They tend t o cons o l i d a t e the n o t i o n t h a t the co-ordinated 
dynamic acts are mediated by centres i n a p a r t i c u l a r place i n rhe 
c e n t r a l nervous system which now g e n e r a l l y appears t o be c a l l e d 
"the i n s t i n c t c e n t r e " . (e) The i n s t i n c t s are mediated i n 
McDougall's terms, by " s p e c i f i c n e u r o l o g i c a l c o r r e l a t e s " . 
3. I n s t i n c t s i n R e l a t i o n t o Emotions. 
L i k e i n s t i n c t , the concept of emotion i s sometimes 
confusedly used and at times l o o s e l y discussed. I t has given r i s e 
t o a number of p h i l o s o p h i c a l and psychological problems. The most 
important of them concerns the f u n c t i o n of emotions and the 
c r i t e r i a f o r t h e i r v a l i d i t y . The t r a d i t i o n a l theory, f o r example, held 
by w r i t e r s such as Dugald S t e w a r t ^ 1 6 4 \ l 8 5 4 ) , Thomas R e i d ^ 1 6 5 \ l 7 8 5 , 
f166) 
1843), Adam Smith^ ; ( 1 7 5 9 ) , Alexander Sutherland V ;(1898} Herbert 
(163) See f o r example: E t k i n , W i l l i a m . , "The E t h o l o g i c a l Concept of 
I n s t i n c t " , Ch.7, p.171, i n Social Behaviour and Organisation 
Among Vertebrates, ed. by: E t k i n , W i l l i a m , Univ. of Chicago 
Press, (1964). 
(164) Collected Works, ed. by S i r W i l l i a m Hamilton, Edinburgh, v o l . 1 1 , 
pp. 12-36. 
(165) ( 1 ) (1785) Essays on the I n t e l l e c t u a l Powers of Man, o p . c i t . , 
(11) (1843) Essays on the A c t i v e Powers of the Human Mind, o p . c i t 
(166) Theory of Moral Sentiments, Reprinted i n B r i t i s h M o r a l i s t s , v o l . 1 
ed. by L.A.Selby-Bigge, (1790). 
(167) The O r i g i n and Growth of the Moral I n s t i n c t , 2 v o l s . , London, 
Longmans, v o l . 1 1 , Ch.XXII. 
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S p e n c e r ^ 1 6 8 ^ (1855) , and to an e x t e n t , Th.Ribot ^ 1 6 9 \ l 8 9 7 ) , 
regarded emotions as " f e e l i n g s " or " p a s s i o n s " . However, among 
a l l d i s c u s s i o n s of emotions, McDougall's own treatment of the 
s u b j e c t i s c o n s idered (J.Drever : 1 9 3 2 « ^ 1 7 0 ^ E r o l Bedford : 1 9 5 7 } ^ 1 7 1 ^ 
(172) 
R.S. P e t e r s and C.A. Mace : (1962) as more commendable. His 
g e n e r a l conception of an emotion i s r e m i n i s c e n t of Darwin's view 
expressed i n E x p r e s s i o n of Emotions i n Man and Animals (1 8 7 2 ) , 
namely, t h a t the emotions a r i s e i n v o l u n t a r i l y . Emotional a c t i v i t y 
can be s t u d i e d i n s e v e r a l ways : p h y s i o l o g i c a l l y , i n t r o s p e c t i v e l y , 
b e h a v i o u n s t i c a l l y ; but McDougall could remedy a long-standing 
e r r o r whereby emotions were regarded as a s p e c t s of experience only, 
w h i l e the outward a c t i v i t y which commonly accompanies them was 
c o n s i d e r e d as a process having no d e f i n a b l e r e l a t i o n to the 
emotional e x p e r i e n c e . McDougall's c o r r e c t i o n i s i d e n t i f i e d i n 
(168) The P r i n c i p l e s of Psychology, p a r t IV, C h . v m . 
(169) The Psychology of Emotions, London, Walter S c o t t , 
pp. 93-94. 
(170) "The Nature of Emotion", J.Abnor. and S o c i a l Psych., v o l . X X V I I , 
No.3, pp. 2 9 8 f f . 
(171) "Emotions" Proc. A r i s t o t . S o c i e t y , v o l . L V I I , pp. 2 8 1 f f . 
(172) "Emotions and the category of P a s s i v i t y " , P r o c . A r i s t o t . S o c i e t y , 
v o l . L X I I , pp. 123ff., c f . 
H.E. and M.C.Jones, "Genetic S t u d i e s of Emotions", P s y c h . B u l l . , 
vol.27, No.l, (1930), pp. 4 0 f f . 
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t r e a t i n g the two a s p e c t s of any primary emotional or i n s t i n c t i v e 
excitement as but one and the same "complete s e r i e s of 
(173) 
phenomena". I n McDougall's system, an emotion i s conceived 
of as an e x p r e s s i o n i n d i c a t i v e of an i n s t i n c t ; and h i s d e f i n i t i o n 
of i n s t i n c t was i n f a c t i n terms of d e f i n i t e emotions. 
I n a d d i t i o n to "primary" emotions, McDougall spoke 
of "complex f e e l i n g s " which he c a l l e d " d e r i v e d emotions". I t was 
i n regard to such and f u r t h e r terminology t h a t t h e r e had been 
l i v e l y c o n t r o v e r s y between him and Alexander F. Shand; and t h i s 
may now be worth c o n s i d e r a t i o n . 
(174) 
I n 1896, A.F. Shanid s e t out a p o s i t i o n which 
might be considered as the b a s i s f o r h i s theory of sentiments. 
I n those views, which he l a t e r advanced i n book-form, ^ ' ^ h e 
endeavoured to i n d i c a t e by a m p l i f i c a t i o n the evolvement of 
f e e l i n g s , emotions and sentiments. Some of the i d e a s he enunciated 
aroused c r u c i a l d i f f e r e n c e s of opinion between him and McDougall. 
Before p o i n t i n g out what seems to s e p a r a t e him from McDougall, a 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n must now be given to h i s arguments implemented i n 
t h a t e a r l i e r a r t i c l e . 
(173) "The Nature of Emotion", J.Abnor.and S o c i a l P s y c h o l . , 
v o l . X X V I I I , (1933), pp.246ff. 
(174) " C h aracter and Emotions" MIND, N.S, vol.V, No.18, (1896). 
(175) The Foundations of C h a r a c t e r , London, MacMillan, (1914), 
2nd ed., 1920. 
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Shand's a r t i c l e began w i t h the c o n s i d e r a t i o n of f e e l i n g s 
which he c l a s s i f i e d a c c o r d i n g to the degree and c h a r a c t e r of t h e i r 
o r g a n i s a t i o n . These may be summarised as : (1) The unorganised 
and i s o l a t e d , or what he c a l l e d " b o d i l y " f e e l i n g s , such as p a i n 
and p l e a s u r e . These may a l s o be named as o b j e c t l e s s f e e l i n g s , 
s i n c e they have no o b j e c t of t h e i r own. (2) The organised 
f e e l i n g s , which a r e " f e l t f o r an o b j e c t " . These may be termed 
" o b j e c t i v e f e e l i n g s " , s i n c e they have an o b j e c t . Under the 
second c l a s s , Shand enumerated anger, f e a r , s u r p r i s e , a dmiration, 
sympathy, hope, j o y , despondency, r e g r e t , disappointment, envy, 
revenge, j e a l o u s y , p r i d e , v a n i t y , ambition, humuliation, shame. 
Shand here i s very much confused over the whole i s s u e . Some of 
thes e he l a t e r on c l a s s e d as emotions and some he named as 
sentiments. Such a conf u s i o n w i l l be seen l a t e r . The two c l a s s e s , 
however, were f u r t h e r c l a s s i f i e d as the l o c a l i s e d and the 
n o n - l o c a l i s e d r e s p e c t i v e l y . ( 3 ) Shand i n d i c a t e d as f e e l i n g s 
a l l sentiments and i n t e r e s t s such as lo v e and h a t r e d . ^"^^ 
No marked d i f f e r e n c e i s s e t up between an emotion 
and a p a s s i o n from Shand's viewpoint. When a p a s s i o n reaches an 
i n t e n s i t y to the extent t h a t a person l o s e s s e l f - c o n t r o l , i t i s an 
(177) 
emotion. Thus we speak of the p a s s i o n of g r i e f and the p a s s i o n v 
(176) "Character and the Emotions", Mind, N.S, vol.V, (1896), 
o p . c i t . , pp. 215, 225-226. 
(177) i b i d , p. 216. 
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of rage. As a c o r o l l a r y to thxs he adds, " I t t h e r e f o r e seems 
best to use the term "emotion" to xnclude j o y , hope, despondency, 
and others^ l i k e f e e l i n g s , however f a i n t t h e i r i n t e n s i t y i s ; and / 
w h i l e they s t i l l remain emotions a t t h e i r h i g h e s t degree, t h i s 
(1T8 ) 
degree i s more d e f i n i t e l y expressed by the term " p a s s i o n " . 
(179) 
We f i n d here t h a t w h i l e McDougall i s t a l k i n g , as above, of 
"complex f e e l i n g s " as "derived emotions", Shand i s subsuming 
under mere f e e l i n g s " p a s s i o n s " , "emotions", " a f f e c t i o n s " and 
"sentiments". 
The terms "sentiment", " i n t e r e s t " and " a f f e c t i o n " do 
not seem to mark any important d i f f e r e n c e f o r Shand; whereas 
i n t e r e s t to McDougall i s any i n s t i n c t i v e a c t i v i t y which has no 
emotional q u a l i t y , as p r e v i o u s l y i n d i c a t e d . According to Shand 
we can speak of the sentiments of j u s t i c e , t r u t h , and the moral 
sentiments g e n e r a l l y , as we can speak of the sentiment of 
f r i e n d s h i p ; but on h i s view we can t a l k of a f f e c t i o n f o r our 
f r i e n d s , r a t h e r than sentiment, and of i n t e r e s t i n our h e a l t h or 
b u s i n e s s , r a t h e r than e i t h e r . T h e d i f f e r e n c e between our 
emotions and sentiments, Shand thought, l i e s i n the d i f f e r e n t 
(178) i b i d , pp. 216-217. 
(179) "Emotion and F e e l i n g D i s t i n g u i s h e d " , F e e l i n g s and Emotions, 
ed. by M.L. Reymert, (1928), o p . c i t . , p.202. 
(180) "Character and the Emotions" Mind, vol.V, (1896), o p . c i t . , 
p. 217. 
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growth of thexr o r g a n i s a t i o n . While the l a t t e r a r e h i g h l y 
organised - t h i s seems to be one of the main p o i n t s upon which he 
and McDougall d i f f e r - the former may s u b s i s t a t a st a g e of r e l a t i v e 
i s o l a t i o n and s i m p l i c i t y . The emotions tend always to b u i l d 
themselves i n t o more s t a b l e and complex f e e l i n g s ; these Shand 
c a l l e d sentiments, which i n t h e i r t u r n become the c e n t r e s of 
attachment of the organised emotions. The sentiments and i n t e r e s t s 
on the one hand, and the organised emotions on the other, a l l form 
two complementary c l a s s e s . 
However admirable Shand's scheme may be, i t cannot 
be denied t h a t i t i s r a t h e r p e r p l e x i n g . The grouping of terms 
seems to have been made without any p r i n c i p l e of c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . 
Some a r e q u a l i t i e s of a c t i o n or conduct, as c r u e l t y ; others a r e 
sentiments, l i k e f r i e n d s h i p , love of knowledge or a r t , and s e l f -
i n t e r e s t ; others a r e a p p e t i t e s , such as l u s t ; o t h e r s as hope, 
f e a r , anger, a r e emotions. Emotions he regarded as a d j e c t i v a l 
and q u a l i f y a more s t a b l e f e e l i n g , a point which i s h i g h l y 
d i s p u t a b l e ; whereas the s p e c i f i c o r g a n i s a t i o n of our sentiments 
Shand considered as the r e l a t i v e l y s t a b l e c e n t r e s to which emotions 
a t t a c h themselves. 
(181) i b i d , pp. 217-218. 
- 363 -
To Sha&id " p l e a s u r e " and " p a i n " a r e " e g o i s t i c emotions". 
"Love" i s sometimes c l a s s i f i e d as an "emotion" and a t other times 
(182^ 
i s regarded as a "sentiment"; The same a p p l i e s to "hatred". 
The h i e r a r c h i c a l , mutual dependence of emotions and sentiments 
as d i s c e r n e d by Shand can best be e x p l a i n e d by c i t i n g h i s own 
words on the i s s u e . "The sentiment as i n t e r p r e t e d from the 
o u t s i d e , i s the thought of an o b j e c t , as a permanent t h i n g or 
q u a l i t y . While the emotion, where i t has a thought, r e f e r s to 
some change or event, not to a permanent q u a l i t y . As the 
r e l a t i v e l y s t a b l e thought of the sentiment i s modified, and becomes, 
f o r i n s t a n c e , the thought of t h i s man whom I l i k e as i n j u r e d or 
i n s u l t e d , or t h i s t h i n g which I l i k e as broken or l o s t , so an 
emotion i s e x c i t e d and merged i n the sentiment; and the emotion i s 
the sentiment as t h i s change of thought i s to the i d e n t i t y of 
thought on which i t r e s t s . And t h i s i d e n t i t y of thought which 
r e f e r s to the same o b j e c t w i t h i t s f e e l i n g — tone and c o n a t i v e 
tendency, which p e r s i s t s through the emotional phases e x c i t e d i n 
(183 ) 
i t , i s the sentiment. 
The views Shand put forward, as above, he c o n s i d e r a b l y 
e l a b o r a t e d i n h i s well-known book which might be regarded as 
(182) i b i d , pp. 219-223. 
(183) "Character and the Emotions", Mind, vol.V, (1896), 
o p . c i t . , p. 224. 
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c l a s s i c a l . As a l r e a d y i n d i c a t e d , S h a n d s e t h i m s e l f to show 
th a t the b a s i c c o n s t i t u e n t s of c h a r a c t e r a r e i n s t i n c t , emotion, 
and sentiment, I t i s now important to see what r e l a t i o n , from 
Shand's s t a n d p o i n t , obtains between i n s t i n c t and emotion. 
The emotions a r e " f o r c e s " . "They work i n c e r t a i n 
ways and i n c e r t a i n d i r e c t i o n s " . They a r e w i t h i n us to perform 
c e r t a i n f u n c t i o n s . They need, and i n man they a c q u i r e , higher 
systems to c o n t r o l them; but, "they a r e e s s e n t i a l l y organised 
systems". The emotion, on Shand's theory, i s a "system" 
w i t h t h r e e d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e p a r t s , the emotion i t s e l f , the 
p r o c e s s e s connected w i t h i t i n the organism, or i n "sub-
C 1 8 7 ) 
c o n s c i o u s n e s s " , and i t s outward e x p r e s s i o n and m*des of 
behaviour. A l l these p a r t s a r e r e l a t e d together and form one 
system - the system of the emotion. Now, although i n s t i n c t i s 
r e c o g n i s e d i n Shand's system, y e t i t has not been given t h a t 
p r i o r i t y which McDougall gave as a s u b s t a n t i a l determinant of 
behaviour. For Shand what appears i n v a r i a b l y to i n i t i a t e the 
(184) P a r t I , c h a p . I l l of the present study. 
(185) The Foundations of C h a r a c t e r , o p . c i t . , (1914), 2nd. ed (1920), 
Rep. ( 1 9 2 6 ) , p.179. 
(186) i b i d , p.179. 
t l 8 7 ) i b i d , p.180, 185. 
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op e r a t i o n of an i n s t i n c t i s not "emotion" but "impulse". Without 
impulse i t would be, from Shend's own viewpoint, no more than "a 
(188) 
compound r e f l e x a c t i o n " . T h i s simply means t h a t an i n s t i n c t 
i s l i m i t e d i n scope and r e s t r i c t e d i n f u n c t i o n . I n other words, 
i t i s i n c l u d e d i n the a c t i v i t y of any primary emotion. T h i s , 
once again, i s one of the c h i e f d i f f e r e n c e s i n opinion between 
him and MsDougall. 
An emotion w i t h i t s system i s c o n s i d e r e d by Shand as 
a more comprehensive f a c t than an i n s t i n c t w i t h i t s impulse, 
because i n the emotional system, t h e r e may be org a n i s e d a v a r i e t y 
of i n s t i n c t s w i t h t h e i r impulses, a l l of which subserve i n 
d i f f e r e n t s i t u a t i o n s the same end of the emotion. According to 
t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , t h e r e may be a l s o i n an emotional system a 
number of a c q u i r e d t e n d e n c i e s . Corresponding w i t h these i n n a t e 
and a c q u i r e d tendencies i n the system of an emotion, t h e r e w i l l 
be f e l t and i n c l u d e d a v a r i e t y of impulses. On t h i s view, an 
i n s t i n c t has only one kind of behaviour connected w i t h i t , w h i l e 
an emotion has a v a r i e t y of d i f f e r e n t kinds of behaviour 
a t t a c h e d to i t . ^ 1 8 9 ^ T h i s has been the essence of Shand's point 
of view which l e d him to formulate h i s t w e n t y - s i x t h law regarding 
(188) i b i d , pp. 189-190. 
(189) The Foundations of C h a r a c t e r , o p . c i t . , pp. 190-192. 
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the r e l a t i o n of i n s t i n c t to emotion. The law reads "Every primary 
emotion tends to organ i s e i n i t s system, a l l i n s t i n c t s t h a t a r e 
s e r v i c e a b l e to i t s i n n a t e l y determined end, and to a c q u i r e many 
s e r v i c e a b l e tendencies which modify such i n s t i n c t s " . 
S t r e s s i n g t h i s n o t i o n of the d i f f e r e n c e between 
"primary emotions" and "primary impulses", Shand i n d i c a t e d 
elsewhere, t h a t primary impulses meant those t h a t accompany 
and c o n d i t i o n the ope r a t i o n of i n s t i n c t s . The e s s e n t i a l 
d i f f e r e n c e s which Shand conceived between emotions and impulses i s 
t h a t , w h i l e the former are wider m scope, the l a t t e r a r e more 
r e s t r i c t e d i n f u n c t i o n . Here a g a i n , comes a c r u c i a l p oint of 
d i f f e r e n c e between h i s own obs e r v a t i o n s and those of McDougall. 
The problem of the r e l a t i o n of i n s t i n c t and emotion 
was made the s u b j e c t of a symposium between McDougall, Shand and 
(192) 
Stout, a t a meeting of The A r i s t o t e l i a n S o c i e t y ( 1 9 1 5 ) . 
(190) i b i d , p. 192. 
(191) "Of Impulse, Emotion, and I n s t i n c t " , P r o c . A r i s t . S o c i e t y , 
v o l . XX, (1919), p.80; T h i s a r t i c l e was l a t e r 
appended 0 Appendix I ) : To The Foundationsof C h a r a c t e r , 
pp. 526-541. 
(192) V o l . XV (19 1 5 ) , " I n s t i n c t and Emotion". 
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According to the theory which McDougall c o n s i s t e n t l y 
defended, an emotional experience of a p a r t i c u l a r kind forms a 
c e n t r a l p a r t o± every i n s t i n c t i v e p r o c e s s . I n the c h o i c e of 
primary emotions, f o r example, McDougall i s guided by a p r i n c i p l e , 
namely, t h a t "each primary emotion accompanies the excitement of 
one of the i n s t i n c t s , and i s the a f f e c t i v e aspect of a simple 
„ (193) 
i n s t i n c t i v e mental process . On McDougall s theory of the 
emotions, we only know the nature of our own motives from the 
p e c u l i a r q u a l i t y of the emotion t h a t i s f e l t a t the time. T h i s 
he regarded as "the e s s e n t i a l f u n c t i o n of the emotional q u a l i t i e s 
i n our mental l i f e . They enable us to r e c o g n i s e our own s t a t e , 
and to r e g u l a t e , d i r e c t , and i n some degree c o n t r o l the impulses 
(194) 
by which we a r e moved". The primary emotion i n i t s e l f i s 
.. (195) 
an i n d i c a t o r of the i n s t i n c t i v e impulse a t work . I t s 
b o d i l y e x p r e s s i o n serveS>"to i n d i c a t e the nature of the impulse 
to our f e l l o w s and to evoke i n them the same i n s t i n c t i v e impulse, 
,. (196) 
a t t i t u d e , and emotional excitement . An emotion has a 
q u a l i t y which McDougall looked on as an a l l - i m p o r t a n t f a c t o r . I t 
(193) An I n t r o d u c t i o n to S o c i a l Psychology, o p . c i t . , p.109. 
(194) An O u t l i n e of Psychology, o p . c i t . , p.326, s e e a l s o : 
E n e r g i e s of Men, o p . c i t . , pp. 148, 150. 
(195) An O u t l i n e of Psychology, o p . c i t . , p.325. 
(196) i b i d , p.325, see a l s o : E n e r g i e s of Men, o p . c i t . , p.150. 
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i s so because, as i n d i c a t e d above, the emotional q u a l i t i e s have 
"a c o g n i t i v e f u n c t i o n ; they s i g n i f y to us p r i m a r i l y not the 
nature of t h i n g s , but r a t h e r the nature of our i m p u l s i v e 
r e a c t i o n s to t h i n g s ; they a r e the c o g n i t i v e b a s i s of s e l f -
(197) 
knowledge and s e l f - c o n t r o l " . I n t h i s sense, they a r e 
s u b j e c t i v e r a t h e r than o b j e c t i v e . 
S i n c e the primary e m o t i o n s " m a y be combined i n 
a l a r g e number of d i f f e r e n t ways" and s i n c e "the p r i m a r i e s t h a t 
e n t e r i n t o the composition of a secondary emotion may be present 
i n many d i f f e r e n t degrees of i n t e n s i t y , " the whole range of 
"complex emotions p r e s e n t s an i n d e f i n i t e l y l a r g e number of 
q u a l i t i e s t h a t shade i m p e r c e p t i b l y i n t o one another without 
(199) 
sharp d i v i d i n g l i n e s " . The complex emotional s t a t e s McDougall 
d i v i d e d i n t o two main groups, roughly, ( 1 ) Those which do not 
n e c e s s a r i l y imply the e x i s t e n c e of any organised sentiment; and 
(2) those which can be experienced only m v i r t u e of the e x i s t e n c e 
of some sentiment w i t h i n the system of which they may be s a i d to 
(197) i b i d , p.326, see a l s o : E n e r g i e s of Men, o p . c i t . , p.148. 
(198) ( i ) c f . W.M.Marston's "Primary Colours and Primary Emotions" 
i n Psyche, v o l . V I I I , No.2, (19 2 7 ) , pp. 4-33. 
( n ) J.C. F l u g e l ' s "The Emotional Value of D r e s s " i n Psyche, 
v o l . X I I , No.l, (1 9 3 1 ) , pp.49-59. 
(199) An I n t r o d u c t i o n to S o c i a l Psychology, o p . c i t . , pp.109-110. 
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be e x c i t e d . Under the f i r s t heading, McDougall d i s c u s s e d 
admiration, awe, r e v e r e n c e , g r a t i t u d e , s c o r n , contempt, l o a t h i n g , 
f a s c i n a t i o n , envy. Under the second category, he mentioned : 
reproach, a n x i e t y , j e a l o u s y , vengeful emotion, resentment, shame, 
b a s h f u l n e s s , j o y , sorrow, p i t y , happiness, s u r p r i s e , remorse. ^^"^ 
Both c l a s s e s above (1 and 2 ) , McDougall l a t e r on 
subsumed under the s u b - t i t l e of "the blended or secondary 
e m o t i o n s " . T h e l i s t was enlarged by adding to i t , " h o r r o r " 
(202) 
and "embarrassment". I n McDougall's opinion, i t i s p o s s i b l e 
to t a l k of blended or secondary emotions when two i n s t i n c t i v e 
impulses may be e x c i t e d s i m u l t a n e o u s l y . T h i s happens when an 
animal's behaviour i s c l e a r l y the e x p r e s s i o n of a c o n f l i c t and 
a l t e r n a t i o n between the a v e r s i o n of f e a r and the a t t r a c t i o n of 
c u r i o s i t y . The two i n s t i n c t s aroused become d i r e c t e d toward two 
opposite g o a l s ; when the two c o n t r a d i c t each other, the one 
(203) 
impulse i n h i b i t s the other. I t i s n e c e s s a r i l y important to 
know t h a t the complex emotional experience which McDougall 
defended i s not l i t e r a l l y formed by the s e p a r a t e excitement, the 
(200) i b i d , pp. 110-136. 
(201) An O u t l i n e of Psychology, o p . c i t . , p.329. 
(202) i b i d , pp. 330-336. 
(203) i b i d , p. 330. 
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coming together and the subsequent blending of two emotions, 
r a t h e r i t i s the immediate response to the complex s i t u a t i o n 
(204) 
i n which the a c t i v i t y takes p l a c e . 
B e s i d e s the primary and blended or "complex" 
emotions, McDougall r e c o g n i s e d what he c a l l e d " d e r i v e d emotions". 
These sometimes a r e confused and spoken of as v a r i e t i e s of 
„ (205) 
" f e e l i n g " . McDougall marked the d i f f e r e n c e by s t a t i n g t h a t 
the word " d e r i v e d " i s used "to denote the f a c t t h a t an emotion of 
t h i s c l a s s i s not c o n s t a n t l y c o r r e l a t e d w i t h any one impulse or 
tendency, but r a t h e r may a r i s e i n the course of the o p e r a t i o n of 
9?(207) 
any strong impulse or tendency. As d e r i v e d emotions, 
(208) 
McDougall d e p i c t e d f i v e : confidence, hope, despondency, and 
(204) i b i d , pp. 330ff. 
(205) i b i d , C h . X I I . 
(206) ( l ) The E n e r g i e s of Men, o p . c i t . , p.151. 
( n ) An O u t l i n e of Psychology, o p . c i t . , C h . X I I . 
(207) ( l ) An O u t l i n e of Psychology, o p . c i t . , p.338. 
( n ) An I n t r o d u c t i o n to S o c i a l Psychology, o p . c i t . , 
pp.130, 364, 365. 
( m ) The E n e r g i e s of Men, o p . c i t . , p.151. 
(208) An O u t l i n e of Psychology, o p . c i t . , p. 339. 
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d e s p a i r . These, Shand designated a s , "the p r o s p e c t i v e emotions 
of d e s i r e " , a phrase which McDougall a c c e p t e d . ^ 2 1 < ^ 
As he spoke above of p r o s p e c t i v e emotions of d e s i r e , 
McDougall a l s o spoke of " r e t r o s p e c t i v e emotions of d e s i r e " . 
The argument put forward i s t h a t , "Although p r i m i t i v e l y , d e s i r e 
looks only toward some goal imagined as l y i n g i n the f u t u r e , y e t , 
(212) 
i n the developed mind, d e s i r e may be d i r e c t e d towards the p a s t " . 
The c o n f u s i o n a r i s e s when we f i n d t h a t under t h i s heading, both 
"remorse" and "sorrow" a r e i n c l u d e d . These two words have a l r e a d y 
(213) 
been c a t e g o r i s e d as complex emotions. "Regret" i s enumerated 
here as one of "the r e s t r o s p e c t i v e emotions of d e s i r e " - a 
(209) The Foundations of C h a r a c t e r , o p . c i t . , pp. 462, 463. 
(210) An O u t l i n e of Psychology, o p . c i t . , p.341. 
(211) ( I ) An I n t r o d u c t i o n to S o c i a l Psychology, o p . c i t . , 
pp. 316, 375. 
( n ) An O u t l i n e of Psychology, o p . c i t . , p.341. 
(212) ( i ) An O u t l i n e of Psychology, o p . c i t . , p.341. 
( n ) The E n e r g i e s of Men, o p . c i t . , pp. 4, 64. 
(213) An O u t l i n e of Psychology, o p . c i t . , p.342. 
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terminology t h a t was not favoured by Shand. Another confusion 
emerges from r e - c l a s s i n g of " j o y " and " s u r p r i s e ' ^ ^ ^ a s d e r i v e d 
emotions. These two McDougall a l r e a d y named as complex or 
secondary emotions. I t i s d i f f i c u l t to accept the argument 
advanced to j u s t i f y why he r e - c l a s s e d these four words, namely, 
remorse, sorrow, j o y , and s u r p r i s e , under d i f f e r e n t c a t e g o r i e s 
other than those under which he had d i s c u s s e d ; However, the 
essence of McDougall's d i s t i n c t i o n between primary and d e r i v e d 
emotions seems to be t h a t the former a r e more d i r e c t i o n a l i n 
c h a r a c t e r and s p r i n g from immediately corresponding i n s t i n c t i v e 
d i s p o s i t i o n s ; whereas the l a t t e r a r e i n c i d e n t a l to the o b j e c t or 
the s i t u a t i o n i n v o l v e d and a r e not attached or r e l a t e d to any 
s p e c i f i c i n s t i n c t . 
From the fore-going o b s e r v a t i o n s t h e r e seems to have 
been a c o n s i d e r a b l e d i f f e r e n c e of opinion between McDougall and 
Shand concerning i n s t i n c t s , emotions and sent i m e n t s . C h i e f among 
these a r e the f o l l o w i n g . To Shand, the emotions a r e h i g h l y 
complex in n a t e d i s p o s i t i o n s , w h i l e to McDougall they a r e a f f e c t i v e 
- c o n a t i v e a s p e c t s , experienced when the a p p r o p r i a t e i n s t i n c t i s 
e x c i t e d . Shand regarded the sentiments as i n n a t e l y organised 
systems of emotional d i s p o s i t i o n s , whereas McDougall considered the 
sentiments as a c q u i r e d through the i n d i v i d u a l ' s e x p e r i e n c e . Shand 
(214) i b i d , pp. 343-345. 
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spoke of p r o s p e c t i v e emotions of d e s i r e , where McDougall 
spoke of p r o s p e c t i v e and r e t r o s p e c t i v e emotions of 
d e s i r e . Shand t a l k e d of d e s i r e as an emotional system, 
w h i l e to McDougall such an idea sounded i n d e f e n s i b l e . 
To Shand, emotions a r e f o r c e s . F o r c e s to McDougall a r e 
the i n s t i n c t s . For Shand, the d e r i v e d emotions have 
t h e i r own s p e c i f i c tendencies which McDougall denied. 
With Shand, the d e r i v e d emotions a r e f o r c e s of 
c h a r a c t e r , an i d e a which McDougall s t o u t l y r e j e c t e d . The 
h i e r a r c h i c a l system of sentiments i s the b a s i s of the 
c h a r a c t e r of the i n d i v i d u a l , a c c o r d i n g to McDougall. 
According to Shand "hope" i s an independent motive and i t 
e n t e r s i n t o the s t r u c t u r e of c h a r a c t e r , but not f o r 
McDougall. Shand thought t h a t " a n x i e t y " i s a c o n a t i v e 
f o r c e , w h i l e McDougall spoke i n s t e a d of the impulse of 
f e a r awakened by the thought of the consequences of some 
a n t i c i p a t e d o b s t r u c t i o n or danger. Sorrow f o r Shand i s 
one of the primary emotions; whereas f o r McDougall i t i s 
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(215) a d e r i v e d e m o t i o n . These and more d i f f e r e n c e s e x i s t t o w h i c h 
b o t h a u t h o r s adhered. McDougall emphasised i n s t i n c t as a p r i m a r y 
( 2 1 5 ) ( I ) M c D o u g a l l , Wm., An I n t r o d u c t i o n t o S o c i a l P s y c h o l o g y , 
o p . c i t . , 
( l i ) , An O u t l i n e o f P s y c h o l o g y , o p . c i t . , 
( m ) , The E n e r g i e s o f Men, o p . c i t . , Ch.XIV. 
( I V ) , " i s Conscience an Emotion" T h e H i b b e r t 
J o u r n a l , v o l . X I X , No.2, 1920-21, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y p.283. 
( v ) , "The R e v i v a l o f E m o t i o n a l Memories 
and i t s T h e r a p e u t i c V a l u e " , B r i t . 
P s y c h o l . Med. S e c , v o l . 1 , ( 1 9 2 0 ) , 
pp. 23-29. 
( v i ) , " B e l i e f as a D e r i v e d E m o t i o n " P s y c h o l . 
Rev., v o l . 2 8 , No.5, ( 1 9 2 1 ) , pp.215-327. 
( v n ) , " i n s t i n c t and E m o t i o n " A Symposium, 
Proc. A n s t o t . S o c i e t y , v o l . V, (1914-
1 9 1 5 ) . 
( v i n ) , " C h a r a c t e r and t h e Emotions", Mind, N.S, 
v o l . V, No.18, ( 1 8 9 6 ) , o p . c i t . 
( I X ) , The Foundations o f C h a r a c t e r , o p . c i t . , 
( x ) , "The Sources o f Tender Emotion" Chap. X V I , 
i n G.F. S t o u t ' s Groundwork o f 
P s y c h o l o g y , pp. 176-194. 
( x i ) , " I n s t i n c t and Emotion" A Symposium m 
P r o c . A r i s t o t . S o c i e t y , v o l . XV, ( 1 9 1 4 - 1 9 1 5 ) , 
o p . c i t . , 
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and b i o l o g i c a l f a c t o r o f b e h a v i o u r , Shand s t r e s s e d prxmary emotions 
as a b i o l o g i c a l f o r c e p u r s u i n g t h e i r i n n a t e l y d e t e r m i n e d ends by 
means o f i n s t i n c t s . Shand t h u s c o n c e i v e d o f i n s t i n c t as o f a 
secondary r o l e i n t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s l i f e . B e s i d e s , a p r i m a r y e m o t i o n 
f o r Shand i s e s s e n t i a l l y c o n a t i v e . I t s o r i g i n a l b i o l o g i c a l end i s 
supplemented by a number o f a c q u i r e d ends; and emotions always have 
t h e i r c o g n i t i v e a s p e c t s . S h a n d ' s views e x p r e s s e d h e r e seem t o 
(217) 
be s u p p o r t e d t o a degree by W.K. W r i g h t who s t a t e d " I t seems t o 
t h e r e v i e w e r t h a t , w h i l e Mr. Shand has made a good p o i n t a g a i n s t 
Mr. McDougall i n showing t h a t an e m o t i o n may f i n d e x p r e s s i o n i n one 
o f s e v e r a l modes o f b e h a v i o u r , and t h a t t h e same mode o f b e h a v i o u r 
may be a t t a c h e d t o d i f f e r e n t e m o t i o n s , i t none t h e l e s s remains more 
advantageous t o r e t a i n t h e t e r m ' i n s t i n c t ' f o r t h e e n t i r e 
d i s p o s i t i o n w h i c h Shand c a l l s t h e 'systems o f t h e e m o t i o n s ' , and t o 
c o n f i n e 'emotion' t o t h e a f f e c t i v e phase ' p r e s e n t m c o n s c i o u s n e s s ' " . 
The c i t a t i o n h e r e may a l s o be t a k e n as h i g h l y f a v o u r i n g McDougall's 
p o s i t i o n . I n a c c o r d w i t h t h i s i s S t o u t ' s view e x p r e s s e d i n t h e 
(218 ) 
symposium (1914-1915) a l r e a d y a l l u d e d t o . S t o u t was d i s p o s e d t o 
(216) Shand, A.F., " i n s t i n c t and Emotion", P r o c . A r i s t o t . S c o e i t y , 
o p . c i t . , v o l . XV, ( 1 9 1 5 ) , pp.75-76. 
(217) See The P h i l o s o p h i c a l Review, v o l . X X I I I , ( 1 9 1 4 ) , p.5., 
i t i s a l s o r e f e r r e d t o by Shand above. 
(2 1 8 ) " I n s t i n c t and E m o t i o n " , P r o c . A r i s t o t . S o c . , v o l . XV, p.99. 
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agree w i t h McDougall xn hxs p r o t e s t a g a x n s t Shand's assumptxon t h a t 
t h e s y s t e m a t x c x n t e r c o n n e c t x o n o f emotions w i t h x n a s e n t i m e n t xs due 
m a i n l y t o a s p e c i a l i n n a t e d x s p o s x t x o n r a t h e r t h a n t o g e n e r a l 
p s y c h o l o g x c a l l a w s . 
The t h e o r x e s o f McDougall and Shand a r e p r o b a b l y 
t h e most s y s t e m a t x c a l l y worked o u t e x p l a n a t x o n s i n t h e l i t e r a t u r e 
o f t h e r e l a t x o n between x n s t m c t and e m o t i o n . Yet n e i t h e r o f them, 
as i t seems, has e a r n e d any g e n e r a l a s s e n t . A l a r g e p a r t o f t h e 
d i f f i c u l t y i s due t o t h e l a c k o f any agreement as t o what e m o t i o n 
i s o r t o what t h e t e r m s h o u l d be a p p l i e d . Some more e x a c t 
d e f i n i t i o n i s needed. To t a l k o f " e m o t i o n a l s y s t e m s " as Shand has 
done, i s h i g h l y m i s l e a d i n g , f o r e m o t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e i s n o t 
f u n d a m e n t a l t o them. I t m i g h t be s a f e r t o d e s c r i b e them as 
c o n a t i o n a l systems, r a t h e r t h a n e m o t i o n a l , " i t i s o n l y t h e 
e x i g e n c i e s o f a t h e o r y " , w r o t e A. Campbell G a r n e t t , " t h a t w o u l d 
l e a d any one t o a s s e r t t h a t e m o t i o n i s p r e s e n t i n a l l t h o s e humdrum 
performances o f e v e r y d a y l i f e where ... as McDougall r i g h t l y 
„ (219) 
m a i n t a i n s , t h e c o n a t i o n s p r i n g s f r o m some i n s t i n c t i v e s o u r c e s . 
(219) The Mind i n A c t i o n , London, N i s b e t and Co., ( 1 9 3 1 ) , p.46. 
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The g e n e r a l t r e n d o f t h o u g h t r e g a r d i n g t h e t h e o r i e s 
o f emotions may be summarised as f o l l o w s : 
I n Shand's o p i n i o n , an e m o t i o n i s a system, because 
i t s e s s e n t i a l elements a r e geared f o r an end. The system o f an 
e m o t i o n may c o n t a i n s e v e r a l i n s t i n c t s . One o r o t h e r o f t h e s e 
i n s t i n c t s may be s t u m u l a t e d , and e l i c i t t h e s p e c i f i c b e h a v i o u r 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f i t , w i t h o u t s i m u l t a n e o u s l y e v o k i n g t h e e m o t i o n . 
An e m o t i o n tends t o i n c l u d e i n i t s system a l l i n s t i n c t s and o t h e r 
d i s p o s i t i o n s t h a t s ubserve i t s end. 
(220) 
For t h e m t r o s p e c t i o n i s t , e m o t i o n i s a s t i r r e d up 
s t a t e o f mind " a n a l y s a b l e i n t o k i n a e s t h e t i c and o r g a n i c s e n s a t i o n s 
and f e e l i n g s " . The f e e l i n g s may o r may n o t be f u r t h e r r e d u c i b l e t o 
o r g a n i c s e n s a t i o n s . The e m o t i o n a c c o r d i n g t o t h i s v i e w , i s o f 
c o u r s e , s u b j e c t i v e l y r e g a r d e d . 
From t h e b e h a v i o u r i s t i c s t a n d p o i n t ^ e m o t i o n i s an 
i n h e r i t e d r e a c t i o n p a t t e r n . P r o f o u n d changes o f t h e b o d i l y 
mechanism a r e i n v o l v e d when an e m o t i o n i s evoked. Emotion i s t h u s 
anal^gous t o i n s t i n c t . The d i f f e r e n c e i s t h a t t h e l a t t e r i s l o o k e d / 
upon as an o v e r t r e s p o n s e . On t h i s v i e w , e m o t i o n i s t r e a t e d 
o b j e c t i v e l y . 
( 220) See ( I ) B r i d g e s , J.W., "A R e c o n c i l i a t i o n o f C u r r e n t T h e o r i e s 
o f Emotion", R e p . B r i t . A s s o c . , ( 1 9 2 4 ) , p.435; 
See a l s o : ( n ) Dunbar, F., Emotions and B o d i l y Changes, New 
Y o r k , Columbia U n i v . P r e s s , 4 t h . ed. ( 1 9 5 4 ) . 
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( 2 2 1 ) I n t h e James-Lange t h e o r y , an emotxon was c o n c e i v e d 
o f as t h e c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f t h e r e s p o n s e . James emphasised t h e 
s k e l e t a l r e sponse. Lange s t r e s s e d t h e v a s c u l a r s i d e . 
A c c o r d i n g t o J . D r e v e r ( S n r ) , two a s p e c t s must be 
d i s t i n c t l y d i s c r i m i n a t e d , an i n s t i n c t - i n t e r e s t w h i c h accompanies an 
i n s t i n c t - a c t i v i t y , and e m o t i o n w h i c h f o l l o w s t h e f r u s t r a t i o n o f 
i n s t i n c t i v e a c t i o n . 
McDougall's t h e o r y i s t h a t an e m o t i o n i s t h e 
s u b j e c t i v e a s p e c t o f an i n s t i n c t . The two f r e q u e n t l y o ccur t o g e t h e r , 
s i n c e t h e same s i t u a t i o n o f t e n l e a d s t o b o t h t y p e s o f response. I n 
t h e case o f McDougall's t h e o r y , however, t h e p o s i t i o n , and t o c i t e 
S m i t h (1960a) on t h i s , i s t h a t , " i n organisms where c o n s i s t e n t ... 
c o n j u n c t i o n s o f s t i m u l u s and response have been n o t e d , t h e i n s t i n c t 
c o u l d be r e g a r d e d as enhancing t h e p o p u l a r i t y o f a t y p e o f r e a c t i o n 
and t h e e m p i r i c a l e v i d e n c e o f r e c o r d e d c o n j u n c t i o n s o f s t i m u l u s and 
response c o u l d p r o v i d e t h e b a s i s f o r p r e d i c t i o n ; b u t i t s h o u l d be 
remembered t h a t n o t a l l o f t h e a n i m a l ' s b e h a v i o u r w o u l d be 
c o v e r e d by such r e c o r d e d c o n j u n c t i o n s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , such f i n d i n g s 
i n a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h t h e knowledge o f t h e l i f e c y c l e and t h e p r e s e n t 
h a b i t a t c o u l d r e s u l t i n a v e r y u s e f u l degree o f c o - o r d i n a t i o n and 
(222) 
p r e d i c t i o n " . Smith's s t a t e m e n t may be t a k e n t o r e f l e c t t h e 
(221) See: B r o a d h u r s t , P.L., and Eysenok, H.J., " E m o t i o n a l i t y i n 
t h e Rat: A Problem o f Response S p e c i f l t y " i n : S t u d i e s 
i n P s y c h o l o g y , o p . c i t . , pp. 207-8. 
(2 2 2 ) E x p l a n a t i o n o f Human B e h a v i o u r , o p . c i t . , p.184. 
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genuine r e l a t i o n between i n s t i n c t and e m o t i o n . No d o u b t , a p i e c e 
o f b e h a v i o u r can be p r e d i c t e d on t h e b a s i s o f a p r i o r t knowledge 
o f t h e i n s t i n c t s w h i c h a r e r e g a r d e d as t h e m a j o r c o n s t i t u e n t s o f 
t h e organism's b e h a v i o u r a l p o t e n t i a l . That emotions a r e psycho-
p h y s i o l o g i c a l responses i s i n d i s p u t a b l e . Every e m o t i o n has i t s 
s u b j e c t i v e as w e l l as o b j e c t i v e a s p e c t s . I n Smith's own words, 
t h e e m o t i o n s , as McDougall d i s c e r n e d them, " d i d c a r r y t h e 
i m p l i c a t i o n o f a g e n e r a l t y p e , o f a c t i o n , b u t as s t a t e d , t h e r e w o u l d 
be d i f f i c u l t i e s m d i s c e r n i n g j u s t w h i c h e m o t i o n c o u l d be s a i d t o 
be o p e r a t i n g a n d i n any event; n o t a l l o f t h e emotions l i s t e d have 
as y e t been shown t o have some k i n d o f n e u r o l o g i c a l o r 
p h y s i o l o g i c a l c o r r e l a t e so t h a t t h e i r s t a t u s as e x i s t i n g s t a t e s 
( 2 2 3 ) 
c o u l d be d e b a t e d . " S m i t h i s a p p a r e n t l y j u s t i f i e d i n h i s 
a s s u m p t i o n t h a t emotions "as e x i s t i n g s t a t e s c o u l d be debated"; 
b u t t h e o b s t a c l e s he i s p r e d i c t i n g may i n no way h i n d e r t h e e f f e c t s 
o f emotions as o p e r a t i v e f u n c t i o n s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , no b e t t e r can 
be done m e n d i n g t h i s s e c t i o n t h a n c i t i n g Smith's c o n c l u s i o n about 
McDougall's arguments w i t h r e g a r d t o e m o t i o n s . " I n r e t r o s p e c t " , 
w r i t e s S m i t h , "McDougall's system o f f e r e d a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f p o s s i b l e 
e m o t i o n a l s t a t e s and i m p u l s e s t o a c t i o n f o r some o f w h i c h , p a r t s o f 
n e u r o l o g i c a l c o r r e l a t e s have been i n d i c a t e d . W i t h i n t h e s e 
( 2 2 3 ) E x p l a n a t i o n o f Human B e h a v i o u r , o p . c i t . , pp. 184-185. 
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c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s , t h e o r g a n i s m , be i t human o r a n i m a l , behaved 
p u r p o s i v e l y so t h a t , m e f f e c t , t h e system p r o v i d e d an o u t l i n e 
o f some p o s s i b l e n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s and some s u f f i c i e n t reasons 
(224) 
f o r b e h a v i o u r " . 
Q u i t e i n k e e p i n g w i t h Smith's v i e w s , i s B u r t ' s 
/ n n c \ 
t h e o r y mf " g e n e r a l e m o t i o n a l i t y " w h i c h i s based upon, and 
e m p i r i c a l l y has p r o v i d e d s u p p o r t f o r McDougall*s t h e o r y o f e m o t i o n s . 
B u r t has f o u n d t h a t by t h e i r h i e r a r c h i c a l r e l a t i o n s , e m o t i o n a l 
t r a i t s a r e m o s t l y p o s i t i v e . F o r hi m , " t h e emotions ... a r e b u t 
s p e c i a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n s o f a p r i m a l e m o t i o n a l e n e r g y , an elan v i t a l 
.. ( 226) 
o r f u n d a m e n t a l w i l l t o l i v e . T h i s a g a i n , e x a c t l y r e f l e c t s 
t h e views McDougall advanced, c o n c e r n i n g e m o t i o n s , t o q u o t e S m i t h 
( 1 9 6 0 a ) , " i t i s f r e q u e n t l y o b served and B u r t has p r o v i d e d 
e x p e r i m e n t a l c o n f i r m a t i o n t h a t t h e i n t e n s i t i e s w i t h w h i c h e m o t i o n a l 
s t a t e s as commonly d e s c r i b e d by d i f f e r e n t words a r e m a n i f e s t e d , a r e 
(227) 
p o s i t i v e l y c o r r e l a t e d " . The mechanisms, however, w h i c h 
( 2 2 4 ) i b i d , p.185; See a l s o , ( l ) J . C . F l u g e l ' s a r t i c l e , "A 
Q u a n t i t a t i v e Study o f F e e l i n g and Emotion i n Everyday 
L i f e " , B.J.Psych., v o l . XV, p a r t 4, ( 1 9 2 5 ) , pp.318-355, 
( n ) J.T. McCurdy, The Psychology o f Emotion, Cambridge ( 1 9 2 5 ) , 
( m ) Cf. D.O.Hebb, "Emotion m Animals and Man", Psych. Re v . , 
v o l . 53, ( 1 9 4 6 ) , pp.259-276. 
(2 2 5 ) "The F a c t o r i a l A n a l y s i s o f E m o t i o n a l T r a i t s " , C h a r a c t e r and 
P e r s o n a l i t y , v o l . V I I , Nos.3 and 4, ( 1 9 3 9 ) , I , pp.238-54, I I , 
285-99; 
( I V ) Al-Bassam, A . A . I . , A Study o f C h a r a c t e r T r a i t s i n School 
C h i l d r e n , A Ph.D.Thesis i n t h e l i b r a r y o f London U n i v e r s i t y , 
( 1 9 5 0 - 5 1 ) . 
( 2 2 6 ) The Young D e l i n q u e n t , o p . c i t . , p. 423. 
(2 2 7 ) E x p l a n a t i o n o f Human B e h a v i o u r , o p . c i t . , p.149. 
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u n d e r l i e t h e emotions a r e h e l d t o be "as d e v i c e s f o r g e n e r a t i n g " 
o r a t l e a s t " f o r s t r o n g l y r e i n f o r c i n g , nervous e n e r g y " ( B u r t : 1939, 
p . 2 5 0 ) . A p e r s o n , a t any r a t e , i s c o n s i d e r e d as, " h i g h l y e m o t i o n a l , 
w i t h r e s p e c t t o s e v e r a l e m o t i o n s " ( S m i t h : 1960a, p . 1 4 9 ) , b u t t h e r e 
i s a p o s s i b i l i t y w h i c h i s t o be acco u n t e d f o r , namely, t h a t " t h e 
d i s t i n c t i o n between e m o t i o n a l s t a t e s w h i c h i s i m p l i e d by t h e use o f 
d i f f e r e n t words i s based more upon t h e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e s i t u a t i o n 
and t h e o u t w a r d l y o b s e r v a b l e r e a c t i o n s t h a n upon i n t r o s p e c t a b l e 
d i f f e r e n c e s between t h e a s s o c i a t e d e m o t i o n a l s t a t e s " ( S m i t h : 1960a, 
p . 1 5 0 ) . Whatever t h e c r i t e r i a , McDougall's t h e o r y t h u s seems t o be 
i n a p o s i t i o n t o c l a i m some s u p p o r t . 
4. D i s c u s s i o n and some I n f e r e n c e s . 
" While many o t h e r s have w r i t t e n on t h e t o p i c o f 
i n s t i n c t and m o t i v a t i o n g e n e r a l l y , McDougall's system i s r e m a r k a b l e 
„ (228) 
f o r a number o f reasons . T h i s s t a t e m e n t w h i c h has been made 
by S m i t h ( 1 9 6 0 ) , i s a p p a r e n t l y based upon subsequent i n v e s t i g a t i o n s 
and w i d e - s c a l e s t u d y i n t o t h e t o p i c o f i n s t i n c t . Then Smith goes 
on t o m e n t i o n some as p e c t s o f McDougall's scheme, and more p r o m i n e n t 
a r e , "The v i g o r o u s p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e h o r m i c o r p u r p o s i v e c o n c e p t i o n , 
t h e p o s t u l a t i o n o f d i s t i n c t i v e n e u r o l o g i c a l c o r r e l a t e s f o r t h e 
(228) E x p l a n a t i o n o f Human B e h a v i o u r , o p . c i t . , f o o t n o t e , p.120. 
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d i f f e r e n t i n s t i n c t s and t h e p r o v i s i o n f o r t h e i n f l u e n c e o f t h e 
en v i r o n m e n t by way o f t h e h i e r a r c h i c a l o r g a n i s a t i o n o f s e n t i m e n t s 
and s e l v e s make t h e system t h e most comprehensive i n o u t l i n e i n 
t h e r e c e n t h i s t o r y o f p s y c h o l o g y . W i t h i n t h e scope o f t h e system, 
s e v e r a l f i e l d s o f p s y c h o l o g y and many i s s u e s w h i c h o t h e r w r i t e r s 
.1 (229) 
have been a b l e t o t r e a t i n g r e a t e r d e t a i l , a r e i n v o l v e d . 
I n Smith's words, a r e o u t l i n e d t h e s a l i e n t f e a t u r e s 
o f McDougall's h o r m i c t h e o r y , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e d i s t i n c t i v e a s p e c t 
(230) 
o f i n s t i n c t . McDougall s v e r s i o n was t h a t each i n s t i n c t on 
b e i n g e x c i t e d g e n e r a t e s an u r g e , an i m p u l s e , o r a c o n a t i o n t o s t r i v e 
t o w a r d a g o a l p e c u l i a r t o i t s e l f . The s t r i v i n g e x p e r i e n c e i s n o t 
s i m p l y u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d c o n a t i v e q u a l i t y , b u t has i n t h e case o f 
each i n s t i n c t , a q u a l i t y r e l e v a n t t o i t s e l f c a l l e d a p r i m a r y 
e m o t i o n a l q u a l i t y . So t h e g e n e r a l assumption t h a t "emotions and 
i n s t i n c t s a r e i n some way i n t e r r e l a t e d has remained i n f l u e n t i a l , 
( 2 3 1 ) 
and f i n d s e x p r e s s i o n i n McDougall's t h e o r y " , as D. Rapaport 
( 1 9 6 1 ) has i n d i c a t e d . The eminent p o i n t i n McDougall's t h e o r y i s 
t h a t emotions a r e i n t i m a t e l y r e l a t e d t o i n s t i n c t s , r a t h e r t h a n 
(229 ) i b i d , p.120. 
(23 0 ) " P u r p o s i v e S t r i v i n g as a f u n d a m e n t a l c a t e g o r y o f Ps y c h o l o g y " , 
Psych.Rev., v o l . 3 2 , ( 1 9 2 5 ) , p p . 3 0 7 f f . 
(231 ) Emotions and Memory, New Y o r k , Science e d i t i o n , p.23. 
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b e i n g r e g a r d e d as "sensory p r o c e s s e s " t o use Rapaport's own words. 
I n f a c t , McDougall's c a p a b i l i t y o f v i e w i n g emotions and c o n a t i o n s 
as b e i n g c l o s e l y l i n k e d , has l e d t o t h e i n t i m a t e r e l a t i o n o f 
(232) 
emotions and m o t i v a t i o n s i n p r e s e n t day p s y c h o l o g y . 
R e p e a t e d l y , McDougall t r i e d t o j u s t i f y , c l a r i f y and 
r e c t i f y h i s t h e o r y o f i n s t i n c t . O f t e n he w r o t e i n an emphatic way 
such as t h i s , " t h e r e i s e v e r y r e a s o n t o b e l i e v e t h a t even t h e most 
p u r e l y i n s t i n c t i v e a c t i o n i s t h e outcome o f a d i s t i n c t l y m e n t a l 
„ (233) 
p r o c e s s » Y e t he conceded t h a t when he spoke o f any p a r t i c u l a r 
i n s t i n c t he d i d n o t r e c k o n o f i t s n a t u r e i n t h e , s t a t i c t e r m s ; b u t 
t h a t a l a r g e s c a l e o f o b s e r v a t i o n s may be c o n d u c i v e t o v a l i d 
i n f o r m a t i o n i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h i n s t i n c t . S t i l l f u r t h e r , he 
endeavoured t o d i s t i n g u i s h between t h e f a c t s o f m e n t a l s t r u c t u r e , 
w h i c h a r e i n f e r e n t i a l f r o m t h e b e h a v i o u r m a n i f e s t e d , and t h e f a c t s 
o f a c t i v i t y i t s e l f . To c l a r i f y t h e s i t u a t i o n f u r t h e r , McDougall 
(234) 
p o i n t e d o u t c e r t a i n f e a t u r e s as d e n o t i n g t h e i n s t i n c t i v e 
a c t i v i t y , namely, ( 1 ) t h e i n s t i n c t does n o t r e v e a l i t s whole n a t u r e 
(232) i b i d , p.24. 
(233) ( I ) An I n t r o d u c t i o n t o S o c i a l P s y c h o l o g y , o p . c i t . , p.27. 
( n ) A n o u t l i n e o f P s y c h o l o g y , o p . c i t . , p.103. 
(234) ( I ) An I n t r o d u c t i o n t o S o c i a l P s y c h o l o g y , o p . c i t . , pp.27-28. 
( n ) A n o u t l i n e o f P s y c h o l o g y , o p . c i t . , pp. 103-105. 
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i n one a c t i o n o r one t r a i n o f b e h a v i o u r . ( 2 ) Any one i n s t i n c t 
c o n s t i t u t e s one example o f t h e l a r g e c l a s s o f s i m i l a r c o n c r e t e 
f a c t s o r t h i n g s . ( 3 ) Comparative s t u d y o f d i f f e r e n t s p e c i e s may 
t h r o w l i g h t upon any p a r t i c u l a r i n s t i n c t . ( 4 ) An i n s t i n c t i s a 
"Mendelian u n i t " whose e x i s t e n c e can be p r o v e d by means o f 
b i o l o g i c a l s t u d y o f h e r e d i t y . ( 5 ) An i n s t i n c t i s a " u n i t f a c t o r " 
L 
&L w h i c h i t i s meant t h a t i t i s t r a n s m i s s i b l e . ( 6 ) An i n s t i n c t * 
i s a permanent f e a t u r e o f t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n o f any i n d i v i d u a l a n i m a l . 
( 7 ) P h y s i o l o g i c a l l y , an i n s t i n c t i v e a c t i v i t y i s bound up w i t h t h e > 
whole i n t e g r i t y o f t h e nervous system. ( 8 ) An i n s t i n c t i v e 
f u n c t i o n i n g i m p l i e s a c o n s i d e r a b l e amount o f p r e d i c t i o n f 
C e r t a i n c o n c l u s i o n s may now be i n d i c a t e d . An i n s t i n c t 
may be d e f i n e d and i d e n t i f i e d i n terms o f , ( I ) t h e n a t u r e o f t h e 
g o a l sought a f t e r ; ( n ) t h e k i n d o f t h e s i t u a t i o n i n v o l v e d ; 
( m ) t h e o b j e c t o r t h e s p e c i f i c s t i m u l i t h a t a c t i v a t e s i t w i t h i n 
t h a t p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n ; ( I V ) more i m p o r t a n t perhaps i s t h a t t h e 
above b r o a d c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s may be r e g a r d e d as an a m p l i f i c a t i o n o f 
(235) 
t h e d e s c r i p t i v e marks o f b e h a v i o u r . These a r e : ( 1 ) a c e r t a i n 
s p o n t a n e i t y o f movement, ( 2 ) The p e r s i s t e n c e o f a c t i v i t y 
i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f t h e c o n t i n u a n c e o f t h e i m p r e s s i o n w h i c h may have 
i n i t i a t e d i t . ( 3 ) v a r i a t i o n o f d i r e c t i o n o f p e r s i s t e n t movements. 
(235) An o u t l i n e o f P s y c h o l o g y , o p . c i t . , pp.44-56. 
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( 4 ) The coming t o an end o f t h e a n i m a l ' s movements as soon as t h e y 
b r o u g h t a p a r t i c u l a r k i n d o f change m i t s s i t u a t i o n . ( 5 ) P r e -
p a r a t i o n f o r t h e new s i t u a t i o n t o w a r d t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f w h i c h t h e 
a c t i o n c o n t r i b u t e s . ( 6 ) Some degree o f improvement i n t h e 
e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f b e h a v i o u r , when i t i s r e p e a t e d by t h e a n i m a l under 
s i m i l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s . ( 7 ) P u r p o s i v e a c t i o n i s a t o t a l r e a c t i o n o f 
t h e o r g a n i s m . 
The l a s t c a t e g o r y ( n o . 7 ) seems t o be o f w i d e r 
i m p l i c a t i o n s . F u r t h e r a n a l y s i s w o u l d show t h a t ( a ) i t i n d i c a t e s 
t h a t purpose i m p l i e s f o r e s i g h t . ( b ) I t i n v o l v e s t h e i m p r e s s i o n t h a t 
p u r p o s i v e a c t i o n i s t h e most e s s e n t i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c i n h o r m i c 
p s y c h o l o g y , ( c ) I t r e f l e c t s t h e i d e a t h a t p u r p o s i v e n e s s i s t h e 
essence o f m e n t a l a c t i v i t y . ( d ) B e h a v i o u r i s a c o n t i n u o u s f l o w o f 
a c t i v i t i e s . ( e ) The a c t i v i t i e s themselves a r e r e s u l t a n t s o f 
m o b i l i s e d energy. ( f ) The s o u r c e o f t h i s energy i s i n s t i n c t w h i c h 
i s i n h e r i t e d i n t h e manner o f a M e n d e l i a n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c . Yet 
b e h a v i o u r i s n o t d e t e r m i n e d by any p a r t i c u l a r o r s i n g l e i n s t i n c t ; 
and i n s t i n c t s a r e d i s c o v e r e d by means o f i n f e r e n c e w h i c h can be made 
t h r o u g h t h e c o n s i s t e n c y o f t h e o b s e r v a b l e a c t s p e r f o r m e d . 
F u r t h e r m o r e , s i n c e i n s t i n c t s a r e i n h e r e n t i n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n o f t h e 
i n d i v i d u a l o r g a n i s m , and p h y s i o l o g i c a l l y a r e n e u r a l d i s p o s i t i o n s , 
t h e y a r e bound t o have b e a r i n g on m o t i v a t i o n a l courses o f b e h a v i o u r . 
S c i e n t i f i c e v i d e n c e f o r t h e i r e x i s t e n c e s comes f r o m p e r s i s t e n t 
b e h a v i o u r and f r o m s c i e n t i f i c methods such as e t h o l o g i c a l approaches 
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i n o b s e r v a t i o n as w e l l as e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n . The immanent q u e s t i o n 
i s now whether t h e d o c t r i n e o f i n s t i n c t was e x o n e r a t e d f r o m 
e x h o r b i t a n t c r i t i c i s m s . E v i d e n c e , w h i c h i s abundant, suggests and 
c l e a r l y shows t h a t b o t h McDougall and i n s t i n c t s became a t a r g e t 
( 236) 
f o r s t r i c t u r e s . T h i s was why he used t h e t e r m " p r o p e n s i t y " as 
an a l t e r n a t i v e t o i n s t i n c t . H i s e x p l a n a t i o n o f p r o p e n s i t i e s 
i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e y a r e t h e c o r e s o f i n s t i n c t , i f n o t i n s t i n c t s 
under a d i f f e r e n t name. The word " p r o p e n s i t y " McDougall borrowed 
(237 ) 
f r o m Dugald S t e w a r t ( 1 8 5 5 ) , who had w r i t t e n o f what he c a l l e d 
" i m p l a n t e d p r o p e n s i t i e s " whereby he meant " a p p e t i t e s " , " d e s i r e s " 
and " a f f e c t i o n s " . S t e w a r t h i m s e l f a l s o m entioned " i n s t i n c t i v e 
p r o p e n s i t i e s " . 
F u n d a m e n t a l l y , t h e whole d i s a g r e e m e n t p e r t i n e n t t o 
i n s t i n c t s seems t o c e n t r e m a i n l y around t h e f o l l o w i n g i t e m s : 
( 1 ) t h e o r e t i c a l p r o b l e m s . ( 2 ) The n a t u r e and ground o f i n s t i n c t s . 
( 3 ) The number o f i n s t i n c t s . ( 4 ) The i n n a t e n e s s o f i n s t i n c t s , 
w h e t h e r t h e y a r e i n h e r i t e d o r a c q u i r e d w h o l l y o r i n p a r t . ( 5 ) Where 
more i n s t i n c t s c o u l d be f o u n d : i n man o r i n a n i m a l s , ( 6 ) The way 
o f g r o u p i n g i n s t i n c t s i n t o c e r t a i n c l a s s e s . ( 7 ) Whether i n s t i n c t s 
a r e c o g n i t i v e , c o n a t i v e , a f f e c t i v e , o r a l l o f t h e s e f a c t o r s . 
( 2 3 6 ) The E n e r g i e s o f Men, ( 1 9 3 2 ) , o p . c i t . , pp.26,64,97-98. 
(237) The P h i l o s o p h y o f t h e A c t i v e and M o r a l Powers o f Man, 
E d i n b u r g h , Thomas C o n s t a b l e and Co., v o l . 1 , pp.4,9; ed. 
by S i r Wm. H a m i l t o n under t h e t i t l e : The C o l l e c t e d Works 
o f Dugald S t e w a r t , v o l . V I . 
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( 8 ) How i n s t i n c t s a r e t o be c o n s i d e r e d : t e l e o l o g i c a l l y and 
v i t a l i s t i c a l l y o r m e c h a n i s t i c a l l y . ( 9 ) Whether a l t e r n a t i v e names 
such as, f o r example, d r i v e s , f i x e d p a t t e r n s , r e f l e x e s , "goads 
(238 ) 
and g u i d e s " , p s y c h o g e n e t i c a c t i v a t o r s , motor s e t s , 
o r t h o g e n e t i c e l e m e n t s , b i o g e n e t i c t e n d e n c i e s , o p e r a t i v e f a c t o r s , 
m e n t a l p r e d i s p o s i t i o n s , h o r m i c e n e r g i e s , and t h e l i k e , c o u l d be 
used i n s t e a d o f i n s t i n c t s . ( 1 0 ) The l o c a l i s a t i o n o f i n s t i n c t s . 
( 1 1 ) R e l a t i o n s o f emotions t o i n s t i n c t s and w h i c h s h o u l d come f i r s t 
and have t h e p r i o r i t y i n d e t e r m i n i n g b e h a v i o u r . ( 1 2 ) The b a s i c 
c r i t e r i a t o be adopted i n i n d i c a t i n g i n s t i n c t s ; ( a ) b i o l o g i c a l , 
( b ) p s y c h o l o g i c a l , ( c ) s t a t i s t i c a l , ( d ) t h e b e h a v i o u r o v e r t l y 
e x p r e s s e d , ( e ) t h e a c t i v i t i e s g e n e r a l l y , b o t h m e n t a l l y and p h y s i c a l l y , 
( f ) t h e d i r e c t i o n o f a c t i v i t y assumed by t h e b e h a v i n g i n d i v i d u a l , 
( g ) t h e g o a l a t t a i n e d and w h e t h e r t h e s e c a t e g o r i e s ( a t o g) can be 
t a k e n i n d i v i d u a l l y o r as a w h ole as i n d i c a t i v e o f i n s t i n c t i v e 
a c t i v i t i e s . 
Anyhow, i n w h a t e v e r sense t h e y may be used, i n s t i n c t s 
now appear t o be w i d e l y r e c o g n i s e d by a l m o s t a l l p s y c h o l o g i s t s as 
b i o l o g i c a l and p s y c h o l o g i c a l phenomena; and t h e q u e s t i o n i n Great 
g r i t a i n was, and perhaps i s s t i l l , "Whether man may n o t have c a r r i e d 
t h e s e i n s t i n c t i v e modes o f b e h a v i o u r upward w i t h him i n t h e c o u r s e 
(238) T h i s i s t h e t i t l e o f Chapter 16 i n : "Psychology, The S cience 
o f M e n t a l L i f e , by George A. M i l l e r , P e l i c a n e d i t i o n , 
( 1 9 6 6 ) . 
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o f e v o l u t i o n , and w h e t h e r t h e y a r e n o t s t i l l t h e b a s i s o f h i s 
(239 ) 
complex e x i s t e n c e " . T h i s q u e r y w h i c h C y r i l B u r t has r a i s e d 
(240) 
(1941) seems t o be a r e p e t i t i o n o f McDougall's e x p r e s s e d wonder, 
"how any one can deny t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f human i n s t i n c t , w i t h o u t 
d e n y i n g i t a l s o i n t h e mammals i n g e n e r a l , o r w i t h o u t d e n y i n g t h e 
c o n t i n u i t y o f e v o l u t i o n o f man f r o m t h e a n i m a l s " . An a f f i r m a t i v e 
answer, however, has o f t e n been g i v e n by a c o n s i d e r a b l e number o f 
a u t h o r s , n o t a b l y , S t o u t ( 1 9 3 2 ) , J . D r e v e r ( S n r ) (1917,1942), F r a n c i s 
A v e l m g ( 1 9 3 7 ) , G o d f r e y H.Thomson ( 1 9 2 4 ) , C.S. Myers (1910, 1 9 4 2 ) , 
(241) (242) A.C.Garnet ( 1 9 2 8 ) , B u r l t o n A l l e n v ' ( 1 9 3 0 ) , A.G.Tansley v '(1920, 
1 9 5 2 ) , W.H.Thorpe ( 1 9 5 6 ) , F.V.Smith (1960a, 1 9 6 8 a ) , and o t h e r s , and 
(239) " I s t h e D o c t r i n e o f I n s t i n c t s Dead ?" B r i t . J . E d . P s y c h . , 
v o l . X I , p.156. 
(240) J . Abnor. and S o c i a l P s y c h o l . , v o l . X V I , ( 1 9 2 2 ) , o p . c i t . , 
( 2 4 1 ) P l e a s u r e and I n s t i n c t , London, Kegan P a u l . 
(242) ( I ) (1920) The New Psychology, London, George A l l e n 
and Unwin. 
( n ) (1952) Mind and L i f e , London, George A l l e n and 
Unwin. 
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(243) as S m i t h (1960a) has remarked "The pendulum w h i c h seemed t o be 
(244) 
s w i n g i n g away f r o m s p e c i f l t y i n t h e 1930's w o u l d now appear 
t o be r e t u r n i n g " i n f a v o u r o f i n s t i n c t . L a t e r c h a p t e r s w i l l 
show t h a t modern evid e n c e c o n c e r n i n g t h e ' n e u r o l o g i c a l c o r r e l a t e ' 
(McDougall's p h r a s e ) f u r t h e r s u p p o r t s t h i s v i e w . 
(243) E x p l a n a t i o n o f Human B e h a v i o u r , o p . c i t . , p.178. 
(2 4 4 ) ( 1 ) Under t h e i n f l u e n c e o f : 
Kuo, Z.Y., ( l ) " G i v i n g up i n s t i n c t s i n P s y c h o l o g y " 
J . P h i l o s . , v o l . X V I I I , ( 1 9 2 1 ) , o p . c i t . , 
( n ) "How A r e o u r I n s t i n c t s A c q u i r e d ? " 
Psych.Rev., v o l . XXIX, ( 1 9 2 2 ) , o p . c i t . , 
( m ) "The Genesis o f t h e Cat's Response t o 
t h e R a t " , J.Comp.Psych., v o l . X I , ( 1 9 3 0 ) , 
o p . c i t . , 
( 2 ) and L a s h l e y , K.S., B r a i n Mechanisms and I n t e l l i g e n c e , 
Monograph, Chicago, U n i v e r s i t y o f Chicago P r e s s , 
( 1 9 2 9 ) . 
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CHAPTER V I I . 
BROAD FEATURES OF THE HORMIC 
THEORY. 
1. P r i n c i p a l Bases S t a t e d . 
The d e s c r i p t i v e t i t l e "Hormic Psychology", 
McDougall adopted i n 1930; and hoped t h a t i t would s e r v e as "a 
(2) 
banner and badge" to many p s y c h o l o g i s t s . Although he 
(3) 
r e g r e t t e d t h a t he d i d not use t h i s t i t l e a t the f i r s t 
p u b l i c a t i o n of h i s I n t r o d u c t i o n to S o c i a l Psychology (1908), by the 
year 1930, however, i t appeared to McDougall t h a t " h i s crusade had 
(4) 
made n o t i c e a b l e p r o g r e s s " , to use a sentence from Woodworth. I n 
p o i n t of f a c t , the p r i n c i p l e of the hormic theory was a l r e a d y s e t 
out i n the book c l e a r l y and e x p l i c i t l y . The most e s s e n t i a l 
sentences need only be reproduced here. "We may say, then," wrote 
McDougall, " t h a t d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y the i n s t i n c t s a r e the prime 
movers of a l l human a c t i v i t y } by the c o n a t i v e or the i m p u l s i v e 
f o r c e of some i n s t i n c t ( o r of some h a b i t d e r i v e d from an i n s t i n c t ) , 
every t r a m of thought, however c o l d and p a s s i o n l e s s i t may seem, (1 ) "Hormic Psychology" i n : P s y c h o l o g i e s of 1930, ed. by 
C.Murchison, C l a r k U n i v . P r e s s , Mass. 
(2) P r e f a c e to the twenty-second ed. of : I n t r o d u c t i o n to S o c i a l 
Psychology, p. xx. 
(3 ) i b i d , p. x i x . 
( 4 ) Contemporary Schools of Psychology, o p . c i t . , p.228. 
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i s borne along towards i t s end, and every b o d i l y a c t i v i t y i s 
i n i t i a t e d and s u s t a i n e d . The i n s t i n c t i v e impulses determine the 
ends of a l l a c t i v i t i e s and supply the d r i v i n g power by which a l l 
mental a c t i v i t i e s a r e s u s t a i n e d ; and a l l the complex i n t e l l e c t u a l 
apparatus of the most h i g h l y developed mind i s but a means towards 
these ends, i s but the instrument by which these impulses seek 
t h e i r s a t i s f a c t i o n ... Take away th e s e i n s t i n c t i v e d i s p o s i t i o n s 
w i t h t h e i r powerful impulses, and the organism would become 
in c a p a b l e of a c t i v i t y of any kind; i t would be i n t e r t and 
motionless l i k e a wonderful clockwork whose n a m s p r i n g had been 
removed or a steam-engine whose f i r e s had been drawn. These 
impulses a r e the mental f o r c e s t h a t maintain and shape a l l the 
l i f e of i n d i v i d u a l s and s o c i e t i e s , and xn them we a r e confronted 
(5) 
wxth the c e n t r a l mystery of l i f e and mind and w i l l " . 
The reason why the above passage has been quoted a t 
length,mainly because i t i s b a s i c to McDougall's whole arguments. < 
K \ 
I t g i v e s the impression t h a t , to c i t e Smith (1960) "McDougall was 
prompted by the o b s e r v a t i o n of the broad c o n s i s t e n t f e a t u r e s i n 
human and animal behaviour to advance the hypothesis of some 
underlying f e a t u r e i n the s t r u c t u r e of the organism whxch could be 
r e s p o n s i b l e by way of p r e s c r i p t i o n , f o r the observed c o n s i s t e n c i e s " . ( 5 ) An I n t r o d u c t i o n to S o c i a l Psychology, o p . c i t • , 25th ed., p.38. 
(6) E x p l a n a t i o n of Human Behaviour, o p . c i t . , p.128. 
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So McDougall's statement, which has so oft e n been quoted by many an 
author may be regarded as the key to h i s hormic theory of behaviour. 
Therefore i t i s h i g h l y probable t h a t he had f o r some time been 
a n t i c i p a t i n g a hormic psychology f o r which he f u r n i s h e d the f i r s t 
foundations; and the i m p l i c a t i o n of Smith's o b s e r v a t i o n here, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y of " c o n s i s t e n t f e a t u r e s " and "observed c o n s i s t e n c i e s " , 
seems to i n d i c a t e the mnateness of i n s t i n c t which may be r e a l i s e d 
a t any one of c e r t a i n phases: (1) i n the i n s t i g a t i o n of a c t i v i t y , 
(11) m the predominance of one movement over o t h e r s , ( m ) m an 
in n a t e a b i l i t y of s e l e c t i v e p e r c e p t i o n . Examples may i l l u s t r a t e the 
( 7 ) 
c a s e . I n a number of p u b l i c a t i o n s , F.V.Smith (1960,1962), Smith e t 
(7) ( l ) ( 1 9 6 0 ) , Animal Behaviour, v o l . 8 , pp.197-200. 
( n ) (1962), Symp.Zool.Society of London, v o l . 8 , pp.171-191. 
(8) (1) (1961), Animal Behaviour, v o l . 9 , pp.159-166. 
( n ) (1963a), Animal Behaviour, vol.11, pp.57-61. 
( i n ) (1963b), Animal Behaviour, vol.11, pp.300-305. 
(IV) ( 1 9 6 3 c ) , Animal Behaviour, vol.11, pp.397-399. 
( v ) (1964a), Animal Behaviour, v o l . 1 2 , pp.60-63. 
( v i ) (1964b), Animal Behaviour, v o l . 1 2 , pp.252-258. 
( v n ) ( 1 9 6 4 c ) , Animal Behaviour, v o l . 1 2 , pp.259-263. 
( v m ) (1966a) , Animal Behaviour, vol.14, pp.120-125. 
( I X ) (1966b), Animal Behaviour, vol,14, pp.291-295. 
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a l (1961,1963a,1963b,19630,19643,19641),1964c,1966a,1966b), could 
demonstrate an h y p o t h e s i s , namely, "the v i s u a l s t i m u l i e f f e c t i v e i n 
evoking i n i t i a l approach and f i x a t i o n " m c h i c k s , a r e l i a b l e to 
v a r y according as to the c o l o u r of the l i g h t , frequency and i n t e n s i t y 
of the s t i m u l u s i n v o l v e d i n the s i t u a t i o n and the d i s t a n c e of the 
o b j e c t above the c h i c k . To d e s c r i b e one experiment f u l l y may s u f f i c e 
( 9 ) 
a t the moment. Smith and P.A.Hoyes ( 1 9 6 1 ) , f o r example, found 
t h a t the c h i c k s used to move i n the d i r e c t i o n of "the f a m i l i a r 
s t i m u l u s which they had approached during the week and remained i n 
i t s immediate v i c i n i t y even though" they were presented s i m u l t a n e o u s l y 
w i t h another s t i m u l u s " c l e a r l y v i s i b l e to them",^ 1^ The 
experimenters have s t a t e d t h a t "some c h i c k s do respond s t r o n g l y w i t h 
the complete p a t t e r n of movements a f t e r i n i t i a l l y t u r n i n g away".^ 1 1^ 
Such "strong e f f o r t to respond" seemed c l e a r to the experimenters 
(12) 
even m " c h i c k s w i t h c o n s i d e r a b l e deformation of the f e e t " . The 
g i s t of the experiment i s t h a t two o b j e c t s were suspended from a 
(13) 
r a d i u s arm a t d i f f e r e n t h e i g h t s of about 6" and 20" above the f l o o r . 
(9) " P r o p e r t i e s of the v i s u a l s t i m u l i f o r the Approach Response i n 
the Domestic C h i r c k " , Animal Behaviour, No.219, v o l . 9 , J u l y -
October, (1961), pp.159-166. 
(10) i b i d , pp.164-5. 
(11) i b i d , p.165. 
(12) i b i d , p.165. 
(13) see a l s o Smith, F.V., I m p r i n t i n g , MS, o p . c i t . , pp.33,40,43,44,48, 
65,89,99,119. 
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I t was found t h a t lower o b j e c t s were f a r more e f f e c t i v e i n a t t r a c t i n g 
the a t t e n t i o n of the c h i c k s . The c o n c l u s i o n t h a t the experimenters 
reached was t h i s , "While the r e s u l t s ... do i n d i c a t e t h a t some 
f e a t u r e s of the s t i m u l u s s i t u a t i o n a r e more s i g n i f i c a n t than oth e r s i n 
inducing the i n i t i a l movement of approach, our o b s e r v a t i o n s would 
suggest t h a t e x c l u s i v e attachment to a p a r t i c u l a r s t i m u l u s i s not a 
(14) 
sudden and i r r e v o c a b l e development". There i s evidence of l e a r n i n g ; 
but the e s s e n t i a l point i s t h a t the process of l e a r n i n g begins 
w i t h i n the r e l a t i v e l y narrow range of s t i m u l i which a r e i n i t i a l l y 
e f f e c t i v e , 
(15) 
Smith (1968) has on v a r i o u s o c c a s i o n s "been a b l e 
to induce a v i d f o l l o w i n g to a r e d box i n domestic d u c k l i n g s (Khaki 
Campbells) and a f t e r s e v e r a l t r a i n i n g t r i a l s w i t h t h i s o b j e c t f o r 8 
c o n s e c u t i v e days and w i t h v i r t u a l l y a maximum response, the b i r d s 
t r a n s f e r r e d s i m i l a r , r a p i d approach to a f l a s h i n g l i g h t , a r o t a t i n g 
b l a c k and white d i s c " and even Smith h i m s e l f . Movement w i t h i n a 
c e r t a i n h e ight appears to be the e s s e n t i a l f e a t u r e . Another example 
can be drawn from an independent study by G. G o t t l i e b ( 1 9 6 8 ) , which 
seems to support Smith's f i n d i n g s , G o t t l i e b ' s experiments were 
intended to a s s e s s "the r e l a t i v e importance of s p e c i e s — t y p i c a l , 
maternal a u d i t o r y and v i s u a l s t i m u l a t i o n i n the development of s p e c i e s 
(14) Animal Behaviour, v o l . 9 , ( 1 9 6 1 ) , o p , c i t . , p.165, 
(15) I m p r i n t i n g , MS, o p . c i t . , pp.89-90. 
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(16) i d e n t i f i c a t i o n during the e a r l y p o s t n a t a l phase" i n Wood 
duc k l i n g s and M a l l a r d d u c k l i n g s . The f i n a l r e s u l t s showed t h a t 
maternal, a u d i t o r y s t i m u l a t i o n has a more preponderant r o l e than 
maternal v i s u a l s t i m u l a t i o n i n a t t r a c t i n g d u c k l i n g s of both s p e c i e s 
to t h e i r p a r e n t s . "Therefore", concludes G o t t l i e b , "the maternal 
c a l l would seem to f u n c t i o n as the s e l e c t i v e p a r t of the 
a u d i o v i s u a l , p e r c e p t u a l mechanism f o r s p e c i e s - r e c o g n i t i o n , 
a s s u r i n g t h a t the approach aspect of the f o l l o w i n g - response w i l l 
be both ( 1 ) prompt and ( 2 ) addressed to the b i o l o g i c a l l y a p p r o p r i a t e 
o b j e c t " . 
Indeed, such s t u d i e s as those c a r r i e d out by Smith, 
Smith e t a l . , G o t t l i e b , and by o t h e r s , tend to i n d i c a t e t h a t a t 
l e a s t i n some of h i s c o n t e n t i o n s , McDougall could be j u s t i f i e d . His 
p o s t u l a t i o n that "the i n s t i n c t i s not d e f i n e d by the ki n d or kinds 
of b o d i l y a c t i v i t y to which i t impels the animal, but r a t h e r by the 
nature of the o b j e c t s and s i t u a t i o n s which evoke i t and, more 
e s p e c i a l l y , by the nature of the go a l , the change i n the s i t u a t i o n , 
i n the o b j e c t or i n the animal's r e l a t i o n to i t , t o which i n s t i n c t 
(18) 
impels", c l e a r l y r e f l e c t s the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the pe r c e p t u a l and 
(16) "Species R e c o g n i t i o n i n Ground-Nesting and Hole-Nesting D u c k l i n g s " 
Ecology, vol.49, No.l, (1968), pp.87-95. 
(17) i b i d , p.95. 
(18) An I n t r o d u c t i o n to S o c i a l Psychology, o p . c i t . , p.416. 
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c o g n i t i v e powers which enable the organism to adapt i t s e l f to the 
surrounding environment and the changing c o n d i t i o n s i n i t . Moreover, 
McDougall's statement, c i t e d here, f u r t h e r p o i n t s out that behaviour 
cannot be e x p l a i n e d simply i n terms of, say, S-R alone, nor should i t 
(19) 
be i n t e r p r e t e d i n terms of h a b i t which Margaret A. Boden (1965) 
has l i k e n e d to "our l i n g u i s t i c h a b i t s which determine the manner i n 
which we ask f o r something, but not what we ask f o r " . The point to be 
s t r e s s e d here, however, i s t h a t p r i n c i p l e s which e v e n t u a l l y render the 
i n d i v i d u a l ' s behaviour i n t e l l i g i b l e a r e to be searched f o r w i t h i n the 
i n d i v i d u a l concerned; such b a s i c p r i n c i p l e s a r e inborn and r e p r e s e n t e d 
by i n s t i n c t s or " i n n a t e p r o p e n s i t i e s " . 
Behaviour i s but a p e r c e p t u a l rhythm of energy 
d i s c h a r g e d from w i t h i n the i n d i v i d u a l . Within t h i s c o n t e x t , the 
i n d i v i d u a l i n s t i n c t s can now be r e a l i s e d f o r what they r e a l l y a r e ; 
they can be conceived as " l a b e l s a t t a c h e d to c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s of 
behaviour p a t t e r n s i n terms of t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l e n d - s t a t e s such as 
e a t i n g , f i g h t i n g , or mating; or i n terms of t h e i r b i o l o g i c a l f u n c t i o n " 
(21) 
such as r e p r o d u c t i o n , ( S . M i l l a r : 1968, p.36). As a c o r o l l a r y of 
t h i s , the i n d i v i d u a l i n s t i n c t s w i l l i n c e s s a n t l y demand renewed 
s a t i s f a c t i o n so t h a t the b i o l o g i c a l , p s y c h i c a l and p h y s i c a l needs can 
(19) "McDougall R e v i s i t e d " J . P e r s o n a l i t y , v o l . 3 3 , p.10. 
(20) The E n e r g i e s of Men, o p . c i t . , C h . V I I . 
(21) The Psychology of P l a y , P e l i c a n ed. 
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be met and a homeostatic e q u i l i b r i u m i s maintained. Now the r e l a t i o n 
between i n n a t e a c t i v i t i e s , the s t a t e of the organism's c e n t r a l 
nervous system and the c o n d i t i o n s of the e x t e r n a l environment a r e no 
longer e x p l a i n e d as a mere s p i l l i n g over of accumulated energy 
(22) (23) (R.A.Hinde :(1954; P.Zeiger: 1964). The cogent reason i s t h a t 
organisms do not have to be goaded i n t o a c t i o n ; they move and behave 
q u i t e v o l u n t a r i l y by v i r t u e of being a l i v e ; but the a n a l y s i s i n t o 
motivating urges, i n n a t e b e h a v i o u r a l p a t t e r n s and environmental 
s t i m u l a t i o n s can l e a d to a b e t t e r understanding of the s i t u a t i o n s as a 
whole". The emphasis, however, to quote Smith (1960a, p.134) i s to be 
"upon changes i n t o t a l p a t t e r n s and changes a s s o c i a t e d w i t h 
i n t e r a c t i o n s between wholes r a t h e r than s p e c i f i c 'one to one' 
a s s o c i a t i o n s " . 
So too, the a c t i v i t i e s of the organism a r e g e n e r a l l y 
i n t e r p r e t e d as a c t i o n s of a l i v i n g i n d i v i d u a l i t y . The a c t s a re 
normally c a r r i e d out i n response to f e l t urges and a c c o r d i n g to the 
(22) " F a c t o r s Governing the changes i n S trength of a P a r t i a l l y Inborn 
Response, as shown by the Mobbing Behaviour of the C h a f f i n c h 
( F r i n g i l l a c o e l e b s " , 1 and 2, Proc.Roy.Soc., vol.142, pp.306-331, 
and 331-358; see a l s o Hinde's paper : 
"Energy Models of Motivation", Symp.Soc.Exp.Biol., vol.14, (1960), 
pp.199-213, o p . c i t . , 
(23) "Displacement A c t i v i t y and M o t i v a t i o n a l Theory : A Case Study i n 
the H i s t o r y of Ethology" P s y c h . B u l l , v o l . 6 3 , pp.362-376. 
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organism's own "s e n s e s " , to use a word from L.H. Matthews and 
(24) (25) M.Knight (1963) and S.A. B a r n e t t ( 1 9 6 7 ) . The f l e x i b i l i t y 
shown i n the i n d i v i d u a l ' s movements i s a t t r i b u t a b l e mainly to the 
p e r c e p t u a l power i m p l i e d i n the formation of the c o g n i t i v e system. 
Such a p e r c e p t u a l aspect i s e x h i b i t e d by the organism of the changes 
happening i n the environment. The s p e c i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of 
i n s t i n c t i v e behaviour i s t h a t i t i s n e i t h e r taught nor i s i t 
a c q u i r e d . Undoubtedly, maturation, experience and l e a r n i n g do i n c r e a s e 
the s k i l l of the inborn performances. Newly hatched c h i c k s , f o r 
example, s t a r t pecking a t t h i n g s about them such as g r a i n s , but 
t r i a l s - a n d - e r r o r s cannot be r u l e d out here. The c h i c k s sometimes 
peck q u i t e randomly. Accuracy, poor a t f i r s t , improves r a p i d l y as 
they continue t h e i r p r a c t i c e s of pecking and swallowing. I t must be 
e q u a l l y noted t h a t l e a r n i n g i s not a t a l l times v i t a l f o r a l l 
v a r i e t i e s of behaviour; the tendency to peck a t sm a l l t h i n g s a l r e a d y 
e x i s t s i n the newly hatched c h i c k s . The inborn pecking tendency has 
been designated by H e b b ^ 6 \ l 9 6 6 ) as " r e f l e x i v e " , whereby he meant 
t h a t "no l e a r n i n g i s i n v o l v e d " , and the "unconditioned r e f l e x paths 
ar e i n g e n e r a l l a i d down by h e r e d i t y and growth p r o c e s s e s " , 
(24) The Senses of Animals, London, Museum P r e s s . 
(25) I n s t i n c t and I n t e l l i g e n c e , London, MacGibbon and Kee>-, p.5. 
(26) A Textbook of Psychology, P h i l a d e l p h i a , Saunders Co., 2nd ed., 
p.145. 
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I t can be s t a t e d a t t h i s s tage t h a t i n s t i n c t can now 
be regarded^/a concept of genuine s c i e n t i f i c v a l u e . As an a c t i v e '< 
motivating f a c t o r of a co-ordinated and purposeful behaviour, i t 
a t t r a c t e d the a t t e n t i o n of p s y c h o l o g i s t s , e t h o l o g i s t s and 
p h y s i o l o g i s t s to i n v e s t i g a t e i t w i t h i n McDougall's " n e u r o l o g i c a l 
(27) 
framework" (Smith : 1960a, p.134). Of p a r t i c u l a r importance f o r 
the qu e s t i o n of mot i v a t i o n i s the hypothalamus, as a l r e a d y i n d i c a t e d . 
(28) 
What Hebb (1955) has c a l l e d the "new neurology" i s i n f a c t an 
i n d i c a t i o n of the tremendous volume of s t u d i e s e x p l o r i n g the concept 
of the nervous h i e r a r c h i e s and the l o c a l i s a t i o n of m o t i v a t i o n a l 
a c t i v a t o r s , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n s t i n c t s . I n c i d e n t a l l y , the idea of 
nervous h i e r a r c h i e s was f i r s t i n troduced by Herbert Spencer i n the 
(29) 
second e d i t i o n of h i s P r i n c i p l e s of Psychology (1870-2), but the 
concept has now been r e v i v e d i n connection w i t h the i n s t i n c t i v e 
behaviour when Tinbergen^°\l951) introduced a schematic diagram of 
(27) E x p l a n a t i o n of Human Behaviour, o p . c i t . , 
(28) "Drives and the conceptual Nervous System", Psych.Rev., 
Vol.62, pp.243-254. 
(29) 1 s t pu b l i s h e d i n 1855, o p . c i t . , 
(30) The Study of I n s t i n c t , o p . c i t . , 
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i n n a t e a c t i v i t i e s i n v o l v i n g the concept of a s e r i e s of " c e n t r e s " 
of h i e r a r c h i c a l l e v e l s superimposed on one another. The h i g h e s t 
c e n t r e i s b e l i e v e d to provide m o t i v a t i o n a l e n e r g i e s which flow down 
i n t o the c e n t r e s next below. I n t e r e s t i n l o c a t i n g the motivators 
of f u n c t i o n s encouraged i n v e s t i g a t o r s such as Cannon and B n t t o n } a n d 
Bard, as pointed out, to show t h a t "sham r a g e " i n c a t s i s 
c o n t r o l l e d by the " p o s t e r i o r hypothalamus". The i n t e r e s t i n g t h i n g 
about "sham r a g e " i s t h a t i t d i f f e r s from o r d i n a r y rage i n some 
ways: (1) i t can be evoked by mild s t i m u l a t i o n , even by s t r o k i n g the 
animal; ( i i ) i t c e a s e s as soon as s t i m u l a t i o n s t o p s , whereas normal 
rage l a s t s longer; ( m ) i t i s u n d i r e c t e d and t h e r e f o r e i t i s not 
p u r p o s e f u l . Other s t u d i e s , such as those introduced by, f o r i n s t a n c e , 
F.A. Beach'' '(1937, 1940, 1942, 1947, 1951) tend to confirm 
(31) ( I ) (1937) "The Neural B a s i s of Innate Behaviour. I . E f f e c t s 
of C o r t i c a l L e s i o n s upon the Maternal Behaviour 
P a t t e r n i n the Rat", J.Comp.Psych., vol.24, pp.393-
436. 
( n ) (1940) " E f f e c t s of C o r t i c a l L e s i o n s upon the Copulatory 
Behaviour of Male R a t s " , J.Comp.Psych., v o l . 2 9 , 
pp.193-239. 
( m ) (1942) " C e n t r a l Nervous Mechanisms In v o l v e d i n the 
Reproductive Behaviour of V e r t e b r a t e s " , P s y c h . B u l l , 
vol.39, pp.200-206. 
( I V ) (1947) "A Review of P h y s i o l o g i c a l and P s y c h o l o g i c a l S t u d i e s 
of Sexual Behaviour i n Animals", Physiol.Rev., 
vol.27, pp.240-307. 
( v ) (1951) " i n s t i n c t i v e Behaviour : Reproductive A c t i v i t i e s " , 
i n S.S. Stevens, (ed.) : Handbook of Experimental 
Psychology, New York, John Wiley and Sons, pp.403ff. 
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McDougall's hormic p o s i t i o n , namely, t h a t i n s t i n c t i v e behaviour i s 
l a r g e l y independent of p r i o r e x p e r i e n c e and l e a r n i n g . Beach has 
found t h a t c e r t a i n f e a t u r e s of the mating behaviour of r a t s a r e i n 
f a c t i n s t i n c t i v e . He based h i s s u g g e s t i o n upon the f a c t t h a t the 
mating a c t i v i t i e s continued even a f t e r the removal of as much as 40 
percent of the c o r t e x ; t h i s once again confirms the e s s e n t i a l r o l e 
of the t i s s u e s of the hypothalamus which would mean t h a t , "Despite 
i t s r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l s i z e , the hypothalamus has, i n d i r e c t l y or 
d i r e c t l y , a wealth of f u n c t i o n a l connections w i t h other p a r t s of the 
b r a i n " (Smith; 1960a, p.135). 
S t u d i e s such as those i n d i c a t e d above and othersdone 
(32) 
by, f o r example, W.H. I t t e l s o n and F.P. K i l p a t r i c k ( 1 9 5 1 ) , 
(33) (34) R.A. B u t l e r (1954), N.Tinbergen (1955), A.D.Hasler and J.A. 
L a r s e n ( 3 5 ) ( 1 9 5 5 ) , A.M. G u h l ( 3 6 ) ( 1 9 5 6 ) , J . 0 1 d s ( 3 7 ) ( 1 9 5 6 ) , E . H . H e s s ( 3 8 ) 
(32) "Experiments i n P e r c e p t i o n " i n : S c i e n t i f i c American, 
Psychobiology, o p . c i t . , pp.330-5. 
(33) " C u r i o s i t y i n Monkeys", S c i e n t i f i c American, o p . c i t . , pp.173-7. 
(34) "The Curious Behaviour of the S t i c k l e b a c k " , idem, pp.5-9. 
(35) "The Homing Salmon", idem, pp.20-23. 
(36) "The S o c i a l Order of Chickens", idem, pp.113-116. 
(37) " P l e a s u r e Centres i n the B r a i n " , idem, pp.183-188. 
(38) " I m p r i n t i n g i n Animals", idem, pp.107-112. 
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(39") ( 40 ) (1958 ) , S.L. Washburn and I . Devore v ' ( 1 9 6 1 ) , R.L. F a n t z v ' ( 1 9 6 1 ) , 
W.C. D i l g e r ^ 4 1 ^ ( 1 9 6 2 ) , Von Hoist and U r s u l a von Saxnt P a u l ^ 4 2 ^ ( 1 9 6 2 ) , 
(4.3) f44) (45) D.H. Hubel v ( 1 9 6 3 ) , D.S. Lehrman v ' ( 1 9 6 4 ) , W.R.A. Muntz s ' ( 1 9 6 4 ) , 
S. L e v x n e ^ 4 6 ) ( 1 9 6 6 ) , Smith et a l / 4 7 ) (1961) , S m i t h ^ 4 8 ) ( 1 9 6 6 , 1 9 6 8 ) , 
po i n t to s e v e r a l e q u a l l y important f a c t s , namely, ( 1 ) behaviour, both 
human and animal, i s "coded i n " t h e i r "genes"; ( 2 ) t h i s would e n t a i l 
a f o c a l p o i n t , namely, t h a t the c o n t r o l systems a re pr e s e n t i n the 
b r a i n , which determine how the i n d i v i d u a l w i l l a c t ; ( 3 ) d i f f e r e n c e s 
i n b e h a v i o u r a l p a t t e r n s between d i f f e r e n t s p e c i e s a r e i n d i c a t i v e of 
(39) "The S o c i a l L i f e of Baboons," idem, pp.10-19. 
(40) "The O r i g i n of Form P e r c e p t i o n " , idem, pp.308-314. 
(41) "The Behaviour of L o v e b i r d s " , idem, pp.45-52; c f . Armstrong, 
E.A., B i r d D i s p l a y and Behaviour: An I n t r o d u c t i o n to the Study 
of B i r d Psychology, Dover, ( 1 9 6 5 ) , o p . c i t . , 
(42) " E l e c t r i c a l l y C o n t r o l l e d Behaviour", idem, pp.56-65. 
(43) "The v i s u a l c o r t e x of the B r a i n " , idem, pp.270-8. 
(44) "The Reproductive Behaviour of Ring Doves", idem, pp.82-88. 
(45) " V i s i o n i n Frogs", idem, pp.279-286. 
(46) "Sex D i f f e r e n c e s m the B r a i n " , idem, pp.76-81. 
(47) o p . c i t . , Ch.VI above. 
(48) ( I ) ( 1966), o p . c i t . , Ch.VI above, 
( n ) (1968), I m p r i n t i n g , MS, o p . c i t . , 
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the d i f f e r e n t e v o l u t i o n a r y phases t h a t the s p e c i e s r e p r e s e n t ; 
( 4 ) above a l l , t h e s e s t u d i e s have d e f i n i t e l y r e v i v e d a p o s s i b i l i t y , 
namely, t h a t s p e o i f i c i n s t i n c t s as worked out by McDougall e x i s t 
w i t h t h e i r own " n e u r o l o g i c a l c o r r e l a t e s " . Such i n v e s t i g a t i o n s have 
(49) 
i n f a c t , t o quote Smith (1968a), confirmed "The notion of d i f f e r e n t 
' n e u r o l o g i c a l c o r r e l a t e s * mediating s p e c i f i c types of purposeful 
behaviour". I n a sense, t h i s would mean th a t the o r i g i n s of 
mo t i v a t i o n a r e to be looked f o r i n the dominant horme of the 
organism; i n what John F. H a l l ^ ^ ( 1 9 6 5 ) has c a l l e d "the b i o l o g i c a l 
needs" which arouse a "spontaneous", "unlearned" a c t i v i t y . The 
"spontaneous", "unlearned" a c t i v i t y i s c e r t a i n l y prompted by i n s t i n c t 
which i s ( a ) i n h e r i t e d , (b) forms the foundations of the whole 
f u n c t i o n , ( c ) c o n a t i v e i n pursuance of a fundamental aim which i s 
expected to conserve both the i n d i v i d u a l and the s p e c i e s , (d) t h e r e i s 
c o n t i n u i t y of a common mechanism a t a l l l e v e l s i n the c e n t r e s of the 
nervous system. 
However, the i s s u e seems to be as Smith (1960) has 
i n d i c a t e d , namely, "The whole problem of i n n a t e mechanisms and t h e i r 
p r e s c r i p t i v e i n f l u e n c e upon behaviour i s complicated by the a l l -
(49) I m p r i n t i n g , o p . c i t . , pp.10-11. 
(50) The Psychology of Learning, New York, J.B. L i p p m c o t t , Co., p.73, 
see a l s o : 
Mowrer, 0. Hobart, Learning Theory and Behaviour, New York, 
Wiley, (1960), pp.175-182. 
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(51) pervadxng nature of the assumption of the purposive horme . The 
complicated p o s i t i o n i n McDougall's hormic scheme, and which Smith 
e n v i s a g e s , appears to be r e l a t e d to (1) s p e c i f i c inborn tendencies 
which u n d e r l i e the organism's response, and (11) the way i n which the 
behaviour as a whole should be i n t e r p r e t e d . Both a s p e c t s , however, 
ar e i n e x t r i c a b l y a s s o c i a t e d , so t h a t an e x p l a n a t i o n of the one 
r e q u i r e s a t the same time, the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the other. 
I n i t s broad b a s i s , McDougall's hormic theory i s supposed 
to r e f l e c t c e r t a i n f e a t u r e s which a r e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of i t s own 
s e t t i n g . I n c i d e n t a l l y , the term "horme" McDougall borrowed from 
(52) 
T.P.Nunn v (1920) who used i t i n the sense of "urge" or f e l t 
tendency toward an end. According to the hormic view, man i s to be 
conceived as a s i n g l e organism, a "body-mind", the l a t e s t phase of 
e v o l u t i o n a r y p r o c e s s ; and horme, m t h i s c ontext, i s "the b a s i s of 
the a c t i v i t i e s t h a t d i f f e r e n t i a t e the l i v i n g animal from dead 
,. (53) y matter . Yet u n l i k e Nunn, McDougall used horme i n a broader sense 
and a s c r i b e d consciousness and conation even to the lowly organisms. 
T h i s perhaps was the e s s e n t i a l d i f f e r e n c e between the two s t a n d p o i n t s . 
(51) E x p l a n a t i o n of Human Behaviour, o p . c i t . , pp.129-130. 
(52) E d u cation: I t s Data and F i r s t P r i n c i p l e s , o p . c i t . , 23; 
2nd. ed. ( 1 9 3 4 ) . 
(53) i b i d , p.28; see a l s o , pp.19, 21-22. 
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By the hormxc theory, then, McDougall m e a n t ^ 5 4 ^ t h a t man 
and animals a r e xnnately equxpped wxth tendencxes urgxng them to seek 
c e r t a x n ends n a t u r a l to the specxes. I n thxs connectxon, cognxtxon xs 
regarded as havxng a prxncxpal r o l e xn guxdxng the dxsposxtions towards 
thexr approprxate g o a l s . I n c a l l x n g hxs posxtxon the "hormxc theory", 
(55) 
McDougall sxmply meant t h a t xn a l l organxc psychxc and mental l x f e , 
and xn a l l anxmal and human behavxour, t h e r e xs an o r i g x n a l " v x t a l 
nxsus" towards purposxve actxon. The actxon xs prompted by x n s t x n c t s , 
and a t the hxgher l e v e l s of organxc development, xs dxrected to ever 
more x n t e l l x g e n t p a t h s . Perhaps thxs xs why he regarded xnstxnct 
"everywhere shot through wxth x n t e l l x g e n c e " . Thxs xs what Smxth seems 
to have xn mxnd when he s t a t e d t h a t "The f e r t x l x t y of thxs system 
(McDougall's system) xn provxdxng reasons f o r any form of human or 
anxmal behavxour ... xs due to the nature of the x n x t x a l assumptxons". 
Thxs statement Smxth has rejoxned by addxng " A l l anxmal behavxour xs 
(57) 
hormxc or purposxve". By so s t a t x n g , Smxth xs a c t u a l l y emphasxsxng what 
McDougall hxmself would have saxd and what Tolman, a behavxourxst^has 
s t a t e d . I n t e r p r e t e d xn the lxght of r e c e n t l x t e r a t u r e , purposive 
(54) " P l e a s u r e , Paxn and Conatxon", B.J.Ps y c h o l , v o l . X V I I , p a r t 3, 
(19 2 7 ) , p.171. 
(55) Modern Materxalxsm and Emergent Evolutxon, London, Methuen, (19 2 9 ) , 
P.39. 
(56) Explanatxon of Human Behavxour, op.ext., p.178. 
(57) i b i d , P.178. 
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( 58) behaviour, to c i t e a sentence from J.R. M i l l e n s o n ( 1 9 6 7 ) , i s 
"behaviour t h a t i s almost d e f i n e d by i t s consequences". T h i s would 
a p t l y match what McDougall c a l l e d " t e l e o l o g i c a l c a u s a t i o n " ^ ^ w h i c h 
i m p l i e s t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l has an i n s i g h t i n t o and f o r e s i g h t of the 
g o a l s towards which i t s t r i v e s . Purposive a c t i o n s a r e i n f a c t the 
p a t t e r n s of such c a u s a t i o n ; and the a b i l i t y of p e r c e p t i o n w i t h i n 
the whole f u n c t i o n of behaviour i s always a s t e p towards the a c t i v i t y 
as a whole. 
P u r p o s i v e l y e x p l a i n e d , then, and to quote M i l l e n s o n 
again, to say t h a t " r a t s burrow i n t o h o l e s to escape the c o l d can 
e q u i v a l e n t l y be expressed by the statement t h a t r a t s have o f t e n i n 
the p a s t burrowed i n t o holes and found warmer temperature". 
B r i e f l y , the r a t s ' behaviour i s purposive, i t a r i s e s out of c e r t a i n 
s i t u a t i o n s which i n v o l v e both exper i e n c e t h a t the r a t s had before 
and a c h o i c e of what they seemed to have wanted to do. To use a 
McDougallian terminology, the behaviour of the r a t s i s purposive, 
v o l u n t a r y and w i l f u l ; and i n t h i s sense i t i s s i m i l a r to E.L. 
/ C I \ 
Thorndike's " i n s t r u m e n t a l " and B.F. S k i n n e r ' s "operant" behaviours '. 
(58) P r i n c i p l e s of B e h a v i o u r a l A n a l y s i s , New York, the MacMillan Co., 
p.62. 
(59) ( I ) Modern M a t e r i a l i s m and Emergent E v o l u t i o n , o p . c i t . , pp.39-40. 
( n ) B o d y and Mind, Bacon Paperback ed., (1961), f i r s t p u b l i s h e d 
i n (1911), p.244. 
(60) P r i n c i p l e s of B e h a v i o u r a l A n a l y s i s , o p . c i t . p.63. 
(61) ( I ) M i l l e n s o n , J.R., o p . c i t . , pp.63-64. 
( n ) The Fundamentals of L e a r n i n g , New York, Columbia Univ. ( 1 9 3 3 ) . 
( i n ) Cumulative Record, London, Methuen, enlarged ed. (1961), p.103, 
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Both terms i n d i c a t e t h a t behaviour i s o r i e n t e d to a t t a i n ends, and i t 
i s determined by i n t e r n a l m o t i v a t i n g f a c t o r s and past e x p e r i e n c e . 
Yet behaviour cannot be understood f u l l y without c a l c u l a t i n g i t s 
m o tivating elements and c o g n i t i v e and c o n a t i v e i n g r e d i e n t s , f a c t s which 
(62) (63) 
are now widely recognised (D.G.Hebb: 1955, 1960; Robert B. 
(64) (65) Malmo: 1959; Leon F e s t i n g e r : 1964). The q u e s t i o n of mot i v a t i o n 
and a c t i v a t i o n comes a t the b a s i s of co n a t i v e , p u r p o s i v e , hormic 
behaviour. Such behaviour appears to be widely accepted now and i t 
s p r i n g s from i n s t i n c t s as prime movers. 
Any way, whatever may be the vuews maintained i n 
r e s p e c t of behaviour, the e s s e n t i a l f e a t u r e s of m o t i v a t i o n a l a c t i v i t i e s 
seem to be : (1) they a r e purposive and means-ends o r i e n t e d . (2) They 
a l l seem to emerge from a s t a t e of excitement. ( 3 ) I n a l l c a s e s , 
behaviour i s p e r v a s i v e l y c o n t r o l l e d and i n f l u e n c e d by i n t e r n a l as w e l l 
as e x t e r n a l c o n d i t i o n s . ( 4 ) The i n t e r n a l c o n d i t i o n s a r e contingent upon 
(62) "Drive and C.N.S. (Conceptual Nervous System)", B s y c h o l . Rev., 
v o l . 62, pp.243-354. 
(63) P r e s i d e n t i a l Address m s Amer.Psychol., vol.15, pp.735-745. 
(64) " A c t i v a t i o n ^ A N e u r o p h y s i o l o g i c a l Dimension" Psychol.Rev., 
vol.66, pp.367-386. 
(65) "The Motivating E f f e c t of C o g n i t i v e Dissonance" i n : Readings 
i n the C o g n i t i v e P r o c e s s e s , ed. by C.C. Anderson, C.M. C h r i s t e n s o n 
and S.M. Hunka, U n i v e r s i t y of A l b e r t a , P r e n t i c e - H a l l , ( 1 9 6 4 ) , 
pp.509ff. 
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xnnate f a c t o r s . ( 5 ) Conscious e x p e r i e n c e s a r e o f t e n the dominant 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the a c t i v i t i e s e x e r c i s e d by the organism. 
(6) Former e x p e r i e n c e i s r u l e d out i n the c a s e of the s e l f - r e g u l a t e d 
performances f u n c t i o n e d f o r the f i r s t time; l a t e r e x p erience, A 
however, may help modify the behaviour. ( 7 ) The a c t i v i t i e s a r e not 
haphazardly performed; they s e r v e and f u l f i l l b i o l o g i c a l , p h y s i o l o g i c a l y 
and p s y c h i c a l ends. ( 8 ) Behaviour i s not merely the o v e r t movements 
t h a t the organism demonstrates, r a t h e ^ i t i s the apex, the outcome of 
a multitude of elements, both c o n g e n i t a l and environmental. I t 
f o l l o w s from t h i s t h a t the hormic theory, as worked out by McDougall, 
i s not only purposive, but a l s o a n i m i s t i c i n c h a r a c t e r . T h i s means 
th a t the organism, i n i t s s t r i v i n g , e x p r e s s e s purposive pursuance, 
and i s e s s e n t i a l l y and inwardly motivated to a c h i e v e a c e r t a i n segment 
of behaviour. T h i s again, e n t a i l s t h a t the urges t h a t i n s t i g a t e the 
organism to be a c t i v e a r e connate and i n most c a s e s , the goal d e s i r e d 
i s a n t i c i p a t e d . I n i t s a c t i v i t y , however, the conatmg i n d i v i d u a l i s 
not without i n s i g h t , f o r e s i g h t and c o g n i t i v e experience or " n a t u r a l 
( 66 ) 
experience", to use L l o y d Morgan's e x p r e s s i o n . The c o g n i t i v e 
experience becomes c i r c u m s p e c t l y p a r t of the organism's knowledge which 
consequently would f a c i l i t a t e i t s f u t u r e / s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n s . / 
\ 
(66) ( I ) "The N a t u r a l H i s t o r y of E x p e r i e n c e " , B . J . P s y c h o l . , v o l . I l l , 
p a r t I , ( 1 9 0 9 ) , pp. l l f f . 
( n ) L i f e , Mind and S p i r i t , The G i f f o r d L e c t u r e s , London, W i l l i a m 
Norgate, (1925). 
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The questxon now xs, why McDougall was so xnsxstent on 
emphasisxng the p a r t xnstxnct p l a y s xn hormxc psychology, whereas 
some psychologxsts such as the behavxourxsts, f o r example, seemed to 
be somewhat r e l u c t a n t and dubious xn the x r acceptance. The posxtxon 
appears to be l x k e t h x s : the vxew t h a t behavxour xs a product of 
e x t e r n a l stxmulx and f o r c e s seemed u n a t t r a c t x v e to McDougall. Havxng 
C ^ 9 been an xnstxi^txvxst, a cognxvxst, and a v x t a l x s t , he r e a l x s e d t h a t ; 
( 61} 
"behavxourxsm was a monstrous perversxon", as Hebb (1960) has put 
x t . Thxs was so, so long as x t allowed no space xn x t s domaxn f o r 
terms l x k e perceptxon, thought, x n s t x n c t , emotxon, sentxment, volxtxon, 
conatxon, cognxtxon, x n t e r e s t , w x l l , f e e l x n g , a f f e c t x o n , purpose, 
horme, g o a l , goal-guxded behavxour, s e l f - r e g u l a t e d a c t x v x t y , end-seekxng 
a c t s , and so f o r t h . To the behavxourxst such terms have no appeal; 
f o r hxm xt xs "a mechanxstxc vxew", to use M.H. Marx'- and W.A. H x l l x x ' s 
( 1 9 6 3 ) e x p r e s s x o n , whxch r e a l l y matters; whereas to a hormxst, such 
as McDougall, the above words - some or a l l of them - c o a l e s c e and 
s e t the xndxvxdual to r e a c h an axm. T h e r e f o r e , he dxsputed the 
mechanxstxc gtandpoxnt and r x g o r o u s l y dxscarded x t . I n s t e a d he was 
" d r x v e n " ^ ^ , as he xndxcated, to the hormxc posxtxon whxch seemed to 
(67) Amer. P s y c h o l . , v o l . 1 5 , op.ext., pp.735-745. 
(68) Systems and Theorxes xn Psychology., New York, McGraw-Hxll, p.163. 
(69) ( x ) An Introductxon to Socx a l Psychology, op.ext., p.458. 
(xx) "Autobxography" xn : Hxstory of Psychology xn A u t o b i o g r a p h y , /-
ed. by C.Murchxson, v o l . 1 , New York, (1961), 1 s t publxshed 
xn 1930, p.215. 
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him as "the only a l t e r n a t i v e t e l e o l o g i c a l theory of a c t i o n " . 
Apparently, t h i s l e d him to p o s t u l a t e t h a t , "where t h e r e i s l i f e t h e r e 
i s mmd",^^ an assumption the nature of which i s r e f l e c t e d c h i e f l y 
i n the t y p i c a l e n d - o r i e n t a t i o n i n d i c a t i v e of l i f e - p r o c e s s e s . The key 
i d e a which u n d e r l i e s such an assumption i s t h a t the organisms, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y the " h i g h l y developed" ones, a r e h o r m i c a l l y urged to 
f u n c t i o n . I n the course of b i o l o g i c a l e v o l u t i o n , the i n d i v i d u a l ' s 
(71) 
behaviour i s d i f f e r e n t i a t e d i n t o s p e c i a l i s e d forms which McDougall 
c a l l e d " i n s t i n c t s " . The i n d i v i d u a l t h e r e f o r e , i s spontaneously 
a c t i v a t e d from w i t h i n , and organic nature i s always endowed w i t h an 
i n s t i n c t i v e urge to l i v e . The most fundamental c o n s t r u c t of a l l i s 
horme' or the w i l l to l i v e , and i n s t i n c t i s i n d i s p e n s a b l e m any hormic 
a c t i v i t y which i s p u r p o s e f u l j and to a c t p u r p o s e f u l l y i s a s i g n of 
mind. As a hormist, he maintained t h a t "the hormic Psychology 
(72) 
i m p e r a t i v e l y r e q u i r e s r e c o g n i t i o n " of i n s t i n c t s and i n s t i n c t i v e 
a c t i o n . T h i s would imply the complexity of the a c t i v i t i e s i n v o l v e d 
and manifested. So McDougall's hormic theory, then, can prove 
d e f e n s i b l e i f , as he always assumes^that where t h e r e i s l i f e t h e r e i s 
mind. 
(70) An I n t r o d u c t i o n to S o c i a l Psychology, o p , c i t . , p.462. 
(71) "Autobiography": H i s t o r y of Psychology i n Autobiography, v o l . 1 , 
o p . c i t . , pp.215-216. 
(72) An I n t r o d u c t i o n to S o c i a l Psychology, o p . c i t . , p.459. 
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I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g , however, to note t h a t w i t h i n the 
context of the hormic approach , McDougall d i s t i n g u i s h e d between 
"conduct" and "behaviour". I n a somewhat dogmatic manner, he s t a t e d , 
(73) 
"my p r i n c i p a l aim i n w r i t i n g t h i s volume was to improve the 
p s y c h o l o g i c a l foundations of the s o c i a l s c i e n c e s by deepening our 
(74) 
understanding of the p r i n c i p l e s of human conduct". The reason why 
conduct i s s p e c i f i e d r a t h e r than behaviour, i s apt to be questioned. 
Answers, both i m p l i c i t and e x p l i c i t , can be deduced from the 
w r i t i n g s of McDougall h i m s e l f . Conduct i s the h i g h e s t type of 
behaviour; and i t i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of " s e l f - c o n s c i o u s and r a t i o n a l 
(75 ) 
beings"; by t h i s he meant £he human beings. So he wanted human 
conduct, m i t s v a r i o u s s pheres, to be "the t o p i c w i t h which a l l the 
s o c i a l s c i e n c e s a r e concerned". i n so d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between 
conduct and behaviour, McDougall o b v i o u s l y wanted the former, w i t h 
i t s more general connotations of r a t i o n a l behaving and t r a d i t i o n s , 
to be r e s t r i c t e d to the human groups and t h e i r s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
(73) An I n t r o d u c t i o n to S o c i a l Psychology, ( 1 9 0 8 ) . 
(74) I b i d , p. 303. 
(75) I b i d , p. 304. 
(76) I b i d , p. 304. 
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The l a t t e r , w i t h i t s s p e c i f i c d e n o t a t i o n s , i s meant to be l i m i t e d to 
i r r a t i o n a l beings. Both conduct and behaviour a r e underpinned by the 
d o c t r i n e s of i n s t i n c t s , of v o l i t i o n s and, i n the ca s e of man, of 
(77) 
sentiments m McDougall's system or what G.W. A l l p o r t c a l l e d "the 
master-sentiments", "the eminent t r a i t s " , "the r u l i n g p a s s i o n s " , "the 
r a d i x of l i f e " . The broad foundation, however, of both i s t he 
concept of horme'which "permeates the whole of McDougall's w r i t i n g so 
(78) 
thoroughly", as Smith has i n d i c a t e d . The essence of the hormic urge 
i s t h a t "to the qu e s t i o n - why does a c e r t a i n animal or man seek t h i s 
(79) 
or t h a t goal ?", the answer i s "because i t i s h i s nature to do so", 
- and a v a s t and complex a e t i o l o g y d e r i v i n g from g e n e t i c s , 
e v o l u t i o n a r y s e l e c t i o n and neurophysiology could be invoked to 
i l l u s t r a t e t h i s c o n t e n t i o n . 
Such a qu e s t i o n as the one j u s t mentioned above seems 
to have i n s p i r e d many a p s y c h o l o g i s t to t h i n k a g a i n and delve behind 
the r e a l m o t i v a t i o n a l promptings. C h a r l e s T a y l o r (1964) , f o r 
example, vo i c e d almost e x a c t l y the same q u e s t i o n which McDougall had 
a l r e a d y r a i s e d . "What, then, does i t mean to say t h a t human, or 
(77) P e r s o n a l i t y , New York, Holt, ( 1 9 3 7 ) , Ch.12, see a l s o by the same 
author, "The general and the unique i n P s y c h o l o g i c a l S c i e n c e " 
J . P e r s o n a l i t y , vol.30, (1962), pp.405-422. 
(78) E x p l a n a t i o n of Human Behaviour, o p . o i t . , p.122. 
(79) An I n t r o d u c t i o n to S o c i a l Psychology, o p . c i t . , p.458. 
(80) The E x p l a n a t i o n of Behaviour, London, Kegan P a u l , p.5. 
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animal, behavxour i s purposive ?" asked T a y l o r . I n a s e n s e , the q u e s t i o n 
r e f l e c t s the e x t e n s i o n of McDougall's purposive, hormic impact which i s 
( 81) 
not "a negative i n f l u e n c e " , as J.G.Beebe-Center (1 9 5 2 ) , of Harvard 
U n i v e r s i t y , tended to t h i n k . The tone of the q u e s t i o n , any way, 
i n d i c a t e s t h a t T a y l o r appears not only to accept the hormic v e r s i o n , 
but he a l s o a p p r e c i a t e s i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s as a b a s i s f o r the e x p l a n a t i o n 
of animate behaviour. Repudiating as inadequate the m e c h a n i s t i c 
" b l i n d a c c i d e n t " i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of animal's and man's a c t i v i t i e s , 
T a y l o r p r e f e r r e d a t e l e o l o g i c a ] e x p l a n a t i o n . His s p e c i f i c statement i s 
t h a t , "the events productive of order m animate beings a r e to be 
e x p l a i n e d not m terms of other unconnected a n t e c e d e n t c o n d i t i o n s , y 
(go) 
but i n terms of the very order which they produce". The notion here 
(83) 
i s e n t i r e l y i n l i n e w i t h McDougall's hormic argument t h a t behaviour 
i s to be e x p l a i n e d by the nature of the end sought a f t e r , by the change 
i n the whole s i t u a t i o n , by the o b j e c t i n v o l v e d and the r e l a t i o n of the 
behaving animal to a l l of t h e s e e v e n t s . C e n t r a l to T a y l o r ' s view, 
which b r i n g s i t c l o s e r to McDougall's p o s i t i o n , i s t h a t behaviour of 
^the animate c r e a t u r e s ought to be e x p l a i n e d p u r p o s i v e l y so long as the ^ 
be h a v i o u r a l events "occur f o r the sake of the s t a t e of a f f a i r s which 
(81) " F e e l i n g and Emotion" Ch.6, i n : T h e o r e t i c a l Foundations of 
Psychology, ed. by H.Helson and D.V.Nostrand, New York, p.265. 
(82) o p . c i t . , p.5. 
(83) I n t r o d u c t i o n to S o c i a l Psychology, o p . c i t . , p.416. 
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f o l l o w s " ; thxs makes the a f f x n i t y to the hormxc x n t e r p r e t a t x o n c l e a r e r 
and. s t r o n g e r , because xt emphasises the rhythmxc flow of the movements 
whxch hormiiism xs xnclxned to s t r e s s . 
I n hxs xnformatxve chapter on McDougall's system, S m x t h ^ ^ 
(1960) has made varxous observatxons concernxng horm^ism, For example, ^ 
reg a r d i n g the assumptxon of horme', he has s t a t e d t h a t " xt may be 
remarked t h a t t h e r e xs no way of comxng to grxps and d e f x n x t e l y 
.. (85) 
re f u t x n g xt . To support thxs o b s e r v a t i o n , Smxth has f u r t h e r added 
"and t h a t t h e r e xs a v a s t amount of evxdence which xs c o n s i s t e n t wxth 
. i (86) 
i t . I n the wording of h i s own views, Smith seems to be c a u t i o u s . 
Admitting t h a t the concept of horme cannot be r e j e c t e d and t h e r e i s 
s u f f i c i e n t evidence supporting i t , y e t he made c e r t a i n assumptions 
which should be taken i n t o account. Notable among Smith's p r e c a u t i o n s 
(87) 
a r e these : ( 1 ) the d i f f e r e n c e i n response among the d i f f e r e n t 
s p e c i e s . ( 2 ) The i n n a t e types of response as w e l l as the d i f f e r e n t 
v a r i e t i e s of e f f e c t i v e s t i m u l i should be accounted f o r . ( 3 ) The t h i r d 
d i f f i c u l t y i s t h a t the assumption of horme may be taken as a "workxng 
h y p o t h e s i s " suggesting c e r t a i n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s which might be 
(84) Chapter VI i n : E x p l a n a t i o n of Human Behaviour, op.ext., 
(85) xbid, p.178. 
(86) xbxd, p.178. 
(87) xbxd, pp.178-179. 
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u n t e s t a b l e . (4) I f the hormic concept i s adopted as "a working 
h y p o t h e s i s " , i t might o b s t r u c t "the p u r s u i t of f a c t o r s c a u s a l l y 
r e l a t e d to the behaviour observed". ( 5 ) C e r t a i n environmental 
c o n d i t i o n s a r e a l s o i n v o l v e d m e l i c i t i n g behaviour, and not the 
i n t e l l i g e n t i n s t i n c t alone as the hormic d o c t r i n e u s u a l l y m a i n t a i n s . 
I t seems q u i t e obvious t h a t t h e r e i s always a 
d i f f i c u l t y l u r k i n g somewhere i n i d e n t i f y i n g the^ i n n a t e l y i n s t i n c t i v e K 
behaviour from ^fce^ l e a r n t modes of response which a r e the r e s u l t of ^ 
environmental o p e r a t i o n s . W.H. Thorpe v ( 1 9 6 3 ) , R.A. Hinde (1 9 6 6 ) , 
and o t h e r s , f o r example, tend to emphasise t h a t the determinants of 
the organism's a c t i o n s stem from two i n e x t r i c a b l e s o u r c e s , namely, 
the^ i n h e r i t e d f a c t o r s and tfte^environmental i n f l u e n c e s . Both the X 
g e n e t i c s t r u c t u r e s and the i n e v i t a b l e surroundings a r e the c h i e f 
determinants of the a c t i v i t i e s performed. The outcome, however, depends 
on both "nature and n u r t u r e " , to borrow an e x p r e s s i o n from Hinde. Y e t , 
as always has been, the quest i o n s t i l l remains t h a t i t must be 
c l a r i f i e d as to how much of the behaviour i s a r e s u l t a n t of the 
environment and how much of i t i s g e n e t i c a l l y i n h e r i t e d . McDougall, i n 
h i s 'marks of behaviour' mentioned the ' t r y , t r y a g a i n ' nature of 
(88) L e a r n i n g and I n s t i n c t i n Animals, London, Methuen, o p . c i t . , 
(89) Animal Behaviour, New York, McGraw-Hill, see e s p e c i a l l y Chapter 
19. 
+ An o u t l i n e of Psychology, o p . c i t . , pp. 4 4 f f . 
- 416 -
animal behaviour. Without t h i s , no s p e c i f i c s t i m u l i could be 
e f f e c t i v e and no opportunity f o r l e a r n i n g or m o d i f i c a t i o n e x p l o i t e d . 
Without some assumption l i k e horme /of the i n t r i n s i c a l l y purposive 
n a t u r e of animal behaviour, t h e r e i s by o b j e c t i v e human examination, 
a gap. 
W i t h i n the frame of horme', McDougall t r i e d to 
Y 
d i s t i n g u i s h between hormic a c t i v i t y and hormic theory. The former 
he t r e a t e d as "an energy m a n i f e s t a t i o n " ; the l a t t e r he c o n s i d e r e d 
as a source l i b e r a t i n g "energy p o t e n t i a l or l a t e n t m chemical form 
i n the t i s s u e s " . S u c h a d i s t i n c t i o n appears to be a r e p e t i t i o n 
of an oft-made d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between i n s t i n c t as such and 
i n s t i n c t i v e a c t i o n : i n s t i n c t as an a c t i v a t o r and i n s t i n c t i v e 
a c t i v i t y as the outcome d i s p l a y . I n u s i n g the a d j e c t i v e s "hormic" 
and " i n s t i n c t i v e " a c t i v i t i e s , McDougall may be judged a§^to have v' 
safeguarded h i s p o s i t i o n . I n other words, such a d j e c t i v e s appear 
not to commit anybody to any s p e c i a l e x p l a n a t i o n as to whether they 
a r e inborn or a c q u i r e d . Yet the n o t i o n u n d e r l y i n g them i s c e r t a i n l y 
a u n i t a r y i n n a t e p r o c e s s . There a r e s t i l l , however, some p s y c h o l o g i s t s 
(91) ( 1 ) Psycho-Analysis and S o c i a l Psychology, London, Methuen, 
2nd. ed., (1937), p.113. 
( n ) "The S t a t e of the B r a i n during Hypnosis" B r a i n , vol.XXXI, 
p a r t 2, (1908), p.248. 
( n i ) An o u t l i n e of Abnormal Psychology, o p . c i t . , p.19. 
( I V ) An I n t r o d u c t i o n to S o c i a l Psychology, o p . c i t . , p.460. 
- 417 -
such a s , f o r i n s t a n c e , D a l b i r B m d ra ( 1 9 5 9 ) , who wishes '^ a-s' 
completely to avoid the connotations of the term ' i n s t i n c t i v e ' " and 
(91) 
to use i n s t e a d the phrase " s p e c i e s - s p e c i f I C behaviour". 
I n h i s d i s t i n c t i o n , a t any r a t e , McDougall tended to 
s t a y w i t h i n the e v o l u t i o n a r y c o n t i n u i t y . I n such a c o n t i n u i t y , the 
hormic tendency i s b e s t presented as an expansion of l i f e . McDougall 
appears to have endeavoured throughout h i s arguments to s t r e s s a 
p a r t i c u l a r theme, namely, horme' can never w e l l be comprehended u n t i l 
a thorough i n v e s t i g a t i o n of e v o l u t i o n i s scanned. I t s nature can 
be r e v e a l e d only i n the ends toward which i t s t e a d i l y yet 
p e r s i s t e n t l y moves. I n such a rhythmic c o n t i n u a t i o n , "Some t r a c e of 
(92) 
mental nature and a c t i v i t y " can be a v a i l a b l e . McDougall a l s o 
seems to have t r i e d to emphasise t h a t the hormic theory i s broad i n 
dimensions. For example, he tended to e x p l a i n t h a t i t i s 
h o s p i t a b l e to any information concerning " t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s t h a t 
(93) 
p h y s i o l o g i c a l c h e m i s t r y " can p r o v i d e . Yet i t s t i c k s to " f a c t s " (94) and r e j e c t s "to be bound by c u r r e n t hypotheses of p h y s i c a l s c i e n c e " . 
(91) Motivation ; A Systematic R e m t e r p r e t a t i o n , New York, Ronald 
P r e s s Co., p.9, 
(92) An I n t r o d u c t i o n to S o c i a l Psychology, o p . c i t . , p.462. 
(93) i b i d , p.460. 
(94) i b i d , pp.460-461. 
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The notion i m p l i e d i n such words seems to be t h r e e f o l d : (1) to s t r e s s 
f u r t h e r the d i s t i n c t i o n between the hormic a c t i v i t y and the hormic 
theory i t s e l f . (2) to preclude any m e c h a n i s t i c view t h a t might occur 
to the r e a d e r s of the hormic theory. (3) to c r e a t e the impression 
t h a t the concept of horme7 i s r e a l l y the span of l i f e as a whole. 
Yet the " f a c t s " , a l l u d e d to above, are meant to be 
the d e s c r i p t i v e marks of behaviour and compatible w i t h them. 
Such marks were a l r e a d y (Ch.V above) r e f e r r e d t o , although now 
McDougall t r i e d to word them d i f f e r e n t l y . I t may only be 
e s s e n t i a l to i n d i c a t e a t the moment t h a t those b e h a v i o u r a l 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s imply t h a t mental a c t i v i t y w i t h i n the context of 
the hormic theory i n v o l v e s ( a ) c o g n i t i v e tendency, or to use a r e c e n t 
(95) 
term by W.J. McGuire (1966) " c o g n i t i v e c o n s i s t e n c y " , where the 
word " c o n s i s t e n c y " i s d e f i n e d as a "motive". An a f f i n i t y w i t h the 
same usage can be found i n J . S . Brown (1961), D.P. Crowne and 
(97) \ f a s ) D. Marlowe ' ( 1 9 6 4 ) , C.N. Cofer and M.H. Appleby v ' ( 1 9 6 5 ) , and i n 
(95) "The Current S t a t e s of C o g n i t i v e C o n s i s t e n c y T h e o r i e s " i n : 
C o g n i t i v e C o n s i s t e n c y , ed, by Feldman, S h e l , New York, 
Academic P r e s s , p.33. 
(96) The Motivation of Behaviour, New York, McGraw-Hill. 
(97) The Approval Motive : S t u d i e s i n E v a l u a t i v e Dependence, New 
York, Wiley. 
(98) Motivation ; Theory and Research, New York, Wiley. 
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o t h e r s ' works. (b) I t i n d i c a t e s t h a t conation i s i n i t i a t e d and 
c o n t r o l l e d by c o g n i t i o n i t s e l f . ( c ) I t a l s o i n v o l v e s accumulating 
experience, whether p l e a s a n t or p a i n f u l . These t h r e e fundamental 
(99) 
a s p e c t s are i n s e p a r a b l e i n r e a l i t y . S t i l l , however, the q u e s t i o n 
to be asked i s how to r e c o n c i l e mind and i t s i d e a l s w i t h i n s t i n c t s . 
E x p l a n a t i o n s can be t r a c e d i n the arguments of McDougall and 
of o t h e r s , p a r t i c u l a r l y A.G. T a n s l e y ^ 1 0 1 ^ ( 1 9 2 1 , 1 9 5 2 ) . T a n s l e y ' s 
contentions a r e , i n summary, (1) the i n h e r i t e d i n s t i n c t s of man form 
the foundation on which the whole of h i s mental a c t i v i t y i s based. 
(99) ( l ) McDougall, W i l l i a m , "Mental E v o l u t i o n " i n : E v o l u t i o n i n 
the L i g h t of Modern Knowledge, a c o l l e c t i o n work, London, 
(1925), p.340. 
( n ) , An I n t r o d u c t i o n to S o c i a l Psychology, o p . c i t . , 
p.462. 
(100) ( l ) Psychology; The Study of Behaviour, ( 1 9 1 2 ) , o p . c i t . , p.82, 
( n ) The E n e r g i e s of Men, (1932), o p . c i t . , pp.7,170,374. 
( i n ) "Of the words C h a r a c t e r and P e r s o n a l i t y " i n : C h a r a c t e r 
and P e r s o n a l i t y , v o l . 1 , ( 1 9 3 2 ) , pp.3-16. 
(101) ( l ) The New Psychology and i t s R e l a t i o n to L i f e , London, 
George A l l e n , 1 s t p u b l i s h e d i n 1920; e s p e c i a l l y chapter 
VI "The contents of the Mind". 
( n ) Mind and L i f e , London, George A l l e n , ( 1 9 5 2 ) , pp.3-4, 
2 2 f f . 
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(2 ) There emerge mental complexes which determine the form of the 
working of i n s t i n c t s . ( 3 ) The r e s u l t i n g c o m p l i c a t i o n s which the 
mind m a n i f e s t s a r e r e l a t e d to the i n t e r a c t i o n s of the d i s p l a y e d 
complexes. (4) The p s y c h i c a l energy of the mind i s c l o s e l y l i n k e d 
w i t h the i n s t i n c t s through c o n a t i v e channels. By "mental" 
McDougall meant both the p h y s i c a l and the p s y c h i c a l a s p e c t s . I t 
i s intended to comprise a l l p r o c e s s e s and s t r u c t u r e s i n v o l v e d i n 
the i n t e l l i g e n t purposive f u n c t i o n s of man and animals. " P s y c h i c " 
or " p s y c h i c a l " p r o c e s s e s , on the other hand, a r e s u b j e c t i v e events, 
and a r e " n a t u r a l o c c u r r e n c e s " ^ 1 0 ^ which a r e i m p o s s i b l e to ignore. 
Yet McDougall's o f t - r e p e a t e d view i s t h a t i t i s o nly m a b s t r a c t 
t h a t a d i s t i n c t i o n can be made between one mental process and 
another. 
2. The Hormic Theory i n R e l a t i o n to Some Other M o t i v a t i o n a l 
O b s e r v a t i o n s . 
(103) 
I n the p l e t h o r a of m o t i v a t i o n a l t h e o r i e s , t h e r e have 
(102) The E n e r g i e s of Men, o p . c i t . , p.7, footnote. 
(103) See f o r example; 
( l ) Smith, F.V., E x p l a n a t i o n of Human Behaviour, o p . c i t . , (1960a), 
e s p e c i a l l y , p a r t s I I & I I I , Chapters VI-XIV. 
( n ) Woodworth, R.S., Contemporary Schools of Psychology, 9th ed. 
(1965), London, Methuen, o p . c i t . , 
( m ) H i l g a r d , E.R., T h e o r i e s of L e a r n i n g , 2nd ed., New York, 
Appleton-Century ( 1 9 5 6 ) . 
( I V ) McGeoch, J.A., The Psychology of Human Le a r n i n g , New York, 
Longmans, 2nd ed. (19 5 8 ) . 
( v ) Marx, M.H., and H i l l i x , W.A., Systems and T h e o r i e s m 
Psychology, New York, MrGraw-Hill, ( 1 9 6 3 ) , o p . c i t . 
( v i ) Wolman, Benjamin, B., Contemporary T h e o r i e s and Systems 
i n Psychology. New York. Harper,(1965), o p . c i t . 
- 421 -
been advanced some c r u c i a l d i s c r e p a n c i e s . The nature of the 
c o n t r o v e r s i e s r a i s e d i s l a r g e l y due to the enormous f i e l d of 
b e h a v i o u r a l s t u d i e s which a r e i n c r e a s i n g r a p i d l y . The hormic theory, 
f o r example, being based on i n s t i n c t s mainly, i n s i s t s t h a t behaviour 
ought to be e x p l a i n e d i n terms of the purposive ends that the 
organism s e e k s . I n i t s " n a t u r a l i s t i c l e v e l " ( C . T a y l o r , ^ 1 <~ > <^1964), 
a r e comprised a l a r g e number of i n s t i n c t s or purposes to account f o r 
the d i f f e r e n t types of a c t i v i t i e s manifested by man and the animals 
a l i k e . While some S-R t h e o r i s t s , such as Watson and Kuo, t r e a t 
i n s t i n c t s as convenient f i c t i o n s , o t h e r s , such as A l l p o r t and Tolman, 
regard them as r e a l or i n f e r r e d f a c t s . Again, w h i l e the c o g n i t i v e 
p s y c h o l o g i s t s , p a r t i c u l a r l y McDougall and Tolman, c o n c e n t r a t e on the 
more b a s i c a l l y complex f a c t o r s m o tivating behaviour, the S-R 
e x p e r i m e n t a l i s t s , such as B.F, Skinner ^ " ^ ^ (1957) , f o r example, 
emphasise s i t u a t i o n s where no e x c e s s i v e d i f f i c u l t i e s a r e c r e a t e d by 
the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of s t i m u l i and responses. The disadvantage of 
such a t r e n d of t h i n k i n g i s t h a t the organism might no longer be 
thought of as an organism proper; i t might be t r e a t e d as a machine 
(104) The E x p l a n a t i o n of Behaviour, o p . c i t . , p.221. 
(105) Verbal Behaviour, New York, Appleton ~ Century. 
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being operated externally, or to use a term from G. S e t h ^ 1 0 < ^ (1968), 
i t might be conceptualised "as a homunculus". In point of f a c t , 
Skinner himself declares that he i s against "physiologismg" in 
Psychology on the ground, as he believes, that this i s not prerequisite 
to the development of methods for understanding behaviour. His 
position, however, has been designated as a "psychology of the empty 
organism"^ 1 0^ (R.Borger and A.E.M, Seabourne, 1966, p.77), whereas 
the s o l i d fact i s that "there i s a reason for everything that an 
animal d o e s " ^ 1 ^ ^ ( C . J . Herrick, 1956, p.18), however remote and vague 
the goal at which the creature i s aiming; and i t does so, because i t 
i s excersicing i t s own nature as an organism. So in the S—R 
experimentalist's work, the i n s i g h t f u l behaviour seems to be neglected 
or ignored; to quote S e t h ^ 1 0 9 \ l 9 6 8 , p.150) again, "Much of the work 
of the experimentalists, even when - or, perhaps, e s p e c i a l l y when - i t 
i s conducted on the convenient r a t , appears to have l o s t sight of 
the l i v i n g organism". Indeed, before any aperant conditioning can 
begin, a behavioural tendency must e x i s t . 
(106) "Dissonance and Stress in the Teaching of Psychology: Some 
Reflections of an Accidental Psychologist", Presidential Address 
delivered at the Annual Conference of the B r i t i s h Psychological 
Society at Sheffield, B u l l , of B r i t i s h Psychological Society, 
vol.21, No.72, p.150. 
(107) The Psychology of Learning, Pelican ed. 
(108) The Evolution of Human Behaviour, Austin, University of Texas Pres 
(109) Presidential Address, Bull.of Brit.Psychol.Society, vol.21, op.cit 
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Apparently, Seth (1968) has expressed his concern 
p a r t i c u l a r l y about the work of those experimentalists who tend 
to deny the organism i t s r e a l v i t a l i t y , i t s i n t e r n a l l y voluntary 
activating force; of such experimentalists, Tolman surely i s 
excluded c h i e f l y because, i n his experiments on r a t s , he delved for 
the motivating factors within the animal, and he was mostly 
concerned about the development of cognition which would eventually 
lead to purposeful r e s u l t s . His position, which i s discussed below, 
f a l l s within the biological interpretation which S e t h ^ 1 1 ^ (1968) has 
stressed and i s generally advocated. In this connection, i t can be 
said that, evidently, when McDougall formulated his s c i e n t i f i c theory 
of I n s t i n c t s he had in view the biological and evolutionary 
continuity of the organismic world as a whole. He r e a l i s e d that 
behaviour develops through what G.E. Coghill (1929) c a l l e d "the 
progressive expansion of a perfectly integrated t o t a l pattern". 
The mechanisms of behavioural patterns, conceived as a g e s t a l t , are 
i n r e a l i t y a sort of growth; they grow according to the organism's 
own i n t r i n s i c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ; i t i s an i n t e g r a t i o n which can be Y 
sought i n the b i o l o g i c a l l y inherited i n s t i n c t s This i s so, because y 
(110) i b i d , see e s p e c i a l l y , pp. 147, 150. 
(111) Anatomy and the Problem of Behaviour, London, Cambridge 
University Press, p. 38. 
- 424 -
i n s t i n c t includes, both potentially and actuall y , various grades of 
co-ordinated acts ranging from tropism and t a x i s up to the most 
elaborately complicated, innate performances of birds, mammals and 
man. As a corollary to t h i s , behaviour can be interpreted on firmly 
s c i e n t i f i c grounds as "the expansion of a unitary system within which 
p a r t i a l systems a r i s e as dependencies under i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n " ^ 1 1 ^ 
(Coghill, 1929). This c e r t a i n l y would imply the r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of 
"the phenomena of behaviour as treated under the various accepted 
categories" (Coghill,^ 1 1 3^1929, pp.642-43). The whole significance 
of t h i s , however, i s that the t o t a l l y integrated pattern of 
behaviour predominantly^ 1 1^ e x i s t s from the s t a r t and i s maintained 
throughout the individual*s l i f e ; and the development of behaviour 
primarily through the growth of the entire pattern i s indicative of 
the organism*s integration as a whole. I t indicates, too, the 
e s s e n t i a l function of the nervous system, the development of the 
functional neurones m p a r t i c u l a r . This can be taken as of great 
advantage to McDougall's position. By introducing and advocating 
(112) i b i d , pp. 642-643. 
(113) See also by the same author: 
"The Genetic In t e r r e l a t i o n of I n s t i n c t i v e Behaviour and 
Reflexes", Psych.Rev., vol.37,(1930), pp.264-266. 
(114) i b i d . 
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xnstmcts , McDougall consolidated the foundations which he l a i d 
down for motivational Psychology; for i n s t i n c t s had been and s t i l l 
have been used as guides by other investigators; they are tested, 
closely scrutinized, widely discussed and thei r v a l i d i t y i s now no 
longer i n doubt, so that they have become part and parcel of 
present-day s c i e n t i f i c Psychology, both experimental and observational. 
Among many other things, i t i s t h i s which i n fact renders the topic 
of i n s t i n c t s a worthwhile one, so long as i t comprehends 
innumerable situations to be treated and allows for the prediction 
of future events to be made. In f a c t , "Basic behaviour patterns i n 
man (and animals) are indeed more dependent on our inherited higher 
nervous systems than we sometimes care to a d m i t ^ ( W . S a r g a n t : 
1965, p.108) - and the rapidly increasing fund of observations from 
the ethologists would appear to support t h i s . 
The value of i n s t i n c t s as chief activators of behaviour 
i s now widely recognised. To A l l p o r t ^ 1 1 ^ ( 1 9 4 6 ) , i n p a r t i c u l a r , 
McDougall's purposive and hormic doctrine i s indispensable. Allport 
e x p l i c i t l y pointed out that he was more hospitable to McDougall's 
scheme of i n s t i n c t s than to Freud's i n s t i n c t s which "were l e s s 
(115) Battle for the Mind, London, Pan Books Ltd., 6th Printing; 1st 
published i n 1957. 
(116) "Geneticism Versus Ego-Structure i n Theories of Personality", 
Symposium on Personality in : B.J.Ed.Psych., vol.XVI, part 2, 
P.58. 
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differentiated and l e s s numerous". This c e r t a i n l y means that 
McDougall*s doctrine of i n s t i n c t s i s broader i n denotation, so that 
he could, to quote Allport again, "at l e a s t c a l l upon the l a s t i n g 
energies of the parental i n s t i n c t , s e l f - a s s e r t i o n , and submission to 
account f o r " ^ 1 1 ^ ^ wide range of complex and evolving i n t e r e s t s . 
This also seems to be why Allport preferred McDougall's i n s t i n c t s to 
what he c a l l e d the "concatenated reflexes"^ 1 1^^and "the crude 
t h e o r i e s " ^ 1 2 0 ^ upon which these reflexes are b u i l t . Such reflexes 
seemed to Allport as " t o t a l l y unable to provide any i n t e l l i g i b l e 
conception"^"1"2'1"^of the causation of behaviour. 
(122) 
As Smith (1968b) has observed, Allport "saw human 
behaviour within the whole context of tendencies that were innate 
and those acquired within a s o c i a l context". In Allport's system, 
the behavioural, innate dispositions, which Smith ( I 9 6 0 a ^ 1 2 ^ 1 9 6 8 b ^ 1 2 ^ ) , 
(117) i b i d , p.58. 
(118, 119). ( i ) i b i d , p.58, see also, pp,57,59 and Allport's papers i n 
( n ) Amer.J.Psych., vol.50, (1937), pp.141-156. 
( m ) Psych.Rev., vol.47, (1940), pp. 540ff. 
(120) i b i d , p.58. 
(121) i b i d , p.58. 
(122) "Gordon Willard Allport (1897-1967)," Obituary Notice i n 
B.J.Psych., vol.59, part 2, p.99. 
(123) Explanation of Human Behaviour, op.cit., chapter V I I . 
(124) B r i t . J . Psych., vol.59, op.cit., pp.99ff. 
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has discussed are the " t r a i t s " whose nature i n respect of neurological 
underpinning i s s i m ilar to that of McDougall's i n s t i n c t , although 
many features of the t r a i t were said to be acquired. In Allport's 
position, to c i t e Smith^ 1" 2 5^ (1968b) again, " t r a i t s were held to be 
unique to the pattern of the personality of each individual". Smith's 
statement here i s quite compatible with that of Allport (1937) 
who could indicate that, "behind a l l the confusions of terms, behind 
the disagreement of judges and apart from errors and f a i l u r e s of 
empirical observations, there are none the l e s s bona fide mental 
structures, i n each personality that account for the consistency of 
i t s behaviour". 
In Smith's and Allport's statements ci t e d above, there i s 
a c l e a r indication that behaviour, both human and animals, i s 
underpinned by innate factors which are st r u c t u r a l m character. I t 
can be said that Allport had much i n common with McDougall and was 
incline d to accept McDougall's hormic conceptions. Yet i t should also 
be indicated now that the hormic connotations, as delineated by 
McDougall, are broader and deeper than Allport's "ldiographic" 
approach. For example, i n McDougall's treatment, both evolutionary 
continuity and the individual's status m society are considered; 
(125) i b i d , p.101. 
(126) Personality; A Psychological Interpretation, New York, 
Holt, p.295. 
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whereas Allport's s p e c i f i c concern was limited to dealing with human 
behaviour only. Another difference perhaps i s that i n his approach, 
McDougall tended to be more neurologically orientated, while 
Allport's chief task was based mainly upon close observations of 
general phenomena r e l a t i n g to i n d i v i d u a l i t y . Both authors, however, 
deeply believed and consistently held that underlying a l l behavioural 
repertoire were innate tendencies which are mental, concrete, 
psycho-physical i n nature and purposive i n function. 
McDougall's hormic assumptions of behaviour were strongly 
shared by E.C.Tolman (1886-1961). Indeed, there are aspects i n his 
position which cast considerable l i g h t on his attitude towards 
(127) 
i n s t i n c t and purposivism. Rejecting the mechanistic explanation, 
Tolman believed that an i n s t i n c t could better be understood on the 
(128) 
basis of t e l e o l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e s . Outstandingly important m 
his approach was his emphasis throughout that l i v i n g organisms set 
up t h e i r "expectations", and that they are capable of inventive 
learning. He consistently maintained such a view which i s m keeping 
with h i s purposive p r o c l i v i t y . 
(127) Tolman, E.C., "Principles of Purposive Behaviour", Psychology: 
A Study of Science, vol.2, (1959), New York, McGraw«»Hill, ed.by 
Koch, S., p.94. 
(128) ( l ) " I n s t i n c t and Purpose" Psych.Rev., vol.27,(1920), pp.217-233. 
( n ) "The Nature of I n s t i n c t " Psych.Bull., vol.20, (1923), pp.200-
16. 
( m ) "Purpose and Cognition" Psych.Rev., vol.32, (1925), pp.285-
297. 
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MoDougall's raentalistxcally purposive explanation of 
(129) behaviour found i t s way through to Tolman's s p e c i f i c observations. 
As "a ra t psychologist", as he described himself, Tolman spenl a 
long time experimenting on r a t s - r a t s with purpose, because they were 
(130) 
i n a designed maze and they purposefully sought food. His 
formula of behaviour or as he c a l l e d i t "tentative schema", i s 
rather complicated. In i t s simplest form i t means that behaviour i s 
a function of the situ a t i o n i n which i t happens and other antecendent 
causes. Between the causes and the consequents there come what he 
ca l l e d "intervening variables". Some of these "intervening v a r i a b l e s " 
are cognitive i n character and serve as determiners of the a c t i v i t y . 
Others are "demand" variables and serve as motives. The whole issue, 
however, i s that Tolman's t e l e o l o g i c a l purposivism i s an innately 
motivated scheme. 
(129) "A Behaviouristic View of Purpose", J.Philos, vol.XVIII, (1921). 
(130) ( I ) "Cognitive maps m Rats and Men", Psychological Rev., 
vol.55, (1948), pp.189-208. 
( i i ) "The Determiners of Behaviour at A Choice Point", Psych. 
Rev., vol.45, (1938), pp.1-41. 
( i n ) "Hypotheses m Rats" Psych.Rev., vol.39, (1932), pp.516-532 
see also : the author's Purposive Behaviour i n Animals and 
Men, Univ.of C a l i f o r n i a Press, (1932), pp.19, 258. 
(131) Collected Papers i n Psychology, Univ. of Ca l i f o r n i a Press, (1951), 
p . l . 
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Tolman's purposive contentxons P.V.Smxth (1960a) has 
(132) 
catalogued under what he c a l l s "guidxng p r i n c i p l e s " . Three such 
principles are : " ( i ) The inescapable purposive and cognitive 
features of behaviour", " ( n ) The data which the purposive behaviour 
(133) 
can use", " ( m ) The Pri n c i p l e of D o c i l i t y " . The l a t t e r 
perhaps needs to be explained. In Smith's own words, i t means that 
"many of the inferred determinants of behaviour, within the 
environment, such as 'discriminanda', 'means-end-relationships' and 
'sxgn-gestalt expectatxons* are appropriate only i n those cases 
where the organism i n a sense accepts the environment and behaves 
(134) 
purposively within i t " . 
I t may now be indicated that the concept of horme' i s 
rather accommodative. Within i t s context i t allows for other types 
of behaviour to be explained. In Tolman's system, for instance, 
the r a t ' s trial-and-error behaviour i n explorxng a maze-once the 
food i s found i n the food-box-is v i s i b l y goal-seeking a c t i v i t y . A 
s e r i e s of t r i a l s i s demonstrated u n t i l the end i s reached. I f one 
route does not lead to the goal with the food, other routes would be 
t r i e d , so that the aim could be achieved. The adoption of the 
shortest available path i n the a l l e y shows that i n i t s learning and 
(132) Explanation of Human Behaviour, op.cit., p.426. 
(133) xbxd, pp. 426-428. 
(134) xbxd, p. 428. 
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behaviour, the animal i s means-end-oriented; i t s behaviour i s 
purposive m character. Tolman's approach may probably be 
c r i t i c i s e d as being based mainly on observations c a r r i e d out 
exclusively on r a t s , hence i t has no significance to human l i f e . 
A convincing answer, at any rate, can be found m Smith's (1960a) 
comprehensive treatment of Tolman's purposive scheme wherein he 
stated that, "The system has some relationship to human behaviour 
as many studies i n economics and sociology have demonstrated". ^ "^^ 
Tolman, i t should be remembered, began with the basic assumption that, 
"behaviour, as behaviour, that i s as molar, is_ purposive and i s 
cognitive. These purposes and cognitions are of i t s immediate 
descriptive warp and woof. I t , no doubt, i s s t r i c t l y and completely 
dependent upon an underlying manifold of physics and chemistry, but 
i n i t i a l l y and as a matter of f i r s t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , behaviour as 
( X 36 ) 
behaviour reeks of purpose and cognition". He accepted i n effect 
McDougall's basic hormic assumption. He merely t r i e d , with remarkable 
ingenuity to conduct h i s description of behaviour i n s t r i c t l y 
behaviouristic terms1. 
* Tolman dedicated his major work, Purposive Behaviour i n Animals and 
Men (1932), New York, Appleton-Century, to the r a t , Mus Norvegicus 
Albmus . 
(135) Explanation of Human Behaviour, op.cit., p.445. 
(136) Purposive Behaviour in Animals and Men, op.cit., p.12. 
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Within the hormic domain, the concept of drive has a 
role v i t a l to the explanation of behaviour. Evidence shows that 
(137) 
t h i s concept i s a " c h i l d of the i n s t i n c t a f f a i r " (R.S.Peters: 
1953; D. B i n d r a f 1959). I f t h i s i s so, "drive" may have the 
power of directing the behaviour and guiding i t , as the i n s t i n c t 
(139) 
does. J.S.Brown (1953), for example, has indicated that the 
functions that can be attributed to drive are those of "energizing" 
behaviour, of s t a b i l i s i n g the movements, of increasing the a c t i v i t y 
to meet a s i t u a t i o n . This however, may suggest that something i s 
being involuntarily pushed or driven. Either "drives" must have 
f u l l d i r e c t i o n a l properties i n themselves or the organism must be 
prepared to be aware of c e r t a i n internal states and capable of doing 
something e f f e c t i v e about them within i t s environment. The concept 
of 'drive* i s thus lacking in the perceptual and conative features 
associated with McDougall's concept of i n s t i n c t , 
McDougall's^^own view i s ( a n a l o g i c a l l y ) t h a t " a l l the 
various machines (the i n s t i n c t s ) are driven by power transmitted from 
(137) Brett's History of Psychology, op.cit., pp.665-666. 
(138) Motivation, op.cit., p.9. 
(139) "Problems presented by the concept of Acquired Drives" 
Symposium; Current Theory and Research in Motivation, Lincoln 
University of Nebraska. 
(140) ( l ) "Motives i n the l i g h t of Recent Discussions" Mind, N.S. 
vol.XXIX, No.115, (1920), p.277. 
( i i ) "The Energies of Men, op.cit., p.50. 
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a central power-station where the current from the e l e c t r i c mains 
enters the factory and i s converted into mechanical power". 
Woodworth^ 1^ 1^(1922), on the other hand, although he agreed to such 
a metaphor, thought that i n addition to the central and powerful 
dynamos "every machine has i t s own supplementary dynamo xn which 
drive i s generated", as McDougall spoke for him. By the "power 
(142) 
house", both authors meant "mind" as a "mechanism" l i b e r a t i n g 
a stream of energy. McDougall was apparently agreeable to both 
(143) 
explanations discussed here; his question "Does each propensity 
generate i t s own current ? Or i s there a central power-house ?" 
c l e a r l y indicates that he favoured both views. In either case, the 
common factor consists in the sum t o t a l of available conative energy, 
He conceived of energy as both physical and conative i n character,, . 
To him, the whole nervous system i s conceived as forming a single 
interconnected set of conducting paths. So neurologically speaking, 
nervous energy liberated in any part i s capable of diffusing to any 
other portion of the nervous system. 
(141) Dynamic Psychology, Columbia University Press, 1st published 
i n 1918. 
(142) ( i ) . Woodworth, R.S., Dynamic Psychology, op.cit., p.36. 
( n ) McDougall, Wm., Mind, N.S., vol.XXIX, (1920), op.cit., 
pp. 268ff. 
( i n ) , An outline of Psychology, op.cit., 
pp.114-118. 
(143) The Energies of Men, op.cit., p.50. 
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However, agreeing i n p r i n c i p l e with McDougall, Woodworth 
could exorcise himself from being committed to any mechanistic view. 
His strong arguments i n favour of a dynamic psychology brought his 
system closer to McDougall's hormic position. Even so, McDougall 
would not have been w i l l i n g to equate i n s t i n c t with drive. Perhaps 
he would have been disposed to say, for example, that a p a r t i c u l a r 
s i t u a t i o n may instigate the innate predisposition (the i n s t i n c t ) 
evoking from i t a conation, an impulse or a drive. So i t i s hard to 
think that he could have intended to employ drive exactly i n the 
sense of i n s t i n c t at a l l . 
Whether the drive contributes to the guidance and 
regulation of behaviour, to activating behaviour, or to both, Smith 
seems to have his own view. Discussing "drive" within the context 
(144) 
of the hormic theory, Smith (1960a) has maintained that the use 
of the concept of drive assumes that "the organism i s i n some way 
aware of p a r t i c u l a r internal states and i s capable of making some 
ef f e c t i v e adaptation". Smith has conjoined t h i s statement by adding 
that "Many so-called 'drive-states' are known to involve p a r t i c u l a r 
neural centres and i t has been shown that i n some species, some 
innate features of organisation of the perceptual processes are 
(144) Explanation of Human Behaviour, op.cit., p.179. 
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relevant to the completion or consummation of 'drive' s t a t e s " . 
Indeed, such views, p a r t i c u l a r l y those related to perceptual powers, 
Smith has been able to v e r i f y i n some species by means of experiments 
on chicks and lambs. S m i t h ^ 1 4 6 \ l 9 6 2 ) has found that newly hatched 
chicks show the a b i l i t y of responding to a variety of moving objects 
and v i s u a l patterns having s p e c i f i c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . He has shown 
that not a l l chickens, however, are equally attracted by the obj'ects 
displayed; the conspicuous objects had more effect on the chickens 
than the l e s s variegated ones. Lambs, by i n s t i n c t , w i l l place t h e i r 
heads under any object which has a protruding ledge or surface at 
about the height of t h e i r own shoulder. In other words, 'drives' to 
be e f f e c t i v e as a concept need something more than the mere notion 
of impulsion. 
A l l the above mentioned views r e l a t e to behaviour. Yet 
t h e i r arguments diverge i n regard to the implications and the nature 
of the behavioural processes. An innate neural structure i s stressed 
i n McDougall's hormic theme. In t h i s seheme,the action i s 
associated with the inherited, unitary i n s t i n c t s with t h e i r emotional 
(145) Explanation of Human Behaviour, op.cit., p.179. 
(146) Sym. Zool. Soc., London, vol.8, op.cit., pp. 171-191. 
see also; 
Smith, F.V. ed. Bird, M.W., (1964a,b), Anim.Beh., vol.12, 
op.cit., pp.252-258, 259-263. 
- 436 -
aspect, and the a c t i v i t y w i l l p e r s i s t u n t i l an end i s reached. In 
Allport's system i t i s t r a i t or t r a i t s which are basic to 
motivational acts. They are supposed to be biophysical units and 
l i k e i n s t i n c t s , they are neurophysiological i n character and have 
the capacity of a psychical nature. Although "drive" may suggest 
that something or somebody i s being pushed m a p a r t i c u l a r direction, 
i t i s often used i n the sense of a mechanism which would bring i t 
nearer to the biological needs of the organism. I t may be employed 
i n the sense of energizing purposively. In Tolman's behavioural 
teleology, behaviour i s to be interpreted i n terms of i t s goals. On 
t h i s view, behaviour i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y purposive, and can be 
understood i n terms of i t s f i n a l achievements. According to the 
behaviouristic point of view, behaviour i s merely an external process. 
In the hormic conception teleology, heredity, innate dispositions 
and tendencies are emphasised; i n S-R theories, the s t r e s s i s placed 
upon environment. Yet i n both systems, there are common features 
namely, a concern about neuro-physiological bases and acquired 
adjustments, 
3. Salient Features of the Hormic Theory. 
Confident of his views, as he seemed to be, McDougall 
gave various reasons as to why the hormic theory i s advantageous 
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(147) psychologically. In summary, these reasons are : (1) The hormic 
theory accounts for a defensible story of organic, evolutionary 
continuity. (2) Although the hormic theory p e r s i s t e n t l y explains 
that experience consists of different aspects, these aspects are 
inseparable and must be treated as an integrated whole or unit. 
(3) In the hormic theory, the s t r i v i n g capacities of any species are 
conceived as being differentiated out of "a primal urge to l i v e " . 
(4) The theory allows for the fact that only i n the human being, does 
cognitive development a t t a i n certain l e v e l s so that an anticipation 
of remote goals becomes foreseeable. (5) I t displays a whole and 
systematic psychology on the ground of recognising the wholeness of 
the organised mind of the adult as "a structure elaborated i n the 
service of the hormic urge to more and f u l l e r l i f e " . (6) In the 
hormic theory could be found a consistent account and an i n t e l l i g i b l e 
interpretation of human valuations. (7) I t notes that the 
development of i n s t i n c t i v e tendencies i s an important feature of 
each phase throughout the evolutionary scale of the animal l i f e . 
(8) I t sponsors the doctrine of the sentiments, the d i s t i n c t i v e 
system of the developed mind. (9) I t tends to find s i m i l a r i t i e s 
between the human a c t i v i t i e s and those f u l f i l l e d by different animals. 
(10) The hormic theory i s f l e x i b l e enough to assimilate a l l that i s 
sound and useful i n "the newer schools of psychology". 
(147) An Introduction to Social Psychology, op.cit., pp.478-488. 
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Other reasons are mentioned by McDougall but have 
previously been omitted largely because (1) they are r e p e t i t i v e i n 
character, (11) some have been amalgamated wi t h those indicated 
above, ( i i i ) some were mentioned by him but no satisfactory 
explanation was offered i n t h e i r support. For example, neo-
Darwimsm was c r i t i c i s e d on the ground of the d i f f i c u l t i e s involved 
m i t , yet no suggestion was made by him as to how those d i f f i c u l t i e s 
could be overcome by the hormic theory. Apart from that, McDougall 
would appear to be j u s t i f i e d m his claim t h a t , "(the) C a t h o l i c i t y , 
(the) power of comprehensive assimilation of new t r u t h from widely 
d i f f e r i n g systems of psychological thinking i s , perhaps, the best 
proof of the fundamental Tightness of the hormic Psychology".^ 1^ 8^ 
4. Discussion and some Remarks. 
What McDougall and Nunn termed hormic psychology i s , 
i n a l l i t s forms, naturally expressed i n terms of conative a c t i v i t y . 
According to the hormic p r i n c i p l e which McDougall emphatically 
stressed, a l l human and animal performances are prompted and 
sustained by impulses which spring from deeply-rooted innate 
tendencies. Within the hormic theory, certain points seem to be 
constantly emphasised. F i r s t , an attempt i s always being made to 
(148) An Introduction to Social Psychology, op. c i t . , p.488. 
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discover consistent manifestations of i t s own nature. Secondly, 
the innate and cognitive elements are persistently stressed. 
Thirdly, i t t r i e s to assimilate other motivational views, so long 
as those views are not r i g i d l y mechanistic. 
I t may be argued, however, that the assumption of 
horme' cannot be taken as a complete alternative to other theories 
of behaviour. I t appears that i t embodies some features which 
present i t as a theory which can off e r wider explanations than 
other theories. The hormic theory tends to focus on the 
consequences of behaviour and i t s e f f e c t s . I n the hormic concept, 
continuity i n experience as an essential factor, i s always 
emphasised. Basic features, such as, for example, i n s i g h t , 
foresight are stressed as c r u c i a l . Moreover, i f , as D.O. Hebb (1960) 
has pointed out, "The self i s neither mythical nor mystical, 
(149) 
but a complex mental process", thenMcDougall could claim at 
least p a r t i a l success, because t h i s was part of his hormic thesis. 
The concept of horme, however, can be taken as a 
c l a r i f y i n g guide, o f f e r i n g an explanation of many psychological 
issues and events, even i f machines can be programmed by a 
teleological a c t i v i t y of man, to achieve a desired end—result. 
S t r i v i n g towards an end i s characteristic of the hormic a c t i v i t y which 
i n no way can be compared with the mechanistic view; i t could be 
(149) Amer. Psychol., vol.15, op.cit., pp.735-745. 
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said with some certainty, however, that even those who rejec t 
McDougall's hormic arguments, tend to maintain his emphasis of 
such terms as; "goal", "wish", "desire", "guided-behaviour", 
"regulated-activity", and so on. 
I t may well be claimed, too, when applied to the 
facts and structure of mind, that the hormic theory does work. 
In i t there can be provided an account of any behaviour that may be 
required of the individual i n his environment. In hormic Psychology, 
for example, there can be found an answer to the successive stages 
of psychological growth as the impulsive nature of the c h i l d passes 
over i n t o the disciplined character of the mature adult. I n hormic 
Psychology, again, i t i s equally stressed that man can aspire 
towards l o f t y chosen ends, maintaining at the same time the highly 
s p i r i t u a l t r a d i t i o n . I n short, and to quote Smith (1960a), to 
consider McDougall's hormic system i s "a convenient method of 
becoming acquainted with many of the problems involved i n the 
explanation of behaviour". ^ ]"^0^ To t h i s observation, Smith has added 
that"m the l i g h t of more recent work, McDougall's position s t i l l 
remains p l a u s i b l e " , ^ 1 5 1 ^ His basic concept of d i s t i n c t i v e i n s t i n c t s , 
each mediated by distinguishable "neurological correlates", has now 
(150) Explanation of Human Behaviour, op.cit., p.120. 
(151) i b i d , p.120. 
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objective, experimental support and as to the i n t r i n s i c a l l y 
purposive nature of a l l animal behaviour, even the most 
fanati c a l empiricist would be obliged to concede, on the bas 
of objective observations of behaviour, that the balance of 
p r o b a b i l i t y was heavily m favour of hormic assumptions, 
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CHAPTER V I I I . 
FURTHER DEFENCE OF THE HORMIC THEORY. 
1. Basic Principles For A Theory Of Social Psychology. 
"What was McDougall t r y i n g to do ?" This question, which 
Smith^ 1^(1960a) has raised, i s of wider implications. Amplifying his 
observations on McDougall's system, Smith has stated that " i t i s 
submitted that McDougall was t r y i n g to provide Psychology with an 
account of the innate data of animal nature which, i n the manner 
indicated by Freud, could form the basis of a system i n which the 
(2) 
contribution of experience would also be reflected". In his e f f o r t s , 
McDougall appeared to have been aided by the asset of a r i c h and 
relevant background; and i n his attempts, he seemed to have been 
prompted, to quote Smith again, by "certain sincere philosophical 
convictions, which were on the whole consistent with the observations 
(3) 
that he was able to make". 
In Smith's statements above, at least two points require 
consideration here : (a) "the innate data of animal nature" and 
(b) "philosophical convictions" supporting the data obtained. By 
(1) Explanation of Human Behaviour, op.cit., p.121. 
(2) i b i d , p.121, see also by the same author : 
"Social Theory and The Basic Motives", Presidential Address i n 
B u l l e t i n of B r i t i s h Psychological Society, September (1960c), 
PP. 4 f f . 
(3) Explanation of Human Behaviour, op. c i t . , p.121. 
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"animal nature" Smith seems to have meant both man and the other 
animals. I f t h i s i s what he meant, and i t appears so, his views 
then correctly r e f l e c t McDougall's notion of abolishing any 
dichotomy between man and the other creatures. Even so, McDougall 
at times intended to t a l k about human conduct, rather than 
behaviour, although he mostly used both synonymously. Whenever 
i t happened that he employed conduct, he discussed i t i n terms of 
behavioural patterns, with the emphasis of course on hormic purpose 
as a central feature. Therefore (a) and (b) are intimately 
associated and Smith has aptly presented them i n one i n t a c t picture. 
From the beginning, McDougall took account of 
c r i t e r i a when he thought they would help solve the problem of human 
behaviour and the question of mental processes. Throughout his 
writings questions l i k e the following are often encountered : 
(1) whether the p a r t i c u l a r pattern of behaviour appears early i n 
l i f e and whether i t i s affected by t r a i n i n g . This perhaps Smith has 
i n view when he brought in t o the picture "experience" along with 
"the innate data" m his above statement. (2) Whether behaviour 
i s persistent i n a p a r t i c u l a r species and whether there are certain 
organs concerned with the purposive i n s t i n c t s . (3) Whether there 
exists any s i m i l a r i t y i n terms of behavioural patterns between man 
and the higher primates. (4) I f behaviour persists when the 
individual creature i s denied the s a t i s f a c t i o n of the desired goal. 
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Such questions as these tend to suggest that i n i t s p r e f e r e n t i a l 
a t t e n t i o n , the creature i s predestined to s t r i v e f o r an end 
without the behaviour by which he would t h r i v e being already 
prescribed i n d e t a i l . Certain notions may underlie such a view: 
(1) the neurophysiological and psychical conceptions of the 
innate i n s t i n c t s as hormic urges; (11) the teleological nature of 
i n s t i n c t as observed by the n a t u r a l i s t can f i n d support by the 
(4) 
laboratory psychologist or ethologist (P.M.Driver : 1968 ; 
(5) 
S.S. Kety : 1968 ); ( i n ) a hasty mechanistic explanation i s 
e n t i r e l y incompatible with the p l a s t i c i t y of an innate behaviour. 
This i s so, largely because the innate mechanisms i n man and many 
animals are f l e x i b l e ; they are not completely defined either i n 
regard to what the cognitive side w i l l d i c t a t e or what the conative 
aspect would determine„ To say that man i s urged by inborn 
tendencies, means that he can be easily taught to attend to certain 
things and his behaviour i s easily modified by experience. 
McDougall's thorough and convincing arguments have indicated that 
behavioural patterns discernible i n the animal kingdom are 
paralleled by similar i n s t i n c t s underlying a l l human a c t i v i t i e s . 
(4) "An ethological Approach to the Problem of Mind", The Mind : 
Biological Approach to i t s functions, ed. by W.CoCorning and 
M.Balaban, New York, Wiley, pp.280-281. 
(5) "A Biologist Examines the Mind and Behaviour" The Mind ; 
Biological Approach to i t s functions, op.cit., pp. 305«=»3~8. 
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Yet the position seems rather complicated so that 
"unfortunately", as Lorenz has w r i t t e n (1968), "the working 
structure of the i n s t i n c t i v e and c u l t u r a l l y acquired patterns of 
behaviour which make the social l i f e of man seems to be one of the 
most complicated systems" known on earth. Approaches to the 
question range widely, and any attempt to describe and explain the 
focal nature of the human a c t i v i t i e s must encompass the whole 
forces that i n i t i a t e and sustain the individual's behaviour i n a 
particular d i r e c t i o n . At the present i t i s widely maintained by 
wr i t e r s , such as J.S.Bruner^ (1958,1961) , F.V.Smith^8^ (1960a,1960b, 
(9) 
1960c,1962,1965,1968a), A.R.Lindesmith and A.L.Strauss (1956), 
T.M.Newcomb, R.H.Turner and P.E.Converse (1965),^ 1 0^ H.Proshansky 
and B.Seidenberg (1966)^ 1 1^ and others, that the "fundamental nature" 
(6) On Aggression, University paperback ed., p . x i . 
J(7) ( i ) (1958) "Social Psychology and Perception" i n ; Readings i n 
Social Psychology, ed. by E.E.Maccoly, T.M.Newcomb, 
and E.L.Hartley, London, Methuen, pp.85«940 
(n)(1961) Preface to McDougall's Body and Mind, Beacon paper-
back ed., pp.vn-xxvi. 
(8) op.cit., 
(9) Social Psychology, New York, Holt, pp.274-454-5. 
(10) Social Psychology, New York, Holt, pp.4, 273. 
(11) ( e d i t o r s ) , Basic Studies m Social Psychology, New York, Holt, 
pp. 28, 235. 
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of a l l human beings i s t o be looked for i n " a l l complex social 
(12) 
motives" which are "at root, inherited impulses to action". 
(13) 
Along with t h i s view, other terms l i k e " c u l t u r a l r e l a t i v i s m " 
are sometimes used; t h i s may mean one of two things: I t could 
mean that social phenomena are so complicated and human conduct 
i s a r e f l e c t i o n of such a complex, so that i t i s not s u f f i c i e n t 
to explain human motivation i n terms of i n s t i n c t s alone. The 
other meaning may be attached to such an expression i s that i t 
may prefer the a b o l i t i o n of the i n s t i n c t u a l foundation of social 
motivation. 
True, the purposive, goal^oriented q u a l i t y of 
behaviour was discussed by other interested authors such as A l l p o r t , 
Woodworth, C a t t e l l , Burt and others. Yet i t was McDougall who 
emphasised the issue i n terms of specific i n s t i n c t s . To him, 
t h e i r derivatives and vicissitudes were unique. Derivatives are 
represented by emotions, sentiments, tastes, sympathy (both active 
and passive), suggestion and im i t a t i o n which McDougall called 
(14) 
"conservative agency" and has now come to be realised as having 
(12) i b i d , pp. 28ff. 
(13) i b i d , p. 235. 
(14) ( i ) An Introduction to Social Psychology, op.cit., p.283. 
( n ) "Organisation of the ef f e c t i v e L i f e " , Acta Psychologica, 
vol.11, (1937), pp. 233-346. 
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(15) 
a " u n i l a t e r a l influence" i n determining interpersonal behaviour. 
Such terms, as c l a r i f i e d and emphasised by McDougall, are now 
discussed m connection with "social perception". This i s so, 
because they affect the individual's attitudes and behaviour 
wi t h i n the context of the social structure. Again, i t appears that 
i t was McDougall who could discover, to quote M.Deutsch and R.M. 
(17) 
Krauss (1965), that "The source of an i n s t i n c t i s the somatic 
process which gives r i s e to the s t i m u l i that are represented i n the 
mind as an i n s t i n c t " . For McDougall, the most useful concept, i s 
that a l l i n s t i n c t s draw upon a common neural energy. In the 
McDougallian sense, energy i s a tendency to act. I t both connotes 
a genetically-directed s p e c i f i c object and specific , or at least 
r e s t r i c t e d mode of behaviour. 
Complete avoidance of ascribing innateness to 
behaviour, both animal and human, now seems questionable. Notable 
w r i t e r s , such as R.B.Cattell, ( 1 9 4 l / 1 8 * 1957/ 1 9^ 1 9 6 5 / 2 0 ^ ) , 
(15) Newcomb, T.M., Turner, R.H. and Converse, P.E. : Social Psychology, 
(1965), op.cit., p.273. 
(16) Bruner, J.S., i n : Readings i n Social Psychology, op.cit., (1958), 
p.85. 
(17) Theories i n Social Psychology, New York, Basic Books, p.131. 
(18) General Psychology, Sci-Art Publishers, Cambridge, Mass. 
(19) Personality and Motivation Structure and Measurement, New York, 
Harcourt. 
(20) The S c i e n t i f i c Analysis of Personality, Penguin ed, see ch.3, 
pp.53-76. 
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e x p l i c i t l y recognise the importance of i n s t i n c t ; yet he tends to 
equate i t with the "erg" i n order to supercede the probable 
d i f f i c u l t i e s that the term " i n s t i n c t " might provoke. Cattell's 
d e f i n i t i o n of an erg may be easily seen as being inspired by 
McDougall's own d e f i n i t i o n of i n s t i n c t . "An erg i s an innate 
psycho-physical disposition which permits i t s possessor to acquire 
a c t i v i t y to certain classes of objects more readily than others, 
to experience a specific emotion, and to desire one kind of 
s a t i s f a c t i o n i n preference to others. There are, f u r t h e r , preferred 
(21) 
ways of behaving i n reaching each of the preferred goals". In 
such a d e f i n i t i o n McDougall's words are repeated almost verbatim. 
, (22) C a t t e l l s erg i s considered as a mam innate disposition i n man . 
Following McDougall, the stress i s being placed upon the whole 
reaction to a whole s i t u a t i o n . In factoring out the inborn 
motivational units of (ergs), C a t t e l l (1957) has found adequate 
support for some of McDougall's i n s t i n c t s such as sex, gregariousness, 
parental protectiveness, exploration, escape, and self-expression. 
I n his analysis, he was guided by McDougall's concepts applied to 
personality*Of self-assertion, C a t t e l l has stated that " i t i s 
i n t e r e s t i n g to note th a t , of the various descriptions of t h i s s e l f " 
(21) General Psychology, op.cit., p.110. 
(22) i b i d , pp.110-111. 
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(23) assertxve drive, McDougall's seems to have been the most unerring". 
What Gat t e l l has called "self-sentiment" whxch he described as an 
(24) 
"environmental mold t r a i t " , i s i n fact based upon the concept of 
McDougall's self-regarding sentiment and i t takes the same important 
r o l e that McDougall assigned to his own concept. In such generally 
favourable results based upon empirical studies of behaviour, there 
may be some evidence endorsing McDougall's contentions. U n t i l 
abundant evidence i s accumulated, i t may be said that so f a r , 
McDougall has at least p a r t i a l l y succeeded xn his claims. 
In social psychology, to speak of hormic concepts 
based upon i n s t i n c t i s not an easy matter. Captious c r i t i c i s m s , 
(25) 
such as "the l a s t of the mid-victorians", "a w r i t e r who 
flourished i n the l a t e r middle ages and had w r i t t e n out a l i s t of 
.. (26) 
alleged i n s t i n c t s of the human species , were often levelled 
against him. Such and other s t r i c t u r e s appear to have been provoked 
by the usage of the concept of i n s t i n c t as an explanatory guide. At 
(23) Personality and Motivation Structure and Measurement, op.cit., 
P.518. 
(24) i b i d , p.525. 
(25) Schmalhausen, S.D., "The Sexual Revolution" i n : Sex i n 
C i v i l i z a t i o n , ed. by the w r i t e r himself and 
Calverton, V.F., New York, Thacaulay, (1929), 
p.367. 
(26) McDougall, Wm., "Autobiography" i n : History of Psychology i n 
Autobiography, v o l . 1 , op.cit., pp.191-223. 
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any rate, phenomena w i t h i n the social structure of a society need to 
be explained. In order to elucidate such phenomena, there should 
be basic foundations. This i s so, because the nature of a certain 
society i s but the sum of i t s i ndividuals' natures. The major 
issue, however, i s as Smith (1960c) has indicated, "that events 
w i t h i n the society are i n some way determined, that i n p r i n c i p l e , 
at least, causes and/or reasons could be found for the a c t i v i t i e s 
(27) 
which are observed". Apparently, by " a c t i v i t i e s " , Smith has 
meant the individuals* a c t i v i t i e s w i t h i n the context of society at 
large. Indeed, social features are so complicated and the 
implications m society are overwhelming, so that there should be 
a s o l i d foundation f o r int e r p r e t i n g the tremendously varied 
phenomena . The problem i s , to c i t e Smith again, "While immensely 
complex, social phenomena are not regarded as e n t i r e l y matters of 
( 28} 
chance". There are consistencies, many of which are predictable. 
In a sense t h i s could j u s t i f y McDougall's recourse to explaining 
the individual's and the social phenomena on i n s t i n c t u a l bases. 
Complications i n human l i f e are considerable, so that a hormic 
in t e r p r e t a t i o n may be ultimately acceptable, and purposive, 
(27) "Social Theory and Basic Motives" Presidential Address, 
Bull.Brit.Psych.Soc., op . c i t . , p . l , 
(28) i b i d , pp.1-2. 
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psychological explanation i s highly relevant. The c r u c i a l thing i s 
t h a t , " I n view of the enormous v a r i a t i o n " , to quote Smith (1960a), 
"both i n the nature and extent of the possible causal contributions 
to behaviour of a purely psychological kind, i t i s often d i f f i c u l t 
(29) 
to r u l e out some potential contributions as e n t i r e l y i r r e l e v a n t " . 
(30) 
Evidently, however, McDougall i s regarded as the 
f i r s t to consider social phenomena i n the l i g h t of man's 
i n s t i n c t i v e and emotional endowments. In so doing, he was followed 
(31) (32) by other leading writers such as W.Trotter (1916) and Freud 
(1920). A l l three attempted to establish a l i n k between certain 
aspects of society and psychology through the concepts of i n s t i n c t s 
and the group mind. Trotter emphasised the herd i n s t i n c t and 
regarded i t as the sole basis for explaining certain features i n 
society. Freud's theory of the group i s a clear r e f l e c t i o n of 
McDougall's influence i n t h i s respect (F.G. Alexander and S.T. 
(33) 
Selesnick: 1967 ) . He too, l i k e McDougall, traced a l l human 
(29) Explanation of Human Behaviour, op.cit., p.5. 
(30) Flugel, J.C., "Professor William McDougall" B.J.Psych., vol.XXIX, 
part 4, (1939). 
(31) I n s t i n c t of the Herd i n Peace and War, London, Ernest Benn, 3rd 
ed. 1947, op.cit., 
(32) Group Psychology and The Analysis of the Ego., English trans., 
London, (1920), see also: McDougall's a r t i c l e : "Professor Freud's 
Group Psychology and his Theory of Suggestion" i n : Problems of 
Personality, ed.by C.M.Campbell, Wm.McDougall and others (1932). 
(33) The History of Psychiatry, London, George Allen, p.205 footnote. 
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behaviour, both of the individual and group, from the operation of 
i n s t i n c t u a l impulses and the way m which these i n s t i n c t s are 
aided and fru s t r a t e d by the impacr of human beings one upon another 
(34) 
(Smith : 1960a). Therefore the description of i n s t i n c t seems to 
be inevitable; i n s t i n c t and i t s derivatives, p a r t i c u l a r l y i t s 
„ ., (35) emotional appeal , have now considerable import f o r the theory 
of the individual and society a l i k e . A l l the complexities of 
thought and action are explained through the complications of the 
i n s t i n c t s and t h e i r excitements and motor responses. 
Coming back to Smith's second point (b) concerning 
McDougall's "philosophical convictions", i t can be said that he 
believed i n science and philosophy as an i r r e f r a n g i b l e d u a l i t y . He 
ascribed the decay of ancient c i v i l i s a t i o n s to the lack of observing 
(34) Explanation of Human Behaviour, op.cit., chapter X, "The 
Freudian Approach", pp. 324-360; 
see also: A l l p o r t , G.W., "The H i s t o r i c a l Background of Modern 
Social Psychology" i n : Handbook of Social Psychology, 
2 vols., ed. by G. Lmdzey, (1959), Addison-Wesley 
Co., Vol.1, pp. 3 f f . 
(35) Lewan, P.C. and Stotland, E., "The Effects of Prior Information 
on Susceptibility to an Emotional Appeal" J.Abnor. 
and Social Psych., vol.62, (1961), pp. 450-453. 
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such facts. He could state that "Older c i v i l i z a t i o n s have decayed 
(36) 
and passed away because they lacked both science and philosophy. 
The present c i v i l i z a t i o n i s equally threatened by the same decay, 
unless i t observes the marriage of science and philosophy as 
indispensible. "Ours", he added, " i s threatened with a similar f a t e , 
and w i t h more rapid destruction" than the older societies. This i s 
so not through "lack of science, but through one-sided development 
of the sciences, through the backwardness of the social sciences 
which alone, under the guidance of philosophy, can adjust our social 
systems to the rapid changes of conditions of l i f e produced at an 
(37) 
ever accelerating rate by the victorious science". Such a 
statement may be considered as a defence of a thesis, a philosophical 
one, and i t could be regarded as a starting-point f o r social science. 
I t c l e a r l y delineates the relationship between various d i s c i p l i n e s , 
namely, psychology, the theory of knowledge, and lo g i c . The 
observation precisely indicates that these three enquiries are 
concerned with mental functions, both of the individual and of his 
a c t i v i t i e s merged with the groups. Each of a l l these branches has i n 
(36) "Philosophy and the Social Sciences" i n : Human A f f a i r s , 
ed. by R.B. C a t t e l l and others, London, MacMillan 
and Co. (1937), p.343. 
(37) i b i d , p.343. 
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a sense connectxon wxth w e l l - n i g h a l l knowledge. Yet such an i d e a l 
enjoins t h a t departments of psychology should not be e s t a b l i s h e d , t o 
( 38 ^  
quote G.Westby (1966) of C a r d i f f U n i v e r s i t y , " e x c l u s i v e l y or 
even p r i m a r i l y as Racing Stables f o r t r a i n i n g research animals, 
l e a r n i n g e x p e r i m e n t a l i s t s ... nor as Spanish Riding Schools f o r 
the t r a i n i n g of re c o n d i t e p r a c t i c a l s k i l l s l i k e a d m i n i s t e r i n g and 
scoring i n t e l l i g e n c e t e s t s and p r o j e c t i v e techniques". I n s h o r t , 
t o confine Psychology t o the w a l l s of the l a b o r a t o r y would mean 
d e p r i v i n g i t of i t s philosophy which can be taken as a guide l i n e 
i n the e x p l o r a t i o n of the supreme a s p i r a t i o n s of the human beings 
as i n d i v i d u a l s and as members of s o c i e t i e s ; and t h i s , again, may 
be p a r t of McDougall's hormic, s o c i a l philosophy. 
E v i d e n t l y , m h i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l arguments, McDougall 
was in f l u e n c e d by P.H. Bradley's (1846-1924) d o c t r i n e s t a t e d i n 
(39) 
"My S t a t i o n and i t s D u t i e s " (1876). I n support of h i s case, he 
c i t e d Bradley's p o s i t i o n a t l e n g t h . These excerpts may 
i l l u s t r a t e * " T h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s consciousness of himself i s inseparable 
(38) "Psychology Today : Problems and D i r e c t i o n s " P r e s i d e n t i a l 
Address i n Bull.Brit.Psych.Soc., vol.19, No.65, p.3. 
(39) m : E t h i c a l Studies, Oxford; 2nd ed. (1927), published 
posthumously. 
(40) The Group Mind, Cambridge, The U n i v e r s i t y Press (1920), p p . x i -
X l l . 
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from the knowing of himself as an organ of the whole . T h e t r u t h 
of i n d i v i d u a l i s m i s saved, because, unless we have intense l i f e 
and s e l f -^consciousness i n the members o i the s t a t e , the whole s t a t e 
i s o s s i f i e d . T h e two problems of the best men and the best s t a t e 
are two sides, two d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e aspects of the one problem, how 
t o r e a l i s e i n human nature the p e r f e c t u n i t y of homogeneity and 
s p e c i f i c a t i o n ... the b e t t e r the one the b e t t e r the other ... 
Personal m o r a l i t y i s moral, because and i n so f a r as i t r e a l i s e s the 
moral whole". 
Seizing upon the clues found i n Bradley's contentions, 
McDougall s t r o v e t o approach the question from a s t r i c t l y 
s c i e n t i f i c a l l y hormic p o s i t i o n . For example, i n The Group Mind : A 
Sketch of the P r i n c i p l e s of C o l l e c t i v e Psychology w i t h some Attempt 
t o Apply them t o the I n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Nation a l L i f e and Character (1920), 
he c l e a r l y explained t h a t the normative d o c t r i n e or " i d e a l " a t 
which he aimed was a synthesis of the p r i n c i p l e s of i n d i v i d u a l i s m , 
democracy, s e l f - r e a l i s a t i o n and se r v i c e t o the community. His 
e f f e c t i v e means of ana l y s i s s t a r t s b a s i c a l l y from i n s t i n c t as usual. I n 
cons i d e r a t i o n of s o c i a l motivations and other problems of s o c i a l 
phenomena, many w r i t e r s t o d a y couple McDougall*s name w i t h t h a t of 
(41) See f o r example: 
( l ) Murray, H.A., "Preparations f o r the S c a f f o l d of A Comprehensive 
System", Psychology;A Study of Science, ed. by S.Koch, New York 
McGraw-Hill, v o l . 3 , (1959), pp.13, 20. 
( n ) S h e r i f , M., "Social Psychology:Problems and Trends", Psychology 
A Study of Science, ed. by S.Koch, New York, McGraw-Hill, vol.6 
(1963), pp.58, 63. 
( m ) Lambert, W i l l i a m W., "Social Psychology and other Behavioural 
Sciences", Psychology;A Study of Science, vol.6,(1963), o p . c i t . 
pp.205, 212. 
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Darwin f o r t h e i r discovery t h a t human nature i s b i o l o g i c a l l y founded 
i n i n s t i n c t s . I n h i s e f f o r t t o f i n d an adequate s o l u t i o n t o problems 
of s o c i a l m o t i v a t i o n , H.A. Murray (1959), f o r instance, e x p l i c i t l y 
acknowledged h i s indebtedness t o Darwin and McDougall, "who had used 
(42) 
the concept of i n s t i n c t as t h e i r t o o l " . "The s o l i d f a c t " t h a t 
Murray has recognised i s t h a t he derived h i s ideas, which are 
(43) r~ _ incorporated i n Explorations of P e r s o n a l i t y (1938) ^Murray et alv 
from McDougall. Here t o o , Murray e t a l t r i e d t o i d e n t i f y a number of 
the determinants of behaviour, the " a c t i o n a l d i s p o s i t i o n s " which are 
u s e f u l constructs i n c a t e g o r i s i n g m f e r e n t i a l l y the overt behaviour of 
(44) 
the i n d i v i d u a l s s t u d i e d . Social Psychology stems h i s t o r i c a l l y from 
McDougall, l a r g e l y because (a) he formulated the theory of i n s t i n c t s 
n e a t l y so t h a t a convincing explanation of human nature could be 
found; and (b) he conceived s o c i a l psychology focussed on the 
i n d i v i d u a l as the main u n i t of s o c i a l l i f e , but the i n d i v i d u a l can 
b e t t e r be understood w i t h i n the context of the group. Along w i t h other 
(45) 
names such as Freud, A l l p o r t , Tolman, and o t h e r s , McDougall i s now 
(42) "Preparations f o r the S c a f f o l d of a Comprehensive System", 
Psychology ; A Study of Science, v o l . 3 , o p . c i t . , p.20. 
(43) New York, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press. 
(44) Lambert, W.W., "Social Psychology and other Behavioural 
& Sciences" (1963), Psychology ; A Study 
(45) of Science, v o l . 6 , o p . c i t , , p.212. 
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always placed at the top of the l i s t m d e f i n i n g and s t r e s s i n g the 
importance of m o t i v a t i o n a l f a c t o r s i n s o c i a l Psychology. 
McDougall was p a r t i c u l a r l y impressed by the phenomena of group 
s p i r i t . He p o s t u l a t e d a group mind c h i e f l y because he r e a l i s e d t h a t 
the i n d i v i d u a l cannot be f u l l y understood by studying him s o l e l y as 
an i s o l a t e d person; and the g i s t of h i s Group Mind above i s as 
f o l l o w s . 
As the i n d i v i d u a l s are endowed w i t h i n s t i n c t s , they 
a t t a i n the consciousness of the s e l f , moral s o c i a l i s a t i o n and 
e v e n t u a l l y " s o c i a l consciousness", through the m o d i f i c a t i o n of the 
" p r i m i t i v e impulses". M o d i f i c a t i o n takes place through experiences 
i n which conduct i s r e g u l a t e d by means of the i n d i v i d u a l ' s own 
i d e a l s . The d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s of s o c i a l and moral consciousness, 
however, are determined by the degree t o which the other i n s t i n c t s 
w i t h the s o c i a l consciousness they i n v o l v e can be organised under the 
s e l f - r e g a r d i n g sentiment. The c h a r a c t e r i s t i c f e a t u r e of human 
r e f l e c t i v e consciousness i s a s c r i b a b l e t o the complications t h a t 
a r i s e through the f r e e i n g of ideas, the a s s o c i a t i o n and a s s i m i l a t i o n 
of these t o each other and t o the i n d i v i d u a l ' s perceptual powers, 
and f i n a l l y the whole s i t u a t i o n i s r e l a t e d t o the o r g a n i s a t i o n of a l l 
these features i n t o thought systems. Such a complex involves the 
(46) Asch, S.E., "A Perspective on S o c i a l Psychology, Psychology; 
A Study of Science, v o l . 6 , (1963), o p . c i t . , 
pp.368-9. 
- 458 -
combination of emotional elements i n t o the systems of sentiments and 
the c r e a t i n g of d i s p o s i t i o n s . So McDougall*s s o c i a l psychology i s 
w h o l l y c o n s i s t e n t w i t h h i s over-*all hormic approach t o a l l 
psychological problems. 
Thus i n t e r p r e t i n g h i s p r i n c i p l e s , McDougall endeavoured 
t o apply them t o the understanding, i n p a r t i c u l a r , of the l i f e of 
nat i o n s . By so doing, he attempted t o make group psychology a 
d i s t i n c t f i e l d w i t h i n s o c i a l psychology. While s o c i a l psychology 
studies the r e c i p r o c a l influences of the i n d i v i d u a l and the s o c i e t y 
i n which he l i v e s , group psychology concerns i t s e l f w i t h the study of 
mental l i f e of the groups of a l l k i n d s . The consigned task of group 
psychology i s t o examine the v a l i d i t y of the conceptions of a group 
mind, t o set f o r t h the general p r i n c i p l e s of c o l l e c t i v e mental l i f e , 
t o describe the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the various types w i t h i n the main 
group and t o account f o r them. So i t could be s a i d perhaps t h a t 
McDougall's attempt t o create such a branch w i t h i n s o c i a l psychology 
was the f i r s t o f i t s k i n d . 
I t must be admitted, however, t h a t the proper problem of 
the s o c i a l sciences i s complicated by the very s u b t l e , psychological 
problems of e v a l u a t i o n . Such sciences are also i n e v i t a b l y mixed and 
entangled w i t h a m u l t i t u d e of p h i l o s o p h i c a l questions, as i n d i c a t e d -
the questions not only of f i n a l goals and absolute values, but also 
the many s u b t l e issues of r e l a t i v e values and a v a l i d h ierarchy of 
c e r t a i n values. Such considerations undoubtedly come w i t h i n the 
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sphere of s o c i a l philosophy which should l a y i t s s p e c i f i c a t i o n s i n 
accordance w i t h a scale of values w e l l thought out and v a l i d a t e d . 
Then the s o c i a l sciences may proceed t o discover how these values 
could best be r e a l i s e d . This e v e n t u a l l y r e q u i r e s the a i d of science, 
and here a r e l e v a n t question i s t o be r a i s e d as t o how psychology can 
help i n t h i s f i e l d . I t may be s a i d t h a t ( 1 ) since a l l the s o c i a l 
sciences are concerned w i t h human a c t i v i t i e s , they i n e v i t a b l y need 
the support of Psychology; ( 1 1 ) psychology also can a s s i s t i n 
diagnosing the problems which might emerge and enter the s p e c i a l 
f i e l d o f psychological i n v e s t i g a t i o n s ; ( 1 1 1 ) many s o c i a l phenomena 
can best be t a c k l e d through the psychological researches. From 
t h i s i t f o l l o w s t h a t i t would be f a r b e t t e r i f the s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t 
takes an i n t e r e s t m philosophy, t o o . Support, however^for the 
marriage of science and philosophy can be found i n a succession of 
(47) 
p u b l i c a t i o n s by a considerable number of w r i t e r s such as G. Ryle 
(1949), D.W. H a r d m g ^ 4 8 ) ( 1 9 5 6 ) , F.V. S m i t h ( 4 9 \ l 9 6 0 a and 1960c), 
A.R, White^ 5°\l961), G. Westby^ 5 1^(1965, 1966) and many others. 
(47) The Concept of Mind. 
(48) "Education Through Psychology" B u l l . B r i t . P s y c h . S o c i e t y , vol.28, 
pp.5-14. 
(49) ( l ) (1960a) Explanation of Human Behaviour, o p . c i t . , 
( n ) (1960c) "Social Theory and the Basic Motives" o p . c i t . , 
(50) Philosophy, Psychology and Sociology, Dep.of Philosophy, U n i v e r s i t y 
of H u l l . 
(51) ( l ) (1965) "Psychology and the S o c i a l Sciences" Adv.of Science, 
vol.22, pp.424-84. 
( n ) "Psychology today : Problems and D i r e c t i o n s " 
Bull.Brit.Psych.Soc. o p . c i t . , 
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The essence of these w r i t e r s ' arguments, i s t h a t the considerable 
advance which sciences have thus f a r f u l f i l l e d i s b a s i c a l l y b u i l t 
upon and e x p l i c a b l e i n the l i g h t of p h i l o s o p h i c a l discussions. 
2. Some of the Experiments Made. 
B e l i e v i n g i n a t e l e o l o g i c a l and d i r e c t i v e f o r c e , 
McDougall c r i t i c i s e d most of the older and contemporary t h e o r i e s 
a l i k e . He was, f o r instance, i n o p p o s i t i o n t o the work of the 
beh a v i o u r i s t s who proposed a somewhat extreme e m p i r i c a l view of 
c o g n i t i v e development. He s t r o n g l y opposed the n o t i o n t h a t l e a r n i n g 
was the l i t e r a l and immediate a s s o c i a t i o n of d i f f e r e n t processes. 
He expressed d i s l i k e f o r the idea t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r p a t t e r n of 
muscular a c t i v i t y becomes associated w i t h p a r t i c u l a r circumstances, 
so t h a t there i s a k i n d of automatic p a t t e r n of response, as the 
beh a v i o u r i s t s maintained. He agreed w i t h the Gestalt School i n i t s 
(52) 
emphasis of the t o t a l s i t u a t i o n ; but he concluded t h a t i n s i g h t 
alone i s not a s u f f i c i e n t explanation of animal behaviour. He 
c r i t i c i s e d the Gestalt psychologists on the ground t h a t t h e i r theory 
would remain mechanistic i n the broader sense unless they accepted 
a conative guide of f o r e s i g h t . I t can be s a i d , however, t h a t h i s 
(52) See f o r example: 
( l ) Smith F.V., "An I n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the Theory of the G e s t a l t " 
The A u s t r a l i a n J. of Psychol, and P h i l o s . , 
vol.XIX, No.3, (1941), pp.193-215. 
( n ) Smith, F.V.,Explanation of Human Behaviour, (1960) , o p . c i t . , 
ch.IX. 
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experiments and observations are i n f l u e n t i a l on both contemporary 
(53) 
and subsequent psychological thought. As F.H. George (1962), 
of B r i s t o l U n i v e r s i t y has remarked, "McDougall's work i s r e l e v a n t t o 
Galton's, because he shows the e f f e c t of the i n f l u e n c e of t h e o r i e s 
of b i o l o g i c a l e v o l u t i o n on h i s own theory of c o g n i t i o n " . Such a 
judgement acceptable as i t i s , might have w e l l added t h a t McDougall's 
work i s more v a l i d t o the present, psychological i n v e s t i g a t i o n s . 
Among the many experiments which McDouall d i d , were 
those conducted f o r the t e s t i n g of the Lamarckian hypothesis. These 
experiments were undoubtedly h i s longest m d u r a t i o n of time, and 
the r e s u l t s were claimed t o be p o s i t i v e . I n connection w i t h them, 
however, three c h i e f p o i n t s should be r a i s e d : (1) The nature and the 
outcome of the experiments themselves, ( n ) the foundations on which 
they were based and t h e i r i m p l i c a t i o n s , ( m ) the psychological 
value and v a l i d i t y of the r e s u l t s obtained. 
With regard t o ( i ) i n 1920 McDougall undertook a 
s e r i e s of experiments on r a t s . The d u r a t i o n of time was d i v i d e d i n t o 
f o u r mam periods; (1) from 1920 t o June 1926, (2) from June 1926 t o 
June 1929, (3) from June 1929 t o June 1933, (4) from June 1933 u n t i l 
1937,v 
(53) Cognition, London, Methuen, p.20. 
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The experiments r e q u i r e d successive generations of r a t s 
t o escape from an underwater tank by choosing the cue of a dimly l i t 
i n preference t o a b r i g h t l y l i t c o r r i d o r . There were i n each 
generation a " t r a i n e d " l i n e which received t r a i n i n g i n escaping and 
(54) 
an u n t r a i n e d l i n e . McDougall claimed b r i l l i a n t l y p o s i t i v e 
r e s u l t s . A f t e r nineteen generations, descendants of the t r a i n e d 
l i n e were claimed t o be escaping w i t h s i g n i f i c a n t l y fewer e r r o r s than 
the descendants of the u n t r a i n e d l i n e . This was h e l d t o be evidence 
of the passing on from one generation t o the next of some measure, at 
l e a s t , of an acquired s k i l l or as he put i t , of Lamarckian 
transmissions 
However, the experiments appear t o have been based on 
the f o l l o w i n g assumptions: 
1. There would be an adequate theory of organic e v o l u t i o n i f the 
Lamarckian hypothesis was v a l i d - the hypothesis t h a t m o d i f i c a t i o n s 
of f u n c t i o n and s t r u c t u r e acquired by the i n d i v i d u a l organism may 
be t r a n s m i t t e d t o i t s descendants. 
(54) ( I ) "An Experiment f o r the Testing of the Hypothesis of Lamarck" 
B.J.Psych., v o l . x v i i , p a r t 4, (1927). 
( n ) "Second Report on a Lamarckian Experiment" B.J.Psych., v o l . 
XX, p a r t 3, (1930). 
( i n ) " T h i r d Report on a Lamarckian Experiment" B.J.Psych., v o l . 
x x i v , p a r t 2, (1933); ( w i t h J.B.Rhine). 
( I V ) "Fourth Report on a Lamarckian Experiment" B.J.Psych., v o l . 
x x v i i i , p a r t 3, (1938). 
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2. I t seemed t o McDougall t h a t through the Lamarckian hypothesis, 
i t would be p o s s i b l e t o assign t o mind, o r , i n other words, t o 
purposive, t e l e o l o g i c a l , or hormic a c t i v i t y , an understandable 
and d e c i s i v e r o l e i n the drama of l i f e . 
3. I n the absence of the Lamarckian p r i n c i p l e , the place of mind 
i n the scheme o f nature would be " u n i n t e l l i g i b l e " . 
4. I f the Lamarckian contentions were v a l i d , McDougall thought t h a t 
much l i g h t could be thrown on "the s o c i a l outlook". As t o how 
t h i s l a s t concept could b e n e f i t from a Lamarckian t h e o r i s a t i o n , 
was not made c l e a r ; but c l e a r l y i t would have been very 
comforting f o r McDougall's general p o s i t i o n i f i n a d d i t i o n t o 
the o p e r a t i o n of purpose and i n t e l l i g e n c e , the means whereby 
s p e c i f i c p a t t e r n s of behaviour - i . e . i n s t i n c t s could come i n t o 
being, could be determined. I n t h i s sense, he would have had i t 
"both ways", as Smith^ 5 5^(1960a) has put i t . 
Presumably the experiments a t issue and the arguments 
marshalled i n t h e i r support were founded on the hormic viewpoint 
incorporated i n An I n t r o d u c t i o n t o So c i a l Psychology. This assumption 
i s based p a r t i c u l a r l y on the f o l l o w i n g passage: " I f we t u r n from the 
d e s c r i p t i v e account m± e v o l u t i o n t o the problem of the dynamics ef 
(55) Explanation of Human Behaviour, op,cit«, pp.122, 127. 
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the process, the hormic theory again i s the only one t h a t can o f f e r 
an i n t e l l i g i b l e and s e l f - c o n s i s t e n t scheme. I t notes how the human 
cr e a t u r e , through constant s t r i v i n g w i t h i n f i n i t e l y v a r i e d 
circumstances, c a r r i e s the d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of both c o g n i t i v e and 
s t r i v i n g powers f a r beyond the p o i n t t o which the h e r e d i t a r y 
momentum w i l l c a r r y them, the p o i n t common t o the species, how i t 
develops new d i s c r i m i n a t i o n s , modified goals of a p p e t i t i o n and 
aversion, modified t r a i n s of a c t i v i t y f o r p u r s u i t or r e t r e a t . I t 
notes t h a t these m o d i f i c a t i o n s are achieved under the guidance of 
pleasure and the p a i n , the s a t i s f a c t i o n and d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n , t h a t 
a t t e n d success and f a i l u r e r e s p e c t i v e l y ; i t i n c l i n e s t o view the 
e v o l u t i o n or r a t h e r the epigenesis of the i n d i v i d u a l creature's 
adaptations as the model i n the l i g h t of which we may i n t e r p r e t the 
epigenesis of r a c i a l a d a p t a t i o n . Such i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i m p l i e s 
.. (56) 
acceptance of Lamarckian transmission . 
The above statement has been presented a t l e n g t h i n 
order t o show the importance of c e r t a i n p o i n t s , namely, t h a t ; 
( I ) The concept of horme' can be taken as a workable scheme. 
( I I ) The ev o l u t i o n a r y and the dynamic c o n s t i t u e n t s of the organism 
are i n e x t r i c a b l y entwined i n i t s c o n s t i t u t i o n . 
(56) An I n t r o d u c t i o n t o Social Psychology, o p . c i t . , pp.479-480. 
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( i i i ) Under c e r t a i n circumstances, m o d i f i c a t i o n of a c t i v i t i e s i s 
m d i s p e n s i b l e f o r the perpetuation of the i n d i v i d u a l ' s own 
b e n e f i t . 
( I V ) The adaptation of the i n d i v i d u a l can be taken as a guide l i n e 
t o understand the adaptation of the species t o which the 
i n d i v i d u a l belongs. 
The essence of the passage, however, i s r e f l e c t e d i n the 
d e t a i l e d arguments e x p l a i n i n g the experiments done f o r t e s t i n g the 
Lamarckian hypothesis. The experiments provoked an enormous amount 
of i n t e r e s t , as shown below, and i t must i n no way be supposed t h a t 
since the r e s u l t s of subsequent experiments by others were e n t i r e l y 
negative, the hormic theory i s a c cordingly f u t i l e . Such an 
assumption i s t o be completely r u l e d o u t , mainly because : 
1. The concept of horme i s a theory which i s vast m i t s connotations 
and implementations. 
2. The theory, as mentioned before, i s not at a l l borrowed from 
Lamarckian presumptions. 
3. The experiments were conducted merely t o t e s t a hypothesis i m p l i e d 
m one of Lamarck's e v o l u t i o n a r y p r i n c i p l e s . I f they f a i l e d 
because of an e r r o r i n experimental method, no r e f u t a t i o n of the 
hormic theory i s i n v o l v e d . 
B e l i e v i n g i n e v o l u t i o n a r y c o n t i n u i t y , McDougall made i t 
p e r f e c t l y c l e a r t h a t i n the case of every new development of form or 
f u n c t i o n , the f i r s t step i s the v a r i a t i o n of the i n s t i n c t i v e nature 
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of the species toward a c t i v i t i e s r e q u i r e d f o r the e f f i c i e n t 
performance of the form and f u n c t i o n . From McDougall*s d i f f e r e n t 
d iscussions, i t seems t h a t he was of the o p i n i o n t h a t i f a 
r e l a t i v e l y new mode of behaviour became f i x e d through repeated, 
successful e f f o r t s , n a t u r a l s e l e c t i o n might w e l l perpetuate a l l 
congruent b o d i l y v a r i a t i o n s which are of opposite nature. This 
p r i n c i p l e , i f i t may be c a l l e d so, might be rendered more e f f e c t i v e 
by recognising from McDougall's s t a n d p o i n t , two t h i n g s ; (1) the 
causal e f f i c a c y of hormic s t r i v i n g , and (2) the r e a l i t y of 
Lamarckian i n h e r i t a n c e . This seems t o be m o p p o s i t i o n t o the neo-
Darwinism which appeared t o him as r i g i d l y mechanistic and 
m a t e r i a l i s t i c . Consequently i t seems t h a t i t was because of h i s 
p r o t e s t against the neo-Darwinism, formulated by F.L. August 
(57) (58) Weismann (1892, 1894) and o t h e r s , t h a t he decided t o c a r r y 
out h i s Lamarckian experiments on r a t s . This takes us now back t o 
item ( n ) above, namely, the foundations and i m p l i c a t i o n s i n v o l v e d . 
Lamarck's d o c t r i n e was the subject of a c t i v e 
c o n t r o v e r s i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y since the days of Weismann, The g i s t of 
t h e case against i t i s t h a t such acquired t r a i t s are not h e r i t a b l e , 
(57) ( I ) (1892) Essays upon Heredity and Kindred B i o l o g i c a l Problems, 
English t r a n s l a t i o n , Oxford, 2nd.ed, 2 v o l s . , v o l . 1 , 
pp. 83-84, 311, 399, 403, 433. 
( n ) (1894) The E f f e c t o f E x t e r n a l I n f l u e n c e upon Development, 
(The Romanes L e c t u r e s ) , London, o p . c i t . , p.155. 
(58) E.B. Poulton, J.M. Baldwin, and L l o y d Morgan. 
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and are t h e r e f o r e i n e f f e c t i v e i n the accumulation of d i f f e r e n c e s 
s u f f i c i e n t t o o r i g i n a t e new species or new h a b i t s . 
Lamarck's theory of the transmission of acquired 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s applies t o both s t r u c t u r e s and f u n c t i o n s ; i t i s 
thought t h a t the f u n c t i o n s may precede and give r i s e t o the 
s t r u c t u r e s . I t appears t h a t the h e r i t a b i l i t y o f f u n c t i o n s was 
a t t r a c t i v e t o McDougall„ The theory of the o r i g i n of i n s t i n c t 
i m p l i e d i n Lamarck*s p o s i t i o n came t o be widely known by George 
Henry Lewes. That s t r u c t u r e s or i n s t i n c t s can be derived from 
i n t e l l i g e n t a c t i v i t i e s , as the Lamarckian i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i m p l i e s , 
i s very d o u b t f u l . 
The animal i s presumed t o develop by r e p e t i t i o n 
an automatic or h a b i t u a l response t o meet a s i t u a t i o n which i t 
was i n i t i a l l y able t o solve out of i t s general or u n s p e c i f i e d 
behavioural resources. Moreover, i t i s assumed t h a t m n a t u r a l 
circumstances, the i n d i v i d u a l organism i s i n i t s own l i f e t i m e 
confronted w i t h the same s i t u a t i o n again and again and so t o o , 
countless, subsequent, generations. The degree of l i k e l i h o o d 
of the same s i t u a t i o n r e c u r r i n g and the r i g i d i t y induced i n the 
organism's general r e p e r t o i r e of responses would render the 
s u r v i v a l value of the opera t i o n somewhat dubious, because of 
reduced adaptation. I n any case, McDougall's very p o s i t i v e 
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( 59) r e s u l t s were unique. The r e s u l t s published by experimenters such 
(59) ( i ) Crew, P.A.E., "Lamarckism: A Review of McDougall's 2nd. 
Report on a Lamarckian Experiment", Eugenic Rev., vol.22, 
(1930), pp.55-59. c f . Morgan, T.H., (a) "The Mechanisms 
and Laws of Heredity", The Foundation of Experimental 
Psychology, ed. by Murchison, C a r l , Worcester,Mass: Clark 
Univ.Press, (1929); (b) "Lamarckism", Encyclopaedia 
B r i t t a n i c , v o l . x i n , (1929). 
( n ) Crew, F.A.E., "I n h e r i t a n c e of E d u c a b i l i t y : A F i r s t r e p o r t 
on an attempt t o examine Prof.McDougall's conclusions 
r e l a t i n g t o h i s experiments f o r the t e s t i n g of the hypothesis 
of Lamarck", Proceedings of the 6 t h I n t e r n a t i o n a l Congress, 
Genetics, v o l . 1 , (1932), pp.21-34. 
( m ) , "A R e p e t i t i o n of McDougall's Lamarckian Experiment", 
J. o f Genetics, v o l . x x x i i i , No.l, (1936), pp.61-101. 
( I V ) Dunlap, Knight, "Standardising E l e c t r i c Shocks f o r Rats", 
J.Comp.Psycho., v o l . x n , (1931), pp.133-5. 
( v ) Sonneborn, T.M., "McDougall's Lamarckian Experiment" Amer. 
Nature, vol.65, (1931), pp.541-50. 
( v i ) Krechevsky, I . , "Hereditary Nature of Hypotheses", J.Comp 
Psycho., v o l . x i v , (1932), pp.99-116. 
( v i i ) Wever, E.G., "Water Temperature as an I n c e n t i v e t o Swimming 
A c t i v i t y i n the Rat", J.Comp.Psycho., v o l . x i v , (1932) pp. 
219-224. 
( v n i ) Haldane, J.B.S., "Note on a F a l l a c i o u s Method of Avoiding 
S e l e c t i o n " , Amer.Nature, 66, (1932), pp.479-8; c f . 
Haldane's reference t o McDougall's 1st and 2nd r e p o r t s i n : 
The Causes of E v o l u t i o n , (1932), o p . c i t . , pp.136-7. 
( I X ) Hack, E.R., "Learning as a Function of Water Temperature", 
J.Exp.Psycho., v o l . x v i , (1933), pp.442-5. 
(x) Drew, G.C., "McDougall's experiments on the i n h e r i t a n c e of 
Acquired Habits", Nature, London, vol.143,(1939),pp.188-91. 
( x i ) Agar, W.E., Drummond, F.H. and Tiegs, O.W., "A F i r s t Report 
on a t e s t of McDougall's Lamarckian Experiment on the t r a i n i n g 
of Rats", J.Exp.Biol., v o l . x n , No.3, (1935), pp.191-211. 
( x n ) Agar, W.E., "Second Report on a t e s t of McDougall's 
Lamarckian experiment on the t r a i n i n g of Rats", J.Exp.Biol., 
v o l . x i x , no.2., (1942), pp.158-167, see a l s o ; 
Castle, W.E., Amer.Nature, vol.75, (1941), p.492. 
fo o t n o t e continued: 
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as F.A.E. Crew., W.E. Agar, P.H. Drummond and O.W. Txegs, Agar alone, 
and o t h e r s , d i d not confirm McDougall's r e s u l t s . I n f a c t , they 
provided no p o s i t i v e evidence of transmission of the acquired s k i l l . 
The c r i t i c i s m s l e v e l l e d against McDougall's 
Lamarckian experiments, seem t o r e s t on the inadequacy of the 
methods a p p l i e d i n the sampling and t e s t s conducted a t each 
generation, whereby c e r t a i n f a c t o r s of bias i n favour of the bred 
l i n e were admitted. However, w h i l e these experiments appear t o have 
given no r e a l support t o McDougall's p o s i t i o n , other avenues of 
support were forthcoming. Subsequent studies such as those made 
by Lorenz, Tinbergen, and Lashley p o s i t i v e l y supported McDougall's 
general d o c t r i n e of i n s t i n c t s . Lashley's important paper "The 
Experimental B e h a v i o u r " ^ ^ (1938), f o r example, gave a confirmatory 
account of c e r t a i n assumptions of s p e c i f i c r e l e a s e r s made by 
Continuation of f o o t n o t e (59) from previous page:-
( x n ) Agar, W.E., "Th i r d Report on a t e s t of McDougall's Lamarckian 
experiment on the t r a i n i n g of Rats", J.Exp.Biol., 
v o l . x x v , N0$2, (1948), pp.107-122. 
( x i v ) Agar, W.E., "Fourth Report on a t e s t of McDougall's Lamarckian 
experiment on the t r a i n i n g o f Rats", J.Exp.Biol., 
v o l . x x x i , No.3, (1954), pp.307-321. 
(60) Psycho.Rev., vol.45, pp.445-471; see a l s o : 
Smith, F.V., Explanation of Human Behaviour, o p . c i t . , 
P.158. 
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McDougall. In the l i g h t of the considerable evidence i n the 
l i t e r a t u r e of ethology, one would be disposed to agree with Smith 
(1960a) i n his judgement th a t , " i t would only be f a i r to state 
that there i s an obligation to reconsider McDougall's position". 
I t i s j u s t i f i a b l e to state that the whole, vast and rapidly growing 
l i t e r a t u r e of Ethology from Darwin, Whitman, Heinroth, Lorenz, 
Tmbergen and t h e i r many followers i s a vindication, on empirical 
evidence, of McDougall's insistence upon the existence of 
behavioural patterns which are innate; and as pointed out (Ch.VI), 
the experimental evidence deriving from neurological techniques 
i n i t i a t e d by Hess and Brugger and the chemical stimulation techniques 
of Fisher have shown that such patterns are mediated by demonstrable 
structures. 
3. Discussion and some Conclusions. 
I t i s now about s i x t y years since McDougall had 
declared (1908) that the science of Psychology must be recognised 
as the most essential common foundation on which a l l the social 
sciences l i k e "ethics, economics, p o l i t i c a l science, philosophy of 
(61) Explanation of Human Behaviour, op.cit., p.158. 
(62) An Introduction to Social Psychology, op.cit., 
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hxstory, sociology, c u l t u r a l anthropology, and the more special 
sciences, such as the sciences of r e l i g i o n , of law, of education 
and of a r t " - must be b u i l t up. Such a broad claim may be 
(63) 
c r i t i c i s e d , m G. Westby's (1966) words, as seeking a " s c i e n t i f i c 
empire f o r Psychology". 
McDougall*s distinguishing characteristic, however, 
was that his pronounced hormic Psychology is appropriately related 
to every walk of l i f e , p a r t i c u l a r l y to the int e r n a l l i f e of man. 
By int e r n a l l i f e , McDougall almost always meant mental l i f e which 
for some time remained highly disputable f o r lack of a s c i e n t i f i c a l l y 
acceptable techniques of investigation. Apparently t h i s i s why he 
wanted a hormic, s c i e n t i f i c Psychology permeating the essential 
disciplines of humanities and education. Again, perhaps t h i s was 
(64) (65) (66) (67) why i n early 1897,v ' 1902, ' 1903, 1906, he attempted 
(63) Bull.Brit.Psych.Soc., vol.19, No.65, op.cit., p.8. 
(64) "A Contribution towards an Improvement of Psychological Method" 
MIND, N.S., v o l . V I I . 
(65) "Physiological Factors of the Attention Process" MIND, N,S., 
vol . X I , paper I . 
(66) "Physiological Factors of the Attention Process" MIND, N.S., 
vol. X I I , paper I I . 
(67) "Physiological Factors of the Attention Process" MIND, N.S., 
vol . XV, paper I I I . 
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to improve Psychology, aiming at rescuing "Mind" from an 
"undignified position to which i t had been reduced by the prevalence 
of Epiphenomenalism and Psycho-physical Parallelism". Instead, he 
def ended (1911) a d u a l i s t i c hypothesis of animism which he based 
on teleol o g i c a l v i t a l i s m . His unlimited b e l i e f was that "psychic 
a c t i v i t y i s always and everywhere t e l e o l o g i c a l , a s t r i v i n g towards 
some end or g o a l " . ^ ^ This, however, i n no w ay^^ means that 
"teleological or purposive causation" i s associated with the 
mechanistic point of view. 
I n a sense a l l mental, psychical a c t i v i t y i s purposive, 
(71) 
and, i n J. Cohen's (1951) words, "purposive explanations are so 
(68) Body and Mind ; A History and Defence of Animism, London, 
Methuen, now published m paperback (1961), Beacon Press. 
(69) The Energies of Men, op.cit., p. x n . 
(70) i b i d , p . x i i , see also by the same author: 
( I ) "Mechanism, Purpose and the New Freedom" J.Philos., 
v o l . IX, No. 33, (1934). 
( n ) Religion and the Sciences of L i f e , London, Methuen, 
(1934). 
( i n ) The Riddle of L i f e , London, Methuen, (1938). 
(71) "Teleological Explanations" Proc.Arist.Soc., v o l . L I , p.272., 
See also; 
( I ) Kneele, M., "What i s the Mind-Body Problem ?" Proc.Arist. 
Soc., vol.L, (1950), pp.105-122. 
( n ) Joad, C.E.M., Ewing, A.C., and Maciver, A.M., " i s there 
Mmd-Body Interaction?" Symposium i n ; Proc.Arist.Soc., 
v o l . L I , (1951). 
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useful f o r understandxng the behaviour". By purposive behaviour i s 
n aturally meant that which i n i t s consequences i s always aiming at 
(72) 
an end (K.R.L. Hall : 1963a). Such a type of behaviour i s 
adaptive and i s held to be constituted of unlearned patterns. I t 
i s complex and i t s elements are recognised to be ready p r i o r to 
(73) 
specific learning (P.H. S c h i l l e r : 1952); m a word, such 
elements are widely admitted to be inherent m the organism's 
cons t i t u t i o n . This c l e a r l y indicates that the constituents which 
have the prepotency of activating purposive behaviour are held to 
be " i n s t i n c t s i n which the emotions are instigated via innately 
(74) 
organised perceptual system", as Smith has pointed out. What 
(75) 
K. and M. Breland (1961) have called " i n s t i n c t i v e d r i f t " , i s 
a clear indication of how strong the i n s t i n c t i v e behavioural patterns 
are. I t i s obvious that i n s t i n c t i v e patterns are stronger than the 
conditioned responses, and the organisms act the way they do because 
(76) 
they are "tapped by strong i n s t i n c t i v e behaviours". In such a trend (72) "Tool using performances as indicators of behavioural 
ad a p t a b i l i t y " Current Anthropology, vol.4, pp.479™494. 
(73) "innate constituents of complex responses i n Primates" 
Psych.Rev., vol.59, pp.171-191. 
(74) "Social Theory and the Basic Motives" Bull.Brit.Psych.Soc., 
(1960c), op . c i t . , p.13. 
(75) "The Misbehaviour of Organisms" Amer.Psychologist, vol.16, 
pp.681-684. 
(76) i b i d 
- 474 -
of thinking there might be an answer to McDougall's repeated 
question: "Why do you, why does any one, desire t h i s or that 
(or any l i n e of a c t i o n } ? " ^ ^ . To t h i s may be added that the 
in d i v i d u a l , both human and animal, behaves m a part i c u l a r way 
because he i s constituted i n that way. 
The goal-seeking nature of the a c t i v i t y which i s 
achieved persistently and the adaptability of the a c t i v i t y i t s e l f 
are mam c r i t e r i a indicating the existence of i n s t i n c t . These 
two features of behaviour are applicable to the individual as 
well as to society at large. Apparently t h i s was the reason that 
McDougall made in s t i n c t s the basis of understanding the co n s t i t u t i o n 
of human nature and consequently society which may be likened 
to an organisation. In t h e i r nascent stages, i n s t i n c t s are easily 
modifiable, so that they are included i n what Smith (1960c) has 
called "the developmental history of the person", and, i t may 
be added, society as w e l l , so long as Smith used the expression 
w i t h i n the context of his hypothesis of social theory. Indeed, they 
are included i n what K.R.L. Hall (1963b) has called "the ontogeny 
(79) 
of social learning"; they underlie McDougall's hormic, social 
theory. 
(77) The Energies of Men, op.cit., pp.25-26. 
(78) "Social Theory and Basic Motives" Bull.Brit.Psych.Soc., op.cit., 
P.12. 
(79) "Observational Learning i n Monkeys and Apes" B r i t . J . Psych., 
vol.54, pp.201-226. 
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Criticisms, however, are often made as to how McDougall's 
i n s t i n c t would materialise m the human individual and i n society 
a l i k e . A n a m e l e s s c r i t i c , for example, remarked that "while 
giving a f u l l account of the genesis of i n s t i n c t s that act i n 
society, he hardly shows how they issue i n t o society". Such and 
more criticisms are frequently expressed, but the points to consider 
are; (1) no suggestion was made by the c r i t i c s as to any clear-cut 
alternative to the term " i n s t i n c t " against which the stand was 
taken. (11) I n most of the cr i t i c i s m s encountered, there i s an 
overlooked f a c t , namely, the i n s t i n c t i s an explanatory concept 
valuable to the dynamic hormic psychology. ( n i ) I t is sometimes 
mistakenly believed that an i n s t i n c t i s a mere class name for a 
certain type of behaviour, (IV) I n s t i n c t i s part and parcel of 
( 81} 
McDougall's hormic psychology which he wanted to be, i n Smith's 
words, "inevitably associated with any theory of events i n society". 
The cr u c i a l point appears to be as Woodworth (1965) 
has seen i t , namely, "McDougall's influence has been probably 
( 82) 
greater than he thought". Yet i t cannot be said that the hormic 
theory can be taken as an absolute substitute f o r other motivational 
(80) quoted by McDougall himself i n : The Group Mind, op.cit., p . v i n . 
(81) "Social Theory and Basic Motives" op . c i t . , p.19. 
(82) Contemporary Schools of Psychology, 9th ed., op.cit., p.350. 
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(83} theories such as those of, say, G.W. A l l p o r t and C.R.Rogers 
(born 1902) which concentrate on c u l t u r a l l y induced patterns. 
Nevertheless, the basic features of the neurological correlate 
for each i n s t i n c t , the specific q u a l i t y of the i n s t i g a t i n g s t i m u l i 
and accompanying emotion, the many ethological demonstrations of 
i n t r i c a t e patterns of behaviour which i n an impressively consistent 
way d i s t i n g u i s h one species or class from another and demonstrate 
remarkably an evolutionary continuity i n behaviour, have a l l now, 
strong empirical support. What, m 1908, was an a t t r a c t i v e and even 
to some, imaginative theory which directed the course of Psychology 
away from the narrow Wundtian laboratory studies of man, has now 
acquired the standing of a serious, defensible hypothesis. No other 
hypothesis i n the whole history of Psychology has received anything 
l i k e the same degree of empirical confirmation, and while the dangers 
of using the concept of horme as a working hypothesis have been 
stressed above, i t can be claimed that the assumption that much animal 
behaviour i s purposive has more empirical support than the hypothesis 
that i t i s not. 
(83) See for example: 
( 1 ) Rogers, C.R., "A Theory of Therapy, Personality, and 
Interpersonal Relationships, As developed i n the Client-
Centred Framework" m: Psychology; A Study of Science, ed. 
by S.Koch, vol.3, (1959), New York, McGraw-Hill, pp.184-
256. 
( n ) , On Becoming A Person: A Therapist's View of 
Psychotherapy, Boston, Houghton M u f f l i n , (1961). 
